

CHRYSIPPUS' *ON AFFECTIONS*

# PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUA

## A SERIES OF STUDIES ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

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TEUN TIELEMAN

CHRYSIPPUS' *ON AFFECTIONS*



# CHRYSIPPUS' *ON AFFECTIONS*

RECONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

BY

TEUN TIELEMAN



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## PREFACE

The writing of this book has taken me longer than I and, I fear, others had anticipated. In the process I have incurred debts of gratitude to several institutions and persons. The foundations were laid while I held a research fellowship of the Royal Dutch Academy of Arts and Sciences (1993-6) at Utrecht University. During Lent Term of the course 1993-4, I had the honour of working at the Faculty of Classics in Cambridge University. In Cambridge I enjoyed the hospitality of Professor Malcolm Schofield at St John's College. A period of teaching Classics at Lauwers College, Buitenpost (Friesland) followed, during which the work came to an almost complete halt. It was given new impetus by a sabbatical leave spent at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS) at Wassenaar, the Netherlands (2000-1). I want to record my gratitude to NIAS, the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) as well as the Board of Lauwers College for facilitating this invaluable period of reflection and writing. In the years I worked on this book I also profited from the expert assistance of Luc de Vries and Amarens Hibma in the best classical library of the Netherlands, the Buma Bibliotheek in Leeuwarden.

An embryonic version of Chapter 4 was delivered at the *IX<sup>ème</sup> Colloque Hippocratique International* (Pisa, September 1996) and subsequently published in its proceedings (= Tieleman 1999, see Bibliography). Some of my ideas on Zeno of Citium and psychological monism received a preliminary airing at the International Zeno Conference, Larnaca Cyprus 9-11 September 1998 (see Tieleman, *forthcoming* 1). An ancestor of Chapter 1 will appear in the proceedings of the *VII Jornadas Internacionales, Estudios actuales sobre textos griegos: Galeno, composición literaria y estilo* (Madrid, Octubre 1999; see Tieleman, *forthcoming* 2). In recent years I discussed other aspects of this book before audiences in Wassenaar, Leiden and Utrecht.

The past years have not always been the easiest, both privately and professionally. For the successful outcome of this project it was essential to have friends and colleagues around who kept their faith in it and actively helped create the circumstances which rendered completion possible. Among them, Jaap Mansfeld played a crucial role both

in instigating the project and in providing stimuli during its gestation. His work and personality provide a model of scholarship which I feel very privileged to have had before my eyes. I also owe warm thanks to my friend and colleague Keimpe Algra for his encouragement and help over the years. It is a real pleasure to be able to work together again at the Utrecht Department of Philosophy, to which I am proud to be affiliated.

It is difficult to do justice in a few words to everything my wife Linda Hazenkamp has done for me during these years while having a demanding job of her own and sharing with me the care of our two sons, Laurens and Sebastiaan. To them this book is dedicated with love.

Leeuwarden, 13 May 2002

## ABBREVIATIONS

- ANRW* W. Haase, H. Temporini (eds.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, Berlin 1972-
- CHHP* K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, M. Schofield (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge 1999)
- DG* H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, Berlin 1976 (=1879)
- DK* H. Diels, W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 3 vols., Berlin 1960<sup>10</sup>
- FHS&G* W.W. Fortenbaugh - P.M. Huby - R.W. Sharples - D. Gutas, *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings and Influence*, 2 vols., Leiden etc. 1992
- LS* A.A. Long & D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols., Cambridge 1987.
- LSJ* H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. Stuart Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford 1968 (=1940<sup>9</sup>)
- PHP* Galenus, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*
- RE* Pauly's Real-Encyclopädie der Altertums-Wissenschaft, herausg. von G. Wissowa, Stuttgart 1894 etc.
- SVF* J. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, 3 vols., Leipzig 1903-5; vol. 4, indexes by M. Adler, Leipzig 1924

## NOTICE TO THE READER

When quoting Greek texts, I have used, unless it is otherwise indicated, the modern standard editions: the Oxford Classical Texts (*OCT*) for Plato and Aristotle, the Loeb editions for Plutarch and Sextus Empiricus and the Berlin edition of the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* for the Greek commentators on Aristotle. For Diogenes Laertius I have used the Teubner edition by Marcovich. For other authors see the editions referred to in the Index locorum. For Galen I have used the editions available in the *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* (*CMG*). References to the *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* (*PHP*) give

book-, chapter- and paragraph-numbers in the De Lacy's edition in the *CMG* series (Berlin 1978-84). Further I have used the Teubner editions of the *Scripta Minora* by Marquardt, von Müller and Helmreich and that of the *De usu partium* by Helmreich. In all other cases the still indispensable *Opera Omnia* edition by K.G. Kühn (K.) (20 vols. Leipzig 1821-33, repr. Hildesheim 1964-5) has been used.

In general the names of ancient authors and the titles of their works are abbreviated according to *LSJ* and the Oxford Latin Dictionary. For Galen I use the abbreviations proposed by R.J. Hankinson (1991), Appendix 2 ('A guide to the editions and abbreviations of the Galenic corpus'). Most of these are self-explanatory; but if needed some assistance is given by the *Index locorum* at the end of this volume.



## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

### 1. *Chrysippus' On Affections and How Von Arnim Dealt with It*

Chrysippus of Soli (c. 280-204 BCE), the third head of the Stoa, may count as one of the greatest philosophers of Graeco-Roman antiquity. His role in the history of his school was considered pivotal. 'Without Chrysippus there would be no Stoa', it was said (D.L. 7.183). Modern studies have confirmed the ancient verdict. But his stature stands in marked contrast to the fate suffered by his voluminous writings. As the Stoic schools closed down in the course of the third century CE his works, like those of the other founding fathers of Stoicism, were no longer preserved.<sup>1</sup> Today we study their thought on the basis of quotations and reports from a diverse assortment of later authors—very meagre remains indeed, involving a complicated *Rezeptionsgeschichte*.

Among our losses is Chrysippus' *On Affections* (Περὶ παθῶν). For more than three centuries Stoics and others turned to this treatise as the classic statement of the Stoic doctrine of the affections or emotions of the soul.<sup>2</sup> Its vogue may have contributed to the relatively favourable state of our evidence. Some seventy verbatim quotations are embedded in the polemical discussion conducted by the philosopher-cum-physician Galen of Pergamon (129-c.213 CE) in books 4 and 5 of his great work *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* (which I shall refer to as *PHP* from the initial letters of its Latin title). This material can be supplemented from the discussion of the affections offered by Cicero (106-43 BCE) in books 3 and 4 of his *Tusculan Disputations*. In addition two intriguing verbatim fragments have been preserved by the Christian theologian Origen (c.185-254 CE) in his *Against Celsus* (VIII, 51). Witnesses of a less direct nature, though by no means indispensable, are Diogenes Laertius (c. 200 CE) and Stobaeus (early 5th cent CE), who present or reflect scholastic systematisations of what Chrysippus originally wrote. Further, we should note the *On Moral Virtue* by Plutarch (c.45-125 CE), who mounts a

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<sup>1</sup> This provides just one example of the loss of large parts of Hellenistic philosophical literature, see the *Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (1999) 3 ff.

<sup>2</sup> On the terminology see *infra* section 4.

well-informed polemic against Stoic psychology that can be usefully compared with Galen's *PHP*. This list may be augmented, e.g. with Calcidius' Latin commentary on the Platonic *Timaeus* (c. 350 CE) as well as other treatises by Galen.<sup>3</sup>

To the uninitiated this may seem impressive; but in fact our evidence is miserably defective. The original text of the *On Affections* encompassed four books, each of which, Galen tells us, was twice the size of a book of his *PHP*.<sup>4</sup> What Galen has preserved may (on a rough estimation) amount to no more than 20 percent of the original text. Substantial sections are completely lost. Of others we get mere glimpses. Even so, the *On Affections* has fared much better than most other Chrysippean works (which numbered more than 200, several of them quite long).<sup>5</sup> So when Hans von Arnim compiled his still standard collection of fragments of the Early Stoa, he made an exception to his thematic principle of arrangement<sup>6</sup> and brought together the material relating to *On Affections* in one separate section (*SVF* 3.456-490). The only other treatise to receive such privileged treatment was the *On the Soul* (Περὶ ψυχῆς, *SVF* 2.879-910). From this work Galen in *PHP* bks. 2 and 3 furnishes so many verbatim quotations that Von Arnim felt able to reconstruct the almost continuous text of the part thus preserved, viz. most of the second half of the first book (out of two), where Chrysippus demonstrated that the intellect resides in the heart (*SVF* 2.911).<sup>7</sup>

Continuous reconstruction of one or more extensive sections of the *On Affections* is impossible because of the way the original text has

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<sup>3</sup> For an overview see Index. Insofar as this book involves the procedure of sifting and inventorizing the evidence for the *On Affections* I would like to refer the reader to the new edition of Stoic fragments that is in *statu nascendi* in Utrecht. It will include a fresh presentation of the evidence for this treatise in the light of the results obtained by the research of which this book is the written record.

<sup>4</sup> *PHP* 5.6.45, p.336 De Lacy.

<sup>5</sup> For the evidence and further details see my article on Chrysippus in D.J. Zeyl (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy* (Westport CT 1997).

<sup>6</sup> This is loosely based on original Stoic divisions of philosophical topics. In view of Chrysippus' supposed influence Von Arnim printed explicitly attested Chrysippean material together with texts taken to report 'general Stoic doctrine'. In compensation he provided an *Appendix* listing sets of verbatim fragments from named treatises by Chrysippus (*SVF* 3, pp.194-205). A glance at this appendix reveals how widely many of these fragments have come apart in the present collection. In fact, their diversity as to philosophical content was one of the reasons why Von Arnim opted for a thematic arrangement; see his observations in his *RE*-article 'Chrysippos' (nr. 14), vol. III (1899) col. 2505.

<sup>7</sup> These fragments and Galen's treatment are the subject of an earlier study, Tieleman (1996a), on which see further *infra*, section 3.

been excerpted and presented by Galen and our other sources. Still, the sheer amount of textual evidence justifies Von Arnim's decision to devote a separate section of his fragment-collection to this particular treatise. However, the course taken by Stoic studies since the appearance of his *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (1903-5) seems to have proved him wrong. No separate study has so far been dedicated to the treatise. Historians of Stoicism have been quick to conclude that its remains (like those of other Chrysippean treatises) provide too meagre a basis for the reconstruction of his doctrines, let alone for the study of methodological, literary or other aspects of his argument. Von Arnim may not have been over-optimistic in conceiving the idea of a separate section for the *On Affections*. But the way he actually handled the material also contributed to the subsequent neglect of the treatise. He included several relevant testimonies from Cicero in thematic sections elsewhere in *SVF*, thus making the body of evidence look smaller than it is.

Following Von Arnim's lead, students of Stoicism have on the whole adopted a thematic approach with only a few exceptions of little import.<sup>8</sup> The direct quotations to be found in Galen, Plutarch and other authors are treated not as a privileged source of information but as just one among several—a practice reflecting the jumble of sources characteristic of Von Arnim's mode of presentation.<sup>9</sup> In this respect his collection is certainly open to criticism. Most of his chapters open with derivative reports, with precious *ipsissima verba* of Chrysippus tucked away amid later inferior material—a mode of presentation calculated to promote a distorted picture of the relative value of the sources involved. In partial apology it must be said that the *S.V.F.* necessarily mirrors the state of knowledge of Stoicism at the time of its publication (1903-5). Since then there have been considerable advances in research which (it is only fair to say) were certainly facilitated and stimulated by Von Arnim's collection. And it

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<sup>8</sup> Bréhier (1951) ch. II presents brief surveys of the contents of a number of Chrysippean treatises, including *On Affections*, and so does Steinmetz (1994) 586 ff. On Fillion-Lahille (1984), see *infra*, pp. 6 f. Much earlier Alfred Gercke (1885) assembled and discussed fragments from *On Providence* and *On Fate*. In his preface, though, he criticized Von Arnim's predecessor, F. Baguet, *De Chrysippi vita, doctrina et reliquis commentatio* (Louvain 1822) for having assigned fragments to individual treatises on the basis of doctrinal content alone: Gercke (1885) 691. On the handful of studies devoted to individual treatises cf. also the bibliography in Flashar (1994) 619 f.

<sup>9</sup> See *supra*, n. 6

is only in the past three or four decades that the study of early Stoicism gained real momentum in the context of the general upsurge of interest in Hellenistic philosophy.

The verbatim fragments have suffered a comparative neglect. There are good methodological reasons to redress the balance in favour of this category of textual evidence wherever this seems feasible. I have studied the rich evidence for the *On the Soul* in an earlier monograph (1996), more on which see below (section 3). The present study aims to do the same for the *On Affections*.

## 2. *Aims and Methods. Other Studies*

In this book the comparatively rich material from and relating to the *On Affections* will be subjected to a closer scrutiny than has so far been undertaken. This should lead to answers on the following questions: Just how far can the treatise be reconstructed? What does such an inquiry add to our knowledge of the theory of emotion proposed by Chrysippus? What does it tell us about his relation to his predecessors? And about his influence on later developments? In addition, the textual evidence may even permit us to study his philosophical method. How did he develop his position with an eye on the philosophical competition of his day?

In studying these aspects, we may achieve a fuller understanding of the Stoic philosophy of emotion and its therapeutic treatment. It is well known that Chrysippus took the bold step of identifying emotions with judgements, i.e. mistaken judgements on the value of things. Accordingly he saw emotions as the disturbances of a wholly rational intellect. Scholars often characterize this conception of the intellect as ‘monistic’ (a modern coinage) as opposed to Platonism-Aristotelian dualism with its distinction between rational and non-rational functions. This opposition seems clear enough; yet it leaves open important questions about the precise nature of—and rationale behind—the Stoic innovation. It is often insufficiently realized that the monism/dualism polarity is taken from two of our main sources—Galen and Plutarch—who are not historians (or at least not in our sense) but engaged in a trenchant anti-Stoic polemic governed by rules and conventions radically different from ours.

Students of ancient philosophy are becoming increasingly—though slowly—sensitive to the methodological issues involved in

collecting and studying philosophical fragments.<sup>10</sup> Our existing collections, however convenient and indeed indispensable, present material from sources which differ widely in date, literary genre, philosophical or religious affiliation, intelligence, reliability and so on. There is an obvious tension lurking here. Whereas so-called fragments are brought together under the heading of one particular doctrine, they often serve quite different purposes in the original expositions from which they have been culled. None of the ancient sources was in the business of historiography in its present-day sense. In consequence, we have to take their specific aims and purposes into account in order to assess the nature and reliability of their reports and even quotations. In sum, the context of the so-called fragments comes into play.

By 'context' I do not merely mean the immediate context, i.e. the kind of formulas sandwiching quotations in sources like Galen and Plutarch which even scissors-happy Von Arnim includes. Context should also be taken in a wider sense, i.e. the complete treatise that is used as a source or perhaps even the complete *oeuvre* of the author concerned. Thus we may acquaint ourselves with the habits of mind of these sources and the peculiarities of the literary and philosophical traditions whose stamp they bear.<sup>11</sup> Clearly fragment-collections can be of little use here. But then they need not be. Their function is to provide a sort of data-base, i.e. an overview of the relevant texts and sources. We should just use them in full awareness of the issues involved in working with ancient sources. Collections such as Von Arnim's *SVF* or Edelstein-Kidd's Posidonius (to take an arbitrary sample) are the materializations of a host of decisions and preferences—some of which might be idiosyncratic or ephemeral—with regard to the nature and reliability of the sources involved. These collections often become authoritative—which may be good—or indeed achieve canonical status—which is decidedly dubious. The *SVF* provides a fine example, as does Diels' *Vorsokratiker*. Both collections are often used as if they constitute the definitive body of evidence. This tendency towards canonization should be resisted, however. Fragment-collections should signal and guide us toward

<sup>10</sup> Cf. e.g. the studies assembled by Most (1997), Burkert *et al.* (1998).

<sup>11</sup> I here subscribe to a principle underlying much of the work of J. Mansfeld and D.T. Runia; cf. Schofield, *Phronesis* 36.2 (1991) 235-9. Kidd (1998) too makes valuable observations—supported by examples—on how to study the Stoic material offered by Plutarch, arguing that one should acquaint oneself with his habits of mind by reading his vast *oeuvre* as a whole (esp. 288 f.).

the sources instead of providing a justification for leaving them unopened.

But if our purpose is to reconstruct the *On Affections* by tracing and analyzing relevant sources, an obvious query arises. Does not this project involve a return to something awful called *Quellenforschung*, or source-criticism? The 19th and early 20th century variety of this method earned itself a reputation for barren speculation and circular reasoning (things cannot have been all that bad: it is precisely to this phase of classical scholarship that we owe some of the fragment-collections still in unquestioned use).<sup>12</sup> But, I would like to counter, it remains legitimate and feasible to operate with the concept of source or the more flexible one of tradition provided we steer clear of the pitfalls of *Quellenforschung* in the antiquated mode.<sup>13</sup> Some of its presuppositions have now been removed or modified. We no longer treat authors such as Plutarch and Cicero as mere mouth-pieces for one or more lost models that are standardly taken as more important from a philosophical point of view. We make full allowance for their independence in the light of their theories and practices as philosophical authors. Obviously this renders the question of the influences inspiring them more complicated. Some consolation may be derived from the recognition that the results produced by a more sophisticated and up-to-date approach rest on a firmer basis than those produced by the cruder type of source-hunting. The question will come to the fore especially in connection with Cicero who apparently did not draw directly on Chrysippus' treatise but seems to have used an intermediary source. Galen could and did use the *On Affections* directly. In his case pressing questions arise as to the tradition, or traditions, on which he depends in handling his Chrysippean material.

Surprisingly little work has been done on our sources for Chrysippus' treatise—despite the increasing appraisal of contextual factors we have just noted. Take our main source—Galen in *PHP* 4-5. Fillion-

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<sup>12</sup> For a recent account of *Quellenforschung* including its strengths and limitations, see Mansfeld (1998).

<sup>13</sup> Sallmann (1971) 1 ff., 31 ff., 165 ff. makes several excellent observations on *Quellenforschung* and how an enlightened form of it should be practised today. The responsible source critic does not operate on the basis of preconceived ideas about the lost source so as to avoid circular reasoning. Instead he starts from (1) the literary purpose of the author of the extant work; (2) his working method; (3) his relation to his source; (4) his conception of his subject-matter. All these aspects are adverted to in the course of this book.

Lahille (1984) has made some way towards a reconstruction of Chrysippus' treatise through a comparison between Galen and Cicero. She includes some Ciceronian material unjustifiably omitted by Von Arnim. However, she is concerned with the *On Affections* (as well as Chrysippus' *On the Soul* and Posidonius' *On Affections*) primarily as source for Seneca's *On Anger*, which constitutes her main subject. In consequence, the material is presented but not studied in a systematic manner involving Galen's aims and methods.<sup>14</sup> None the less, Fillion-Lahille makes some useful observations on Galen as a source author and she is rightly suspicious of his story of a dramatic controversy between Chrysippus and Posidonius. Yet I have to disagree with some of her solutions as to the reconstruction of the *On Affections* and shall indicate the points at issue as the occasion arises.

Other scholars too have grown suspicious of Galen's claims. Thus Gill (1998) argues that Galen takes a rather one-sided view of Platonic psychology, involving clearly demarcated psychic functions, which may or may not co-operate. In the latter case an outburst of emotion ensues. However, Galen seems less sensitive to other features of Plato's theory on the emotions. Plato increasingly stressed their cognitive nature as well as the interaction between the soul-parts rather than their separation. In fact, Gill suggests, Plato's tendency to conceive of the psychic functions in terms of (often competing) sets of beliefs is far more similar to, and presumably influenced, Chrysippus' view of emotion (viz. as a kind of psychological division).<sup>15</sup> Galen suppresses this similarity because of the obvious fact that he is concerned to play off Plato against Chrysippus. Clearly this reading would also put a different complexion on Posidonius' role. Insofar as he is drawing on Plato, he is merely following Chrysippus' lead.

Gill provides stimulating and often plausible suggestions, but, as he himself acknowledges, one would like to have firmer ground for them, especially where Chrysippus' supposed readings of Plato are concerned.<sup>16</sup> We need not doubt that Chrysippus knew and used the relevant Platonic works but the precise ways in which he did are more difficult to establish.<sup>17</sup> Gill undertakes to study the relations between

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<sup>14</sup> The same holds for Graver (2002) 203 ff., who also notes the correspondence between Cicero's account and the Chrysippean fragments presented by Galen (though without reference to Fillion-Lahille).

<sup>15</sup> See esp. Gill (1998) 114 f.

<sup>16</sup> See esp. Gill (1998) 135.

<sup>17</sup> Gill (1998) esp. 135 ff. suggests that Chrysippus did not explicitly criticize Plato (a fact about which Galen complains) because of his dependence on Plato.

the theories of Galen, Chrysippus, Posidonius and Plato within the compass of a single article. So, naturally enough, he covers only part of the relevant evidence. What we need is a more comprehensive scrutiny of the relevant texts. In particular, we should study Chrysippus' position both in its *complete* Galenic context and in relation to its own contemporary backdrop. In so doing I hope to show that we should compare Chrysippus not only with Plato but also with Aristotle and medical literature.

In the relevant chapters of his grand monograph on the emotions, Sorabji (2000) takes account of Galen's mode of presentation, though not undertaking a systematic treatment of this aspect either.<sup>18</sup> Overall, he leans heavily on Seneca's *On Anger*, arguing that this author reconciles the differences that existed between Zeno, Chrysippus and Posidonius—according to Galen. For reasons to be argued in the main body of this book I shall disagree with Sorabji on the positions of each of these Stoics. Unlike him, I do not accept Galen's claim that there was an important difference between Chrysippus on the one hand and Zeno and Posidonius on the other. Accordingly I take a different view of Seneca's role as well.

The Stoic philosopher Posidonius (c. 135-c.51 BCE) is also a source for Chrysippus' treatise, albeit one in a special sense. In his own *On Affections* Posidonius responded to Chrysippus and in doing so quoted from the latter's work. Galen in his turn used Posidonius against Chrysippus, claiming that Posidonius had criticized and abandoned Chrysippus' unitarian conception of the soul in favour of the older Platonic tripartition. Galen backs up this claim with paraphrases and direct quotations from Posidonius. Some of these quotations contain Chrysippean material as used by Posidonius. So what we have here is Chrysippus in Posidonius in Galen. Clearly we need some certainty as to Posidonius' real motivation in citing Chrysippus. Is Galen right in presenting Posidonius as a full-blooded dissident? It is a moot question whether and how far this was the case and (which is another question) what Posidonius himself thought he was doing. The most

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But this (not complete) lack of explicitness can be explained by reference to Chrysippus' concept and use of dialectic, see Tieleman (1996a) 265. Apart from that, Chrysippus did argue against the Platonic tripartition, as is witnessed by his *On the Soul*, on which see further *infra*, pp. 12 ff. On Gill's view Chrysippus even drew inspiration from Plato's account of the tripartition-cum-trilocation of the soul as expounded in the *Timaeus*, see also Gill (1997)

<sup>18</sup> Ch. 6 does focus on Galen's report, albeit in connection with Posidonius' position only.



authoritative collection of Posidonian fragments—that of Edelstein and Kidd (1972)—goes along with Galen in this respect, including generous chunks of trenchant polemic as based on Posidonius' critique of Chrysippean psychology—so much so that considerable parts of *PHP* 4-5 would have to be read as paraphrases of this critique. In consequence, we cannot dodge the question of Posidonius' role.

Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* books 3 and 4 does not provide verbatim quotations but a comparison with Galen shows that several passages in these books reflect, in one way or another, Chrysippus' original text. One extended section, *Tusc.* 4.11-33, seems particularly close to the Chrysippean original (though, as we have seen, there is room for doubt whether Cicero ever saw the original text himself). Cicero's testimony is all the more useful for our purposes since he is free of the polemical concerns that inform Galen's presentation of the evidence. Though not a Stoic himself Cicero expresses a predilection for the Chrysippean theory of emotion (4.10-11). To be sure, he does not surrender himself to Chrysippus. But his selections and emphases may be expected to differ from Galen's in ways that enable us to supplement and check the latter's assertions. Since Von Arnim and his generation there have been marked advances in our knowledge of Cicero's outlook and procedures. It was an article by Boyancé (1936) which marked the end of old-fashioned *Quellenforschung* as applied to Cicero.<sup>19</sup> However, subsequent study of Cicero as a philosopher in his own right has concentrated on other works and other books of the *Tusculans*. For the third and fourth books of this treatise we still have to turn to studies as old as Pohlenz (1906) and Philippson (1932), whose main occupation was to combat even more enthusiastic source-hunters. The lack of recent work stands in awkward contrast to Cicero's importance both as a source and a philosopher in his own right.<sup>20</sup> What we need are more studies concentrating on the interaction between this author and his Stoic material, just as in Galen's case. Although I set out to concentrate on Galen and in

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<sup>19</sup> Boyancé was by no means the first to criticize the excesses of traditional *Quellenforschung*. The criticism levelled at so-called Pan-Posidonianism by such scholars as J.F. Dobson, R.M. Jones and L. Edelstein around the same time also heralded a new era.

<sup>20</sup> Graver (2002) provides a new translation of the two books with a commentary and appendixes dealing with the sources for Cicero's account including Chrysippus and Posidonius. The main concentration of this book, however, is on the translation. The concise discussion of possible sources necessarily remains at the surface of the questions to be solved. Obviously, Graver is more concerned with Cicero's aims and methods than with reconstructing Chrysippus' *On Affections*.

the present book still do, I could not but engage more fully with Cicero than I had initially anticipated. I hope to have done just enough to be able to present a few responsible conclusions about how to assess the evidence provided by Cicero in relation to Galen.

There is no shortage of historical studies concerned with emotion—a situation which reflects the lasting fascination exerted by this subject on philosophers and psychologists alike. Nor has the Stoic theory gone unnoticed. My justification for adding a monograph will have emerged from the preceding pages. It is largely methodological: not only does this book deal with astonishingly underused material but it also takes an approach that differs from that taken by other studies but that is needed for a fuller understanding of what Chrysippus and other Stoics originally meant to argue. Because this is a project of historical reconstruction, I have kept references to emotion theories by contemporary philosophers to the barest minimum—whatever general inspiration I may have drawn from them while working on the intricacies of ancient texts.<sup>21</sup> One should not try to do too many different things within the compass of a single book. My purpose is the more down-to-earth one of providing a firmer foundation for conclusions on the Stoic theory and its historical development. In this respect it can be seen as preliminary to any comparison between this theory and current ideas and debates.

The structure of the present study reflects my purpose of undertaking a systematic and contextual approach to the material from the *On Affections*, ‘contextual’ being taken in both the wider and narrower sense I have explained above. I shall take my point of departure from the aims and method determining Galen’s overall argument in *PHP* books 4–5 (chapters 1 and 2). In the light of this discussion I shall take a closer look at the material deriving from the *On Affections* in its more immediate Galenic context. Here both lesser sources for *On Affections* (such as Origen) and Stoic texts will be called upon to elucidate Chrysippus’ meaning (chapters 3 and 4). Next I shall address Posidonius’ presence in *PHP* 4–5 (chapter 5). The final chapter is concerned with Cicero, for the reasons and with the disclaimers I have just expressed (chapter 6). I shall conclude with an Epilogue in which I assemble the conclusions from the individual chapters,

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<sup>21</sup> The concern with contemporary topics is more prominent in Sorabji (2000). Nussbaum (1994) too is strongly motivated by the relevance of Hellenistic philosophical therapy for us here and now.

drawing an overall picture of the position of Chrysippus and the other Stoics concerned.

This book takes the form of an extensive argument in support of a few related theses. For the convenience of the reader I had better lay my cards on the table before embarking on it. I shall argue that Galen misrepresents the relations between the philosophers whom he discusses in important respects. Moreover, his main points of criticism against Chrysippus involve gross distortions of the latter's position. Exactly how and to what extent this is the case can only be established by taking full account of the aims and methods of Galen as a philosophical author and polemicist of the second century CE. The picture that emerges from this inquiry is one of basic harmony from Zeno up to and including Posidonius. This continuity contrasts sharply with Galen's theme of disagreement. In fact, it also corrects our own expectation that shifts and divergences will have occurred in the course of time—developments important enough to justify periodisations such as the distinction between Early and Middle Stoicism. In reality the Stoics remained within the basic framework left by their founder, Zeno, each of them contributing to the mainstream Stoic position. Of special importance was Chrysippus, who grafted his conception of affection firmly on to his causal theory. There is an important physical basis underlying his theory, which has been largely suppressed by Galen (at least in *PHP* 4-5) as well as by Cicero. Yet it remains possible to clarify this aspect by means of the evidence supplied by these sources *malgré eux* and by taking account of the medical backdrop to the Chrysippean theory.

Posidonius was not the dissident portrayed by Galen. Posidonius' reference to Plato in his discussion of the 'ancient account' (ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος) should not be taken to imply that he repudiated Chrysippean monism in favour of the Platonic tripartition. Rather he appropriated Plato and others as forerunners of the mainstream Stoic position. But his role was not very significant from a philosophical point of view. He merely contributed a few doctrinal refinements and technical terms. From a historiographical perspective, however, the extensive use made by Galen of Posidonius' treatise is quite valuable. The evidence thus transmitted sheds welcome light on some of the distinctive features and motives of the Stoic 'monistic' position. Thus, Cleanthes' versified dialogue between Reason and Anger as quoted by Posidonius attests to the way the Stoics responded to the faculty approach to the soul of their adversaries.

### 3. *Chrysippus' On the Soul: Looking Back on an Earlier Study*

This volume is designed as a sequel to my *Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul. Argument and Refutation in the De Placitis Books II-III* (1996). In what follows I will summarize the main conclusions of this earlier monograph because they help explain some of the questions raised here as well as my method of dealing with them. But the results presented in 1996 are not used in such a way as to make the argument of this volume vitally dependent upon them.

In the first three books of *PHP* (of which the first is largely lost) Galen defends his scientifically updated version of the Platonic (and, he claims, Hippocratic) trilocation of the soul: reason in the brain, anger in the heart and desire in the liver. His opponents are the Peripatetics and most Stoics, who assign all these functions to the heart. As in the later books, a distinctive feature of Galen's treatment is his insertion in his argument of substantial quotations from the principal authorities of these schools—Aristotle and Chrysippus. Thus, as we have noticed in section 1, he pillages the relevant part of the latter's *On the Soul*. These quotations serve as proof-texts substantiating Galen's criticisms of the Stoic (and Aristotelian) position and the arguments supporting it. His treatment is not exclusively or even primarily polemical, however. Galen presses Chrysippus' words into the service of a dialectical procedure aimed at arriving at positive results. Thus he also drums up scientific procedures such as dissection and vivisection experiments.<sup>22</sup> By these means he succeeds in showing the structure and workings of the nervous system including the central role played by the brain. Other arguments which appeal to the automatism of the heart-beat or physical effects related to emotions such as fear and erotic desire (which had also been adduced by Chrysippus) are taken to point to the location of the Platonic spirited part in the heart. I also made a foray into *PHP* book 6, which belongs with this argument. Here Galen advances anatomical insights to demonstrate that the liver is the seat of the principle of growth and nourishment and hence of the Platonic third part of the soul, i.e. appetite. This completes his vindication of the tripartition-cum-trilocation of the soul.

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<sup>22</sup> In Tieleman (1996a) I showed how the experiments fit into the whole of Galen's demonstration. For a discussion that focuses on these epochal experiments themselves see Tieleman (2002).

Galen's project involves a massive effort of reinterpretation of the original positions of Plato and Hippocrates. Plato did not assign appetite to the liver. More problematically still, 'Hippocrates' did not anticipate the Platonic tripartition-cum-trilocation of the soul. Yet this is what Galen sets out to show, corroborating his claims by means of quotations, just as he did in regard to opponents such as Chrysippus. But this time we are in a position to check Galen's quotations and claims against the extant works of the authorities concerned. Galen's method in *PHP* 1-2, it has turned out, involves a large degree of distortion of what his predecessors had said. Their words are mercilessly exploited in support of preconceived theses and options.

Obviously Galen in *PHP* 1-3 and 6 expounds a coherent and powerful demonstration based on philosophy and empirical science. But where does this leave Chrysippus? Why did he choose to ignore the discovery of the nervous system by the great Alexandrian scientists Herophilus and Erasistratus (first half of the third cent. BCE)? And what about his naive (or so it seems) appeal to common parlance, popular notions and the poets? Judging from Galen's account this type of argument must have taken up the major part of Chrysippus' argument. Our jubilation on the large quantity of preserved text is immediately dampened by our disappointment at the apparent ineptitude of Chrysippus' procedure.

An assessment based upon uncritical acceptance of Galen's argument is hard to square with Chrysippus' reputed acumen. Indeed, the above picture is superficial and anachronistic. In order to explain how and why this is so, I took a contextual approach akin to the one pursued in the present study. I found that Galen follows a traditional procedure of definition-cum-diaeresis as it had taken shape in contemporary Platonism (so-called 'Middle Platonism'). His version of this procedure is further enriched by techniques belonging to the exegetical tradition concerned with the Aristotelian *Topics*. These historical affiliations could be established through a comparison of his theoretical passages and actual procedure with a wide range of sources including Cicero, Alcinous, Clement and Boethius. One of the most salient features of Galen's method is a sharp differentiation between real attributes of the thing under examination (such as the heart or the brain) and the beliefs of experts (philosophers, scientists and even poets) as well as people in general, i.e. the whole range of what Aristotle had referred to as *endoxa* (ἐνδοξά), i.e. received or

reputable opinions that are suited as the starting points for dialectical disputation. Galen, however, declares this type of experience to be rhetorical and foreign to scientific and dialectical procedure. This position motivates his dismissal of large parts of Chrysippus' argument as belonging to this category. This is to ignore the fact that Chrysippus took references to common notions and popular parlance as his *point of departure* and to attack them as if they represented the definitive conclusions of Chrysippus' argument. But in fact, they constituted the raw conceptual material from which the great scholar developed proofs of a more technical kind, including scientific insights. If one takes due account of the level and spread of anatomical knowledge at the time, Chrysippus' procedure appears in a completely different light.

I proposed a reconstruction of Chrysippus' argument which differs in certain respects from that offered by Von Arnim. It shows Chrysippus developing a few arguments in a sequence of fields of reference marked by an increasing level of conceptual articulation: common experience, poetical statements, science and philosophy. The integrative concept of the whole procedure is that of the plausible or persuasive (τὸ πιθανόν). Its role in Hellenistic dialectic emerges from a comparison between Chrysippus and Carneades. Here, then, the recovery of the original context does much to explain Chrysippus' procedure, for instance his sophisticated and powerful attack on the Platonic separation of psychic parts.

Behind Galen's misrepresentations lies not so much a blatant lack of professional morality but a set of entirely different conventions of dealing with other people's words in written philosophical disputation. A central role is played by the schema of options. Authorities and their pronouncements (i.e. the quotes) are so to speak plugged into the pre-existing schema. We for our part would use and expect of others the reverse procedure: first study the literature and next condense your findings into a schema. Thus Galen's procedure cuts across our own habits and expectations. If we are not sensitive to this fact we run a serious risk of being fooled into believing what he tells us about these verbatim fragments which he has so kindly preserved.

4. *Pathos: A Terminological Note*<sup>23</sup>

At least since the days of Plato and Aristotle the term *πάθος* could indicate emotion as a generic concept covering common mental phenomena such as anger, fear, distress, joy and the like.<sup>24</sup> It is clearly what Chrysippus is talking about. 'Emotion' is therefore used by Sorabji.<sup>25</sup> On the other hand the rendering 'passion' is more firmly entrenched in the Western philosophical tradition. It is used by experts on Stoicism such as Inwood (1985) and Long-Sedley (1987). In present-day English, however, this term usually bears the specific sense of very strong emotion, in particular (sexual) desire. As a very strong feeling about something, it might seem particularly appropriate to the Stoic ideal of the extirpation of all *παθή* on the supposition that the Stoics cannot have meant to eradicate all feelings. As an interpretation of the doctrine concerned, this is contentious. The protracted controversy between the Stoics and their Peripatetic opponents (who advocated moderation of emotion) would boil down to a question of terminology.<sup>26</sup> So if 'passion' is adopted as a translation, no such connotation should be taken for granted.

'Passion' is derived from Latin *passio*, which, like the Greek *πάθος*, connotes passivity.<sup>27</sup> Yet the modern term retains this connotation only for those who are sensitive to its etymology. Nussbaum uses 'suffering' (though with special reference to Epicurus)<sup>28</sup>. But this is to overemphasize the element of passivity to the exclusion of others. To limit ourselves to the Stoics, it would obfuscate the active aspect involved in the technical Stoic definition of *πάθος*, viz. as a particular kind of conation, or impulse (*ὁρμή*). Moreover, the Stoics class *πάθος* as morally wrong. It should however be said that with reference to

<sup>23</sup> On the translation of *πάθος* see also Inwood (1985) 127 ff., Vegetti (1995), Nussbaum (1994) 13, 102, 319 n.4.

<sup>24</sup> See Pl. *Phaedr.* 265b, *Tim.* 86b; Arist. *EN* B.5. 1105b21-23, *De an.* A.1. 403a2-18, *Rh.* 1418a12, *Pol.* 1287b; cf. also Democr. B 31 DK.

<sup>25</sup> See esp. Sorabji (2000) 7, 17; likewise, though with some hesitation, Annas (1992) 103 f., 114 n.77.

<sup>26</sup> On this question see Frede (1986) 84; Dillon (1983); Sorabji (2000) 206 ff.

<sup>27</sup> For this reason by Aquinas preferred 'passion' (i.e. Latin *passio*), see *ST* IaIIae.22.2. It should be noted that Aquinas' view of passion (or emotion) as a passive potency is modelled on Aristotle's account of thought rather than that of emotion. In fact Aristotle, like the Stoics, recognized both active and passive aspects of emotion, see *De an.* A 1: 403a5-8.

<sup>28</sup> Nussbaum (1994) 13, 102.

Stoicism Nussbaum uses, more or less interchangeably, ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’.<sup>29</sup>

The rendering ‘affection’—preferred by Frede (1986) and others—may not be so fashionable as ‘emotion’ but this can be turned into an advantage. It preserves the aspect of passivity. But it also does justice to that other common meaning of the Greek word πάθος, viz. disease or illness.<sup>30</sup> As will transpire in the course of my argument, it is this sense that conditions Chrysippus’ argument in important ways, as when he exploits it in drawing his detailed analogy between philosophy and medicine (ch. 4). So with some hesitation and with the other possible renderings in mind, I shall mostly use ‘affection’ as perhaps best suited to preserve the different shades of meaning of πάθος in its Stoic usage.

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<sup>29</sup> Cf. Nussbaum (1994) p.319 n.4.

<sup>30</sup> On this sense cf. Pl. *Ti.* 86b and the translator’s note issued by Cic. *Tusc.* 4.5, who himself prefers ‘disturbance’ (*perturbatio*) to ‘disease’ (*morbus*); cf. also *ibid.* 3.7, *Fin.* 3.35. See further, with special reference to the *Corpus Hippocraticum*, Vegetti (1995).



## CHAPTER ONE

### GALEN, *PHP* 4-5: AIMS AND METHODS

#### 1. *Preamble*

Galen's insistence on empirical verifiability made him disinclined to pronounce on a number of issues which divided the philosophical schools of antiquity.<sup>1</sup> Until not quite so long ago, this attitude legitimated his exclusion from the pantheon of philosophy. Historians of ancient philosophy read him mainly as a source for the doctrines of other philosophers he happens to speak about. Meanwhile notions of what philosophy is, or should be, have shifted, trailing along our perspective on our philosophical pedigree. Today, ironically, it is precisely Galen's scientific concerns which boost his appeal for historians of philosophy. It has become possible to welcome him as a exception to the metaphysicists crowding the philosophical scene of his day. This re-appraisal is to be applauded, not least because he was taken seriously as a philosopher in his own day and beyond. In fact, our earliest extant testimonies—a mere handful—concern his influence in regard to philosophical not medical matters.<sup>2</sup>

A fuller understanding of Galen's position, his purposes, habits of mind, priorities and blind spots helps to explain his response to Chrysippus and the other philosophers whom he quotes or refers to. On this assumption I shall undertake to present in the following pages an account of his argument in *PHP* books 4 and 5. Obviously enough, there are several ways of discussing the ideas and arguments of Galen (or any other philosopher). One could, for instance, analyse the logical structure of his arguments more or less in isolation. This is not the line taken here. I shall attempt to study Galen as much as possible against the backdrop of his philosophical, medical and

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<sup>1</sup> On this peculiarity of Galen's brand of philosophical eclecticism, see the pioneering study by Frede (1981). These speculative questions include that of the substance of the soul and the nature of God.

<sup>2</sup> See the testimonies adduced and discussed by Nutton (1984) 316 ff. Cf. also Temkin (1973) 51 ff., Frede (1981) 66.

literary environment. The motivation behind this strategy is simple but, I believe, appropriate and rewarding. When we identify the various literary and philosophical influences present in Galen's argument, we put ourselves in a better position also to isolate what is peculiar to him. So to which traditions was he indebted? What does this mean for his representation of the positions of Stoics such as Chrysippus and Posidonius? Or those ascribed by him to Plato and Aristotle? I hope to show that we would grossly oversimplify the actual situation if we were to picture Galen as conversing directly with a few past masters—however hard he himself may try to have it seem that way. To be sure, he had read several of their original works. But one should never underestimate the role of traditional ways of reading classical authors which had developed in the schools in the course of centuries and which may help explain certain peculiarities of exegesis. One first came to such an author under the guidance of a teacher and with prior knowledge of their thought derived from traditional handbooks and compilations—a fact of life (in Dillon's apt words) which is often overlooked.<sup>3</sup>

The universality of Galen's interests and competence is well known. In practical terms, it means that we have to take account of a variety of literary and intellectual traditions as possible influences on his work. In the following section I shall explore several of them in the hope of doing justice to those viewpoints that seem relevant to his treatment of the Stoics. I shall first set Galen's subject-matter in its historical context, starting from the way he himself has defined and ordered the questions he tackles (§ 2). In addition, it is worth studying the way in which Galen presents the options at issue in the debate (§ 3). As an extension of this aspect, I shall continue to discuss relevant ideas on authority, tradition and truth (§ 4). Next, I will move on to some aspects of a more technical and practical nature: the procedures current in the commentary tradition and Galen's own relation to this tradition (§ 5) as well as the working method of ancient authors like Galen, notably the technique of excerpting (§ 6). Finally I shall present a few general observations about the relevance to *PHP* 4-5 of the genres and techniques surveyed in the main body of this chapter (§ 7).

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<sup>3</sup> Dillon (1977) xv.

## 2. Theme

*PHP* books 1-6 were the fruit of Galen's tumultuous first stay in Rome (162-166 CE).<sup>4</sup> His concern with philosophical issues in these books suited the campaign of self-advertisement he had mounted. Competence as a philosopher would enhance his standing as a doctor. On another, less mundane level, he was keen to demonstrate the relevance of medical theorems to questions that had traditionally divided the philosophers. Thus the anatomical experiments reported in books 1-3 are designed as a contribution to the long-standing debate conducted by philosophers over the seat of the intellect and everything implicated by it.<sup>5</sup> But there is more to Galen's blend of philosophy and medicine than the opportunity for occasional cross-fertilisation, however topical or important the issues concerned. There is a distinctly programmatic side to *PHP* insofar as it promulgates a unitary project of sound medicine-cum-philosophy, with Plato and Hippocrates as its fountain-heads.<sup>6</sup> Medicine is so redefined by Galen as to absorb those traditional parts of philosophy which he takes as useful for scientific and moral progress.<sup>7</sup> This includes ethics and what we might call moral psychology. To this last field belong *PHP* 4 and 5, dealing with the affections of the soul.<sup>8</sup> Of the nine books of the work these are perhaps the least medical in its conventional sense.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Books 7-9 were completed after 176 CE. See Ilberg (1889) esp. 217 f. 228 f., De Lacy (1978) 46-8.

<sup>5</sup> On the significance of these experiments cf. Lloyd (1979) 167; Mansfeld (1991) 128, 131; Tieleman (2002). On Galen's public performances of these and other experiments see Debru (1995); cf. also Von Staden (1995a).

<sup>6</sup> Of course philosophy and medicine had always to some extent overlapped, as is witnessed, among others, by Plato in his *Timaeus*; see further *infra*, p. 39 n. 77.

<sup>7</sup> See in particular his manifesto *That the Best Doctor Is Also a Philosopher*, I 53-63 K. (= *SM* II, pp.1-8 Müller), in which he argues that the ideal doctor has a thorough command of the three traditional parts of philosophy (logic, physics, ethics). On Galen's view of the nature and mission of medicine see further Isnardi Parente (1961); Vegetti (1981), (1986).

<sup>8</sup> Many treatises on moral philosophy listed at *Libr. prop.* c.12, XIX pp. 45 f. K. (*SM* II pp.121-122 Müller). Most relevant to the subject-matter of *PHP* 4 and 5 are the twin essays *Aff. Dign.* and *Pecc. Dign.* (V 1-57; 58-103 K., *CMGV* 4,1,1 De Boer) as well as the *On Moral Dispositions* (Περὶ ἠθῶν, four books), extant in an Arabic epitome only (transl. by Mattock 1972); cf. Walzer (1962).

<sup>9</sup> But cf. 5.2.10, where Galen draws on his medical expertise in order to correct Chrysippus and even Posidonius on their use of the metaphor of disease to explain psychic affections.

Which questions can the reader expect Galen to tackle? The central issue can be summarized as follows: Do affections causally involve one or more non-rational functions? Or are affections purely cognitive, being perverted states of the wholly rational intellect? The field was dominated by the opposition between the Platonic-cum-Aristotelian tradition, which postulated non-rational faculties alongside reason, on the one hand, and Stoicism, which denied the presence of such faculties in the human intellect, on the other. This was the traditional issue the number of the faculties of the soul. It features in doxographic compilations such as the Aëtian *Placita*, IV 4 (§ 5 is concerned with the related issue of the seat of the mind discussed in *PHP* 1-3 and 6)<sup>10</sup> as well as the *De anima* literature.<sup>11</sup> Separate tracts were devoted to the question, e.g. Plutarch's *On Moral Virtue*, which, like *PHP* 4-5, is designed as an attack on the Stoic conception of the unitary intellect. A later though important witness to this traditional debate is Porphyry's essay *On the Powers of the Soul*, of which a handful of fragments have been preserved.<sup>12</sup> In fact, Galen too wrote a monograph in three books (now lost) entitled *On the Parts and Powers of the Soul*, which in his conspectus *On My Own Books* is listed under the heading 'Treatises pertaining to Plato's philosophy'.<sup>13</sup> At *PHP* 9.9.42 he refers to the same tract, using the variant title *On the Forms [or: Parts] of the Soul* (Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰδῶν).<sup>14</sup> Here, Galen tells us, he proceeded 'in accordance with Plato's inquiry'—which must primarily refer to *Republic* 4, from which Galen quotes substantial passages in *PHP* 5.7.

*PHP* books 4 and 5 can be read as a more or less self-contained contribution to the traditional issue of the number of psychic faculties. But they are not completely unrelated to the rest of the work. It

<sup>10</sup> I shall deal with the relevant passages from the doxographic traditions separately below Ch. 2.

<sup>11</sup> The issue can be traced back to Aristotle, see esp. *De an.* A 1.402b1-3: σκεπτόν δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερὴς, καὶ πότερον ὁμοειδὴς ἅπαντα ψυχὴ ἢ οὐ· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμοειδὴς, πότερον εἶδει ἢ γένει. cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3087 and further *infra*, p. 22.

<sup>12</sup> See Frs. 251-255 Smith; on this treatise cf. also Beutler (1953) 289; Dörrie (1959) 158 n.1. On the position taken by Porphyry (232/3-c.305 CE) in the debate as compared with Galen's, see further *infra*, pp. 78 ff.

<sup>13</sup> *Lib. Prop.* 13, *SM* II p.122.14 f. Müller; cf. Ilberg (1897) 595 ff.

<sup>14</sup> That is, if one accepts the plausible addition of <καὶ> (*ibid.* p.608.8) proposed by Einarson and De Lacy; see De Lacy *ad loc.* At *Foet. Form.* IV pp. 701-2 K. Galen refers twice to this tract in a context similar to our section, *viz.* *PHP* 9.9.6 ff.. On its contents see esp. 9.45-46.

may therefore be worth considering briefly their place within the overall framework of *PHP*. Due to the loss of a large part of book 1, we do not possess Galen's initial statement of his purpose in writing *PHP*.<sup>15</sup> But in the extant books he declares a few times that he aimed to examine the principal doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato with a view to proving their truth and basic agreement.<sup>16</sup> Which doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato he has singled out for treatment first is stated in the following passage, which appears to be repeated from the preface to the whole work in the lost beginning of Bk. 1 (2.1.1 = *Test.* Bk. 1, fourth text):

Having proposed to investigate the doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, I began with the doctrine that is first in importance, from which I showed that very nearly all particular details follow;<sup>17</sup> this is their doctrine about the powers (δυνάμεων) that govern us, their number, the nature of each, and the place that each occupies in the animal (τὰ περὶ τῶν διοικοῦσων ἡμᾶς δυνάμεων ὅποια ἑκάστη ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ ἀριθμὸν ὅποια τέ τις ἐκάστη καὶ τόπον ὄντιν' ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ κατείληφεν).<sup>18</sup>

It is easy to recognize here an echo of the Aristotelian categories of quantity, quality and place. But it is more accurate to say that the types of question listed by Galen belong with the rhetorical-cum-dialectical concept of the 'theoretical question' or thesis (θέσις, Latin *quaestio*), which arose under the influence of Aristotle's work in particular.<sup>19</sup> Aristotle had distinguished these question-types in theoretical contexts<sup>20</sup> and applied them in argument. This is how he introduces his own monograph on the soul:

We seek to study and understand its [scil. the soul's] nature and being and then its accidents (*On the Soul* A 1.402a7 f.).

<sup>15</sup> Of Book 1 we possess only the closing sections, which on De Lacy's estimation amount to about one third of the original whole, which must have been rather long; see De Lacy (1978-84) vol. 1, 12-13.

<sup>16</sup> On the harmonization of Plato and Hippocrates as Galen's theme see 6.8.76, 9.1.1 = Book 1, *Test.* I a, b (p.64.6-14 De Lacy); the theme of the accuracy of their doctrines is made explicit at 5.6.40-41, which should be added to the two testimonies for book 1 printed by De Lacy; cf. also De Lacy (1978 etc.) vol. 1, 48.

<sup>17</sup> I.e. ethical subjects such as the emotions and the virtues addressed in *PHP* 4 and 5; cf. *supra*, n. 19.

<sup>18</sup> Similarly 3.1.1 (= *Test.* II, second text).

<sup>19</sup> Its role in dialectic as well as its relation to the *Placita* literature has been studied by Mansfeld (1990b), esp. 3193 ff. For their use as items on the check-lists of Cicero, Lucretius and Sextus see Mansfeld (1990b) 3125 ff., 3149 ff., 3161 f.

<sup>20</sup> See esp. *APost.* B 1.89b24-35; *Rhet.* Γ 16.1416b20-1; cf. Alex. Aphr. *In Top.* p. 63.13-9.

The soul's existence is taken for granted; its definition (i.e. its being) and accidents are discussed from A 2 onwards. What we have here is Aristotle's celebrated distinction between categories, i.e. being ('substance') and the so-called accidental categories. Compare also the following passage:

Perhaps it is first necessary to determine in which of the genera it [scil. the soul] belongs, and what it is. I mean whether it is a particular thing (τόδε τι), i.e. a *substance* (οὐσία), or a *quality* (ποιόν) or *quantity* (ποσόν) or belongs to any other of the distinguished categories (διαρθεσιῶν κατηγοριῶν), and furthermore, whether it has potential or actual existence.<sup>21</sup> For this makes no small difference. And also we must inquire whether it has parts or not and whether each soul is of the same kind or not; and if not of the same kind, whether the difference is one of species or genus... (*On the Soul* A 1.402a23-b3; cf. *ibid.* 402b10-403a3).

Galen does not ask in which particular category the soul belongs. On the other hand Aristotle does anticipate the question whether or not the soul has parts (cf. *On the Soul* Γ 9). Since this question had become traditional well before Galen, we need not assume that he arranged his material in the light of Aristotelian passages such as these (although he will have known them). Rather these passages were used in a systematized form in the schools as a check-list of questions and options of the kind known from various sources. Compare also the way in which his younger contemporary Alexander of Aphrodisias (*flor.* ca. 200 CE) opens his *On the Soul*:

Our theme is to discuss the soul belonging to the body in growth and decay: what is its being (substance) and which are its powers and how many, and what is their difference from each other (p. 1.2-3 Bruns).<sup>22</sup>

Here we have being / quality / quantity again. Alexander omits the question of place but he discusses this question after the questions he does list here (94.7-100.17 Br.). In general, these later authors stuck to this list of question-types far more systematically than Aristotle himself had ever done. Their agenda broadly conforms to the division and ordering of issues in the so-called *Placita* tradition, which

<sup>21</sup> This particular problem is not addressed by Galen.

<sup>22</sup> ἡ μὲν πρόθεσις ἡμῖν περὶ ψυχῆς εἰπεῖν τῆς (τοῦ) ἐν γενέσει τε καὶ φθορᾷ σώματος, τίς τε ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ἡ οὐσία καὶ τίνες αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ πόσαι, καὶ τίς αὐτῶν ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλας διαφορά. In addition see Cic. *Tusc.* 1.60 (quoted *infra*, n. 25); ps. Alex. *Mantissa*, p.101, 1 f. as well as the section headed "Ὅτι πλείους αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις καὶ οὐ μία (*ibid.* pp. 118.5-119.20 Br.); Porphyry *ap.* Stob. *Ecl.phys.* 1 p.353.2, 353.13, 14 W. (= Fr. 253 Sm.). For their use as items on the check-lists of Cicero, Lucretius and Sextus see Mansfeld (1990b) 3125 ff., 3149 ff., 3161 f.

since Diels has been associated with the name of Aëtius in particular. Thus the division into chapters of the relevant section of the fourth book of the reconstructed Aëtian *Placita* runs:

- IV, 2-3 (substance of the soul);
- IV, 4 (its parts);
- IV, 5 (location of regent part);
- IV, 6 + 8-13 (various functions: sense-perception, imagination, thought, speech).<sup>23</sup>

The *Placita* tradition provides further points of contact with *PHP* 4 and 5, especially where the authorities are concerned (see chapter 2). But for the moment it may suffice to note the questions at issue. Of these the 'how many?' and 'of what kind?' are clearly on the agenda in *PHP* books 4 and 5, which are concerned with the number and nature of the soul's parts, while the 'where?' is discussed in books 1-3 and 6. The question of being, by contrast, does seem to provide a point of difference between Galen and both the *Placita* and *De anima* traditions. It is conspicuously absent from his agenda as cited above. But in practice Galen does not, indeed cannot, avoid the aspect of 'being' in every sense of the term. First, there is the preliminary issue of being in the sense of existence, i.e. whether there is such a thing as a soul. For Galen, in line with the large majority of ancient authors, takes the soul's existence as evident from the body's motions and processes. Since in others works he is explicit on this point, he may have made it in the lost opening of *PHP* 1 as well.<sup>24</sup>

Of greater importance is the question of being in the sense of substance: if the soul exists, is it either incorporeal or corporeal? If

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<sup>23</sup> What appears to be roughly the same sequence had already been followed by Chrysippus in his *On the Soul*: (1) its substance; (2) the number of its parts; (3) its regent part and its functions, see *ibid.* Chrys. *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 3.1.16 (*SVF* 2.885) with Mansfeld (1990b) 3168 ff., Tieleman (1996) 134 ff., 154 ff. Diocles Magnes *ap.* D.L. 7.50 (*SVF* II 55). In the long passage cited at *PHP* 1.10-15 (*SVF* II 885) Chrysippus in fact draws on the *Placita* tradition, see Mansfeld (1990b) 3168 ff. The fixed order of subject relating to the soul may have been part of the traditional ordering of physical subjects in general; for some attempts at reconstruction see further Festugière (1945), Mansfeld (1971) 130 f., Giusta (1986) 149-70, but the issue needs further study.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Propr. Plac.* 14.1 Nutton, where Galen appears to be looking back to the *PHP* in particular. Similarly Atticus, a Platonist and contemporary of Galen, *ap.* Eus. *PE* XV 9.10-11 (= Fr. 7 Des Places, II.51-64); ps. Alex. *Mantissa* p.101.3-4 Br. Sextus, *M.* VIII 155 is no doubt using a stock example when he calls bodily motion an 'indicative sign' (τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον) of soul, i.e. a sign which signifies something directly and out of its own nature.

corporeal, of what substance? The omission of this equally traditional question has a different, more peculiarly Galenic background. It is one of those eternal questions which Galen considered insoluble in default of empirical evidence and so chose not to pronounce upon.<sup>25</sup> Yet it is important to realize that the positions he takes on related issues bring him close to one particular option in this debate, viz. the Aristotelian conception of the soul as the form of the body (*On the Soul* B.1).<sup>26</sup> This is because he tends to link the concept of the soul's parts or forms with their being situated in separate bodily organs.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, he approaches the question of the location of the psychic functions by inquiring into the function *of the organs* proposed, identifying function with being or essence and invoking Aristotle (e.g. *PHP* 1.8.7 ff.). From here it seems but a small step to identify the parts (or 'forms', εἶδη) of the soul with the forms of the organs.<sup>28</sup> In *PHP* he never makes this last step, however. In spite of certain passages where he seems to come close, he has not yet accepted reductionism in the hylomorphic mode (see 9.9.7-9).<sup>29</sup> In fact, he still considers corporealism an option in view of the supposed existence of psychic πνεῦμα. At 3.8.32, for example, he associates intelligence

<sup>25</sup> See *PHP* 9.9.7-9; *Hipp. Epid.* p. 271.5 ff. Wenkebach-Pfaff; *Foet. Form.* IV pp. 699-702 K, *Prop. plac.* 13.7, 15.2, pp. 108.11-110.3, 116.20-118.10 Nutton. Likewise Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.60 opts for suspension of judgement as to the soul's substance—though he prefers the view that it is divine and incorporeal in view of its power of memory: *si q u i d sit, non vides, at q u a l e sit vides; si ne id quidem, at q u a n t u m sit profecto vides.* Here we have the same sequence substance—quality—quantity as in the parallel passages. For our purposes it does not matter that Cicero here uses the 'how many?' question with reference to the soul's powers of memory.

<sup>26</sup> This of course left open many questions, notably what this meant for the heart as an individual organ which Aristotle had elsewhere described as central to the functioning of the whole organism, e.g. *PA* Γ 4 and *Iuv.* 3-4. The later doxographic tradition seems to have entailed an increasing concentration on one or more organs as opposed to the body as a whole.

<sup>27</sup> The linking as such can be paralleled from Alcin. *Did.* 24, p. 176 H. so was no longer an exclusively Peripatetic move.

<sup>28</sup> See *PHP* 5.7.50, 6.2.5; cf. *In Tim.* pp.11.25-30, 12.15-18 Schröder.

<sup>29</sup> For this we have to turn to the treatise of his old age, *The Powers of the Mind Follow the Temperaments of the Body*, where he assigns great weight to the dependence of mental phenomena on bodily factors such as drugs and alcohol. In this light he actually submits that the parts of the soul are the forms (εἶδη) *of the organs*, i.e. the mixture (κρᾶσις) of the elementary qualities or corporeal elements, *QAM* c.3, IV pp. 774 ff., 782 ff. K. = *SM* II pp. 37-8, 44-8 Müller. Cf. Donini (1974) 134 ff., Moraux (1984) 774ff. This is meant to qualify the view—held by Peripatetics like Andronicus of Rhodes and Alexander of Aphrodisias—that the soul is the power (δύναμις) *supervening on* the bodily mixture. See Alex. *De an.* pp.2.25-11.13, *ibid.* 24.15-26.30. Cf. Moraux (1984) 784 f.



with the psychic πνεῦμα in the middle ventricle of the brain.<sup>30</sup> His promise (*ibid.* 29) to provide a fuller physiological account is fulfilled only partially in book 7 (3.19-36). Here he reports certain experimental observations: an animal only loses consciousness when one lets its psychic πνεῦμα escape by incising the ventricles of its brain. Moreover, the same animal regains sensation and motion when the ventricles have been closed up. In the light of these observations he prefers to call the psychic πνεῦμα not the soul's substance nor its dwelling but, with an Aristotelian touch, its 'first instrument'.<sup>31</sup> In sum, in *PHP* the question of the soul's substance, though surfacing here and there, remains undecided (esp. *ibid.* 21).

But if we think we can understand why Galen skips the issue of the soul's substance, it is less easy to see why he includes the discussion of the number of faculties after having discussed their location in books 1-3 (though not the Platonic appetitive part, which he discusses in book 6)—a discussion which also involves their differentiation. This cannot merely have been a matter of working one's way through a traditional check-list. Galen subscribes to Posidonius' view that a proper understanding of the cause of the affections may also teach us how to conceive of the virtues, or moral excellences; and knowledge of the cause of the affections in turn depends on that of the powers of the soul (e.g. 5.5.36-6.4).<sup>32</sup> Thus on more than one occasion we find him wavering between prolonging the discussion of the tri-location and addressing the theme of virtue (e.g. 3.1.6). The subject of virtue is announced for book 6 (5.7.73; 6.1, 7.11) but taken up only in book 7 (1.9-2.17).<sup>33</sup> Here, in a predominantly polemical section, he summarily explains the virtues in terms of the Platonic

<sup>30</sup> This point comes up in the context of an allegorical interpretation of a myth, viz. Hesiod's account of the birth of the goddess Athena from Zeus' head. Galen's interpretation is meant to counter the reading proposed by Chrysippus in support of the cardiocentric position (quoted 8.3-19 = *SVF* 2.908).

<sup>31</sup> See esp. *MA* c. 10 (on role of the σύμφυτον πνεῦμα); cf. *De an.* Γ 433b18 ff., *Cael.* Δ 301b20 ff.

<sup>32</sup> But the point is made elsewhere as well, see e.g. Iambl. *De an. ap. Stob. Ecl.* I 369.12-13 W., Plut. *Virt. Mor.* 441C-D. For Posidonius cf. Kidd (1971) 202 f.

<sup>33</sup> Galen tells us that lack of space keeps him from refuting, in the wake of Posidonius, what Chrysippus said in his *On the Difference of the Virtues* (7.1.10). At 7.3.1 he announces his intention to do so in a separate work (cf. 4.4.1); and at 8.1.47-48 he informs us that he has completed this work, which, he says, also includes an exposure of further self-contradictions in Chrysippus' *On Affections* not dealt with in *PHP* either (Books 7-9 were written some time after 1-6, in the period between 169 and 176 CE; cf. De Lacy (1978) 46-8). This latter, projected treatise cannot be identified. Galen may have been inspired by the genre exemplified by such works as Plutarch's *On the Self-Contradictions of the Stoics*, cf. *infra*, p. 44.

tripartition (7.1.22-3; cf. Plato, *Rep.* 442b-d; 443c-444a)—hardly a proper treatment.

Another aspect, too, calls for some comment. In books 4 and 5 Galen focuses on the question of the number of psychic faculties (5.7.2), regardless of their ontological status as either parts (μέρια, μερῇ) or powers (δυνάμεις)—another scholastic question.<sup>34</sup> Galen takes the status of the faculties as *parts* in the above sense to be implied by their spatial separation, viz. the Platonic trilocution established in *PHP* 1-3 and 6.<sup>35</sup> The exclusive concentration in books 4 and 5 on the differentiation of faculties brings him the dialectical advantage of being able to align Aristotle and Posidonius with Plato in a concentrated assault on the Stoic unitarian conception. For Aristotle and, Galen argues, Posidonius had accepted the celebrated Platonic division into reason, anger and appetite, though conceiving of them as powers rather than separately located parts. In fact, Galen often takes the perspective of powers in speaking on behalf of himself, or of Plato. The concept of power is of course central to his physiology, but in the context of ethics, as Galen repeatedly makes clear, one may as well, or even preferably, speak of powers. Thus Plato, who in *Republic* 4 was concerned with the moral issue of the virtues, was content to prove that ‘the *powers* (δυνάμεις) which govern us are three’,<sup>36</sup> or that we have ‘three powers different in kind’ (δυνάμεις ἑτερογενεῖς) (5.7.7, 7.9).<sup>37</sup> Likewise, he has no qualms

<sup>34</sup> Porphyry *ap. Stob. Ecl.* I, 350.9-12 (Fr. 253 Smith): ‘The ancients are divided (διαπεφώνηται) [...] also about the parts (μερῶν) of the soul, and in general what a part (μέρος) is and what a power (δύναμις) and wherein their difference lies.’ Cf. Iambl. *De an. ap. Stob.* I 49.33, p.367.10ff. (Περὶ δυνάμεων ψυχῆς), 34, p.369.5ff. (Περὶ πλήθους δυνάμεων); translation and notes by Festugière (1953) 190-93. Cf. also the ps. Plutarchean tract *Εἰ μέρος τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἢ δύναμις*, one of the two ‘Tyrwhitt’s Fragments’ (Thomas Tyrwhitt [ed.], *Fragmenta duo Plutarchi*, 1773); best modern edition Sandbach (1969) 60-71. For the same issue in the doxographic tradition cf. *infra*, pp. 72 ff.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 24.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. the formula at 2.1 (Test. Book I, fourth text), cited *supra*, p. 21.

<sup>37</sup> For powers in connection with Plato 5.4.3, 7.2, 70.50 (= Posid. Frs. 142-145 E.-K.); cf. *In Hipp. Epid.* pp.272.22-273.2 Wenkebach-Pfaff, esp. 272.25 ff.: ‘Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν οὖν καὶ Πλάτων ὑπὸ μίαν προσηγορίαν [scil. ψυχὴν] ἀμφοτέρας ἄγουσι τὰς δυνάμεις, οὐ μόνον ἢ λογιζόμεθα καὶ μεμνήμεθα ψυχὴν καλοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς, ἣ τρέφεται [...]. Cf. Deuse (1983) 101 n. 28, who rightly points out that what matters in this context is the opposition to the corporeal and unitary conception of the Stoa. This is of course also the situation in *PHP* 4 and 5. Deuse does not however note the close resemblances in wording and content between this Galenic passage and the more extensive abstract from Iambl. *De an. ap. Stob. Ecl.* I, pp.367.10-368.11 W. Cf. Gal., *ibid.* p. 273.15-19, *In Tim.* p.12.15-21 Schroeder: Πλάτων δὲ ὀνομάζει τὰς ἀρχὰς ταύτας εἶδη ψυχῶν, οὐ μίᾳς οὐσίας

about assimilating the concept of power and the originally Stoic concept of *ὁρμή* ('conation'), as when he says that each of the Platonic parts is marked by its own *ὁρμή* (5.7.1).<sup>38</sup> The notion of power and even more that of conation admits of translation in terms of desire and its subspecies and is therefore especially suited to ethical contexts (see below § 3). The assimilation of conation and power here is of crucial importance for Galen's project of playing off Posidonius against Chrysippus. I shall return to this point in due course (see below, p. 37f.).

But the dialectical advantage of aligning Plato and Aristotle is bought at the price of an incongruity of structure. As we saw, Galen has no longer any need of a separate argument for differentiation, having established the tripartition-cum-trilocation in books 1-3. The logical sequence would have been first to discuss the number of faculties (regardless of their status as either powers or parts) and next to determine their status. But nothing prepares us for Galen's announcement that he will establish the doctrine of tripartition and trilocation in the *next* book (viz. 6), as if he had not done so already (5.7.7).<sup>39</sup> The problem is also reflected in the preface to book 6, where he indicates a change of plan:<sup>40</sup>

It was my purpose at the beginning to inquire about the powers that govern us, whether they all have the heart as their base (*ὁρμῶνται*), as Aristotle and Theophrastus believed, or whether it is better to posit three sources (*ἀρχάς*) for them, as Hippocrates and Plato held. But since Chrysippus disputed with the ancients (*τοὺς παλαιούς*) not only about the sources but also about the powers (*δυνάμειων*) themselves, admitting neither the spirited nor the desiderative I decided that I must first [i.e. in books 4-5] examine his opinion and then return to my original plan, which was to show that the brain, the heart and the

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*δυνάμεις* μόνον. ὅντος οὖν τοῦ καὶ τὰς οὐσίας αὐτῶν διαφερούσας εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις σπλάγχνοις οἴκησιν, ἐξέστω τῷ βουλομένῳ δυνάμεις . . . ὀνομάζειν οὐ ψυχάς· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὗτ' εἰς ἰατρικὴν οὗτ' εἰς φιλοσοφίαν βλαβησόμεθα, διοικέσθαι τὶ ζῶον ὑπὸ τριῶν ἀρχῶν εἰπόντες . . . For Plato on psychic faculties as powers cf. *Rep.* 5.477c.

<sup>38</sup> Galen mentions *ὁρμή* alongside perception as a defining characteristic of the regent part at 2.3.4. On the motions of the psychic faculties see Manuli (1988), esp. 207 ff. who stresses early Stoic influence. Cf. Mansfeld (1991) 135 ff., who stresses Posidonian influence (though also with reference to such passages as *Rep.* 9.580d ff.).

<sup>39</sup> It might be supposed that this passage was written before books 1-3, or at any rate before these books were destined to become the first three of the whole treatise. But I know of no other indication to this effect, and there are many passages in *PHP* which tell against it, e.g. 3.7.53, even if allowance is made for later additions etc.

<sup>40</sup> Which is but one of many such cases, cf. De Lacy (1978-80) 48-50.

liver are the sources of the powers that govern us (6.1.1-2 = *Test. lib. primi*, 2, first text, transl. De Lacy, modified).

Galen claims that Plato made the very same proviso with regard to the parts/powers distinction in *Republic* 4, where he proved ‘cogently and irrefutably’ that the soul has three sections. According to Galen, this proof does not include their nature as parts differing in essence (οὐσίαις, 5.7.2, 8).<sup>41</sup> In support of this reading he adduces *Rep.* 435c9-d3 (5.7.6). But Plato’s proviso here concerns the cogency of his argument for tripartition.<sup>42</sup>

This has nothing to do with the part vs. power issue which arose under the influence of critique of the Platonic tripartition as formulated by Aristotle in his *On the Soul* A 5 and Γ 9.<sup>43</sup> Galen announces that he will explain exactly what kind of demonstration is meant by Plato’s ‘longer and fuller way’ in the next book (5.7.7). But in book 6 this promise is forgotten, or at least not really kept.<sup>44</sup> Instead we are given an overview of passages illustrating Plato’s use of the terms ‘form’ and ‘part’ with reference to the soul (6.2).<sup>45</sup> Of course Galen could find in Plato no demonstration of tripartition which would have satisfied his own professed standards. *Republic* 4 discusses the threefold division into purely functional categories with

<sup>41</sup> In his treatise *On Moral Disposition* (extant in an Arabic abstract only) Galen makes the same qualification; p. xxvi Walzer: ‘It makes no difference how I refer to these things in this book [viz., in the *On Moral Dispositions*], whether as separate souls, as parts of the one human soul, or as three different powers of the same essence.’ For the division of options, cf. 6.2.5 (see *infra*, p. 34). In this treatise, Galen does not appeal to physiological insights, such as that into the nervous system, not even when discussing the psychology of action, see pp. xxvi, xlv. On these passages see further Mansfeld (1991) 140-2, who observes that Galen in *On Moral Dispositions* ‘silently drops one of the main points proudly established in the *PHP*. Yet this should not be taken to imply a change of opinion but rather a difference in dialectical context from *PHP*. Cf. Galen’s attitude, *In Tim.* p.12.15-21 Schröder quoted *supra*, n. 37. In the *On Moral Dispositions*, too, Galen considers the tripartite scheme as a *moral* theorem unrelated to the parts-powers issue; he thus makes his exposition acceptable for others (notably Peripatetics). But it remains true, as Mansfeld points out, that Galen faces the problem in reconciling the Platonic tripartition qua moral doctrine with the physiology of the nervous system.

<sup>42</sup> καὶ εὖ γ’ ἴσθι, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ δόξα ἀκριβῶς μὲν τοῦτο ἐκ τοιούτων μεθόδων οἷαις δὴ νῦν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις χρώμεθα, οὐ μὴ ποτε λάβωμεν· ἄλλη γὰρ μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὁδός ... For similar disclaimers see 504b, 534a, 612a.

<sup>43</sup> This question — first raised at 402b1-3 (see *supra*, n. 11) — is also considered at 402b9-16, 413a4-10, 413b11-414a3, 429a1-2, 43219-b7, 433b1-4. Aristotle’s view is that in contrast with νοῦς the other sections of the soul are not separable but theoretically (λόγῳ) different, B 2.413b27-30.

<sup>44</sup> As is observed by De Lacy *ad loc.* (338.3-6); cf. also De Lacy (1972) 32 n.28.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *In Tim.* p.11.21 ff. Schroeder.

a repeatedly stated proviso<sup>46</sup> that is most unwelcome to Galen. For trilocution based on anatomy one has to turn to the *Timaeus*. But its mythical mode of presentation could not pass for the required demonstrative proof either.<sup>47</sup> The only thing Galen is able to do is to show that Plato, in *Republic* 4 and *Timaeus*, spoke of parts and forms. Proof is what he has to provide himself (viz. in bks 1-3 and 6), though he of course claims it to be based on Platonic methodology, notably the method of diaeresis as explained in *PHP* book 9.

By Galen's day soul-partition had become increasingly problematic for those who wished to uphold the soul's unity and immortality. Some Platonists were persuaded to abandon the notion of parts in favour of that of powers. When Galen presents his rather forced reading of *Republic* 4.435c9-d3, which, as we saw, contradicts rather than supports his case, this may represent his attempt to counter-act those who had used the same passage to show that Plato had not been dogmatic about tripartition. Omission of this awkward passage, one supposes, would have been a more attractive option had it been open to him.

Galen, then, vindicates a radical variety of soul-partition with an eye not only on his Stoic and Peripatetic adversaries but also on a group of Platonists who had taken over the Peripatetic conception of powers (δυνάμεις). Exactly whom he has in mind remains uncertain, but a version of the view under attack was advanced by the Platonist Severus, who was a contemporary of Galen's.<sup>48</sup> Versions of it are moreover attested for Nicolaus Damascenus (c. 5 BCE- 64 CE)<sup>49</sup> as well as Porphyry's teacher Longinus (early 3rd c. CE).<sup>50</sup>

<sup>46</sup> See *supra*, n. 42.

<sup>47</sup> Galen elsewhere stresses that Plato qualifies his account as merely 'probable' (εἰκώς, 29c4-d3, 72d4-8). But this concerns issues Galen himself made a point of refraining from: the substance and immortality of the soul, God, etc. See *PHP* 9.9.3, 6, 7 (p.298.9, 20, 26). That this emphasis on Plato's proviso is not extended to the issue of location runs parallel to Galen's treatment of *Rep.* 435c9-d3 as discussed in the text. Both passages are at odds with Galen's belief that the tripartition can be demonstrated. So one passage is misrepresented, and the other is not applied to the issue concerned.

<sup>48</sup> See Eus. *PE* XIII 17.1-6; II, p.239.9 ff. Mras; with Deuse (1983) 102-108, esp. 104 ff. Cf. Dillon (1977) 262-64.

<sup>49</sup> See Porph. *ibid.* (see n. 34) p. 353.12-354.6 W. (= F 7 Roeper/T 9 Lulofs) with Moraux (1973) 481-7.

<sup>50</sup> Porph. *ibid.* p. 351.11-19 W. (Fr. 253, p. 272.32 ff. Sm.), cited *infra*, p. 35; cf. also *ibid.* p. 353.1-11 W. (Fr. 253, p.274.77 ff. Sm.). Highly relevant in this connection is also Tert. *De an.* c. 14, insisting that the idea of powers (as opposed to parts) is fundamental to that of the soul's unity and immortality.

*The Structure of PHP 4 and 5: Synopsis*

It may be convenient to take stock of the overall contents of these books. It should be noted that the chapters marked off by Galen's Renaissance editors do not always coincide with the real arrangement of subject-matter, whether or not as indicated by Galen himself. At the same time, it is clear that no alternative arrangement will reveal these books as a model of transparent organization, as will not surprise those familiar with Galen's work. Yet, for all his repetitions and vagaries, an overall approach is discernible: most space in these two books is devoted to a *critique* of Chrysippean monism, which revolves around two main objections: first, Chrysippus' self-contradictions; second, his failure to explain the cause of the affections of the soul (parts A and B of Book 4 and part A of 5, see below). The method followed in these parts is not wholly destructive, however. The Stoic's self-contradictions, as we have seen, are often caused by what Galen presents as isolated acknowledgements of non-rational factors in the soul which have been forced upon Chrysippus' mind by the plain facts of nature.<sup>51</sup> Thus he prepares the ground for the *vindication* of the Platonic tripartition in the second half of Book 5 (part B, below).

In the following synopsis, Chrysippus is indicated by C. The presence of Posidonius [P.] is indicated by mention of the fragments according to Edelstein-Kidd's edition. Note that these 'fragments' do not only offer clearly recognizable verbatim passages from P. but offer much larger stretches of Galenic exposition. I have also indicated by means of dots (•) the verbatim proof-texts of various authorities presented in these books, whether directly by Galen [G.] or from an intermediate source (e.g. P.).

## BOOK FOUR

## (A) CHRYSIPPUS' SELF-CONTRADICTIONS (chs. 1-4)

1. **C.'s inconsistencies** introduced (ch. 1.1-6) and illustrated by:
  - proof-text from C.'s *On the Soul* (SVF 2.905): C. effectively accepts the Platonic parts in his exegesis of Homeric passages (1.7-13).

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<sup>51</sup> See *infra*, p. 43.

- beginning of the *On Affections*: exegesis of Zeno's definitions (1.14-2.44): C. admits irrational element. • Proof-text: 2.9-12; 14-18 (runners simile, SVF 3.462).
- sequel in C. *Affections*: supervening on judgments (view ascribed to Zeno) or judgments *tout court*? P. introduced. P. follows ancients (T 102 E.-K.); asks C. what the cause of affections is (see further B) (3.1-5)
- C.'s uncommon and ambiguous use of language (3.6-4.34)
  - e.g. sense of 'irrational' (ἄλογον) (4.9-34): proof-texts: 16-17, 24-25, 30, 31, 32 (SVF 3.476).

## (B) THE CAUSE OF AFFECTION (ch. 5.1-46)

### 2. Objections against C.'s monist theory :

- Affections cannot be uncaused, contrary to what C. says.
  - Proof-text: 5.6, from *On Affections* 1 (SVF 3.476)
- Reason cannot be the cause.
  - Proof-text: 13-14, from *Therapeutics* (SVF 3.479): affection contrary to reason.
- Some non-rational power must be the cause.
  - Proof-text: 21-2, from *Ther.* (SVF 3.480): view of psychic weakness (ἀρρωστήμα) as madness implies non-rational power (23).
- *magnitude* of apparent good or evil as a determinant of weakness (C.).
  - Rejoinder with quotes from P. (F 164, part) (24-35).
- Psychic phenomena that are inexplicable on C.'s account.
  - More texts from Posidonius (F 164, part) (36-44).
- Conclusion with quotation from P. (T 60 E.-K.) (45-46).

### 3. Elaboration on some of the points raised (chs. 6-7):

- The presence of a non-rational element in the soul. Further admissions with regard to psychic strength/weakness and tension (6.1.48)
  - Proof-texts from *Therapeutics* 5-9, 11, 19 (SVF 3.473).
- (Further 'Posidonian' criticisms, ch. 7.1-45 = P. F 165 E.-K.)
- problematic notion of affection as 'fresh' opinion (2-11)
  - 10-11: quotation from Euripides (fr. 964 Nauck, Alc. 1085)
- cessation in time

- prooftexts from C. *On Aff.* bk. 2: 12-17 (SVF 3.476); 26-27, 30-31 (SVF 3.467).

(7.45-46: Epilogue to bk. 4: present line of criticism to be continued in bk. 5).

## BOOK FIVE

### (A) THE CRITIQUE OF MONISM, CONTINUED

- 1. Introduction:** theme of bks. 4 and 5 justified (ch.1)
  - relation of subject-matter to question of seat of regent part as treated in bks. 1-3 (§ 1-3).
  - diaeresis of tenets concerned with the affections (C., Zeno, P.- cum-Plato, § 4-7)
  - Stoics contradict obvious phenomena as well as themselves (§ 8-11)
- 2. The Stoic body/soul analogy** (chs. 2 and 3)
  - P.'s criticism of C.'s analogy in terms of health and illness (1-7)
    - quotation from P. at 2.7 (3-12 = Posid. F 163)
    - G.'s criticism of both C. and P. (8-12)
    - Criticism of C.'s comparison with fever (13-19)
    - Proof-text from *Ther.* at 2.14 (SVF 3.465).
    - Further evidence for C.'s use of analogy (2.20-34):
    - Proof-texts from *Ther.* at 2.22-24, 26, 27, 31, 32, 33 (SVF 3.471)
    - Criticisms against C.:
      - (a) inconsistency vis-à-vis *On Aff.* bk. 1;
      - (b) his failure to implement the analogy (2.34-52).
    - physical and psychic *beauty* as right proportion (2.46-3.11).
    - Proof-texts from *Ther.* at 2.47 and 49 (SVF 3.471, first text).
- 3. Various points repeated** (ch. 4.1-17)
  - (diaeresis of views, beauty and ugliness of the soul, emotion as opposed to purely cognitive error)



4. Evidence provided by **children**; implications for education (ch. 5.1-40; 1-29 = Posid. F 169 E.-K.).
- children (and animals) display anger and desire (1-8)
  - origin of vice in children unaccountable on monist view (9-21)
  - Posidonian physiognomics (22-29)
  - P. and Plato on pre- and post-natal child-raising (30-35) (P. F 31 E.-K.).

### (B) TRIPARTITION VINDICATED

#### 5. Posidonius on the cause of affection (ch.5.36-6.46; 6.3-36 = P. F 187 E.-K.)

- (cf. Book four, section B)
- Implications of P.'s acceptance of the Platonic tripartition:
  - = for virtue and the end (5.36-6.12)
  - = for therapy of the soul (6.13-22)
- some difficulties raised earlier (book Four, section B) now soluble (6.23-32)
- P. could claim support of Zeno and Cleanthes (6.33-36)
  - Proof-text at 35 (*SVF* 1 Cleanthes 570); no text of Zeno (cf. 40).
  - implications for *scala naturae* (37-39) (P. F 33 E.-K.)
  - concluding remarks (40-46): the views of Hp., Pl., Pyth. as compared with those of Zeno and C.

#### 6. Plato's Proof in *Rep.* 4 (ch. 7):

- Plato's argument introduced (question of its status) (1-11)
- comments on Platonic passages on reason vs. desire (12-43)
  - proof-texts: *Rep.* 436b, 437b (12, 13); 439a-d (36-40).
- comments on Platonic passages featuring anger.
  - proof-texts: *Rep.* 439e-440a (45-47), 440a-b (53-54), 440c-d (62-63), 440e-441a (72), 441a-c (75-76), including Homer, *Od.* 20.17, leading to
  - comments on proper use of poetic witnesses.

## 3. Options

This is how Galen distinguishes the options, along with their main representatives:<sup>52</sup>

Plato, holding that they [i.e. the forms, εἶδη, of the soul] are separated by their location in the body and differ greatly in essence (ταῖς οὐσίαις πάμπολυ διαλ(λ)άττειν), has good reason to call them both forms and parts (εἶδη τε καὶ μέρη).<sup>53</sup> But Aristotle and Posidonius do not speak of forms or parts of the soul but say that there are powers of a single essence which has its base at the heart (δυνάμεις ... μιᾶς οὐσίας ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ὁρμωμένης).<sup>54</sup> Chrysippus not only subsumes anger (θῦμος) and desire (ἐπιθυμία) under one essence (οὐσία) but also one power (δύναμις) (PHP 6.2.5 = Posid. F. 146 E-K.).

The three doctrines concerned are given in order of correctness. The position ascribed to Aristotle and Posidonius is neatly intermediate in both merit and content:

three essences	three parts	brain, heart, liver	Plato
one essence	three powers	heart	Aristotle-cum- Posidonius
one essence	one power	heart	Chrysippus

As we have noticed, Galen links the notions of essence, part and bodily organ. The notion of a plurality of powers does not involve a division according to essence and location. This conceptual schema is Platonist and Peripatetic.<sup>55</sup> Galen's division of options, then, provides common ground between at least the Platonists and Peripatetics. How far the representation of the Stoic position, or rather positions, is accurate, seems more problematic.

As to the apportionment of options and authorities according to this schema we may compare a few excerpts from Porphyry's aforementioned *On the Powers of the Soul* preserved by Stobaeus. The first of these reads:

<sup>52</sup> That the diaeresis set out here underlies the discussion in books 4 and 5 is further borne out by its more concise version at 5.4.3; cf. also the partial parallel at 6.1.1-2, cited.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Pl. *Tim.* 73b-d, *Rep.* 504a, 580d-581e, 590c, *Phaedr.* 253c.265a ff.

<sup>54</sup> For this phrasing see also 6.1.1; cf. Porph. *ap. Stob. Ecl.* I p. 349.3-4 (= Fr. 251 Smith, p. 269.31 f.): μίαν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν λογικὴν οὐ ... ἐκ μιᾶς ἢ τε νόησις οὐσίας ὁ ρ μ ᾱ τ α ι καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ...

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Alex. Aphr. *De an.* p.94.1-3 Bruns: πᾶσαι γὰρ αὐταὶ μία οὐσαὶ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ταῖς διαφοραῖς τῶν δυνάμεων αὐταῖς διήρηνται. Themist. *De an.* p.117.1-3 Heinze.

It should be said what is the difference between power and part: parts differ from one another in character and kind, whereas powers pertain to the same kind. This is why Aristotle declined to speak of parts with respect to the soul, but not of powers. For partition entails at once a change of substrate, while difference in power also occurs in a single substrate.<sup>56</sup> Longinus holds that not even animals have a plurality of parts but rather are without parts while having a plurality of powers, saying that, as Plato says,<sup>57</sup> the soul receives a plurality of parts when embodied but lacks parts when it is on its own; but the mere fact that it has no parts does not make it single-powered; for it is possible for one entity without parts to have more than one power (*Ecl.* I p. 351.8-19 W. = Porph. Fr. 253, p.272.32-42 Smith, Longinus Fr. 22 Patillon - Brisson).<sup>58</sup>

It is easy to see that Porphyry avails himself of the same conceptual schema as Galen does at *PHP* 6.2.5. At the same time his account differs from it in such a way that he cannot depend on Galen. Both authors draw on the same traditional division of options between Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics (or Chrysippus) in terms of the parts/power distinction.<sup>59</sup> It is interesting to note how each of the two authors adapts this schema to his own purposes. In Porphyry's account his teacher Longinus occupies a compromise position between Plato and Aristotle. This is the main point. The Chrysippean option of one power only is merely mentioned as not necessarily entailed by Longinus' position. Porphyry does not trouble to identify it as Chrysippean, but it is easy to recognize as such in the light of the Galenic parallel. Nevertheless he handles the schema the way that

<sup>56</sup> I omit to translate the phrase τὸ δὲ ἑτεροδύναμον καὶ περὶ ἐν ὑποκείμενον παραλλαγὴν εἰσάγειν inserted by Smith at p. 273.35 f. but probably due to a printer's error. It is entirely absent from the edition of Wachsmuth and cannot be accounted for by what is to be found in the critical apparatus of either Smith or Wachsmuth.

<sup>57</sup> This is based on an exegesis of *Tim.* 35a: τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταύτου φύσεως [αὐτῆς περὶ] καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ.

<sup>58</sup> Ῥητέον δὲ ὅς δύναμις μέρους διήνεγκεν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν μέρος ἐκβέβηκε κατὰ γένος τὸν χαρακτήρα τοῦ ἄλλου μέρους, αἱ δὲ δυνάμεις περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ στρέφονται γένος. Διὸ τὰ μὲν μέρη παρητεῖτο Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰς δὲ δυνάμεις οὐκέτι· τὸ γὰρ ἑτερομερές εὐθὺς ὑποκείμενον παραλλαγὴν εἰσάγειν, τὸ δὲ ἑτεροδύναμον καὶ περὶ ἐν ὑποκείμενον ἐνίστασθαι. Λογῆνος δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ζῶον πολυμερές εἶναι ἀλλ' ἀμερές, πολυδύναμον δὲ, τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐν τοῖς σώμασι πολυμερῇ φάσκων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεσθαι, καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὖσαν ἀμερῇ. ὅτι δὲ οὐ πολυμερής, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ μονοδύναμος· ἐνδέχεσθαι γὰρ ἐν ἀμερές δυνάμεις πλείους ἔχειν.

<sup>59</sup> See also Iambl. *De an. ap. Stob. Ecl.* I, p.368.12-369.4 W. Cf. *ibid.* p.367.11-20; Alex. *De an.* p.94.1-3 Br. Cf. the interpretation by Dörrie - Baltes (1990), B. 46.7.

Galen does, viz. as providing the three main possible options (save for compromise).

No innovative genius, Longinus espoused what was presumably one of the options open to Platonists who wished to respond to the Peripatetic critique of soul-partition along Platonic lines.<sup>60</sup> On the one hand, he accepted a plurality of powers in the Aristotelian sense as basic; but the soul also has parts when it resides in the body (and hence no parts before or after embodiment). As we have noticed, Galen too linked the psychic parts to bodily parts. But the motivation seems entirely different. Platonists like Longinus sought to maintain the unity (and hence immortality) of the soul in the face of the Aristotelian critique. He makes his qualified acceptance of a plurality of powers palatable to his fellow-Platonists by seeking support from the *ipsissima verba* of Plato.<sup>61</sup> Galen took over the Platonist association of the concepts of psychic and bodily parts but lost sight of the unity of the soul—so much so that it becomes problematical. His position, with its blind spot for the coherence and interactions between the parts of the soul, resulted from a combination of his physiological notion of the power of *individual* organs and the Platonic tripartition and trilocation.

Just as Porphyry had an interest in attaching the name of his mentor to the traditional division of the options, so Galen appended Posidonius' name to the standard Aristotelian position. This move is entirely motivated by the role assigned by Galen to Posidonius in books 4 and 5. As I have already indicated, the conceptual schema applied here is incommensurate with Stoic distinctions. First of all, it entails an equivocation with respect to the sense of being, i.e. οὐσία. For Posidonius, like the other Stoics, it denotes not Aristotelian essence but corporeal substance, viz. the psychic *pneuma*.<sup>62</sup> In his *On*

<sup>60</sup> See *supra*, p. 29. Note that the same position is ascribed by Porphyry to a plurality of Platonists, *ibid.* p. 353.1 ff.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. *supra*, pp. 29, 34 for Galen's similar appeal to Plato.

<sup>62</sup> D.L. 7.157 = Pos. F 139 E.-K. Cf. Kidd *ad* 6.2.5 (Fr. 146), *Comm.* vol. II.i, p.543 f., who speaks of a confusion on Galen's part as to the sense of οὐσία, but it may be more accurate to speak of distortion. Galen should be taken to use the term consistently in the sense of 'essence'. Kidd argues that this sense is impossible in view of the difference between ἐπιθυμῆν, θυμοῦσθαι and λογίζεσθαι. But in speaking of three δυνάμεις of a single οὐσία Galen's point is precisely that as far as ethics is concerned there is no essential difference between the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions. Accordingly, Aristotle also conceives of mental conflict in a Platonic way. This view has good credentials from passages in the Aristotelian corpus, notably *De an.* 3.10.433b5-13, presenting the same three desires as conflicting as are at issue at *PHP* 6.2.5; cf. *ENA* 13.1102b14-18. Admittedly Aristotle is less unambiguous

*the Soul* he said that psychic *pneuma* is diffused in the bones and in his *On the Gods* that the soul pervades the bones and sinews.<sup>63</sup> Galen however effectively saddles him with Aristotelian being or essence. There is no good reason to doubt that Posidonius concurred with Chrysippus and most other Stoics in situating intelligence in the heart. On this point at least the conjunction with Aristotle involves no distortion.<sup>64</sup>

Does Chrysippus fare any better in this Platonist-Peripatetic framework? Hardly, of course. Galen ascribes to Chrysippus one power (δύναμις) only, just as Plutarch had done before him and Porphyry was to do.<sup>65</sup> This point clearly refers to the Stoic conception of the wholly and homogeneously rational ἡγεμονικόν or διάνοια, which was commonly assimilated to the Platonic λογιστικόν.<sup>66</sup> Indeed, the Stoics

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on other occasions, cf. Price (1994) 104 f. Likewise Dörrie (1959) 170, in characterizing Galen's position, says that parts can oppose one another whereas δυνάμεις cannot. But this does not follow from the passage from Porphyry *ap. Stob. Ecl.* I p. 352.7 ff. (= Fr. 253 Sm.) to which he refers. This does not of course alter the fact that the use in this context of the essence/powers scheme, which is absent from the relevant Aristotelian passages, seems to have arisen in the parts vs. powers debate in the post-Aristotelian era.

<sup>63</sup> Posid. Fr. 28a, b, p.21.5 f. E.-K. In the latter testimony the word νεῦρων in the phrase κεχώρηκεν διὰ τῶν ὀστέων καὶ τῶν νεύρων must mean 'sinews': see Mansfeld (1991) 137, who *inter alia* compares Sext. *M.* VII 19 (Posid. F 88 E.-K.). We may take his point that if Posidonius had assigned any function to the nervous system, Galen would surely have played off Posidonius against Chrysippus on this score as well. But in fact, Posidonius and Chrysippus were in essential agreement on voluntary motion and perception. For Chrysippus see e.g. Calc. *In Tim.* 220 (SVF 2.879); Gal. *PHP* 3.1.10 (SVF 2.885); and Sen. *Ep.* 113..23 (SVF 1.525 = 3.836, second text).

<sup>64</sup> See the text referred to *supra*, n. 62. Mansfeld's observation (1991) 122 that 'Galen is ... rather coy about the fact that Posidonius did not assign different locations in the body to different functions' is not entirely justifiable. True, he says so only at 6.2.5 and 5.4.3 and it is obvious that he has an interest in aligning Posidonius as much as possible with Plato. But on the other hand the books where Posidonius is present (4 and 5) are concerned solely with the number of the soul's functions (cf. 5.7.1 ff.). And as to the points on which he criticizes the Stoics, he emphatically singles out Chrysippus as representative of the Stoic school as a whole: *PHP* 4.1.3; 5.6.41.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. also *PHP* 4.5.4, 5.1.3; and, for Plutarch, *Virt. Mor.* 441C with Babut (1969a) 4 f.

<sup>66</sup> See esp. 2.5.81, where Galen aligns these two terms and several others, including the Aristotelian νοῦν. On their provenience see De Lacy *ad loc.* (144.3-6); cf. also De Lacy (1988) 51. Galen typically insists that the terms we use are not what matters as long as their reference remains constant. That the ἡγεμονικόν was regularly identified with the λογιστικόν is stated explicitly in Alcinous' Platonist handbook, *Did.* 182.24-26 H. (cf. 173.1-2). Alexander too uses both λογιστικόν and ἡγεμονικόν to refer to the intellect, see *De an.* pp. 39.21-2, 98.24 f. 99.14-5; cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3109 n.222. Cf. also Vander Waerdt (1985b) 377 n.16 with further passages; cf. (1985a) 293 n.27.

do not recognize desire and anger as separate powers but as excessive manifestations of ‘conation’ (ὁρμή).<sup>67</sup> Importantly, conation is not an Aristotelian power alongside reason. Chrysippus defined conation as ‘reason (λόγος) commanding man to act’.<sup>68</sup> In other words, conation is reason in a particular role, viz. as the initiator of action.

Did the Stoics use the concept of ‘power’ (δύναμις) in this context and, if so, how? A few sources ascribe to the Stoic regent part several different powers, viz. φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις, ὁρμή, λόγος (Iambl. *ap. Stob. Ecl.* I p.368.19-20 W., *SVF* 2.826, second text).<sup>69</sup> But arguably this list may also have arisen from the wish to compare the Stoic conception with those of other schools in the context of scholastic debate. The inclusion of λόγος on a par with the others is suspect. In fact, this usage of the term ‘power’ (δύναμις) is not reliably attested as early Stoic. But Aët. *Plac.* IV 21.1 (*SVF* 2.836) seems to provide a more accurate account. Here ‘the Stoics’ are said to describe the regent part as that which *produces* τὰς φαντασίας καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ὁρμάς· καὶ τοῦτο λογισμὸν καλοῦσιν. There is no mention of ‘powers’ here.<sup>70</sup> Moreover, this notice fits in better with Chrysippus’ own definition of conation (ὁρμή) I have just referred to.

Thus when Inwood argues in favour of viewing these δυνάμεις as enduring dispositions of the the regent part,<sup>71</sup> he runs the risk of importing into his account a viewpoint which is foreign to the Stoic conception. In fact, it stems from the traditional Platonist mode of schematization. The crucial point here is not whether or not conation and the like represent enduring capabilities of the mind; the point is whether these capabilities represent a plural aspect which served to account for such mental phenomena as weakness of the will (ἀκρασία).

In fact, the original Stoic usage of the term δύναμις is not that of power in the sense of faculty or capacity, as e.g. in Aristotle. It is power in the sense of *strength*, which depends on the appropriate degree of physical tension (τόνος) of the psychic pneuma.<sup>72</sup> As such,

<sup>67</sup> On the affinities with certain Aristotelian concepts, notably ὄρεξις, ἐπιθυμία and θύμος, see *infra*, pp. 272 f., 275 f.

<sup>68</sup> Plut. *De Stoic. Rep.* 1037F (*SVF* 3.175); see further *infra*, p. 125, 276.

<sup>69</sup> In addition, separate powers are assigned to the seven other parts of the Stoic soul: the five senses and the reproductive and phonetic functions; cf. *ibid.*, p. 368.6 ff. (*SVF* 2.826, second text).

<sup>70</sup> See further Chr. *ap. Gal. PHP* 3.5.31 (*SVF* 2.896); D.L. 7.159. Cf. also the definition of φαντασία as an alteration of the soul, *SVF* 2.55, 56.

<sup>71</sup> Inwood (1985) 33ff. Cf. Voelke (1973) 29.

<sup>72</sup> Plut. *Virt. mor.* 441C (*SVF* 1.202; 3.459); Stob. *Ecl.* II p. 74.1-3 (*SVF* 3.112) ; cf.

it determines whether a soul is characterized by weakness of will or self-control.<sup>73</sup> This idea of psychic strength—which is not confined to the Stoics—is about equivalent to our concept of ‘will’.<sup>74</sup> Its importance for the Stoics is, among other things, clear from Cleanthes’ move to replace practical wisdom (φρόνησις) with self-control (ἐγκράτεια) as one of the primary virtues.<sup>75</sup> Clearly this is something different from δύναμις as used at *PHP* 6.2.5.

#### 4. Authority, Tradition, and Truth

In *PHP* 4-5, Galen identifies a basic insight into the nature of emotion common to Plato, Hippocrates, Pythagoras, Aristotle, Cleanthes and Posidonius. Zeno is an ambiguous case,<sup>76</sup> but Chrysippus is undeniably deviant. This grouping of authorities is not a purely dialectical move. It forms part of his vision of a tradition of sound philosophy-cum-medicine deriving from Hippocrates and Plato and further enriched by outstanding representatives of later generations.<sup>77</sup> This betrays a reconciliationist tendency not uncommon in Galen’s day. Its hallmark is an impatience with terminological differences between schools and thinkers when a case can be made for their substantial agreement. Galen moreover glorifies past masters at the expense of their self-styled followers. Accordingly, he carefully avoids personal association with any of the sects or schools of his day and expresses his intention only to select what is best from them.<sup>78</sup> Wherever possible, the Stoics too are incorporated into the grand tradition, with or without complaints about their penchant for empty

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Alex. Aphr. *De an. Mantissa* p. 118.6 ff. Br. (*SVF* 2.823).

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Plut. *Virt. mor.* 446F-447A (*SVF* 3.459, second text).

<sup>74</sup> On the tension and strength in ancient representations of psychic phenomena see Vegetti (1993); on strength and the will see Mansfeld (1991), esp. 114 ff.

<sup>75</sup> Plut. *De Stoic. Rep.* 1034D (*SVF* 1.563).

<sup>76</sup> See further *infra*, pp. 85 f.

<sup>77</sup> On this and related aspects of *PHP* see Vegetti (1986); on Galen’s ideas on scientific progress as an aspect of tradition see also De Lacy (1972), esp. 33 ff., Hankinson (1994b). The association of philosophy and medicine is by no means novel; cf. Plato’s *Timaeus* 81-89 and the recommendation of Hippocrates’ method, *Phaedr.* 269e ff. Cf. Lloyd (1991), esp. 403. Arist. at *De resp.* 480b23-30 and *De sensu* 436a17-b1 points out that the more accomplished philosophers conclude with the principles of health and disease, whereas the more sophisticated doctors say something about nature and derive their principles therefrom. For Galen and the doxographic tradition, see *infra* pp. 61 ff.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. *Lib. Prop.* p. 94.26 ff. Müller with Mansfeld (1994) 171 f.

terminological innovation (καινοτομία).<sup>79</sup> Those who, like Chrysippus, are too obviously deviant to be thus enlisted are castigated for their sectarian contentiousness (φιλονεικία). Turning their back on the tradition, they have set up philosophical sects of their own—an attitude which Galen puts down to megalomaniac lust for glory. Galen's own Platonism and Hippocratism shielded him from the charge of contentiousness, since it marked him out as a true adherent of the ancients while leaving ample room for innovations.<sup>80</sup>

This orientation towards philosophical and cultural origins is not peculiar to Galen. Platonists such as Porphyry likewise appeal to what they call the 'old account', the παλαιὸς λόγος, i.e. the body of insights entertained by the men of old.<sup>81</sup> Galen too uses the expression παλαιὸς λόγος (or similar formulas) with reference to his unitary tradition, or at least in its earlier stages.<sup>82</sup> What marks him out is his firm exclusion of pre-philosophical thought and poetic myth.<sup>83</sup> Accordingly, he does not associate the παλαιὸς λόγος with any thinkers before Hippocrates and Plato.<sup>84</sup> Furthermore, he insists that

<sup>79</sup> Similarly e.g. Plotinus, *Enn.* II 9.6.1, who associates καινοτομεῖν, ἰδία φιλοσοφία and ἔξω τῆς ἀληθείας.

<sup>80</sup> See Lloyd (1991), esp. 411 f.

<sup>81</sup> See Hadot (1987), esp. 23 ff., Dörrie (1967) esp. 406 f. On the παλαιὸς λόγος and its epistemic value in Plato (e.g. *Phae.* 70c, *Tim.* 20c-d, 21a) see Andresen (1955) 111-14. The fact that the παλαιὸς λόγος of *Tim.* 20 c-d is also an ἀληθὴς λόγος appears to have stimulated the equation of the two notions by Platonists such as Celsus, who wrote an anti-Christian work entitled 'Ἀληθὴς λόγος, cf. Andresen (1955) 117.

<sup>82</sup> *PHP* 2.8.20, 3.1.30, 4.3.3, 7.1.9; παλαιὸν δόγμα or παλαιὰ δόξα, e.g. 4.6.31; 5.1.5, 8; 4.7; 4.6.30, 42; he also speaks of οἱ παλαιοί, referring to Hippocrates and Plato but also Pythagoras, Aristotle and Theophrastus, see 4.2.44-3.1, 7.38 f., 5.2.2, 6.1.1-2, 2.3.12. In these passages Galen is bent on playing Chrysippus off against the 'the ancients'; the derogatory label typically used in connection with Chrysippus' divergence is φιλονεικία, see further De Lacy's Index nominum s.v. παλαιοί.

<sup>83</sup> See esp. his reaction to Chrysippus' allegorical interpretation of the myth of Athena's birth from the crown of the head of Zeus, quoted 3.8.3-19 (*SVF* 2.908). Having submitted an alternative interpretation conforming with anatomical fact (*ibid.* 29-32), he points out that allegoresis is no substitute for scientific premises based on sense-perception and experience, and adduces Plato's rejection of allegoresis, *Phaedr.* 229d3-e4 (*ibid.* 33-37). On the classification of poetic testimonies as rhetorical and unscientific see also *PHP* 2.4.4, 3.2.18, 7.47.

<sup>84</sup> See the passages referred to *supra*, n. 82; Pythagoras is an exception but it was Posidonius who mentioned him as anticipating Plato's psychology; and Galen, though citing this view of Posidonius with no sign of disapproval, gives Pythagoras no role to play in the rest of his argument; see further pp. 77 f. The idealized vision of early man enjoying a larger share of insight—accepted by many Stoics (but cf. also Pl. *Phil.* 16c-e, *Plt.* 272b-c), is absent from Galen. In Galen the nearest we have to this idea would appear to be his idyllic vignette of Hippocrates and his entourage, *AA* III 2: II 346.15-347.2 K; IV 2: II 421.18-422.6, IV 4: II 439.18-440.3 K;



tenets should not be accepted on authority but tested in independent-minded research. In principle, the doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates stand in need of justification as well.<sup>85</sup>

This position is also reflected in the classification of four types of argument in books 2 and 3. Here (untested) references to philosophers and other authorities are classed as rhetorical. Unlike both demonstrative (apodeictic) and dialectical premises, they do not pertain to actual features of the subject under investigation and so are inappropriate to scientific discourse (2.3.8-11; 4.3-4). The use of expert authorities is aligned with the testimony of non-experts like poets and with common opinion. Galen cites with approval a view expressed by Plutarch in his *Homeric Studies* that the poets can be made to speak in favour of all doctrines (3.2.18, fr. 125 Sandbach).<sup>86</sup> In books 2 and 3 he reprimands Chrysippus for attaching independent value to what classical poets and other non-experts say. Yet there is also another side to Galen's attitude which is particularly relevant to his argument in books 4 and 5. Galen also claims that the poets, if called upon, actually testify in favour Plato rather than the Stoics.<sup>87</sup> At 2.2.5 he even envisages a contest to decide who—Plato or Chrysippus—has a majority of poetical and other non-expert testimonies on his side. And when he summarizes his argument in *PHP* at *On the Affected Parts* III 5, he does not fail to include a few lines of verse which lend support to Plato. One of the passages concerned—Homer's

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IX 2: II 716.8-13 K. On Galen's Hippocratism see Lloyd (1991), Harig and Kollesch (1975). On his Platonism see the preliminary survey by De Lacy (1972).

<sup>85</sup> E.g. *PHP* 3.4.31 (the intelligent person does not believe the mere statements of even the wisest men, but 'waits for the proof'); *Nat. Fac.* III 10, *SM* III, p.231 Helm.; *Hipp. Epid.* II 27, p. 91 Wenkeback-Pfaff; *QAM* 9, *SM* II, ch. 9 p.64.9 ff., with Walzer (1949b) 51; Lloyd (1988) 15. In this last tract, however, the appeal to authority in practice provides the main backing for his own positions; cf. also Lloyd (1988) 38. On *PHP* see esp. Vegetti (1986) 236 ff., esp. 239 f. A similar attitude is sometimes adopted by authors such as Cicero, cf. *ND* 1.10, *Luc.* 8-9; *Tusc.* 5.83; cf. 4.7 (stating an eclectic attitude in terms closely similar to Galen, *Lib. Prop.* 1 p.94.26 ff.). Cicero was no doubt inspired by such earlier Academics as Arcesilaus and Carneades, who could point to the spirit of open-ended debate to be found in Plato's Socratic dialogues; cf. Sedley (1989) 102.

<sup>86</sup> Conversely, the author of the ps.Plutarchean *De Homero* takes the fact that Homer has provided the 'seeds and starting points' for all philosophical schools as evidence of the poet's wisdom (B 92). In its present form, this tract cannot be by Plutarch himself but it may at least in part be based on a collection of material made by Plutarch for his *Homeric Studies* and other works; see Kindstrand (1990) p. VIII; cf. Babut (1969) 162, who less plausibly suggests that Galen refers to the *De Homero* but is mistaken as to the title.

<sup>87</sup> E.g. *PHP* 2.2.5, 3.3.1-2, 3.7.47, 3.8.37.

description of Tityos' punishment in Hades (*Od.* 11.576-81)—serves as the finale of his proof concerned with the liver (*PHP* 6.8.77-83).

Some theoretical pronouncements at the end of book 5 further explain his attitude to the use of poetry in scientific, or philosophical, contexts (7.83-88). Having just cited *Rep.* 441a, containing a quotation of *Od.* xx.17, Galen is led to pronounce on the proper use of witnesses like Homer which, he says, is exemplified by Plato. He distinguishes (1) timing: one should not begin by calling upon witnesses but only do so after full proof has been delivered (cf. 3 8.35); (2) subject-matter: witnesses should not be called upon 'to testify about matters that are utterly obscure but either about evident phenomena or about things the indication (ἔνδειξις)<sup>88</sup> of which lies close to sense-perception' (84). The emotions are a case in point. Here no extended or detailed proofs (ἀποδείξεων) are called for; a simple reminder of what we experience (πάσχομεν) is adequate.<sup>89</sup> Indeed, the difference between the soul's powers as such (i.e. the Platonic tripartition) is obvious for all men (cf. p.358, 13, 29: ἐνάργειαν).<sup>90</sup> Thus Plato quoted Homer merely to illustrate the opposition between anger and reason; he consistently refrained from the quotation of verse with regard to their location, which is not obvious and so does not meet condition (2).<sup>91</sup>

<sup>88</sup> I.e. an inference which is not merely empirical, but proceeds from the 'actual nature of the thing', see *MM* II 7, X pp. 126-7 K., *Nat. Fac.* II 9, II p. 124 K. *Subfig. Emp.* 1-2 Walzer. Cf. the concept of indicative sign, which Sextus regards as the invention and hall-mark of dogmatic philosophers and rationalist physicians, *M.* VIII 154-6. Galen, *Inst. Log.* 11.1, p. 24 Kalbfleisch sharply differentiates between ἔνδειξις and ἀπόδειξις on the ground that the former does not proceed by the rules of the syllogism. *Pace De Lacy ad loc.*, the fact that concept of ἔνδειξις at *PHP* 5.7.84 has its technical meaning is supported by Galen's example of the bodily effects of the affections of the soul, e.g. the heart's palpitation, which Galen considers an indication as to the location of some of the functions of the soul: 2.7.17 (note p.154.32 ἐνδειξεται and the reference to the heart's *natural*—κατὰ φύσιν—state, *ibid.* 1.29); cf. *PHP* 2.8.24; 3.1.26-33; 8.1.23.

<sup>89</sup> The whole passage (7.83-84) is printed as Posidonius F 156 E.-K. (cf. T 87). Yet the precise extent of the Posidonian reference must remain uncertain—except perhaps for the point about our experiencing the passions immediately; Kidd *ad F* 156 (Vol. II (ii) 566-8) is strongly in favour of taking the whole passage as Posidonian.

<sup>90</sup> 7.86, p. 358.13 f. διὰ ... τὴν ἐνάργειαν τοῦ πράγματος οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς οὐχ οὕτω γινώσκει. 87, p. 358.20: τοῦτο ... ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι γινώσκουσι...

<sup>91</sup> Cf. 5.7.75-6. Galen does not say here that Plato also quoted Homer at the end of his argument: condition (1). But he probably takes him to satisfy this condition as well; cf. § 82. Note, however, that at 6.8.80 (on which see *supra* in text) Galen, concluding his proof about the function of the liver with a Homeric quotation, clearly means to comply with condition (1) (cf. 77), but flouts condition (2), if the seat of the mind is considered unclear, as it is according to 5.7.87 (and many others

A well-established tradition of anti-Stoic polemic sought to prove the Stoics at variance with the common notions, which they used as their 'natural criteria of truth'<sup>92</sup> in virtue of their clarity (ἐνάργεια).<sup>93</sup> An extant treatise dedicated to this line of criticism is Plutarch's *On the Common Notions Against the Stoics*.<sup>94</sup> Comparison is surely encouraged by Galen's discussion of the criterion of truth at 9.7.2-4, where he aligns the Stoic common notions (κοινὰ ἔννοιαι) with his own concept of phenomena evident to all mankind, which is also at issue at 5.7.84.<sup>95</sup> Thus Chrysippus' statement (4.5.6 = SVF 3.476, fifth text) that the affections move at random (εἰκῇ), i.e. without a cause, is denounced as conflicting with the conceptions (ἔννοιαι) of all men.<sup>96</sup> Galen considers the fact in question ('nothing happens without a cause') logically obvious (*ibid.* 7).

In *PHP* 4-5, the evident facts about mental life are for the most part adduced by Chrysippus. Evident, universal truth obtrudes itself even on the minds of those who try to deny it. Thus Chrysippus (who gives Plato's *arguments* less than their due<sup>97</sup>) often contradicts his professed doctrine by making statements consonant with the teachings of Plato and Hippocrates.<sup>98</sup> Conversely, he cannot propound his own doctrine without contradicting his true statements as well as the obvious facts.<sup>99</sup> The way clear and common perception and self-

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passages). Hence either only one of the conditions of 5.7.84 suffices or Galen is simply inconsistent; cf. also *Loc. Aff.* III 5, referred to *supra* in text.

<sup>92</sup> So Alex. Aphr. *Mixt.* p. 218.10-21 (not in SVF).

<sup>93</sup> On clarity (ἐνάργεια) as characteristic of the common conceptions cf. Alex. *Mixt.* pp. 217.32-218.1 Bruns (SVF 2.473, p. 155.24-30) and *ibid.* p. 227.12-17 (SVF 2.475, p. 156.19-23); cf. *ibid.* 227.20-22; cf. Plut. *Comm. Not.* 1074B, 1079A, F.

<sup>94</sup> On this treatise see Babut (1969a) 34 ff., Cherniss (1976) 397 ff., 622 ff.

<sup>95</sup> The Stoic concept of 'common notions' in the technical sense, which the Stoics saw as the 'seeds' of their system, is not co-extensive with common opinion; cf. Todd (1973), who takes a rather (perhaps too) restrictive view; cf. also Schian (1973) 134-74. But if there is a difference, it is blurred by the polemicists; cf. Cherniss (1976) 625 ff.

<sup>96</sup> These conceptions are aligned with Aristotle and Plato, who are said to represent the 'ancient account' (see *supra*, p. 40) and to reflect 'the nature of things' (4.5.7).

<sup>97</sup> On Chrysippus' reticence about Plato's doctrine see e.g. 4.1.15, 2.1, 3.6; his omission of an exposition of views and argument of opponents can be related to the principles of his dialectic as recorded elsewhere, see e.g. SVF 3.271 with Tieleman (1996a) 140 f., 264 f. Galen's view that Chrysippus completely failed to engage with Plato is false, see e.g. 4.1.7-13, featuring Platonic terminology in an anti-Platonic argument. In such cases Galen seizes on the Platonic terms to argue that Chrysippus is supporting Plato instead of refuting him.

<sup>98</sup> See *PHP* 4.1.5, 1.14 (where note the term ἐπαμφοτερίζω); 2.28; 3.6, 4.1, 4.3, 4.38; 5.1.9, 4.8, 4.14.

<sup>99</sup> E.g. 5.4.7-8, where note also the relation with the παλαιὸν δόγμα, which

contradiction are linked here is familiar from Plutarch's *On Common Notions* too.<sup>100</sup>

Plutarch also devoted a separate treatise to the exposure of Chrysippean inconsistencies, the *On Stoic Self-Contradictions*.<sup>101</sup> Indeed, Galen too contemplates making Chrysippus the butt of a similar treatise (4.4.1).<sup>102</sup> Interestingly enough, he presents an hors d'oeuvre: he plays off Chrysippus' definition of desire (ὄρεξις) in the first book *On Affections* against another one which was to be found both in the sixth book of his *Generic Definitions*<sup>103</sup> and his *On Conation* (or: *On Desire*, Περὶ ὁρμῆς, *ibid.* 2).<sup>104</sup> We hear nothing about the original context of the latter definition, and the two works from which they are taken are mentioned nowhere else in the Galenic corpus. It is therefore likely that Galen draws here upon a lost specimen of the tradition of compilations of Stoic self-contradictions. An analogous case is presented by the solitary definition of reason from Chrysippus' *On Reason* (Περὶ λόγου, 5.3.1).<sup>105</sup>

A related point of criticism raised by both Plutarch<sup>106</sup> and Galen concerns Greek usage. Chrysippus can only escape the charge of self-

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Chrysippus, Galen says, sought to discredit, thereby misusing his own intelligence. Further 5.1.8, 2.1; cf. 6.5.21; 4.2.44; 4.8; cf. 3.3.23 on the relation of poetic testimony to evident phenomena, on which see also *supra* in text. Cf. 5.1.10, where Chrysippus is said to refute himself and at the same time contradicts τὰ ἐναργῶς φαινόμενα, taken up at 11, p. 294.21 as τὰ πασι τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐναργῶς φαινόμενα.

<sup>100</sup> See esp. 4.4.38, 5.1.9, 4.8 and cf. Plut. *De comm. not.* 1068D, 1070E; 1062A-B; 1084D, with Cherniss (1976) 626, 629 f.

<sup>101</sup> On the nature of Plutarch's treatise see esp. Babut (1969a) 24 ff. and Cherniss (1976) 369-406, who argues that a failure to appreciate the sequence of thought of the treatise has often led to an overestimation of Plutarch's dependence on sources, whereas in fact his direct knowledge of Chrysippus' writings was intimate and extensive (p.396); cf. Babut (1969a) 235-38. On the other hand, if Galen used a compilation, such a source must have been available for Plutarch too. Still, comparison with Galen is justifiable and rewarding in view of the traditional component in the works of both authors.

<sup>102</sup> He seems eventually to have written such a tract, see 8.1.47-48 and *supra*, n. 33.

<sup>103</sup> ἐν ἑκτῷ τῶν κατὰ γένος ὄρων, which must refer to a separate work rather than pertaining to what at 4.2.1 are called the ὁρισμοὶ τῶν γενικῶν παθῶν, οὓς πρώτους ἐξέθετο—i.e. the definitions presented by Chrysippus in the first book *On Affections*. Cf. De Lacy *ad* 250.8, who, though inclining to the alternative view, suggests as the separate work referred to the Ὁρων τῶν πρὸς Μητροδωρον τῶν κατὰ γένος (six books), listed in D.L.'s Catalogue, see *SVF* II p.8.36; cf. *SVF* 3, Appendix II, nr. XLI, where two other possible references are mentioned.

<sup>104</sup> This work is, it seems, attested only one other time in ancient sources: see *SVF* III, App. II, nr. XL, where Von Arnim gives Epict. *Diss.* I 4.14, but omits our passage.

<sup>105</sup> On this work cf. *SVF* III, App. II, Nr. XXXIV.

<sup>106</sup> See e.g. *De comm. not.* 1073. Cf. Cherniss (1976) 641.

contradiction if we take his words in a sense different from common usage. Apparently, so Galen intimates, this is what Chrysippus expects us to do. This leads Galen to criticize his bad linguistic manners in general (4.3.6-4.34; cf. 5.7.26-33). This traditional motif fits in with some of Galen's fundamental intuitions about proper usage in scientific (and other) contexts: one should use ordinary Greek words (the συνήθεια τῶν Ἑλλήνων) in a consistent and unambiguous manner.<sup>107</sup> There is a characteristic grumble at 4.4.8 with respect to the sense of ἄλογον in Chrysippus:

He could have avoided all these ambiguities, fabricated so inappropriately and contrary to Greek usage (ὁ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθος), and made his argument exact and articulate in plain Greek words.

Likewise, at 4.3.4:

Right from the start one should avoid the kind of discourse that makes it necessary for one's audience to understand each word not in its usual meaning but according to certain other meanings.

The polemical edge here lies in the Stoics' claim that their concepts were firmly rooted in common usage (cf. 4.4.15; 2.12 = *SVF* 3.462).

With regard to introducing novel meanings, Galen warns us, the utmost restraint is due. In fact, it is justifiable only in those cases where common parlance lacks a proper term. But even so, new terms should always be modelled on it.<sup>108</sup>

Galen's remark that Chrysippus apparently expects us to take his words in a meaning diverging from standard usage is striking.<sup>109</sup> It recalls the Stoic acceptance of 'misuse' (κατάχρησις) in its strong sense, i.e. not just extended usage but 'the transference of a word-usage from an object which is properly (κυρίως) signified to another object which has no proper name (κύριον ὄνομα)'.<sup>110</sup> Galen no doubt

<sup>107</sup> On Galen's views on language see Von Müller (1892) 84 ff., Manuli (1986), Hankinson (1994a), von Staden (1995b).

<sup>108</sup> Cf. *Morb. Temp.* VII p.417 K. νόμος ἐστὶ κοινὸς ἅπασιν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ὧν μὲν ἄν ἔχωμεν ὀνόματα πραγμάτων παρὰ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις εἰρημένα, χρῆσθαι τούτοις, ὧν δ' οὐκ ἔχωμεν, ἥτοι μεταφέρειν ἀπὸ τίνος ὧν ἔχομεν ἢ ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς κατ' ἀναλογίαν τινὰ τὴν πρὸς τὰ κατωνομασμένα τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ καὶ κ α τ α χ ρ ῆ σ θ α ι τοῖς ἐφ' ἐτέρων κειμένοις. ἔξεστι μὲν τῷ μηδὲ φυλάττειν τὰ συνήθη τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ... καὶ πολὺ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις ἰατροῖς ὡς ἂν μὴ παιδευθεῖσι τὴν ἐν παισὶ παιδείαν... Cf. *MM* X p.55 K., *PHP* 5.7.26 ff.

<sup>109</sup> It is repeated at 4.3.5 with regard to Chrysippus' definitions of appetite (ὄρεξις) and desire (ἐπιθυμία); cf. *infra*, pp. 120 f.

<sup>110</sup> Definition given by ps.Plut. *De Homero* B 18; see Barwick (1957) 88-97, esp. 90 f., Atherton (1993) 162-7. Chrysippus wrote on 'Zeno's correct usage of words' (Περὶ τοῦ κυρίως κεχρησθαι Ζήνων τοῖς ὀνόμασι, D.L. 7.122 = *SVF* 3.617). This title

knows about and responds to this Stoic position. But it should also be noted that the principle found its way into the commentary tradition at large. Here the appeal to incorrect usage serves to *resolve* apparent self-contradictions instead of hammering them out.<sup>111</sup> Indeed, the polemical procedure of tracing (apparent) inconsistencies in one and the same author can also be viewed as an application of the time-honoured *Homerum e Homero*-rule in a polemical context.<sup>112</sup>

### 5. Galen the Commentator

This brings us to Galen's affiliations with the genre of commentary. Galen not only wrote commentaries himself<sup>113</sup> but also reflected on exegetical principles and methods involved in their composition. It may be worth our while to compare his views in this area with his procedures in *PHP* 4-5. Though not constituting a commentary in the formal sense, these books, with their extensive quotations, certainly bear comparison with the commentary genre.

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suggests that Galen's charge was levelled at Zeno in Chrysippus' time already.

<sup>111</sup> Cf. e.g. Philo, *De mut. nom.* 11-14, Porph. *In Cat.* p.55.10-14 Busse with Whittaker (1992) 67 f., 73 f. Similarly Porph. *ap. Simpl. In Cat.* p.30.13-15 Kalbfleisch (= Fr. 220 Smith); cf. also Hadot (1987) 19 ff. See Barwick (1957) 88-97; Runia (1988) 82-89, who traces the creative use of intentional κατάχρησις in the theological arguments of Philo; but cf. Whittaker (1992), esp. 70-1, who raises strong doubts as to whether the concept ever functioned in this sense outside Stoic circles. In the commentary tradition the appeal to κατάχρησις was made to harmonize apparently conflicting passages in authors such as Plato; cf. Whittaker (1987) 109 f. with further references. Likewise the supposed unanimity of Plato and Aristotle was illustrated, cf. e.g. Alcin. *Did.* 25 with Whittaker (1989) 90 f.; cf. also Moraux (1986) 138 ff.

<sup>112</sup> For Galen's knowledge of this exegetical principle see *Dign. Puls.* VIII p.958.6 ff. K., *Hipp. Vict.* pp. 183.15-184.2 Helmreich; cf. Mansfeld (1994) 148 f.

<sup>113</sup> *PHP* antedates the major commentaries on the Hippocratic treatises, though he may have begun the commentary on the *Aphorisms* and had completed at least two works on Hippocrates: *On the Elements according to Hippocrates* and *On Hippocrates' Anatomy* (lost), see De Lacy (1978) 55 f., 48, who shows that in *PHP* Galen quotes from the Hippocratic corpus with less discrimination than in his later works. While a young man, Galen had written ὑπομνήματα on logical works of Aristotle, Theophrastus and Chrysippus, see *Lib. Prop.* chs. 14-15, *SM II* p. 122.19 ff. Müller; cf. Ilberg (1897) 591 ff. On ὑπομνήματα as collections of notes not intended for publication see e.g. *Hipp. Fract.* III 32, XVIII A, p. 529 K. with Skydsgaard (1968) 107 ff. Note however that at 8.2.14, p.294.33 it refers at least to the published treatise *Hipp. Elem.* On Galen's practices as a Hippocratic commentator see further Manuli (1984), Manetti-Roselli (1994), Mansfeld (1994) 131 ff. Cf. Sluiter (1995), Vallance (1999). At 6.8.76, Galen points to the difference between the selective procedure of *PHP* and the style of a running commentary; cf. 8.2.13, for which see *infra*, p. 49. For his selective procedure in regard to Chrysippus, cf. 3.1.3.

A commentary, Galen argued in his (lost) *On Exegesis* (Περὶ ἐξηγήσεως), is not the place to test each tenet as to truth and to defend it against sophistic criticisms. Its proper goal (σκοπός) is rather to clarify what is unclear.<sup>114</sup> Clearly, the question of truth was raised by many other commentators (including, in practice, Galen himself).<sup>115</sup> Similarly, in his commentary on the third book of the Hippocratic *Epidemics*<sup>116</sup> he criticizes those who confuse commentary and instruction (διδασκαλία). The latter is concerned with explaining the facts in a detailed and precise manner, whereas commentaries do not provide proof (ἀπόδειξις). But they do presuppose it: the commentator brings to the Hippocratic texts a framework of theories (θεωρήματα, p.22.20 Wenkebach) and conclusions (συμπεράσματα, p.22.6 W.). The medical texts containing these are logically and chronologically prior to the commentaries. The latter provide the context for the discovery (εὑρεσις) not of truth, but of opinion (δόξα, p.22.13 f.). If Galen in his Hippocratic commentaries does advert to the question of the truth of the doctrines under discussion, this is because Hippocrates embodies his medical ideal in all respects. Yet on occasion he mentions truth (but not proofs) as one of the two main goals of the exegete (i.e. alongside a representation consonant with the intentions of the author).<sup>117</sup> His remarks recall the three successive stages of interpretation (viz. of the Platonic dialogues) listed at D.L. 3.65: (1) the meaning of what is said; (2) the author's intention in saying it (e.g. constructive, or in refutation and *ad hominem*); (3) the correctness of what has been said.<sup>118</sup> The first two stages were to become standard in Neoplatonist commentaries but can be traced back to at least the first century CE.<sup>119</sup> In Neoplatonist exegesis, obviously, the second stage blends into the third one, Plato's philosophy

<sup>114</sup> See esp. the programmatic statements in *Hipp. Fract.* XVIII.2 pp.318.1-22.2 K. summarizing what he had said in his *On Exegesis*. Cf. Roselli (1990) 121, Barnes (1992) 271, Mansfeld (1994) 136 f., 149 ff. For the procedure of clarification see further *Diff. resp.* VII p.825.6-7; *Hipp. Vict.* pp. 183.15-184.2 Helmreich.

<sup>115</sup> Cf. *Hipp. Aph.* XVII.2 pp. 561.4 ff. K. with Mansfeld (1994) 135 f.

<sup>116</sup> *Hipp. Epid. III*, CMG V 10,2,1 p. 22 ff. Cf. Deichgräber (1930) 24, Manuli (1983) 476 f.

<sup>117</sup> *Hipp. Epid. III*, p. 17.16-18 Wenkebach; cf. *ibid.* p.6.11, where the instruction into useful things appears instead of truth without any real difference being implied; cf. Deichgräber (1930) 24.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. Dörrie - Baltes (1993) 3, 169 f., 353 ff.

<sup>119</sup> Cf. Dörrie - Baltes (1993) 3, 170, who trace the scheme (which became standard in Neoplatonism) back to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De comp. verb.* 3, II 4.6 ff., *Ad Pomp. Gem.* 2,13 II 230.13 ff. U.-R.; cf. Dionysius Thrax *ap. Sext. M I* 59 (cf. *ibid.* 301), Gal. *In Tim.* p.10.31 ff. Schr.

representing truth. Clearly Galen is in a similar position in regard to Plato and Hippocrates. In the case of Chrysippus and other opponents, moreover, the test as to truth often leads to negative results though not invariably so. As to Chrysippus, Galen states a twofold purpose: first, to explicate his meaning; secondly, to show how far he is mistaken.<sup>120</sup> The addition, now and then, of the question of truth shows that there is no unbridgeable gap separating commentaries and dialectical discussions involving the *ipsissima verba* of philosophers.

So it should occasion little surprise to find Galen applying exegetical principles in philosophical contexts. The exegetical concern with clarity often takes the guise of a charge of unclarity (ἀσάφεια).<sup>121</sup> This usually concerns obscurity *in malam partem*—i.e. the intentional variety. But at times an opaque passage of Chrysippus encapsulates a valuable element waiting to be uncovered by an insightful person such as Galen.<sup>122</sup> In addition, we should note a few cases where Chrysippus is credited with clarity of expression (3.1.18, 5.38).

Another exegetical principle relevant to our purposes is that of selection. In *PHP* 4 and 5 Galen is quite explicit about his intention to limit himself to Chrysippus among the Stoics<sup>123</sup> and, within the compass of the latter's work, to what he considers his main arguments.<sup>124</sup> This conforms to his characterization of his procedure in his *On the Elements According to Hippocrates*, which is an exegesis of the Hippocratic *On the Nature of Man*:

<sup>120</sup> See esp. 4.1.5, where Galen specifies as his aim as twofold: τὴν γνώμην ἐρμηνεύσαι τὰνδρὸς [scil. Chrysippus; cf. (1) and (2)] ... ὅπῃ σφάλλεται δεικνύναι (cf. 3).

<sup>121</sup> *PHP* 2.5.54, 3.3.5, 4.7, 4.8, 4.10, 4.4.8. Cf. also 2.3.1, where Galen refers to his 'clear and full' explanation in the *On Demonstration* of the 'rather unclear and brief' statements of the ancients, i.e. in particular Aristotle in his *Analytics*. On the clarification of what is unclear as one of Galen's exegetical principles see esp. *Hipp. Fract.* XVIII B 318-19, 327-8 K., *Diff. Resp.* VII 825 ff. K. with Barnes (1992) 269 ff., Mansfeld (1994) 148 ff.

<sup>122</sup> 2.5.71, 5.94 f. on *ibid.* 69-70 (= *SVF* 2.898). Of course this kind of assistance to an author who is thus shown to be on the right track is even more common in the case of Plato and Hippocrates. On Galen's method of creative exegesis see also Mansfeld (1994) 155 ff.

<sup>123</sup> *PHP* 4.1.3; 5.6.40-42.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. 3.1.8: although Galen, in connection with book 2, speaks of a selection of Chrysippus' arguments on the basis of their relative strength, it is clear that he had intended to limit himself to this selection in book 2 (3.1.6 ff.) and devote book 3 to an entirely different subject (apparently not involving Chrysippus). As it was, he was challenged by a Stoic to refute all Chrysippus' arguments and this is what he embarks upon in book 3, this time following the order of the arguments as he found them in Chrysippus' text.



It does not explain every word as writers of exegeses commonly do; rather it comments only those statements which contain the doctrine, along with the proofs belonging with it (*PHP* 8.2.13).

This is confirmed by a few passages from *PHP*. At the beginning of book 3 Galen announces that he will treat those arguments of Chrysippus which he had omitted from book 2 and would never have considered in book 3 were it not for the fact that he was challenged by an 'eminent sophist' to refute them as well. In line with the same procedure as he had followed with regard to the Hippocratic *On the Nature of Man*, Galen had initially concentrated on what was strongest in the proof presented by Chrysippus in his *On the Soul*, that is to say on the most important arguments (*PHP* 3.1.5-8). Similarly he says that he will concentrate on the main points of Plato's argument in the fourth book of the *Republic*, that is to say he intends to quote only those passages which he believes contain these highlights. Interestingly he adds that everyone can easily read the full text for himself if he so wishes (5.7.34). Some of the Stoic treatises exploited by Galen may have been less accessible than *Republic* 4 appears to have been from the passage just referred to. But it seems doubtful that even the possibility of checking certain claims made by Galen against the statements of Chrysippus or other Stoic scholars in their original contexts would have served as some guarantee that Galen's presentation remained reasonably balanced.

Galen's orientation towards the philosophical past (on which see § 3) tends to enhance the philological streak of *PHP* 4 and 5, with their extensive quotations from philosophers and poets.<sup>125</sup> In a sense, Galen is engaged in determining, on the basis of his quotations, who belongs to the great tradition and who does not. Real or apparent discrepancies of doctrine and terminology are explained or harmonised; obscurities clarified; alleged misinterpretations set straight.<sup>126</sup> His treatment of Chrysippus, however devastating as to its conclusions, is presented as a comparison of his exact words with those of Plato and Hippocrates, i.e. an examination of what the Stoic actually

<sup>125</sup> On this aspect of the work see esp. Vegetti (1986) 230 ff. Vegetti rightly points to Galen's selective procedure in citing texts, but his suggestion that Galen offers a kind of anthology for an audience—consisting largely of practitioners of the τέχναι—who did not possess the original works themselves is at least in Plato's case incompatible with 5.7.34 (see in text).

<sup>126</sup> One of the many grudges Galen bears against the members of the philosophical and medical sects of his day is that they misrepresent what their founders actually said in their written works; cf. De Lacy (1972) 27.

wrote (4.1.3, 6; 5.6.40-2) and an interpretation or exegesis of his meaning (τὴν γνώμην ἐρμηνεύσαι τάνδρὸς, *ibid.* 1.5, τὴν ῥῆσιν ἐξηγησάμενος αὐτοῦ, *ibid.* 1.15, 4.10).

This exegetical style of philosophizing had developed under the influence of such commentators as Andronicus of Rhodes and Boethus of Sidon (first century BCE).<sup>127</sup> Systematic philosophy was taught mainly on the basis of the major works of the great classical philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Chrysippus.<sup>128</sup> Accordingly, authors wishing to make a philosophical point often did so through citation.<sup>129</sup> That philosophical discussion could become predominantly exegetical appears from those passages where Galen speaks of his dispute with opponents on obscure textual details.<sup>130</sup>

Naturally enough, then, philosophical polemic often took the form of criticism of the writings of the founder (or most authoritative philosopher) of the school of one's opponents, who were thus involved in the attack without being separately or explicitly refuted. In the 2nd century CE Chrysippus was the recognized authority for Stoic doctrine; his treatises were still studied and used for teaching purposes in the Stoic schools.<sup>131</sup> In consequence, as we have seen, he is singled out by Galen for criticism, just as he had been Plutarch's favourite butt (4.1.3; 5.6.40-42).<sup>132</sup>

<sup>127</sup> Seneca complained: 'quae philosophia fuit facta philologia est' (*Ep.* 108.23). For the philosophical and exegetical traditions of Later Antiquity in the light of educational practice (esp. the preliminary stage in the study of an author) see Mansfeld (1994); cf. also Gottschalk (1985) 65, Hadot (1987) 14 ff.

<sup>128</sup> Of course the commitment of a school to the scriptures of one or more founders was essential to its cohesion and survival; cf. Sedley (1989) 100.

<sup>129</sup> Compare Seneca's homily against excessive reliance on quotations from philosophical authorities (*Ep.* 33). According to Seneca, one can only acquaint oneself with great minds by studying their texts as a whole, not just a limited number of highlights (4-6). Cf. also Iren. *Adv. haeres.* I 9.3-5, on which see also *infra*, p. 88 n. 97. Moreover, the use of their statements tends to come in the place of independent thought (7-9). But Seneca could be quite irreverent when he found the arguments of Zeno and other scholars useless for moral progress; cf. *Ep.* 82.9; 83.9; *Otio* 3.1.

<sup>130</sup> Thus he quarrelled with a Stoic on the correct meaning of the verb χωρεῖ in Zeno's syllogism concerned with spoken language (*PHP* 2.5.22). So Galen decides to quote and examine not only Zeno's original argument (*ibid.* 8) but also its more elaborate versions by Diogenes of Babylon and Chrysippus (*ibid.* 9-13, 15-20), which prove his reading of Zeno's argument correct. Cf. also 3.4.12-13, where Galen reports on a difference of opinion between him and certain Stoics on the one hand and other Stoic interpreters on the other with respect to an obscure passage in Chrysippus' *On the Soul*.

<sup>131</sup> On the evidence (mostly from Epictetus) that Chrysippus was the prime authority in Stoic circles of the time see Babut (1969a) 17-18; cf. Gould (1970) 12-14.

<sup>132</sup> Cf. Babut (1969a) 19 f. Cherniss (1976) 397 f.

6. *Galen's Working Method: The Selection of Texts*

Given the part played in our study by source analysis, it is worth considering Galen's procedure from a more practical angle as well. How did he actually go about composing *PHP* books 4 and 5? This question requires an answer which takes account of what is known about the working methods of ancient scholars. Explicit testimonies are however small in number and in some cases open to different interpretations. Galen himself is one of our main sources in this area. In addition, some extant papyri are silent witnesses to the stages followed in the process of composition and hence have added considerably to our knowledge. Modern research has succeeded in reconstructing from this disparate and sparse material a plausible picture of what authorial practice may have looked like.<sup>133</sup>

Ancient authors used a working method which differs in important respects from that of modern scholars. This difference is largely due to practical circumstances and constraints. Ancient scrolls were difficult to handle and less accessible than present-day books. Books were produced in small numbers. If one wished to refer to a particular passage in the work of another author, one served one's readers better by quoting it in full than to give just the reference. It was inconvenient to have to look up each passage in the original work. A scholar did not write with a number of scrolls spread out before them or having them within reach. As a rule, he would first read and make excerpts from a fairly up-to-date standard work. Having worked it through, he would move on to other relevant ones, both more recent and older than the first one. He would continue to make excerpts but gradually he would excerpt less, only making notes of what was different or new.<sup>134</sup> Accordingly Galen in *PHP* refers repeatedly to the procedure of excerpting (ἐκλέγειν) the Stoic treatises by Chrysippus and Posidonius he has singled out for use.<sup>135</sup>

A scholar did not always do the excerpting himself. More often he would dictate the selected passages to a slave, who collected the

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<sup>133</sup> For the following I draw on the researches by Dorandi (1991), with special reference to the important papyrological evidence, and *id.* (1993); see now also his more comprehensive discussion in Dorandi (2000). In addition I found much of use in Skydsgaard (1968) 101-16, who is concerned with Varro and other historians, Mejer (1978) 16 ff., who applies the results of Skydsgaard and others to Diogenes Laertius, as well as Van den Hoek (1996) (Clement of Alexandria).

<sup>134</sup> See Skydsgaard (1968) 105.

<sup>135</sup> *PHP* 3.3.1, 2.18, 2.40; 4.6.47, 7.1.

excerpts on a separate scroll. Alternatively, he could mark the passages in the original text and hand it over to the scribe to do the excerpting. The resulting collections of excerpts constituted the material for a draft out of which a publishable work could grow. An extant text of this kind is Philodemus' *Academicorum philosophorum index Herculanensis* (PH 1012). What we have here is a disorderly collection of notes, many of them jotted down in the margins and even on the back of the sheet.<sup>136</sup> These notes are not only excerpts from existing works but include introductions and transitional comments—possibly also dictated—by the author of the work in progress.<sup>137</sup>

Dictation seems to have been common, in particular during the earlier stages of composition.<sup>138</sup> Galen even reports on entire treatises he dictated to a stenographer without going himself through the text on a later occasion.<sup>139</sup> But in these cases the circumstances were unusual and led to a departure from regular procedure—which made it worthy of mention in the first place. Usually, his working method passes without comment. Nonetheless, it surfaces in a few passages in his *On My Own Books*, for instance where he says that he had generously lent to friends and pupils notes, or notebooks (ὑπομνήματα).<sup>140</sup> These were not intended for publication and so did not bear his name. Galen complains that they were stolen and published under other names and/or used by others for their lectures. Nonetheless a number of them were returned to him so that he could undertake their correction (διορθώσεις) and provide them with a title and his name, thus authorising the views professed in them.<sup>141</sup> Correction then constituted the final stage of composition.

<sup>136</sup> See Dorandi (1991) 15 ff.

<sup>137</sup> Cf. Plin. *Ep.* III 5.10-17 with Dorandi (1991) 14; cf. also 16 f.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. Dorandi (1991), esp. 25., *id.* (2000) 51 ff.

<sup>139</sup> See *Ven. Sect. Er.* XI pp. 19 f., 16 ff. K., *Praen.* 5.20-1. pp. 98 ff. with Nutton *ad loc.* Cf. also Dorandi (1991) 22.

<sup>140</sup> On the range of meaning of the term ὑπομνήμα see esp. Skydsgaard (1968), esp. 110 f., Dorandi (1991), esp. 26 f. Galen, *Hipp. Art.* III 32, XVIII A p.529 f. K. calls the second book of the Hippocratic *Epidemics* a ὑπόμνημα as opposed to the first and third books ('συγγράμματα'), whose more polished state marks them as finished products intended for publication. Note, however, that from the end of the Hellenistic period onwards the term is also used for published treatises marked by a loose structure. Indeed, some authors thought the less polished style well suited to their subject-matter, e.g. philosophical contemplation, as Clement of Alexandria did, see Van den Hoek (1996) 225.

<sup>141</sup> *Lib. Prop.* 1, p. 92.13 ff. Cf. *ibid.* 1, p.94.16 f., p.95.21 ff., 11. p.117.24 ff., p.118.13 f. Müller. See the discussion of these and other related testimonies in Dorandi (2000) 78 ff.

How far Galen's corrections went will have differed in each individual case. This seems clear from a comparison between e.g. his highly polished autobiographical show-piece *On Prognosis* and medical tracts of a more technical kind which were less ambitious from a stylistic point of view. On the whole Galen is notorious for his repetitiveness and incongruities of structure—and large parts of *PHP* do little to improve this reputation.<sup>142</sup> These compositional flaws are at least to some extent explicable on the assumption that Galen had dictated his expositions—in line with the widespread practice we have just noted. In particular, his repetitiveness seems to be a mark of orality, especially when the stage of dictation was not followed by rigorous editing. Presumably Galen did not always devote much time to polishing his writings himself. How else, one may well ask, could he have composed his prodigious oeuvre while at the same time fulfilling his professional and social duties?

Let us take a closer look at the principle, or principles, which governed the selection of excerpts in the first stage of composition. Some help is provided by one of the key passages on ancient methods of composition. This time it is not to be found in Galen but in Ammonius, *On Aristotle's Categories* 4.3-13 Busse:

Of the general treatises [scil. by Aristotle]<sup>143</sup> some are syntagmatic (συνταγματικά), while others are hypomnêmatic (ὑπομνηματικά). Hypomnêmatic are called those in which only main points are noted down; for one should know that in the past if one chose to compose a [publishable] treatise (συγγράψασθαι),<sup>144</sup> they recorded along main lines their individual findings which contributed to the demonstration of their thesis and they took many ideas from older books in order to strengthen those which were correct and to refute those which were not; in a later stage, however, bringing also a certain arrangement to their material and adorning it with beautiful expressions and stylistic elaboration they composed their treatises (συγγράμματα). And herein lies the difference between hypomnêmatic and syntagmatic treatises, viz. in order and beauty of expression.

This description, though associated with the name of Aristotle in particular, fits into the general picture we have sketched, including the relevant statements of Galen.<sup>145</sup> Ammonius confirms that it was

<sup>142</sup> On the work's compositional flaws see De Lacy (1978-80) 51 ff.

<sup>143</sup> In the context Ammonius presents a main division of the Aristotelian treatises into three classes, viz. general (καθόλου), special (μερικά) and intermediate (μεταξύ)

<sup>144</sup> Cf. Galen's usage as quoted *supra*, n. 140.

<sup>145</sup> On this and related testimonies see now Dorandi (2000) 84 ff. Cf. also

not necessary for an ancient author to go through both stages of composition; the first could suffice—as we have seen in Galen’s case.<sup>146</sup> Furthermore, Ammonius provides useful information concerning the principle of selection of excerpts. Concentration is focused on the main thesis along with the proofs backing it up. This bears comparison with what Galen in *PHP* says about his preferred style of exegesis as practised in his *On the Elements according to Hippocrates* (see above, p. 48 f.).

By our standards, ancient conventions of quotation paid little regard to context—whether in polemic or praise. As it was, many books were rare and difficult to consult; hence the need to make excerpts in the first place. Posidonius’ *On Affections*, which plays such a prominent role in the attack launched by Galen against Chrysippus, was a case in point. This treatise is referred to by Galen only.<sup>147</sup> Explicitly attested views of Posidonius on the affections or other ethical subjects come almost exclusively from Galen. A few other sources contemporary with or later than Galen, if they choose to mention Posidonius in connection with moral topics at all, do so in clusters of tenets, taken from compilations and not directly from the original expositions of Posidonius and the other philosophers concerned.<sup>148</sup> Later authors such as Strabo, Cleomedes and Alexander of Aphrodisias treat Posidonius as a thinker who was primarily known for his detailed investigations in such areas as meteorology and geography.<sup>149</sup> His philosophical influence in later antiquity has certainly been overestimated, not least because of his prominence in the *PHP*. The Stoics themselves at any rate do not seem to have been too impressed by Posidonius’ alleged critique of Chrysippean psychology. Galen complains that Posidonius’ attempt to assimilate Zeno’s

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Lucian, *On How History Should Be Written* 47-8, with Skydsgaard (1968) 107 f.

<sup>146</sup> As observed by Dorandi (1991) 29.

<sup>147</sup> See Frs. 30-35 E.-K.

<sup>148</sup> The relevant material from Galen (mostly) and these other sources is collected as Frs. 150-187 E.-K, i.e. in the section ‘fragments not assigned to books’. Posidonius appears relatively often in the clusters of Stoic authorities and their treatises mentioned in connection with a particular tenet by Diogenes Laërtius, see Edelstein-Kidd’s index, vol. 1, p. 259. But obviously these references do not presuppose direct inspection of the original treatises. Diogenes Laërtius, moreover, though usually dated to the 2nd or 3rd cent. CE., reflects the Hellenistic stage of ancient historiography and consequently reveals little to nothing about the standing enjoyed by Posidonius in the Imperial era. See Mejer (1978); cf. Mansfeld (1986) 300 ff.

<sup>149</sup> Cf. the assessment by K. Algra, s.v. ‘Posidonius’ in the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

position to that of the Platonists did not prevent 'nearly all other Stoics' from clinging to Chrysippus' errors (4.4.38, Posid. T 59 E.-K.) and he is even more explicit about Posidonius' lack of influence among later Stoics in his *The Powers of the Soul Follow the Temperaments of the Body* (pp. 77.17-78.2 Müller ~ Posid. T 58 E.-K.).

But if Galen seems exceptional in drawing on one Posidonian treatise in the original, this should not lead us to think of his project as historiographical according to present-day standards. He does not seem to have consulted any other works of Posidonius. Conspicuously absent is another treatise of direct relevance to the issues raised in *PHP*—Posidonius' *On the Soul*, in at least three books.<sup>150</sup> It is difficult to decide whether Galen was simply unable to take hold of a copy or had some less innocent reason to omit any mention of this treatise.<sup>151</sup> Likewise Galen, while referring to books 1, 2 and 4 of Chrysippus' *On Affections*, is silent on its third book.<sup>152</sup> His remark concerning the length of *each* of the four books *On Affections* (5.6.44) suggests that he had seen them all. Why he used the other three is not so difficult to see. The first book contained an exposition and exegesis of Zeno's definitions and was fundamental. The second was more aporetic, dealing as it did with ill-explicable phenomena, and so was useful as a quarry for self-contradictions and admissions of the truth on Chrysippus' part. The fourth, separately entitled the *Therapeutikon*, seems to have been a rather popular guide in moral self-improvement.<sup>153</sup>

Chrysippus' standing among the Stoics of the first two centuries CE ensured his role as the favourite target of critics such as Plutarch and Alexander of Aphrodisias. By this time, it seems, his treatises had almost completely eclipsed those of Zeno and Cleanthes. Galen too concentrates on Chrysippus, as he explicitly announces (4.1.3). But, as we have seen (chs. 1.5, 2), this does not prevent him from making confident and far-reaching claims about Zeno and Cleanthes, telling us that Chrysippus' immediate predecessors had accepted non-

<sup>150</sup> See Posid. Frs. 28a-b E.K. Cf. Mansfeld (1991) 122 f., 136 f., who notes the striking contrast with Galen's extensive dealings with Chrysippus' *On the Soul*.

<sup>151</sup> The fragments of this treatise (see previous n.) as well as F 21 (D.L. 7.138) strongly indicate that Posidonius followed Chrysippus and his other predecessors in taking the soul's substance to be *pneuma* and assigning no role to the nerves. See further, *supra* p. 36 f.

<sup>152</sup> Compare Galen's complete silence on the first of the two books of Chrysippus' *On the Soul*, even though he inserts a great number of quotations (some of them extensive) from the second half of its second book in *PHP* books 2 and 3; cf. *supra*, pp. 12 ff.

<sup>153</sup> See *infra*, p. 141.

rational factors in the soul and indeed the full-fledged Platonic tripartition.<sup>154</sup> The only textual support—taken by Galen from Posidonius—consists of a versified dialogue between anger and reason composed by Cleanthes (5.6.35 ~ *SVF* 1.570). But it is doubtful whether this proves that Cleanthes had subscribed to some form of psychological dualism at odds with Chrysippus' position.<sup>155</sup> As to Zeno, Galen excuses himself on grounds of lack of space for not producing a separate proof-text in his case; that is to say, he admits to not having looked up Zeno's position in an original treatise of his (*ibid.* 40-2).<sup>156</sup>

We should now try to derive some conclusions from this picture of Galen's working method. First, we are to a greater extent than we might like at the mercy of Galen as to what he considers important in an author and hence suitable for inclusion in his discussion. A neat illustration of this fact is the arrangement of subject-matter over *PHP* books 2 and 3. Whereas Galen, as we have seen (see *supra* in text), says that he has selected and discussed the most important arguments of Chrysippus in book 2 (e.g. the celebrated argument from spoken language, 2.5), it is the quotations presented in the first two chapters of book 3 which reveal a few crucial facts about the line of approach followed by Chrysippus, especially as concerns the status accorded to non-expert witnesses—one of the main targets of Galen's criticism.<sup>157</sup> Marginal points, minor concessions, remarks on the difficulty of the problem under discussion—all such cases could be easily exploited by skillful polemicists such as Galen (cf. Plutarch in his *On Stoic Self-Contradictions*).

Nonetheless there may have been certain factors which may, at least to some extent, curbed the tendency to irresponsible manipulation. Galen took part in oral debates with his Stoic contemporaries on the questions at issue in *PHP*. Substantial sections may be taken to reflect these discussions. In consequence, Galen may be expected to respond to those arguments of Chrysippus and other Stoics which their followers still found powerful enough to use. Thus the argument from speech was used by many Stoics as one of their trump-

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<sup>154</sup> 5.6.33, 36 (Zeno and Cleanthes accepted the Platonic postulate of a *παθητικόν* in the soul, a point which Galen says had already been made by Posidonius); cf. *ibid.* 6.42, 8.1.15 (the Platonic tripartition).

<sup>155</sup> On this passage, see further *infra*, p. 264 ff.

<sup>156</sup> On this startling passage, see *supra*, p. *infra*, pp. 85 f.

<sup>157</sup> See further Tieleman (1996a).



cards in the debate on the seat of the soul. In consequence, it prompts an extensive refutation on Galen's part.<sup>158</sup>

The preliminary stage of reading and excerpting described above should warn us not to be too quick in positing one main source. More often than not, the situation is complex. The same original could reach an author by more than one way. An author could first come across and excerpt a quotation from X in a work by Y he had chosen to read first of all. Later he could decide to expand and deepen his reading by turning to the original exposition of X and cull from it more excerpts which supplemented that drawn earlier from Y. There is thus nothing unusual about an author using the same sources both directly and indirectly.<sup>159</sup> This is confirmed by a few passages in *PHP* books 4 and 5. On one occasion Galen fabricates a contradiction between definitions in Chrysippus' *On Affections* and two other works. The definitions from these two other works (which are mentioned nowhere else in the Galenic corpus) are no doubt derived from an additional source. And, I would suggest, Galen found them played off against the definition from the *On Affections* in the same source as well.<sup>160</sup> Likewise, his information about Chrysippus' *On Affections* may in some passages be derived from Posidonius' work of the same title even if Galen had also read the former work directly himself and is drawing upon it on other occasions in *PHP*. This feature will be of relevance once we take a closer look at Galen's use of Posidonius in discussing the Chrysippean doctrine and text.

The ancient practice of excerpting makes it all too likely that passages were quoted out of context. The number of collected excerpts is limited in principle and one could not easily, or at any rate often did not, check the original context. Moreover, collections of excerpts were often used some time after they had been compiled. By that time the original reason why passages had been excerpted might have been forgotten. In consequence, some were used for different purposes which had little to do with their original context. At *PHP* 6.2.7 we have an instance of an excerpt being used in such a way. Here Galen produces *Timaeus* 77b3 f. as evidence that Plato spoke of 'forms' (εἶδη) rather than 'powers' (δυνάμεις) with reference to the soul. However, this quotation does not do this duty particularly well,

<sup>158</sup> See esp. *PHP* 2.5.7, 22, 3.1.8.

<sup>159</sup> Cf. Gal. *Hipp. Epid.* I, p. 43.21 ff. W., *Hipp. Off. Med.* III 22, XVIII B p. 863 K.

<sup>159</sup> Cf. Skydsgaard (1968) 105; Mejer (1978) 18 f.

<sup>160</sup> See *supra*, p. 44.

while constituting a clear illustration of the central thesis defended by Galen in *PHP* 6, viz. that the liver is the seat of desire. We need not doubt that it was first excerpted for this purpose when book 6 was projected.

In sum, the ancient method of composing treatises like *PHP* involves a fair amount of selectivity and makes it highly likely that the original context of quoted passages is lost sight of. In addition Galen is seen to be selective when it comes to choosing Stoic treatises or individual books—there are striking and unexplained omissions, which may be related to the limited availability of certain works or books. Add these facts to Galen's polemical style and motives and it becomes clear that we should expect grave distortions of Chrysippus' original argument. On the other hand, Galen could not, indeed would not, leave undiscussed those doctrines and arguments that were believed to be distinctive of the Stoic position and were still cited by the Stoics. Thus in regard to Chrysippus' *On Affections*, Galen singles out for criticism the central thesis that the affections are judgements and some of the main arguments supporting it (*PHP* 4.2 ff.). Here not his selection of material but interpretation of it may entail distortion from a present-day historiographical point of view. But when Galen proceeds to argue that Zeno and Cleanthes had said something significantly different from Chrysippus, it is the textual evidence again which seems very slim indeed. No original expositions by Zeno and Cleanthes have been used.

## 7. Conclusion

This chapter sets the stage for our detailed treatment of Galen's quotations from Chrysippus' *On Affections* (chs. 3-5). To this end I have sketched his overall aims and methods in the light of the traditions to which he is indebted. I have considered the general contents of *PHP* books 4-5 and their place in the structure of the treatise as a whole (§ 1); the philosophical and scholastic backdrop (§ 2-3); the polemical and exegetical literary traditions (§ 4-5) as well as Galen's technique of excerpting (§ 6).

It is difficult, and probably pointless, to assign *PHP* 4-5 to a single genre marked by a specific set of rules. Galen was a many-sided author, who practised various genres. So it is not surprising to see that elements from various genres and traditions are traceable in

these pages. The different genres themselves were not self-contained entities but may overlap and interact. Thus, as we have noticed, the ways in which he responded to the text of Chrysippus and others also owes something to his work as a commentator, in particular his method of creative exegesis (§ 5). In criticizing Chrysippus Galen provides himself with the context for developing positive doctrines (cf. also § 4). Particularly important in this respect are those Chrysippean passages which according to Galen point to an irrational element in the mind alongside a rational one. Thus he not only chides Chrysippus for denying this obvious truth but isolates useful insights, e.g. by clarifying what the Stoic said obscurely. In studying the Stoic fragments we should therefore be prepared to face a large degree of distortion from a present-day historiographical point of view. This is not so much a matter of low professional morals as of different conventions when it comes to dealing with texts. We shall encounter similar instances of creative exegesis in Galen's attribution of Platonic and Aristotelian ideas to Zeno, Cleanthes and Posidonius (chs. 2.8, 5.6, 5 *passim*).<sup>161</sup>

Of particular interest for our purposes is the fact that Galen follows procedures distinctive of later ancient philosophical literature. He is unmistakably indebted to the same tradition of Platonist scholasticism as is reflected by such authors as Clement, Porphyry, Alcinous, particularly where the essence/attributes and essence/powers distinctions are concerned. His dodging of the parts vs. powers issue, moreover, could be related to current debates between Peripatetics and Platonists as well as among the Platonists themselves (§ 2).

Further, Galen used, and expected others to use, the method of division (διαίρεσις) of available options in any given debate. This practice is related to his use of schemas, some of which can be paralleled from the relevant sections in extant doxographic texts. It is a fair assumption that such schemas determined the expectations an author like Galen brought to the original expositions (§ 3). In addition the actual mode of composition of treatises encouraged a disregard for the original context of passages borrowed from other sources (§ 7). Our survey points to an intricate interplay between memory, intermediate sources, direct consultation of texts, and note-

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<sup>161</sup> Cf. also his ascription of the Platonic tripartition-cum-trilocation to Hippocrates and the interpretative effort required by this move in *PHP* books 1-3 and 6; see also *supra*, p. 39.

taking. Galen's use of a limited number of options and authorities can be related to his projection into the past of a tradition of good philosophy and science (§ 4). The traditional ways in which the views themselves were phrased and assigned to authorities should also be studied against the backdrop of doxographic literature. Given the importance and complexity of the relevant evidence, the next chapter is entirely devoted to the doxographic tradition concerned with the parts of the soul.

## CHAPTER TWO

### DOXOGRAPHY

#### 1. *Galen and the Placita*

The term ‘doxographer’ is a modern coinage.<sup>1</sup> Its Latin counterpart ‘doxographus’ was first used by Hermann Diels in his monumental *Doxographi Graeci* (published in 1879) with reference to ps.Plutarch’s *Placita*, ps.Galen’s *Historia philosopha* and cognate abstracts to be found in Stobaeus’ *Eclogae physicae* as well as Theodoret’s *Graecarum affectionum curatio*. These, then, are extant specimens of the ‘doxographic’ tradition reconstructed, at least in its main outlines, by Diels and traced back to Theophrastus’ *Physical Opinions*.<sup>2</sup> It was typical of Diels’ style of working to pinpoint milestones on the way along which the *doxai* were transmitted. Thus Diels placed much emphasis on specific sources such as Theophrastus, Aëtius and, somewhere half-way between them (first cent. BCE), a work he called the *Vetusta Placita*, reflected by passages in Cicero and Varro (*ap. Censorinus*). In what follows I shall speak of the *Placita* tradition to designate the family of texts featuring in Diels’ work.

At face value, the appellation ‘doxography’ seems quite apposite for these jejune compilations of physical tenets labelled with the names of authorities and arranged according to traditional question-types.<sup>3</sup> In antiquity such compilations were used by a great variety of authors with different axes to grind. Some drew from them preliminary overviews of available options in the context of a systematic treatment of a particular issue. Others used them to create, in a Sceptical

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<sup>1</sup> On the origin, use and abuse of the term see Mansfeld & Runia (1997) 101 f. Cf. also Mejer (1978) 81 ff.

<sup>2</sup> The details of this reconstruction need not concern us here. Diels’ reconstruction of the *Placita* tradition as set out in the labyrinthine *Prolegomena* of the *D. G.* is conveniently summarized by Runia (1989) 245 ff. On the origins of Diels’ theory see Mansfeld and Runia (1997) ch. 1.

<sup>3</sup> But note that the text of Diels’ reconstructed Aëtius has preserved objections and traces of objections to a small number of the tenets. These then must have been a feature of the collection at an earlier stage of its transmission; cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3206 ff. (= XIII 2: ‘Dialectic in Aëtius’). Galen attests to the dialectical use to which doxographic texts put, see *infra* in text.

vein, a stalemate between competing doctrines. This last possibility was facilitated by the arrangement of the tenets to be found in many sections. Often a main opposition is presented between two schools of thought, followed by further divisions and refinements within each of the two camps. Often this diaeretic pattern is counterbalanced by intermediate or compromise positions.<sup>4</sup> This schematization, with its stress on tenets rather than names,<sup>5</sup> inevitably entailed distortions of the original doctrines. Philosophers (or physicians) are moreover made to pronounce on issues which arose when they were long dead; for example, 'Hippocrates' and several Presocratics are credited with views on the seat of the 'regent part of the soul' in its original Hellenistic sense (e.g. *Aët. Plac.* IV 5).<sup>6</sup>

Galen was one among many authors who knew and used the *Placita* tradition. A key text in this connection is *On the Affected Parts* III 5 (VIII, p. 157.3 ff. K.).<sup>7</sup> Here Galen charges the Pneumatist physician Archigenes of Apamea (*flor.* c. 100-120 CE) with contradicting himself in regard to mental afflictions and diseases: he believed the heart to be the affected part but at the same time prescribed treating the head.<sup>8</sup> Archigenes, Galen claims, thus neglects the many statements (or arguments, λόγοι) about the regent part which are the subject of dialectical debate (διαλεκτικῶς ἐρωτηθέντες, 157.17-18) and which indicate (ἐνδεικνύμενοι, 158.1) that mental disease should be cured by tending to the heart. Thus, Archigenes unjustifiably ignores the cardiocentric view as one of the options which are at stake in this dialectical debate.<sup>9</sup>

That the options at issue belong to what we today refer to as the *Placita* tradition becomes apparent from Galen's subsequent discussion. Dogmatists like Archigenes, he complains, cling to untenable positions because of their assumption that the whole body of tenets

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *supra*, pp. 34 f.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the comments on tenets and 'labels' by Mansfeld (1990b) 3058.

<sup>6</sup> This is merely confirmed by the Aristotelian anticipations (esp. *PA* Γ 4) pointed out by Mansfeld (1990b) 3212 ff. The opposition between Aristotle and Plato may have originally stimulated the inclusion of a separate section on this issue. For a relatively early Hellenistic witness, see Chrys. *ap. Gal. PHP* 3.1.10-15 ( *SVF* 2.885) with Mansfeld (1990b) 3167 ff., who speaks in this connection of the 'Vetustissima Placita', thus capping Diels' 'Vetusta Placita'.

<sup>7</sup> For what follows cf. the survey by Mansfeld (1990b) 3141-43.

<sup>8</sup> For the same point made against Pneumatist doctors and others, cf. *MM* XIII, X 928.2-932.17 K. with Mansfeld (1990b) n. 225 with text thereto.

<sup>9</sup> For a similar criticism as levelled at Chrysippus, see *PHP* 3.1.20 ff., 4.1.15 f. and cf. *supra*, p. 43 n. 97.

(δόγματα) of their school or sect will be wrecked by the abandonment of a single one of them. This assumption is foolish, since many of the tenets involved are not mutually consistent, so these dogmatists may give them up without betraying their sect as a whole. The seat of the soul's leading part is a case in point. Whether one locates it in the brain or the heart,<sup>10</sup> one is free to opt for various tenets on other physical questions without running into inconsistencies. Such questions include generation and decay, the soul's substance, the gods, the creation of the world and still others (*ibid.* 158.14-159.9). These questions, like that of the seat of the regent part, all correspond to chapters in the Aëtian *Placita*,<sup>11</sup> as does the mode of formulation in terms of polarities (e.g. 'Is the world created or not?'). The fact that Galen separates topics which have been combined in Aëtius suggests that his information derives from a fuller version of the *Placita*, which devoted separate chapters to these topics.<sup>12</sup> I shall revert to this point in due course.

Galen's reference to dialectical debates affords a rare glimpse of what may be called the *Sitz im Leben* of doxographic compilations. It is a fair assumption that this type of debate, with its traditional schemes of opposing tenets, is reflected by the relevant books of *PHP*, to which he refers in the following context (159.15-16).<sup>13</sup> It is noteworthy that he links these schemes to what he calls the 'rational (or dogmatist) method' (τῆς λογικῆς ὁδοῦ, 158.7), thus underlining their importance for his methodology, notably the procedure of making an accurate division of relevant doctrines when one starts an inquiry. Archigenes flouts this procedure, just as Chrysippus fails to draw up a complete diaeresis at the outset of his *On Affections* or to apply his own impeccable diaeresis in the *On the Soul*.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>10</sup> I.e. the main diaeresis of Aët. *Plac.* IV 5 and the relevant passages in related sources; cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3092 ff. Cf. *UP* I p.15.2 f. Helmreich, reflecting the same doxographic schema; cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3094 n.143.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Aët. *Plac.* IV 5 (seat of the regent part); I 24 (generation and decay), IV 2-3 (the soul's substance), I 7 (gods), II 4 (creation of the world), and for a full and detailed comparison Mansfeld (1990b) 3142. Against Mansfeld, Nutton (1999) 142 f. argues that 'there is no reason to think that Galen was here relying directly on a handbook to organise his thoughts'. But what Mansfeld means is rather that authors such as Galen were so familiar with the doxographic tradition that they did not need to look up things every time.

<sup>12</sup> As observed by Mansfeld (1990) 3142.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. also *PHP* 2.8.47 f., where he uses a lemma about the soul's substance derived from the *Placita*-tradition: cf. Aët. *Plac.* IV 3.3, 14 with Mansfeld (1990b) 3073 n. 48.

<sup>14</sup> See 4.1.14 ff., 3.1.20 ff. Cf. also 5.3.18 f., where Galen raises the question of

Elsewhere I have shown that the pattern of options in *PHP* 1-3 and 6 conforms to the schema known from the *Placita* tradition, viz. its section on the location of the regent part of the soul (e.g. Aët. *Plac.* IV 5).<sup>15</sup> This explains such features as his alignment of Hippocrates and Plato, or his blind spots in regard to certain authorities and doctrines, or to alternative interpretations of experimental results.<sup>16</sup> So it seems worth considering books 4 and 5 against the backdrop of the *Placita* tradition as well, particularly since it includes a separate section devoted to the issue of the (number of) parts of the soul (Aët. *Plac.* IV 4). The main questions are: How could Galen align Plato, Aristotle and Posidonius (with Pythagoras and Hippocrates added)? What does this tell us about the reception of these philosophers in ancient doxography? An answer to these questions may throw more light on Galen's habits and procedures and hence on what these authorities had meant in their original expositions. This is particularly important in the case of the relevant doctrines of the Stoics, notably Chrysippus and Posidonius, for whom Galen is our main source.

As I have noted, the study of doxographic reports should not limit itself to individual tenets, but also consider the way these have been arranged in each separate section. The 'prosopographic' approach, with its attendant disregard for aspects of schematization, is familiar enough from our present-day collections of fragments. But its drawbacks should be apparent. In this light, I shall be studying the way relevant doxographic sources treat the cast of characters staged by Galen (Plato and Pythagoras, Aristotle, the early Stoics, Posidonius). That is to say, I shall proceed by dealing with these sources separately instead of organizing my discussion around the individual philosophers involved.<sup>17</sup> I shall append a brief discussion of two relevant passages in Plutarch and Porphyry, who combine the use of similar doxographic schemes with their own reading of the original expositions. In this respect they were like Galen and so offer us an

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the substance of living bodies as relevant to the conception of beauty as a proportion of their elements.

<sup>15</sup> Tieleman (1996a) xxxiv ff.

<sup>16</sup> See Tieleman (2002); cf. also Mansfeld (1991) 139. Of course Galen also felt justified to cling to the Platonic trilocution by certain physiological observations and considerations, notably the automatism of the heart-beat.

<sup>17</sup> This account develops further the observations made by Mansfeld (1990b) 3085-89 on the section in the *Placita* concerned with the parts of the soul.



opportunity to compare their reception of the doctrines involved with the latter's mode of representation.

Our textual evidence is slim and derivative. It is even more fragmented than in the case of the seat of the soul. Here, as elsewhere, the nature of the various sources involved requires special attention. Yet I believe that a small detour will prove rewarding. In fact, there is still room for more work on the influence of doxography on accounts of the soul in antiquity and in Middle Platonism in particular.<sup>18</sup>

## 2. *Ps. Plutarch and Theodoret*

A section entitled 'On the parts of the soul' is to be found at ps. Plutarch, *Plac.* IV 4. The parallel section in Stobaeus is lost<sup>19</sup> but Theodoret in his *Cure for the Greek Affections* (*Graec. aff. cur.*), V 19-21, clearly depends on the same source as ps. Plutarch, viz. Diels' reconstructed 'Aëtius' (to be dated to the first or second cent. CE).<sup>20</sup> Ps.Plutarch reports that Pythagoras and Plato posited two parts, one rational (λογικόν), the other irrational (ἄλογον). This is called the 'highest explanation'. According to the 'ensuing and precise' explanation, the soul is tripartite (τριμερῆ): 'for they divide the irrational part into the spirited (θυμικόν) and appetitive (ἐπιθυμητικόν) parts' (IV 4.1).<sup>21</sup> The tripartite and bipartite schemes are thus explained in terms of one another.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>18</sup> But cf. Mansfeld (n. 7); Vander Waerdt (1985a), (1985b).

<sup>19</sup> For a trace of it, see however *infra*, n. 35.

<sup>20</sup> Mansfeld and Runia (1997) 319 ff. For doubts about the value of Theodoret as a witness to 'Aëtius' see however Frede (1999), esp. 138 ff., 147 f.

<sup>21</sup> The terms θυμικόν and, it seems, λογικόν as referring to soul-parts are not Platonic but Aristotelian in origin; cf. Arist. *De an.* 432a25, 433b4, *Top.* 12912-19. On the early Peripatetic interpretation of the Platonic tripartition cf. ps. Arist. *MM* 1182a24 f. Πλάτων διείλετο τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς τε τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄλογον ὁρθῶς, καὶ ἀπέδωκεν ἐκάστῳ [τάς] ἀρετάς τὰς προσηκούσας. The reference to the virtues is remarkable since Plato in *Rep.* 4 specifically grafts the four primary virtues onto the tripartite structure of the soul.

<sup>22</sup> Similarly Posid. *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 4.7.39 (= Posid. Test. 95 E.-K.), Cic. *Tusc.* 4.10, on which parallel passages see *infra*, p. 77 f., 293. Alcin. *Did.* ch. 17, p.173.5 ff.; cf. 24, 176.12; 5, p.156.35-6 Hermann; cf. also *Anon. Lond.* col. XV.26-30; XVI.33-44 Diels. Another tripartition is given to Pythagoras at D.L. 8.30: νοῦς, θυμός and φρένες. (Since the first two are shared by man with animals and the third possessed by man alone, the correspondence with the Platonic scheme extends somewhat beyond the mere fact of there being three faculties). M. Giusta (1964-7) vol. 1, 57 f. compares the Aëtian lemma and Cicero with *Tusc.* 4.10 (on Plato and Pythagoras) and D.L. 7.110 (on the eight parts of the soul according to the Stoics), explaining the correspondence by reference to a lost doxographic manual which dealt first

The familiar Stoic conception of the eight parts of the soul<sup>23</sup> is ascribed to the Stoics in general by both ps. Plutarch (IV 4) and Theodoret (V 20), who brings it more into line with the other doctrines by referring to the functions of the regent part as well.<sup>24</sup> Aristotle receives no lemma in ps.Plutarch,<sup>25</sup> but Theodoret reports that ‘the son of Nikomachos’ posited five ἐνεργείαι, viz. τὴν ὀρεκτικὴν τὴν θρεπτικὴν τὴν αἰσθητικὴν τὴν μεταβατικὴν τὴν διανοητικὴν, which coincides with Aristotle’s list at *On the Soul* B 3.414a31 f.

### 3. Tertullian

Galen’s younger contemporary Tertullian (c. 160-240 CE), *On the soul* 14.2 provides a glimpse of the *Placita* tradition at a stage older than that represented by ps. Plutarch and Theodoret<sup>26</sup>. In the preceding context (ch. 14.1) Tertullian draws on the same doxographic source when he appeals to the Sceptic Aenesidemus as well as Strato and Heraclitus for his view that the soul is indivisible. As we shall see, this

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with the division of the soul and next with its affections, i.e. the order followed by Cicero, *ibid.* 10-32. However, his reconstruction of what he calls a ‘Vetusta Placita di Etica’ (an allusion to one of the lost sources posited by Diels in *D.G.*), as part of his enterprise of uncovering a tradition of moral doxography, is now generally rejected; cf. e.g. Mansfeld (1998) 26. Among other things, Giusta confuses doxography in the strict sense (e.g. Aëtius) with the *On sects* literature instantiated by Diogenes Laertius and Arius Didymus. On Cicero (who is in many ways *sui generis*) and *Tusc.* 4.10-32, see further *infra*, pp 296 ff. The soul, including its location and division, traditionally belongs with physics rather than ethics.

<sup>23</sup> See Chrys. *ap. Gal. PHP* 3.1.10-15; D.L. 7.157 (generally Stoic). Cf. also Porph. *De an. ap. Stob. Ecl.* I p.350.13-18 (*SVF* 2.830); cf. Iamblichus, *De anima ap. Stob. Ecl.* I, p.368.12-16 W. (*SVF* 2.826, second text).

<sup>24</sup> That the Stoic and Platonic partitions are not commensurate is noted by Porphyry *ap. Proclus In remp.* I 234.9-17 Kroll (cf. *ibid.* 1-9 = Porphyry Fr. 263 Smith), with Dörrie (1959) 107 f.

<sup>25</sup> I fail to see on what evidence Diels, *D.G.* p.46 bases his remark that ps. Plutarch has conflated the lemmata on Plato and Aristotle in his sources as opposed to Theodoret, *Graec. aff. cur.* V 29.

<sup>26</sup> Diels, *D. G.* 203 ff. derived the scheme presented by Tertullian from the so-called *Vetusta Placita* via Soranus, the Sceptic Aenesidemus being involved as well. On the complex relations between this and other doxographic schemes concerned see further Mansfeld (1990b) 3085 ff. The text of *De An.* 14.2 presents various difficulties, notably the fact that Posidonius is said to have added *two* parts to a number of *twelve* as recognized by ‘certain Stoics’ but subsequently is given seventeen. Kidd (1988) (i) 547 may be right to suggest that this reflects a confusion between two systems of division in Tertullian himself and/or his immediate source, which therefore may be understood but not emended (e.g. so as to read ‘fifteen’ instead of ‘twelve’).

preliminary issue—which goes back to Aristotle<sup>27</sup>—is left out by almost all parallel passages as the result, no doubt, of a process of epitomization. Starting with Plato, whose name is associated with bipartition,<sup>28</sup> the reader is led through a numerically mounting series climaxing in seventeen parts distinguished by Posidonius (F 147 E.-K.). The parts themselves are not specified; several modern attempts—all more or less speculative, some downright frivolous—have been made to supply them. The quintet of faculties given to Aristotle,<sup>29</sup> however, must be identical to those listed in other doxographic reports in accordance with Aristotle's list at *On the Soul* B 3.424a31. This differs from Galen's attribution of three powers, but, as we shall see, it is a moot point how far we are entitled to speak of a genuine discrepancy.<sup>30</sup>

Views ascribed to Stoics predominate. Interestingly, Zeno, who is second on the list, is given three parts (SVF 1.144). Again, the parts are not specified and one would have liked to know what could have occasioned this number.<sup>31</sup> But it is noteworthy that Galen, taking his cue from Posidonius, is quite prepared to suggest that Zeno and Cleanthes had accepted bipartition along Platonic lines, i.e. a bipartition admitting of further subdivision so as to yield three parts.<sup>32</sup> This, then, constitutes an important parallel between Galen and the *Placita* tradition as reflected by Tertullian. Indeed, when the latter ascribes three parts to Zeno, it is highly likely that reason, anger and desire are meant, i.e. those three faculties which are elsewhere ascribed to Plato as well as Aristotle.

Galen, as we have seen, excepts only Chrysippus from the general consensus in favour of the Platonic tripartition. Tertullian (or rather the tradition to which he is indebted), by contrast, is concerned to convey the impression of disagreement among pagan philosophers, most notably the Stoics or (anonymous) groups of Stoics.<sup>33</sup> This may

<sup>27</sup> *De an.* A 1.402b1f., Γ 9.432a20 ff. Cf. *supra*, p. 22.

<sup>28</sup> See *supra*, n. 21; *infra*, pp. 77 f.

<sup>29</sup> Pamelius' insertion of <ab Aristotele> after *quinque* has found general acceptance; cf. Diels, *D.G.* p.205 and Waszink *ad loc.*

<sup>30</sup> See *infra*, pp. 74 f., 78 f.

<sup>31</sup> Zeno is on record as having posited the familiar conception involving eight parts; cf. *supra*, 38 n. 69. However, some caution is due, since sources may use his name merely to label the doctrine at issue as Stoic and so do not warrant firm conclusions about his position: see e.g. Stob. *Ecl.* I 49.34, p. 369.6 ff. W., Nem. *Nat. hom.* c.15, 72.7-9 (SVF 1.143).

<sup>32</sup> *PHP* 5.6.34 (Posid. T93/Fr. 166 E.-K.); cf. 8.1.14-15 (Fr. 38 E.-K.).

<sup>33</sup> Kidd *ad loc.* (p.545) observes that the particular form of this report—a series

explain why the division into eight parts—elsewhere given as generally Stoic—appears here as exclusively Chrysippean.<sup>34</sup> A few contributions from minor Stoics are added.<sup>35</sup>

The details of Posidonius' original scheme too will have to remain uncertain.<sup>36</sup> But that does not mean that we can discount the report altogether. Of particular importance is the fact that he is said to have proceeded from two headings, the ἡγεμονικόν and λογιστικόν. Do these headings correspond to the governing/subordinate and rational/irrational distinctions familiar from the Posidonian material in Galen?<sup>37</sup> I doubt that this distinction is particularly relevant here. At any rate, the heading of λογιστικόν suggests the familiar Platonic division into λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν, whereas a wider range of powers related to bodily functions (nutrition, motion) may have been subsumed under the ἡγεμονικόν.<sup>38</sup> This pair of series yields a parallel to the two series of psychic faculties attributed to Aristotle in other sources (see further below). We are strongly reminded of

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of conflicting dogmatic tenets—has a Sceptical ring. Note the mention of Aenesidemus at *De an.* 14.1 (see above in text).

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 31.

<sup>35</sup> Tertullian says that Apollophanes, a minor figure who had studied with Ariston of Chius (*SVF* 1.408), divided the soul into nine parts (*SVF* 1.405). His addition of one part to the canonical eight—hardly a momentous event—has no parallel in our sources. But it is interesting to note that his name occurs in one ms. of Photius' list of philosophers treated by Stobaeus in his lost section on the parts of the soul. The reference in Photius bears out the dependence of Tert. *De an.* 14.2 on the *Placita* tradition; cf. Stob. *Ecl. phys.* 49.7a (where Wachsmuth has inserted a lemma with Apollophanes' view) and Mansfeld (1990b) 3085. Apollophanes' neat little move was immortalized, presumably because it could be blown up into an instance of dissent from other Stoic opinions. Further, certain Stoics (anonymous) are said to have opted for twelve parts. This number may result from adding the traditional quartet of functions of the ἡγεμονικόν (φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις, ὁρμή, λόγος or αἴσθησις) to the eight parts of the dominant school doctrine; cf. Iambl. *De an. ap. Stob. Ecl.* II p.368.19-20 W. (*SVF* 2.826); *ibid.* p.369.6-9 W. (*SVF* 2.831); Aët. IV 21.1 (*SVF* 2.836), where not the sequel listing the eight parts (*ibid.* 21.2). This and the anonymity of the reference do not inspire confidence as to its historicity; see also *supra*, p. 38.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. the critical survey of proposals by Waszink (1974) 209 ff. and see now also Kidd (1988) (i) esp. 547 f. Theiler's suggestions (Commentary *ad* 396, pp. 329-334) are vitiated by a characteristic use of not explicitly attested material as Posidonian.

<sup>37</sup> As is suggested by Kidd (1988) (ii) 547 f.

<sup>38</sup> Kidd (1988) (ii) 548 refers to Sen. *Ep.* 92.1: *partes ministras, per quas movemur alimurque, propter ipsum principale nobis datas*. Cf. Porph. *De an. apud Stob. Ecl.* I, p. 350.13 ff. Wachsmuth (*SVF* 2.830): οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὀκταμερῆ τὴν ψυχὴν θέντες καὶ πέντε μὲν μέρη τὰ αἰσθητικὰ λαβόντες, ἕκτον δὲ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ ἔβδομον τὸ σπερματικόν, τὸ λοιπὸν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ὡς ἂν ἄρχοντος χώραν ἔχειν ὑπετίθεντο, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα μέρη ἐν ὑπηρετίῳ τάξει ἀπεδίδουσιν, ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ ἐξ ἄρχοντος καὶ ἄρχομένων συνεστάναι.

the fact that Galen too ascribes the tripartition to Posidonius (though without reference to any other division).

The impression one gets from *PHP* books 4 and 5 is that the governing/subordinate distinction is identical with the rational/irrational one and has a moral point. Here, moreover, Posidonius seems not to have kept the two series separate according to the contextual ethical/physical distinction. Thus he is credited with a rudimentary *scala naturae* in terms of the Platonic tripartition: non-rational animals possess only the spirited and appetitive parts—except for animals that are hard to *move* (δυσκίνητα) and are like *plants* attached to rocks: these are governed by desire alone. Man stands out as the sole possessor of reason (5.6.37-9). The same scheme underlies his distinction of three forms of οἰκείωσις, explained by reference to the behaviour of animals and children before the age of reason (5.5.1-8 = F 169 E.-K.). Here, too, Posidonius is said to explain movement and nutrition in terms of the Platonic tripartition, assigning these functions to the two non-rational parts.

Posidonius' hierarchy of the animal kingdom seems to be inspired by such Platonic passages as *Tim.* 76e-77d and *Rep.* 441a7-b3. But certain features, notably the reference to locomotion, indicate that Aristotelian passages may be involved as well. At *On the Soul* B 3.414a29 ff<sup>39</sup> Aristotle charts his well-known scale of living beings in terms of an increasing number of powers (δυνάμεις), viz. the θρεπτικόν, ὀρεκτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, κινητικόν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν. Plants have only the θρεπτικόν; animals possess the αἰσθητικόν in addition.<sup>40</sup> And, if the latter, then the ὀρεκτικόν as well. To facilitate this last inference, Aristotle divides ὄρεξις ('desire') into ἐπιθυμία, θυμός and βούλησις, arguing that these functions are more readily seen to presuppose the αἰσθητικόν than the general concept of ὄρεξις. In other passages Aristotle attributes, of the three forms of ὄρεξις, ἐπιθυμία or both ἐπιθυμία and θυμός to animals.<sup>41</sup>

The scheme ascribed by Galen to Posidonius thus represents a conflation of Platonic and Aristotelian elements. Whether it is due to

<sup>39</sup> As observed by De Lacy *ad loc.* (= *ad* p.334.4-8); cf. Jaeger (1914) 63-4, 104 n.2.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *De an.* B 2.413 b 2-11: sense-perception is characteristic of animals not local motion, for even *animals that do not move* have sensation; plants have only the nutritive faculty (θρεπτικόν).

<sup>41</sup> *De an.* 413b20-4, 414b3-6, 11-12, 414a29-b19; *EN* 1111a24-6, b6-13, 1116b23-1117a5, 1118a16-26; *HA* 448b21; *De sensu* 436a8-11. Of course Aristotle was influenced by Plato as well; see further Solmsen (1955).

Posidonius himself is moot point. In some sources apparently related to the *Placita* tradition, the ethical and psychological ('physical') lists of faculties are, on behalf of Aristotle, linked by the subdivision of the ὀρεκτικόν into anger and desire. I shall return to this point presently.

#### 4. *Ps. Galen*

The section on the soul's parts in our next source, the pseudo-Galenic tract *Philosophos historia* (ch. 24, p.615.1-10 Diels), is clearly related to that by ps.Plutarch, though it exhibits certain peculiarities which must be due to the use of other sources.<sup>42</sup> Like Tertullian, *On the Soul* 14.1, its author begins by raising the preliminary question as to whether or not one should assume parts of the soul at all. The Stoics in general are said to have distinguished *four* parts, viz. the λογικόν<sup>43</sup> αἰσθητικόν φωνητικόν σπερματικόν. Since the αἰσθητικόν encompasses the five sensory parts, this notice seems to constitute an abbreviation of the division into eight parts ascribed by Aëtius and Tertullian to the Stoics in general and Chrysippus respectively. Ps.Galen next ascribes to Plato the three parts λογικόν θυμικόν ἐπιθυμητικόν, in accordance with ps.Plutarch, though without reference to the 'higher' twofold division. There is a separate notice on Aristotle, who is said to have added the φυσικόν and the ζωτικόν to Plato's three parts.<sup>44</sup> In a sense, then, we have here another instance of the ascription of the Platonic tripartition to Aristotle. But it seems hard to parallel this and other features of ps. Galen's survey from the other reports. The λογικόν and φυσικόν correspond to Theodoret's διανοητική and θρεπτική ἐνέργεια respectively. Arguably, a similar correspondence holds between the ὀρεκτική ἐνέργεια and the θυμικόν + ἐπιθυμητικόν.<sup>45</sup> But if so, we are still left with two functions

<sup>42</sup> On this particular section see Mansfeld (1990b) 3086 f. On the nature of ps.Galen's tract and its relation to the *Placita* tradition see now Mansfeld and Runia (1997) 141 ff. Cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3069, 3164.

<sup>43</sup> On the assimilation of the rational parts and the ἡγεμονικόν, see *supra*, p. 37.

<sup>44</sup> For the ζωτικόν μέρος of the soul cf. Nemesius, *Nat. hom.* c. 22, p. 82.21-2, from a closely related context (see *infra* in text): καλεῖται δὲ φυσικόν μὲν τὸ θρεπτικόν .... ζωτικόν δὲ τὸ σφυγμικόν, further explained pp. 84.25 ff. Cf. *ibid.* 2, p.27.11 ff. (in connection with Aristotle particular); cf. Aët. IV 5.10 (ζ. placed by Pythagoras in the heart); Epiph. *Adv. haeres.* III 21 (*DG* p. 591.16).

<sup>45</sup> As suggested by Mansfeld (1990b) 3086 n. 116. This assumption can be shored up by reference to Calcidius, *In Tim.* c.223, p.238.10-11 Waszink (... *appetitus qui in perfectionibus invenitur animalibus, in quibus est cupiditas et iracundia* ...) and

specified by Theodoret (viz. the αἰσθητική and the μεταβατική ἐν ἐργείᾳ) and one by ps.Galen (viz. the ζωτικόν).<sup>46</sup> A closer parallel is provided by a few passages from Plutarch, where the αἰσθητικόν and θεραπετικόν (or φυτικόν) are added to Plato's three canonical parts.<sup>47</sup>

The harmonization of psychological terms of different provenance is typical of doxographic literature. Assimilation and modernization of terminology were bound to occur once tenets of various provenance were accommodated within a single diaeretic scheme. Moreover, some of our extant witnesses, such as ps.Plutarch and ps.Galen, betray the hand of the epitomator. Hence, in this section of ps.Galen, we find a condensation of the canonical Stoic list of functions. In regard to the lemma on Aristotle, it should be noted that the two functions added to the tripartition are at home in the context of physics rather than ethics. It would therefore seem that the division presented by ps.Galen and Plutarch results from a conflation of two original series of faculties, one ethical (the Platonic-cum-Aristotelian tripartition), the other physical and including functions such as the natural or nutritive (φυσικόν/θεραπετικόν), the perceptive (αἰσθητικόν) and/or vital (ζωτικόν). This conflation is made possible by the fact that both series feature a function covering cognition and appetition (ὄρεξις) in the physical series is analysable into the spirited and desiderative faculties of the ethical tripartition. Such an ethical/physical distinction may, as we have noticed, be presupposed by the two headings associated with the name of Posidonius in the abstract preserved by Tertullian (see above, p. 68). Not only this distinction but also two full lists are to be found in our next witness, Nemesius.

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Nem. *Nat. hom.* p. 73.8-12 Morani dividing the ὄρεκτικόν into the θυμικόν and ἐπιθυμητικόν. The latter two passages are from contexts related both to one another and to the *Placita* tradition; see further *infra* in text.

<sup>46</sup> Mansfeld (1990b) 3086 n. 116 argues that a correspondence obtains between θεραπετική + μεταβατική ἐν ἐργείᾳ on the one hand and the φυσικόν and the ζωτικόν on the other. He argues that ps. Galen offers what seems a simplification of the account from which both his and that of Aëtius' source are derived and that in a later stage the Platonic tripartition was ascribed to Aristotle in order to fill out the quintet traditionally attributed to him. But even so, the μεταβατική ἐν. remains without a proper counterpart in ps. Galen (on the ζωτικόν see next. n.) and the αἰσθητική remains.

<sup>47</sup> *De E apud Delphos* 390F, *De def. orac.* 429E.

5. *Nemesius*

The essay in Christian Platonism *On the Nature of Man* by Nemesius of Emesa (c. 400 CE) is remarkable for its wide reading in philosophical and medical literature. In chs. 15 and 16 (72.3 ff. Morani) the learned bishop presents a doxographic account of the parts of the soul which unmistakably belongs with the *Placita* tradition.<sup>48</sup> Interestingly, we find here combined a number of elements from the various sources we have been reviewing. Nemesius does not disclose his source, but we must note that 72.7-73.7 run parallel to the excerpt from Porphyry's *On the Powers of the Soul* (*ap. Stob. Ecl.* I p. 350.9-351.1 W. = Fr. 253 Smith; see further below). But at the same time this excerpt is in some respects less detailed than Nemesius' account.<sup>49</sup> Presumably, then, Nemesius draws on a fuller account by Porphyry than the one preserved by Stobaeus.<sup>50</sup>

Nemesius first addresses a preliminary question (which is not identical to that found in Tertullian and ps.Galen), viz. whether the non-rational element (ἡ ἀλογία) should be seen as a part of the soul or as a soul in its own right. To those<sup>51</sup> who point to non-rational

<sup>48</sup> See *D. G.* 49-50, taking Nemesius to have known the doxographic work by Aëtius (mentioned by the only other witness, Theodoret, *CAG* 2.95, 4.31, 5.16). See further Mansfeld and Runia (1997) 291 ff.

<sup>49</sup> But Porphyry, unlike Nemesius, links Plato's name to the tripartition and reports that Numenius assumed two souls (viz. a rational and an irrational one) rather than parts, cf. *infra*, n. 51.

<sup>50</sup> Porphyry often repeated himself; see Waszink (1962) p. LXXII (on Porph. as the source of Calcidius, *In Tim.* cf. 214-235). Which treatise this was must remain uncertain—the *Mixed Questions* or the *On the Soul to Boethius* come to mind; for the former see *De nat. hom.* 3, pp.38.12-42.9, 42.22-43.8 Morani (Περὶ ἐνώσεως ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος) = 259-261 F Smith; cf. also *ibid.* 2, p.34.18-35.11 M. = Porphyry 447 F Smith (on the immortality of the soul). The explicitly attested fragment from the same work found at Proclus, *In remp.* I 233.29-234.8 (263 F) deals with the issue of the division of the soul, opposing the Stoic and Platonic conceptions. On Nemesius and the Σύμμικτα ζητήματα see further Dörrie (1959) 99 ff., 111 ff. Cf. Calc. *In Tim.* 223, p. 238.5-13, whose account of Aristotelian soul-division is closely similar to Nem. *De nat. hom.* p. 72.12 ff. and likely to derive from Porphyry, see Waszink (1962) LXXV-LXXVII. For Porphyry's *On the Soul* see *De nat. hom.* 3, pp.38.12-42.9, 42.22-43.8 Morani (259-261 F Smith); cf. also *ibid.* 2, p.34.18-35.11 M. (Fr. 447 Smith). Another apparent possibility would seem to be Porphyry's (lost) Φιλόσοφος ιστορία ('Philosophical History'), which Theodoret aligns with Aëtius' τὴν Περὶ ἀρεσκόντων ξυναγωγὴν and (pseudo-)Plutarch's Περὶ τῶν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις δοξάντων ἐπιτομὴν, saying that Porphyry not only presented an account of the life of the Greek philosophers but added their tenets as well, *Graec. aff. cur.* II 95, p.62.4-7 (Porph. T 195 Smith); cf. *ibid.* IV 31, V 16. But the extant *Life of Pythagoras*, which was part of this work of Porphyry, shows that it cannot have been a member of the *Placita* family, see Porph. Fr. 193-224 Smith with Segond (1982).

<sup>51</sup> These people remain anonymous (τινες), but cf. Porph. *ap. Stob. Ecl.* I,



animals in support of the latter option, Nemesius opposes Aristotle as having considered the non-rational element to be both a part and a power (p.73.3-7 Morani). This may seem surprising in view of Aristotle's seminal critique of soul-partition—especially its Platonic variety—delivered at *On the Soul* Γ 9 and reflected by such later authors as Galen who distinguish the respective positions of Plato and Aristotle in terms of the parts/powers distinction (e.g. *PHP* 6.2.5). In practice, however, Aristotle's terminology fluctuates. To be sure, the fact that he on occasion speaks of 'parts' does not imply commitment to the Platonic doctrine; he uses the term merely to refer to the divisions of the soul regardless of their ontological status.<sup>52</sup> Nemesius attests to the exploitation of the terminological variation to construe a compromise position typical of doxographic schematizations.<sup>53</sup> As such, the notice originally belonged to the traditional section 'whether the soul has parts or not?' preliminary to the one about the number and identity of the parts themselves. Being preliminary, it was omitted by epitomators such as ps.Plutarch and others responsible for our extant witnesses to the *Placita* tradition. But, as we have noticed, Tertullian, who reflects an earlier stage of the same tradition, has preserved a doxographic notice concerned with the parts vs. powers issue.<sup>54</sup> As to the faculties of the soul, Aristotle appears more regularly in an intermediate position, notably between Plato and the Stoics. In Galen's scheme of options, as we have noticed, Aristotle sides with Plato as to the number of faculties (whether parts or powers) but with the Stoics as to their seat.<sup>55</sup>

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p.350.25 f. W. (= Fr. 253 [p.272.19-21] Smith = Numenius Fr. 44 Des Places): "Ἄλλοι δέ, ὧν καὶ Νοὺ μὴ νιοῦς, οὐ τρία μέρη ψυχῆς μιᾶς ἢ δύο γε, τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ἀλλὰ δύο ψυχᾶς ἔχειν ἡμᾶς οἴονται, τὴν μὲν λογικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον. Those proponents which remain unmentioned may include Galen, who too differentiated sharply between the parts or forms of the soul and on occasion, in a way not warranted by the Platonic text, referred to them as souls.

<sup>52</sup> On this later issue see *supra*, p. 34 ff.

<sup>53</sup> For an example from *PHP* 5 see 6.42, where Zeno appears in a position intermediate (μέσος) between the worst (Chrysippus) and the best view (Hippocrates and Plato) on the affections, or emotions.

<sup>54</sup> A further point of contact is noteworthy as well. Both Nemesius and Tertullian record that Panaetius modified the Stoic conception of eight parts (which however Nemesius gives to 'Zeno' and Tertullian to Chrysippus) by demoting the reproductive part to 'nature' (φύσις) instead of soul and subsuming the vocal function under the will (ἡ κατ' ὁρμὴν κινήσεως) and hence the ἡγεμονικόν), which resulted in a total number of six parts (p.72.7-11 = fr. 86 Van Straaten; cf. p. 73.17 ff. = fr. 86a v. Str.). See Tieleman (1996a) 99 with further references. Tertullian, as we have seen, presents still more deviant Stoic views.

<sup>55</sup> See *supra*, p. 34.

Whereas in related sources the opposition between Plato and the Stoics is most prominent, it is Aristotle who receives the lion's share of attention from Nemesis. Thus he is also credited with another reconciliatory view. In his *physical* works, Nemesis affirms, he posited five different parts [*sic*], that is to say the ones listed at *On the Soul* B 414a31f. and also mentioned by Theodoret (Aëtius). In his *ethical* works, Aristotle distinguished between λογικόν and ἄλογον as the primary and most generic (πρῶτα καὶ γενικώτατα) parts, subdividing the ἄλογον into one part obedient and another disobedient to reason (cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* A 13.1102b27-35). In the next section (§ 16) Nemesis identifies the obedient part of the ἄλογον as the ὀρεκτικόν, which he further subdivides into the ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμικόν (p.73.11 f. Cf. 75.8 f. Morani). This division is attributed to Aristotle and to him only (p.73.7). But of course the 'ethical' division is identical to the familiar Platonic one. In particular, we should note that ps.Plutarch presents on behalf of Plato this division in the same way, viz. in both bipartite and tripartite terms.<sup>56</sup> Again we recall Posidonius' two series of functions in Tertullian, one of which may have been identical to the trifold ethical division in Nemesis (see above, pp. 68 f.).

The report on Aristotle may be presented in double columns:

Science:

τὸ διανοητικόν

τὸ ὀρεκτικόν

τὸ κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον

τὸ φυτικόν

τὸ αἰσθητικόν

Ethics:

τὸ λογικόν

τὸ θυμικόν

τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν

While, as noted, the left 'scientific' column reflects Aristotle, *On the Soul* 414a31 f., the scheme as a whole should be compared with the final chapter (13) of the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Here Aristotle argues that in ethical analysis (i.e. as opposed to the scientific psychology of *On the Soul*) one should isolate the specifically human functions, for moral virtue is peculiar to man. In consequence,

<sup>56</sup> See *supra*, p. 65.

the principle of nourishment and growth, being common to all living things, can be dispensed with (*ibid.* 13.1102a32 ff., esp. b11-12). The division of the ὀρεκτικόν—the non-rational part relevant to ethics—into the θυμικόν and the ἐπιθυμητικόν is implied, or may easily have been taken to be implied, at 1102b27 ff.<sup>57</sup> Since the ὀρεκτικόν is also said to be obedient to reason (λόγος), we have the same bipartite and tripartite schemas in the same relation to one another as we have encountered in other witnesses to the *Placita* tradition. The notion that tripartition along Platonic lines was accepted by Aristotle found support in many passages where he adopts a distinction between three forms of appetite (ὄρεξις) which were generally taken to correspond to the three Platonic parts, viz. βούλησις, θύμος, ἐπιθυμία.<sup>58</sup> The contextual distinction is in fact indicated by Aristotle himself, who hints at the possibility to expand the ‘ethical’ list to include the functions of growth and nutrition, which are non-rational in an absolute sense. Of course, one uses the expanded list when embarking on a scientific account such as represented by Aristotle’s own *On the Soul*.<sup>59</sup> Here all functions constituting the *scala naturae* are relevant.

I now proceed to two Platonists from the Imperial period, who show familiarity with the *Placita* tradition as well. Since they also knew the original expositions directly, their situation is not dissimilar to Galen’s. As will be shown, they felt obliged to account for certain apparent and real discrepancies between the classical texts and the

<sup>57</sup> Just after a reference to the state of mind of the moderate (σώφρωνος) and the brave (ἀνδρείου) man, Aristotle speaks of the ‘desiderative and in general appetitive faculty’ (τὸ δ’ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πῶς) of the soul. The virtues of moderation and courage belong to the appetitive and spirited parts respectively; cf. *Resp.* 441c2, 604d9; *Lg.* 863; cf. also *Def.* 415e7; Theophr. Fr. 577B FHS&G. On the Platonic backdrop of *ENA* 13 see further Dirlmeier (1956) 293; cf. also Vander Waerdt (1985a) 299 f. A little earlier Aristotle says he bases himself in regard to the structure of the soul on his fuller account in the exoteric works (1102a25 ff.). This is often taken to refer to the *Protrepticus* in view of fr. 6 Ross, where the bipartition is mentioned. However this may be, he may have given a more precise analysis of the ὀρεκτικόν elsewhere. We may therefore have to reckon with the influence of this and other lost works on such later schematizations as have been preserved.

<sup>58</sup> For these three forms of appetite see *De an.* B 3.414b2, Γ 9.432b5-8; 10.433a23-8; *Rh.* A 10.1369a1-4; *MA* 6.700b22; *Pol.* 1334b6-28, esp. 22-3; cf. also *De an.* A 5.411a27ff., *EN* H 7.1149b1-3 (where note the inspiration of Pl. *Resp.* 441a-c); cf. also Theophr. fr. 441 *FHG* & S.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Arist. *De an.* A 1.402b1-5: ‘We must [...] inquire whether it has parts or not, and whether every soul is of the same kind or not; and if not, whether the difference is one of species or of genus. For today those who pronounce on and investigate the soul appear to confine their attention to the human soul ...’

traditional view as solidified and transmitted in the doxographic schemas. I am referring to Plutarch (c. 45-125 CE) and Porphyry (234-c. 305 CE).

## 6. *Plutarch*

I have already touched upon Plutarch's use of the *Placita* tradition concerned with the faculties of the soul in the section devoted to ps. Galen (see above, p. 71). In addition, it is worth considering how Plutarch presents the views of the Stoa, Plato-cum-Pythagoras and Aristotle in his *On Moral Virtue*, 440E – 442B. Plutarch begins by positing a main opposition between the Stoic unitarian conception and those theories which involve an irreducibly non-rational element (ἄλογον) of the soul (440E-441D). Having attributed the latter position to Pythagoras and Plato, he turns to Aristotle (442B):

Aristotle made much [or: long, ἐπὶ πλεόν]<sup>60</sup> use of these principles,<sup>61</sup> as is clear from what he wrote. Later he assigned the spirited part to the appetitive on the ground that anger is a form of desire and an appetite towards vengeance.<sup>62</sup> But until the end he used the affective and non-rational element as differing from the rational ...

Plutarch tells us that the affective element (παθητικόν: bipartition again), though devoid of a rationality of its own, is capable of obeying reason, as opposed to the sensory or the nutritive-cum-vegetative part which, belonging to the body, are deaf to the commands of reason (442B-C; cf. Arist. *ENA* 13.1102b28 f. and above). This of course conforms to the distinction drawn at *Nicomachean Ethics* A 13, though we hear nothing from Plutarch about the contextual difference between morally and psychologically relevant faculties.<sup>63</sup> He refers to 'what

<sup>60</sup> The sense of ἐπὶ πλεόν is disputed. When it is taken in the sense adopted in the text, this report provides an interesting case of an ancient author positing a Platonic phase in Aristotle's development. As such, it has even found its way into modern developmental accounts of Aristotle; see esp. Verbeke (1960) 238 f. Düring (1957) 354 f. translates ἐπὶ πλεόν as 'further' ('We may further observe that ...'); similarly Babut (1969) 137-41; Donini (1974) 68-9; Sandbach (1982) 215-17.

<sup>61</sup> I.e. the three Platonic parts.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. the well-known definition of ὀργή as ὄρεξις ἀντιτυπήσεως, Arist. *De an.* A 403a30-1; cf. *Top.* 156a31-b4. By now it was common currency, cf. ps. Plut. *De Lib. et aegrit.* ch.1, Sen. *De ira* 1.3 with Sandbach (1982) 219; see further *infra*, pp. 277 ff.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Plut. *De E* 390F and *Def. orac.* 429E, on which *supra*, n. 71. Cf. also Arius Did. *ap. Stob. Ecl.* II 7.20, p. 137.15-7 W., in a section entitled Περὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς, ὅτι μεσότης (which parallels the title and one of the main theses of Plutarch's tract): ταύτην [scil. τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν] ὑπολαμβάνουσι περὶ τὸ ἄλογον

Aristotle wrote', but whether he is directly drawing on one or more Aristotelian texts is doubtful.<sup>64</sup> Plutarch's exclusive and direct dependence on the Aristotelian corpus has too often been taken for granted. But perhaps the choice is not one between an intermediary source or the original Aristotelian exposition. Comparison with the doxographic texts I have so far been reviewing suggests a third possibility, viz. that Plutarch is reconciling a doxographic scheme with what he had found in the original expositions.<sup>65</sup> This assumption receives some support from a consideration of his treatment of Plato and Pythagoras. In the *Placita* tradition, Pythagoras and Plato are conjoined as championing bipartition (and at least Plato as also positing tripartition, see above p. 65). Plutarch takes over this scheme,<sup>66</sup> and assigns to Plato the bipartite and tripartite divisions: Plato distinguished between a rational and a non-rational part (τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον) and then subdivided the latter into the spirited and desiderative parts (441E-442C). Plutarch draws textual support from Plato's account of the generation of the World-Soul at *Tim.* 35a ff. (cf. *De gen. an. in Tim.* 1012B ff.).<sup>67</sup> But when it comes to finding an appropriate proof-text for Pythagoras, there is no textual evidence. Plutarch therefore resorts to a reminder of Pythagoras' reputed interest in music, which, he claims, presupposes his acceptance of a non-rational element of the soul (441E).<sup>68</sup> In fact, Posidonius faced the same difficulty as Plutarch when he wished to account for the attribution of bipartition to Pythagoras. His solution is different: Posidonius infers

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μέρος γίνεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπειδὴ διμερῇ πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν θεωρίαν ὑπέθεντο τὴν ψυχήν, τὸ μὲν λόγον ἔχουσιν, τὸ δ' ἄλογον.

<sup>64</sup> That Plutarch uses a traditional account rather than any original Aristotelian text is argued by Düring (1957) 353 ff. and Sandbach (1982) 218 f. For another (apparent) reference to Aristotle's writings in a very similar context cf. Porphyry F 251 Smith, discussed *infra*, pp. 78 ff.

<sup>65</sup> I have to disagree with Vander Waerdt (1985b) 379n.23 who considers this option a case of 'having it both ways' and as such suspect. The most economical explanation from a logical point of view is not necessarily the most plausible one from a historical point of view.

<sup>66</sup> *Pace* VanderWaerdt (1985b) 380 n.25, who dismisses the possibility of Plutarch using the *Placita* with respect to Plato: 'It goes without saying that one would not expect Plutarch to resort to a doxography for information about Plato.' Note the deliciously pejorative intonations with respect to doxography.

<sup>67</sup> Babut (1969b) 136 n.28 suggests that Plutarch also bases himself on other passages in the *Tim.* viz. 41c ff., 69c ff., as well as *Plt.* 309c.

<sup>68</sup> For music as used by the Pythagoreans to influence the non-rational part of the soul, see also *De Is. et Os.* 384A. The link between musical therapy and psychological dualism is also made by Galen and still exerts a bad influence on present-day studies, see *infra*, pp. 242 ff.

the view of Pythagoras from the extant writings of his pupils (who remain anonymous). Presumably he used pseudepigraphic tracts produced in the late Hellenistic era when there was a general resurgence of interest in all things Pythagorean.<sup>69</sup> However this may be, the procedures of Plutarch and Posidonius reveal the importance both of doxographic patterns and of the wish of these authors to adduce proof-texts illustrating the tenets involved. These traditional patterns could not simply be dropped or revised, it seems. Still it is noteworthy that Plutarch had qualms about the doxographic ascription of the Platonic tripartition to Aristotle. If my reading is correct, he had recourse to a developmental solution. Another learned author, though, did refer to the difference between ethics and scientific psychology as a means of making sense of this ascription. I am speaking of Porphyry.

### 7. *Porphyry*

Porphyry—the authority we have sighted behind Nemesius’ *On the Nature of Man* chs. 15 and 16—is an extremely valuable source for the preceding scholastic (notably Platonist) tradition. We are in a position to make direct use of some of his observations on the parts and powers of the soul. An excerpt from his (lost) *On the Powers of the Soul*<sup>70</sup> addresses the same subject-matter:

In Plato and Aristotle in the ethical works [or: in ethics], the soul is said to be tripartite (τριμερής), and this (scil., opinion) has prevailed among the majority, who are unaware that the division of the structure (scil. of the soul) has been made because of the virtues; for [it has] not [been made] to capture all the parts. For obviously the imaginative (φανταστικόν) and perceptive (αἰσθητικόν) and cognitive (νοερόν) and vegetative (φυτικόν) [scil. parts] have not been included in this division (Stob. *Ecl.* I 49.25<sup>a</sup>, p.350.19-25 = Fr. 253 Smith, in part).

Porphyry attests to the prevalence of the view that Aristotle had espoused the Platonic tripartition *tout court*—i.e. the view as it also appears Galen in *PHP* books 4 and 5. Like Plutarch, Porphyry corrects this qualification with an appeal to Aristotle’s original writings.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Posid. *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 5.6.43 = Test. 91/Fr. 151 E.-K. See *supra*, p. 40 n. 84.

<sup>70</sup> On this treatise see *supra*, p. 20.

<sup>71</sup> On Porphyry’s study of Aristotle’s writings see Beutler (1953) 282 ff.

He echoes the critique of the Platonic partition at *On the Soul* Γ 9.432a22 ff, in particular Aristotle's point that the imaginative, perceptive and nutritive (θρεπτικόν, ὃ καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις)<sup>72</sup> faculties would have just as strong a claim to the status of part as the three parts singled out by Plato.<sup>73</sup> The psychic faculties mentioned are just examples: the faculties, Aristotle says, 'in a way seem infinite' (*ibid.* 432a24). In due course I shall return to Aristotle's critique of soul-division which I take to be have been highly influential in shaping the positions of subsequent philosophers of various denominations (see *infra*, pp. 274 ff.).

Whereas Plutarch appealed to a developmental explanation, Porphyry relates Aristotle's criticism to a *contextual* difference between two sets of psychic functions: (1) a tripartite or bipartite division belonging to the moral and exclusively human sphere; (2) another division involving a larger (perhaps even infinitely large) number, which belongs in the context of scientific psychology. As we have noted in connection with Nemesius (above, p. 74), this point is anticipated by a passage in *Nicomachean Ethics* A 13 where Aristotle makes the point—echoed by Porphyry—that the virtues determine the scope of psychological analysis in an ethical context (1102b11-12; but cf. also *De an.* A 1.402b1-5, quoted n. 59). Moreover, Porphyry's surprising mention of the νοερόν ('cognitive'<sup>74</sup>) among the functions not covered by the Platonic tripartition cannot be paralleled from the *On the Soul* passage but makes excellent sense in the light of Aristotle's removal of purely intellectual thought from moral discourse in the same chapter from *Nicomachean Ethics* A (*ibid.* 1103a2). One might say that Porphyry read the passage from the *On the Soul* in the light of *Nicomachean Ethics* A 13.<sup>75</sup> For our purposes it is important to note, first, that Porphyry attests to the widespread idea that Aristotle, like Plato, had accepted the tripartition. Moreover, we must note that Porphyry's remarks are motivated by the failure of his contemporaries (or at any rate the later interpreters of Plato and Aristotle) to take account of the contextual distinction. Who are they? One of the most influential defenders of the *scientific* (as well as moral) accuracy

<sup>72</sup> In fact Plato does assign the nutritive function to the ἐπιθυμητικόν, *Tim.* 70d-e.

<sup>73</sup> The same criticism applies to the division into τὸ λόγον ἔχον and τὸ ἄλογον, propounded by an anonymous group of Academics, cf. *ibid.* 24 ff.

<sup>74</sup> On the sense of this term see *PA* 648a3; *Pr.* 954a35

<sup>75</sup> If we may believe Arabic catalogues, Porphyry wrote a commentary—now completely lost—in twelve books on the *EN*, see e.g. Beutler (1953) 284 (nr. [16]).

of the Platonic tripartition was of course Galen. In the *PHP* he even explicitly aligned the terms separated by Porphyry.<sup>76</sup> In view of the influence exerted by this treatise in the 3rd century debate on the location and structure of the soul, it is extremely likely that he is in the forefront of Porphyry's mind.<sup>77</sup>

### 8. Conclusion: Galen Again

There are good reasons for comparing the pattern of options and authorities in *PHP* 4-5 with relevant passages deriving from the doxographic tradition (§ 1). Unfortunately, the evidence for doxographic schemes concerned with the (number of the) soul's functions is fragmentary, scattered and derivative. It is no longer possible to reconstruct a complete picture of the relevant sections in the *Placita* tradition at a particular stage. Nonetheless, our survey has revealed a few facts of immediate relevance to Galen's handling of tenets and thinkers in *PHP* 4-5.

On the whole, the differences and correspondences between the various related sources we have been reviewing suggests that a fairly comprehensive and detailed version must have been available by Galen's time.<sup>78</sup> An impression of its elaborate quality is still conveyed by Tertullian in the case of the Stoics (§ 3) and by Nemesius in the case of Aristotle (§ 5). The *Placita* at a certain stage presented two columns of faculties on behalf of Aristotle (as well as Posidonius; see Tertullian, § 3), one for ethics, another for scientific psychology.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Thus Galen identifies the Platonic appetitive part with Aristotelian nutritive-cum-generative function (as well as Stoic 'nature'), holding the desirative part in the liver is the cause both of the digestive process and of conscious desires in a more morally relevant sense, see *PHP* 6.3.7; cf. also 8.57, 77.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Tieleman (1996b), *id.* (1998).

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3086.

<sup>79</sup> It might be objected that Porphyry Fr. 253 indicates that it was he who introduced the contextual difference out of dissatisfaction with the attribution of tripartition *tout court* to Aristotle, which, unlike many authors who adopted it, he knew was not warranted (or at least was only the partial truth) from his own reading of the Aristotelian works; hence the presence of two lists of functions in Nemesius (chs. 15-6). Against this proposal, one could point to (1) the traces of conflation of the two lists in authors like ps. Galen (*supra*, pp. 70 f.); (2) the indication for an analogous pair of series ascribed to Posidonius by Tertullian's source (*supra*, pp. 66 ff.); (3) the fact that the contextual difference is intimated by Aristotle himself and other authors who lived well before Porphyry, e.g. Arius Didymus (*supra*, pp. 74, 76 f. n. 63).



A desire for simplification prompted the conflation of the two lists, or simply the selection of one of them. Examples are epitomators as ps.Plutarch (§ 2) and ps.Galen (§ 3) or their sources, notably 'Aëtius'.<sup>80</sup> In this connection it should be recalled that the reflections of the *Placita* in Galen's own *On Affected Parts* III 5 indicate that he was familiar with a compilation that was fuller than Diels' reconstructed Aëtius and may have resembled the passage from Tertullian more closely than those from Theodoret, ps.Plutarch and ps.Galen.<sup>81</sup>

Tertullian, *On the Soul* 14.2 illustrates one of the uses to which doxographic schemes were put, viz. the tack of playing off against each other the views of a group of philosophers (the Stoics in this particular case), i.e. the Sceptical technique of *διαφωνία*. Christian apologists such as Tertullian often recycled this technique as a means of bringing out the prevailing disagreement among their pagan opponents. Galen and others conveyed the impression of disagreement among a more specific group of opponents while at the same time using doxographic schemes as overviews of the options that stood in principle open to anyone who took part in the debate.

It has already transpired that differences such as those construed between the Stoics in Tertullian's scheme go back to shifts of emphasis or refinements rather than fundamental departures in the (often lost) original expositions. The schematization involved (viz. the ascending number of postulated faculties) should warn us against taking reports of this kind for granted. In this case, other sources point to unanimity among the Stoics with respect of the conception of the pneumatic soul. Posidonius, it has to be stressed, is no exception.<sup>82</sup> Indeed, the differences we have noted between the ascriptions in a number of particular cases attest to the fluidity of doxographic schemes handed down in one and the same tradition. No doubt schemas were further elaborated through the addition of intermediate or compromise views. Thus the view ascribed by Tertullian to Posidonius seems to be intermediate between the Stoic and Platonic positions. And if our interpretations are correct, a very similar position is ascribed by Nemesius to Aristotle. Such changes of the names attached to certain tenets show once more that the pattern of options rather than the authorities involved determine the resulting

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<sup>80</sup> See *supra*, p. 65 f., 70 f.

<sup>81</sup> See *supra*, p. 62 ff.

<sup>82</sup> See *supra*, p. 36 f.

scheme. In sum, it is necessary to check individual lemmas very carefully against other sources.

Now exactly which correspondences can be noted between Galen and the specimens of the *Placita* tradition we have been reviewing? First, both Galen and the doxographic reports distinguish between the parts vs. power issue on the one hand and the issue of the number of faculties on the other. One could say that *PHP* 4-5 is to be subsumed under the latter heading.

Secondly, Galen's attribution of the Platonic tripartition to Zeno and Aristotle can be paralleled from the doxographic tradition. And the same probably holds for his association of Posidonius with Aristotle. We should note, though, that we hear nothing from Galen about any contextual difference such as urged by Porhry in line with the doxographic schemes preserved by Nemesius and Tertullian (§ 7; cf. Plutarch, § 6). In ch. 5 I shall examine the Galenic text with a view to answering the question whether Galen is correct in ascribing his own scientific reading of the tripartition to Posidonius.<sup>83</sup>

A further point of contact between Galen and the sources I have been discussing lies in the assimilation of the Aristotelian bipartition and the Platonic tripartition which appears to have occurred not long after Aristotle's death.<sup>84</sup> In fact, this process of harmonization may have been stimulated, or at least appeared to be warranted, by the original texts themselves and Platonic passages implying bipartition.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>83</sup> See *infra*, pp. 198 ff.

<sup>84</sup> An early instance is ps. Arist., *MM* 1182a24 f. attributing the Aristotelian division into τὸ ἄλογον ἄλογον and τὸ ἔχον λόγον to Plato; cf. Vander Waerdt (1985a). This division as such was well-established during Plato's lifetime, see e.g. Arist. *Protr.* fr. B 23 f., B 59-70, with discussion and further references in Vander Waerdt (1985a) 283 f.

<sup>85</sup> E.g. those passages in the *Tim.* where distinction between an immortal and mortal part is drawn, e.g. 35a-b, 41c-d, 69c, 69e, 72d, 90a-c. Galen, *PHP* 9.9.8 refers to the view of certain Platonists who explained the use of 'mortal' for two of the soul's parts as pertaining to their inferiority vis-à-vis the rational part—which amounts to the rational/non-rational distinction (under which no special position is taken by the spirited part). Contrast Vander Waerdt (1985a) 299 ff., who dismisses as irrelevant the above passages from the most influential Platonic dialogue; instead he emphasizes *Resp.* 441a ff. where θύμος is introduced as an ally of reason (after an initial bipartition into the rational and desiderative part). According to Vander Waerdt, the interpretation of the Platonic tripartition in terms of the Aristotelian bipartition (viz. τὸ λόγον ἔχον and τὸ ἄλογον, cf. *ENA* 13) by the Middle Platonists and many others entailed a substantive deviation from Plato's original position, there being no special, intermediate role left for the spirited part. Nonetheless his admission ([1985b] 375n.8) that Galen was an exception because he upheld the original (anatomically based) version of the Platonic tripartition is odd, since Galen does speak in the same bipartite terms as his contemporaries do: see

And, as we have seen, there are Aristotelian texts corresponding to the Platonic tripartition insofar as the forms of appetite are concerned.<sup>86</sup> The bipartition of *Nicomachean Ethics* A 13—an influential key passage—could lend itself easily to a subdivision of the non-rational part, resulting in tripartition in much the same way as at Aëtius, *Placita* IV 4.1.<sup>87</sup> Indeed, some Aristotelian passages feature tripartition without any sign of doubt or disapproval.<sup>88</sup> That Galen accepts the equivalence of the bipartite and tripartite schemes is borne out by *PHP* 9.6.61. Recommending diaeresis as an indispensable method for settling protracted controversies, he gives the nature of the virtues as an example. Philosophers who quarrel about this topic would have done better ‘if they had divided (διήρηντο) the forms [or: parts, εἶδη] of the soul and clearly recognized that the rational (λογιστικόν) is one and the non-rational (ἄλογον) another, and that the latter can be split up in two sections as well.’ Once again, bipartition leads the way, with tripartition resulting from the subsequent subdivision of the ἄλογον.<sup>89</sup> Likewise Galen, summarizing bks. 4 and 5, draws a distinction between one divine form (εἶδος) and two affective (παθητικά) ones (9.9.7).<sup>90</sup> The division made and

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below in text. In fact Galen, as well as many others, employ a bipartite interpretation which is fully compatible with the intermediate role of the spirited element, and they were encouraged to do so by a number of Platonic passages. There is no real difficulty here. The bipartite interpretation of Plato’s psychology highlights the rational/non-rational aspect—the role of the spirited part is another matter. In this light, we need not take recourse to developmental solutions to explain both bipartite and tripartite formulations in Plato, cf. e.g. Rees (1961). The fact that several other sources give the tripartition without the preliminary dichotomy should not be taken to point to the existence of a serious opposition between two schools of interpretation; cf. Vander Waerdt (1985b) 389 n.56.

<sup>86</sup> See *supra*, p. 69.

<sup>87</sup> See *supra*, p. 74.

<sup>88</sup> *Top.* E 133 a 30-32 where ‘having a tripartite (τριμερῆ) soul’ serves as an instance of a property (scil. of man); cf. 113 a35, 126 a 6, 129 a 12 ff., 136 b 10. Of course, passages such as these have stimulated developmental solutions; cf. von Arnim (1927). Today we prefer to regard these passages as giving merely dialectical examples which warrant no conclusions about any doctrinal commitment on Aristotle’s part.

<sup>89</sup> Similarly Alcīn. *Did.* 5, 156.34-7 H.: διαίρεσις μὲν τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν γένους εἰς εἶδη τομῇ, ἢ δὲ ὅλου εἰς μέρη· ὥς ἡνίκα τέμνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς τε τὸ λογικὸν καὶ εἰς τὸ παθητικόν, καὶ αὖ πάλιν τὸ παθητικὸν εἰς τε τὸ θυμικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.

<sup>90</sup> These Galenic passages refute the view taken by Vander Waerdt (1985b) 375 n.8 that Galen was exceptional in upholding the original Platonic version of tripartition with the spirited part in a truly intermediate position, see esp. *Republic* 4 441a ff. One of Vander Waerdt’s main claims is that the ancient interpretation of the Platonic tripartite scheme in bipartite terms seriously distorts Plato’s original intention but came to prevail among Platonists and others under Peripatetic influence.

justified in this context is entirely functional, i.e. non-anatomical. But that its influence could extend to anatomical contexts is clear from one passage in book II, where Galen entertains the possibility that both the spirited and desiderative parts reside in heart (2.7.17). This isolated passage illustrates a fundamental weakness of Galen's project, viz. his failure to account satisfactorily for the interactions between the parts of the soul (most notably, that between the two non-rational ones) at the anatomical and physiological level. At any rate it seems clear that in passages like the one from book 9 we have just cited it is the traditional doxographic division rather than Galen's own anatomical researches which determine his mode of presentation, and that his overall treatment reveals that here lies a problem of reconciliation between the two spheres which he never adequately solved, or indeed faced.

Authors such as Galen, Plutarch and Posidonius come to the original expositions of classical authors with an expectation of which opinions are to find there. They had been introduced to these texts by their teachers and with the assistance of manuals and doxographic compilations. Obviously, they did not shed off this education when they became teachers of philosophy and authors in their own right. If only for reasons of convenience or simply out of habit, they may have continued to follow their handbooks alongside their reading of the classics. So when it comes to assessing their response to past philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle or Zeno, we should take account of the doxographic tradition as well as the original texts (insofar as available). In addition, it should be said that not only tenets, but also arguments were lifted from the original text and, often in a somewhat simplified form, handed down both in oral teaching and in handbooks and compilation.<sup>91</sup>

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But he gives too little weight to passages from other dialogues (*Phaedr.*, *Tim.*, *Lg.*) which tell in favour of a basic bipartition; when viewed in this light, Peripatetic influence appears to have been less crucial. The interfacing between the conception of the two schools also led to the ascription of tripartition to Aristotle—which could also be justified by reference to certain Aristotelian passages; see previous p. Cf. Arius Didymus' account of Peripatetic ethics: after describing the λογικόν as κριτικόν and the ἄλογον as ὁρμητικόν (a typically Stoic term), he divides the ἄλογον: καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου τὸ μὲν ὀρεκτικόν τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιθυμητικόν· τὸ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πλησίον οἷον ἀμυντικόν θυμικόν (*Eccl.* II p.117.12-18 W.).

<sup>91</sup> Cf. Alcin. *Did.* c. XIV pp. 176-7 H.; ps.Plut. *Utrum pars an facultas animi affectibus subiecta sit* c. 2; Plut. *Virt. Mor.* 442B. A further parallel between Alcinous (*ibid.* 177 H.) and Galen (*PHP* 4.6.19 ff.) is their treatment of Euripides, *Medea* 1078-9.

The importance of the schemes provided by this tradition should not be underestimated. Indeed, original passages are quoted to fill out and justify these schemes. The passages from Plutarch (§ 6) and Porphyry (§ 7) we have discussed are highly interesting in this regard. These authors try to correct the apparent discrepancy between the doxographic ascription of tripartition *tout court* to Aristotle and what they read in the original writings: Plutarch assumes a real discrepancy between the tripartition and bipartition which can only be solved by ascribing the former to an early stage in Aristotle's career. Porphyry, as we have noticed, is motivated by passages from the Aristotelian *On the Soul* and *Nicomachean Ethics* to insist on a contextual distinction. Both, it should be emphasized, do not dismiss the ascription of the tripartition to Aristotle altogether.

So the fact that Galen quotes so extensively from the original expositions does not preclude his use of doxographic schemes. On the contrary, these schemes largely determine the pattern of allegiances and silences to be found in *PHP* 4 and 5 and it is this pattern which is filled out by passages from the original expositions of the authorities concerned. Galen's forced exegesis of *Republic* 4.436-440 in *PHP* 5.7 is a case in point insofar as it shows Galen imposing on the Platonic text the doxographical distinction between two issues: (1) parts or powers? and (2) how many faculties? (see also above, p. 28 f.).

That pre-existing schemes rather than independent-minded study of primary sources largely determines Galen's treatment may also be inferred from 5.6.40-42. In the preceding context Galen has argued that Cleanthes accepted the Platonic tripartition, quoting a versified dialogue between reason and anger composed by the latter (*ibid.* 35 ~ *SVF* 1.570).<sup>92</sup> He introduces this dialogue as evidence for the original view of both Cleanthes and his predecessor Zeno. This agrees with his attribution of the tripartition to these philosophers.<sup>93</sup> Here, however, his source—Posidonius—does not provide a separate proof-text from Zeno and Galen is not able to produce one either. Although at first he takes the passage from Cleanthes as adequate evidence for the view of Zeno too, he excuses himself a little further on for not providing a passage from Zeno (*ibid.* 40).<sup>94</sup> Here he appeals to his

<sup>92</sup> For a full discussion from the Stoic perspective see *infra*, pp. 264 ff.

<sup>93</sup> See *PHP* 5.6.33, 34, 42; cf. 4.2.6, 4.38. Galen once says that Chrysippus too admitted that the soul has three powers, 3.7.53; cf. 4.1.14.

<sup>94</sup> That is to say, he excuses himself for not looking up a relevant passage in an original work by Zeno. That Zeno's treatises were still read in the second century CE is also attested by Epictetus, see *Diss.* 1.20.15, 4.9.6.

decision—dictated by the constraints of time—to concentrate on Chrysippus. This is strange because he has just introduced a passage from Cleanthes, in support of his claims about the latter as well as Zeno. But it is no less remarkable that Galen here says that the view of Zeno stands in need of examination on the basis of his own words. But Zeno, he goes on to argue, will have taken one of the following three views (*ibid.* 42):

(1) Zeno held that affections are judgements—the view of Chrysippus. If so, Zeno is liable to the same refutation as Chrysippus and needs no separate refutation.

(2) Zeno accepted Platonic principles—the view of Cleanthes and Posidonius. If so, he subscribes to the position defended by Galen and needs no refutation either.

(3) Zeno took a position intermediate between the best (2) and the worst (1) view, viz. that affections *supervene on* judgements. Although he does not explicitly say so, Galen apparently takes this option to have been refuted along with (1). In any case Galen says here that he believes this was Zeno's original view. Of course this conflicts with the other passages where Zeno is credited with the Platonic tripartiton, i.e. option (2).

In this passage Galen entangles himself in various self-contradictions. But what it shows above all is the dominant role of schemes such as the present one. *PHP* 5.6.40-42 is striking precisely because Galen diverges from his general procedure: instead of apportioning the options among the authorities according to a pre-existing diaeretic schema, he now declares himself in favour of taking his point of departure from the original exposition. He claims that Zeno's original position should be examined on the basis of his own words, even though he has attributed views to him in the preceding discussion without revealing any doubts whatsoever. The views earlier ascribed to Zeno are identical to two of the options in the above schema. The same schema, then, underlies the discussion as a whole. The only difference with the earlier passages is that here Galen shows himself undecided as to which of the three options is the correct one (but, as explained above, in all three cases he can dispense with an independent inquiry concerning Zeno). But as a rule, it clearly is the scheme of options which comes first and its corroboration by means of proof-texts next.

As a third example, it is instructive to compare *PHP* 7.3, where we have something similar to Plutarch's response to the attribution of

three parts to Aristotle. Here Galen argues that Erasistratus first located the source of the nerves in the so-called thick membrane (i.e. the dura mater) but that, when later in his life he performed his dissections with greater care, he discovered that the nerves grow from the brain itself, viz. from the cerebellum. This later view is documented by the quotation of a relevant report of a dissection (7.3.8-11). The earlier view ('nerves grow from the meninx that encloses the brain') is said to be found in 'most of his writings' but is not illustrated through citation. Did Erasistratus really change his mind about the seat of the intellect? In the text quoted by Galen this is neither said nor implied. The information given by Galen that Erasistratus at first had no leisure to perform his dissections with adequate care (*ibid.* 7.3.7) looks gratuitous. But it is worth noting that this alleged initial view can be paralleled from the section in the Aëtian *Placita* concerned with the seat of the regent part (ps.Plut. *Plac.* IV 5.3; cf. Theod. *GAC* V 22): 'Ερασίστρατος περὶ τὴν μήνιγγα τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου, ἣν ἐπικρανίδα λέγει. The term μήνιγγα here means the outer membrane or dura mater, while ἐπικρανίς ('against the skull') denotes the posterior ventricle of the brain which lies *under* the cerebellum.<sup>95</sup> What is more, this lemma from the *Placita* is echoed by Galen himself in the first book of his *On the Use of Parts* (p.15.2 f. Helmreich: ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καρδίαν, ὁ δὲ τὰς μήνιγγας, ὁ δὲ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἐν ἑαυτῷ φησιν ἔχειν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονοῦν). There can be no doubt that Erasistratus lurks behind the second tenet. Galen merely selects from a fuller source (featuring the names of authorities) what he deems sufficient in a particular context.<sup>96</sup> It is a fair assumption that *PHP* 7.3 represents Galen's attempt to square the tenet of Erasistratus he knew from the *Placita* with a passage from Erasistratus himself which lends support to Galen's own anatomical findings. In order to reconcile the doxographic ascription with his own reading, Galen has recourse to the same ploy as we found Plutarch using (see above, p. 76), viz. the developmental solution.

To conclude. On the basis of the preceding overview the following expectation may be formulated with regard to *PHP* 4 and 5. Galen derives diaeretic schemas from the *Placita* tradition or applies analogous schemas of his own making. When it comes to opponents such as the Stoics, he employs these schemas in order to fabricate

<sup>95</sup> Cf. Pollux, *Onom.* II 226; cf. II 46, p. 95.20-23, Nemes. *Nat. hom.* 69.19-20 Morani with Mansfeld (1990b) 3093 n.143.

<sup>96</sup> See *supra*, p. 63.

discrepancies between individual Stoics or between the statements of one of them such as Chrysippus, who is his main target. In general the quotes from their original expositions, if available, are adduced to flesh out and illustrate the pre-existing schema.<sup>97</sup> Yet all kinds of interactions and some amount of wavering between the schemas and the original passages might occur because of certain differences between them. To be sure, these are assumptions that stand in need of further corroboration and explanation in each separate case. This further step crucially involves the study of the Stoic material itself. It will be taken in the next three chapters dealing with Chrysippus (chs. 3, 4) and Posidonius (ch. 5).

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<sup>97</sup> Cf. the 'plot' or 'argument' (ὑπόθεσις) which serves as the basis of a cento (Gr. κέντρον, 'patchwork', 'rag'). Here statements from an existing text are assembled in such a way that an entirely different story is created. Such a patchwork may serve a plurality of purposes. A prose cento may explicitly mention the source, or sources, used, or at least some of them. Comments of various sorts may be interspersed etc. It is often difficult to distinguish between a cento in the strict sense and a concatenation of quotes that have been assembled to serve a particular purpose. On the genre of cento, which in Galen's day had become quite popular, see Mansfeld (1992) 152 ff., *id.* (1999) 28, with further references. Mansfeld also notes the similarities between the cento and certain forms of philosophical and religious polemic as practised in Galen's day. On the possibility of relating the cento to doxography see Diels, *D. G.* 171 f. Cf. also Schoedel (1959) 23 f., who points to the issues listed at Irenaeus, *Adv. haeres.* II 28.2, which correspond to some of the material to be found in ps. Plutarch/Aëtius, *Plac.* III.



## CHAPTER THREE

### CHRYSIPPUS' *ON AFFECTIONS*: THE THEORETICAL BOOKS (I-II)

#### 1. *Number of Books, Length and Contents*

The ancients saw the idea of affections as judgements as the main thesis of Chrysippus' *On Affections*. Not only does it provide the focal point for Galen's critique, it also the thesis for which the treatise is cited by Diogenes Laertius (7.111 ~ *SVF* 2.456). On its overall contents we are further informed by Galen and Cicero, although their information is not as clear and precise as we would like it to be. Chrysippus' work, Galen tells us, consisted of four books, each of which was twice the length of a book of his own *PHP* (5.6.45 ~ *SVF* 3.458).<sup>1</sup> This point is made in support of the charge of verbosity Galen often levels against his opponents, contrasting this feature with the ideal of scientific ('geometrical') brevity (cf. e.g. 8.1.17-48). But even allowing for some degree of exaggeration, we need not doubt that the treatise as a whole was substantial. Further, from a non-polemical passage in Galen's *On Affected Parts* we learn something about Chrysippus' aims and methods:

... theoretical are all those [studies] which going beyond practical utility consider the nature of things, of whatever kind they are with respect to their own essence: thus, for instance, Chrysippus the philosopher, too, wrote on the affections of the soul one book *Therapeutics*, which we use above all with a view to their cure, and three others containing theoretical (λογικάς) inquiries (*Loc. Aff.* III, 1: VIII p. 138 K. ~ *SVF* 3.457).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> .. ὥς τοῦτο γε [scil. how to speak more briefly without omitting anything essential] καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ὧν ἔγραψε Χρύσιππος Περὶ παθῶν ἔνεστι καταμαθεῖν. τεττάρων γὰρ βιβλίων οὕτω μεγάλων αὐτῷ γεγραμμένων ὥσθ' ἕκαστον εἶναι διπλάσιον τῶν ἡμετέρων, ὅμως ἡμεῖς οὐδ' ἐν ὅλοις δύο τὴν περὶ τῶν παθῶν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ἐξητάκαμεν.

<sup>2</sup> τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα λογικώτερα πῶς ἔφην εἶναι· λογικὰ γὰρ ὄντως ἐστὶν ὅσα τῆς χρείας ἐπέκεινα προερχόμενα τὴν φύσιν ἀθρεῖ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅποια τις ὑπάρχει κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν οὐσίαν· οὕτως γοῦν καὶ Χρύσιππος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἔγραψεν περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν ἐν μὲν τὸ θεραπευτικὸν βιβλίον, οὐδ' ἀλλοῖς χρῆζομεν εἰς τὴν ἴασιν αὐτῶν, ἑτέρα δὲ τρία λογικάς ἔχοντα ζητήσεις.

Galen uses the division of subject-matter exemplified by Chrysippus' treatise to illustrate a point of his own. Indeed, he appears to recommend the Stoic's neat arrangement and speaks in the first plural almost as if he and many others use the *Therapeutics* as an authoritative guide in moral affairs. I shall return to its supposed popularity in the separate chapter devoted to the *Therapeutics*.<sup>3</sup>

But a few questions remain: Is the designation of the first three as λογικά Chrysippean or at least early Stoic in origin?<sup>4</sup> And if so, is Galen's gloss 'theoretical' correct? When we turn to the *PHP*, we find that Galen employs the same general characterization of the books of Chrysippus' treatise:

'... his entire treatise *On Affections*, the three books in which he investigates theoretical (λογικά) questions about them and moreover the *Therapeutics*,<sup>5</sup> which is also entitled *Ethics* by some ...' (4.1.14, p.238.4-6 ~ SVF 3.461).<sup>6</sup>

In regard to the fourth and last book Galen implies that *Therapeutics* was the title given by Chrysippus, and *Ethics* that employed by certain others (see also 5.7.52, quoted below). But it remains uncertain whether Chrysippus himself referred to the first three books as the λογικά, though this would seem plausible given his use of a separate title for the last one. On the other hand the fact that others than Chrysippus are responsible for an alternative title for the *Therapeutics* urges us to exercise caution. Although in the fragments themselves the term does not feature, Galen refers four more times to the first three books as λογικά in a casual way suggesting that it was their standard designation (4.5.10, 4.7.21, 5.7.52, 8.1.47).

This broad characterization of the books, at any event, seems to be borne out by the fragments. Galen directly quotes several passages from books 1 and 4 and a few from book 2 as he found them in Posidonius' *On Affections*. He does not quote from or refer to book 3—a silence comparable to that surrounding the second book *On the Soul* and shared by our other main source, Cicero.<sup>7</sup> Book 1 offered a

<sup>3</sup> See *infra*, pp. 140 f.

<sup>4</sup> Fillion-Lahille (1984) 82 ff. takes it thus, using the appellation 'Logikon' as if it were a separate title for the first books on a par with *Therapeutics*.

<sup>5</sup> De Lacy prints the word concerned with a capital Θ yet translates 'the book on their cure'.

<sup>6</sup> τὰ Περὶ παθῶν ἅπαντα, τὰ τε τρία δι' ὧν ἐπισκέπτεται τὰ λογικά περὶ αὐτῶν ζητήματα καὶ προσέτι τὸ Θεραπευτικόν, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ἠθικὸν ἐπιγράφουσι τινες ...

<sup>7</sup> On this silence see *supra*, p. 55 (ch. 1); on Cicero see further, *infra*, pp. 302 ff. (ch. 6).

discussion of Zeno's definitions of affection and its main species and so was concerned with their nature, including their cause. Book 2 discussed at least a series of difficulties (ἀπορίαι) posed by certain everyday phenomena and featuring prominently the question of the cause, i.e. whether the phenomena concerned can be causally explained within the framework of the Stoic unitary theory. This overall arrangement can be paralleled from medical literature, where we encounter the same sequence of nature-*cum*-cause and therapy.<sup>8</sup>

Closer inspection of the evidence indicates that the *Therapeutics* offered far more theory than Galen's distinction might suggest. It offered a summary of the opening section of book 1.<sup>9</sup> There are some indications that this feature is due to the fact the *Therapeutics* was designed to stand on its own feet, that is to say for use by those, Stoics and others, who were more interested in the practical side of Stoic moral thought. In this light it would have made sense for Chrysippus to repeat the gist of the theoretical discussion and show what practical consequences might follow from it. A different reason—not necessarily excluding the former—may lie in the role played by 'theoretical' elements such as definition in the Stoic conception of therapy. Compare what our other main source, Cicero, has to say with reference to Chrysippus' treatise:

... when Chrysippus and the Stoics<sup>10</sup> discuss the soul's affections, they are in large part engaged in dividing and defining them; quite brief is that exposition of theirs on how they cure the souls and do not

<sup>8</sup> Thus Diocles of Carystus (*flor.* c. 350 BCE) wrote a treatise entitled Πάθος αἰτία θεραπεία (Gal. *Loc. aff.* VIII p.186 K.) and Praxagoras of Cos (*flor.* c. 300 BCE) an Αἴτια πάθη θεραπείαι (from Cael. Aurel. *Ac. morb.* III 17.163 [Fr. 109 St.]: 'libris de causis atque passionibus et curationibus', cf. Steckerl (1961) 5: Πάθη Αἰτίαι Θεραπείαι). Caelius also ascribes to Praxagoras a 'quarto libro Curationum' (*Ac. morb.* III 4.32 = fr. 111 St.) and knows about a 'tertio libro de morbis' (*Chron. morb.* V 2.50 = fr. 81 St.). Pace Steckerl (1961) 5 and Bardong, *RE* XXII.2 (1954) 1736, these three references may be to one and the same original work. On Praxagoras and Stoicism see *infra*, p. 192 n. 174 and text thereto. Of course the sequence in which an affection was described first and then its cure prescribed is fairly general and encountered also in such treatises as Philodemus' *On Anger* and Plutarch's *On Garrulity* and *On Bad Shame*. De Lacy *ad* 238.4-6, who notes the correspondence, suggests that Chrysippus set the pattern for many subsequent moral essays.

<sup>9</sup> Thus the two substantial fragments from book 1 presented at *PHP* 4.2.10-12, 14-18 (*SVF* 3.462) can be paralleled from 4.4.16-17 and 24, 30, 31, 32 (*SVF* 476, omitting 30), all from book 4. Two further fragments from book 4 also echo Chrysippus' explanation at the beginning of book 1: 4.5.13-14 (*SVF* 479) and 4.6.35 (*SVF* 478). Galen explicitly remarks on two such correspondences, 4.4.23, 4.5.10. On these passages see further *infra*, nn. 51, 63 and text thereto.

<sup>10</sup> This formulation amounts to 'Chrysippus as followed by other Stoics', see Dougan and Henry *ad loc.* On the context in Cicero, see further *infra*, pp. 292 ff.

permit them [i.e. the souls] to be disturbed (Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.9 ~ *SVF* 3.483).<sup>11</sup>

Cicero is here referring to a particular feature of the Stoic approach, viz. the fact that definition had a role to play in therapy and therefore even loomed large in the separately entitled therapeutical book. At 4.53 he himself indicates very clearly that the study of (Stoic) moral definitions is conducive to mastering affections. I shall return to this point presently. But Cicero will hardly have spoken of the Stoic therapeutical discourse as 'quite brief' when it occupied a whole (and according to Galen long) book. What may also have struck him was the emphasis placed by the Stoic on the preventive side of therapy (here perhaps indicated by the phrase *nec ... patiantur*, 'and do not permit them ...').<sup>12</sup>

The question of the role played by theory in Chrysippean therapeutics gains additional weight in the light of the modern view that Hellenistic moral theory (including Stoic ethics) took its starting point from the individual with his or her needs, feelings and opinions without obtruding a dogmatic world-view.<sup>13</sup>

That the *Therapeutics* may also have been intended for separate use may be suggested—in addition to its separate title<sup>14</sup> and the above passage from Galen—by the following testimony:

Not only in this book [scil. the first book *On the soul*] was he [scil. Chrysippus] completely silent about Plato's arguments,<sup>15</sup> but also in his writings *On Affections*, both the three theoretical ones and that which was written by him separately and apart from these, that which is entitled *Therapeutics* and *Ethics* (*PHP* 5.7.52 ~ *SVF* 3.461; cf. 4.1.14).<sup>16</sup>

This testimony confirms the division between the first three and the final books of the treatise and perhaps even supports the

<sup>11</sup> *Chrysippus et Stoici cum de animi perturbationibus disputant, magnam partem in his partiendis et definiendis occupati sunt; illa eorum perexigua oratio est qua medeantur animis nec eos turbulentos esse patiantur.*

<sup>12</sup> See further *infra*, pp. 141, 167 ff.

<sup>13</sup> See further *infra*, pp. 141 ff., 167.

<sup>14</sup> Origenes, *Contra Celsum* I 64, VIII 51 (vol. 1, p. 117.16 ff., vol. 2, p. 266.18 ff. Kō. ~ *SVF* 3.474) too uses the separate title *Therapeutics* but refers to it as part of the *Aff.* Cf. also Philod. *De ira* Col. I. 11-19 Indelli.

<sup>15</sup> The silence about Plato may not have been as complete as Galen claims but the objection appears to reflect an authentic feature of Chrysippean dialectic, see Tieleman (1996a) 141, 256.

<sup>16</sup> οὐ μόνον δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐσιώπησε τοὺς τοῦ Πλάτωνος λόγους ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὰ περὶ παθῶν συγγράμματα, τὰ τε τρία τὰ λογικὰ καὶ χωρὶς αὐτῶν ἰδίᾳ γεγραμμένον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, τὸ Θεραπευτικὸν τε καὶ Ἠθικὸν ἐπιγραφόμενον.

assumption that the *Therapeutics* was designed to be more or less self-contained.

It is tempting to suppose that Chrysippus himself had used the term λογικά to characterize certain parts of his treatise. But did he mean the same by it as Galen did in the passage from *On Affected Parts*? Another snippet of evidence is especially valuable since it comes from another source, viz. Cicero. Concluding his account of the contents of the *On Affections*, he says:

Here you have what the Stoics discuss in plain terms about the affections. They call these things λογικά, because they are expounded in a rather unadorned fashion. And since our exposition has sailed away from these things as from rough cliffs, let us hold our course for the rest of our disquisition, provided that we have spoken about those things with sufficient lucidity given the obscurity of our subject-matter (*Tusc.* 4.33).

Cicero makes it clear that the Stoics themselves spoke of λογικά and this must include Chrysippus whose treatise he has just summarized and whose name he used at the outset of his summary (4.9). However Cicero takes the term λογικά in the sense of 'plain', 'unadorned', which is rather different from Galen's 'theoretical'. Cicero has chosen to reproduce the Stoic account because of its terseness and precision, thinking primarily of the definitions in book I but also, it seems, of the contents of the *Therapeutics*. The above observation is meant to conclude the summary of Chrysippus' whole treatise, i.e. including the section covering the *Therapeutics* (4.23-32).<sup>17</sup> This last book, as we noticed, repeated much of the theory including the definitions expounded in the first book. But then for Cicero the term λογικά seems to have a stylistic application. He uses this term to oppose the Chrysippean treatment to the more expansive style on which he embarks in what follows. Accordingly he does not apply it to books or sections, but rather to their contents (using, rather vaguely, pronouns in the neutre plural). It is hard to believe that he simply lumps together theory and (Stoic) dialectic (as concerned with definition). It is however also possible that Cicero used an abstract, or report, in which the division of subject-matter among the original books was blurred (see further below, pp. 302 ff.).

But does Cicero's mistake, or probable mistake, about the sense of λογικά, mean that Galen is right? What is known about its original Stoic meaning? The Stoics used the term λογικός in the sense of

<sup>17</sup> Pace Heine *ad loc.*

logical, pertaining to logic, or in the sense of rational (as in the expression ‘rational animal’). The first sense could be related to what is known about book I if we take it to pertain to the part of logic (and, more specifically, dialectic) dealing with definitions and partitions. The use of these methods is particularly evident in ethical texts.<sup>18</sup> In *On Affections* book 1 we come across Zeno’s definition as the result of the procedure of articulation of common conceptions, the latter representing the stage characterized as the ‘account in outline’ (see below). Moreover, we find here the division of affection according to genera and species. However, the *aporiai* of book 2 clearly belong to a different branch of logic than the conceptual articulation of book 1, and it is difficult to think of a sense of λογικά applicable to both books. In sum, Galen’s explanation may be the correct one.

## 2. Zeno’s Definitions of Affection

Modern research has somewhat neglected the Stoic concept—and method—of definition.<sup>19</sup> Yet there can be no doubt as to its centrality to Stoic philosophical method. Definition starts from the ‘outline’ (ὑπογραφή), which according to Diogenes is a ‘statement introducing us to things by means of a sketch, or which conveys the force of the definition more simply than a definition does’ (7.60). In other words, it is the formula used for the preliminary step of marking off a definiendum, prior to the construction of a true definition. The account in outline states a general conception (ἔννοια); the definition converts this into a philosophical concept. Thus another witness states:

The Stoics [...] affirm that from the senses the intellect forms conceptions—which they call ἔννοια—viz. of those things which they articulate by definition. The entire method of learning and teaching, they say, stems and spreads from here (Augustine, *Civ. dei* 8.7 ~ *SVF* 2.106).<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> See from the *Tusc.* itself 4.53 (LS 32 H); cf. also the list of ethical works with the heading ‘Ethical theory concerning the articulation of moral conceptions’, D.L. 7.199–200.

<sup>19</sup> But Long-Sedley (1987) 190–5 assemble and excellently discuss a number of texts concerned with division and definition; cf. also Rieth (1933) 36–54.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. D.L. 7.199, ps. Gal. *Def. med.* XIX p. 348.17–349.4 K., Plut. *De comm. not.* 1059C (*SVF* 2.33); cf. also Stob. *Ecl.* II p. 67.11–12 Wachsmuth = *SVF* 3.294). Both the notion of ‘account in outline’ and the related procedure of articulation are

The reference to learning shows that definition as conceived by the Stoics is aimed at articulating what is true (cf. D.L. 7.42). After all, conceptions are the very stuff of rationality and, when naturally embedded in us, a primary criterion of truth.<sup>21</sup>

This also holds good for the sphere of moral action. Accordingly, Cicero commends definitions of courage advanced by Chrysippus and other Stoics as follows:

'[...] I'm afraid they may be the only real philosophers. For which of those definitions does not uncover the tangled conception of courage which lies buried within us all? And once this has been uncovered, who would require anything more for the warrior, the general, or the orator, and not think them capable of performing any courageous act without rage? (*Tusc.* 4.53).<sup>22</sup>

Thus the Stoics adopted the intellectualist position—here endorsed by Cicero—that to know a particular virtue renders us capable of performing it. But this knowledge is in need of articulation and, as Cicero indicates, should be brought to full consciousness. One may assume that an analogous position was adopted with respect to the affections: to know them is a means of preventing them to strike home. If one is able to recognize which condition is at the verge of taking hold of us, it may still be stopped through rational means, i.e. by letting one's better self persuade us to respond differently to the mental presentation in question. The long lists of affections, each carefully defined and subsumed under one of the four generic affections (pleasure, appetite, distress, fear), that have been preserved in sources such as Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus or ps.Andronicus, for all their apparent aridity, reflect an authentic feature of the original expositions which was geared to a therapeutic purpose.<sup>23</sup> Thus the division between the theoretical and practical sides of the Stoic doctrine of the affections should not be exaggerated. In Chrysippus' treatise, too, the definitions of the first books did not only belong to a strictly theoretical sphere, but were also designed to influence moral

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Aristotelian in origin, see e.g. *ENA* 7.1098a20-9, *Met. Z* 3.1029a7, *ibid.* 1028b31; *De an.* B 1.413a9-10; cf. *EE* 1248b10. On the affinities with Stoicism see also Rieth (1933) 176 f.

<sup>21</sup> Aet. IV 11.3-4 (*SVF* 2.83), D.L. 7.54 (*SVF* 2.105) with Long-Sedley (1987), vol. 1, 194.

<sup>22</sup> *Metuo ne soli philosophi sint. Quae enim istarum definitionum non aperit notionem nostram quam habemus omnes de fortitudine tectam atque involutam? Qua aperta quis est qui aut bellatori aut imperatori aut oratori quaerat aliquid neque eos existimet sine rabie quicquam fortiter facere posse?*

<sup>23</sup> See the evidence collected, *SVF* 3.391-430.

action. And the stipulations of the *Therapeutics* remained firmly rooted in the Stoic doctrine about the nature and cause of the affections.<sup>24</sup> But then Stoic philosophy in general was never theoretical in this strict sense but meant to be relevant to living a well-reasoned life.<sup>25</sup>

Let us now take a closer look at the evidence in *PHP* relating to Chrysippus' use of definitions. First one may ask whether there are any indications that Chrysippus employed the distinction between 'account in outline' and technical definition in the context of the procedure of articulation. Chrysippus employed such a method when he set out to establish the location of the intellect in the second half of the first book of his *On the Soul*—the theme of the predecessor of the present study (Tieleman 1996a, Pt. II). As to the affections, Chrysippus could avail himself of the technical definitions laid down by Zeno in the latter's own *On Affections*<sup>26</sup> or perhaps expressed orally.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, taking one's starting point from Zeno seems to have been *de rigueur* for any Stoic. In addition to current ideas on philosophical allegiance,<sup>28</sup> it was also important to demonstrate the unity and continuity of one's school. Thus additions and indeed adjustments—often occasioned by debate and criticism—were couched in the form of the exegesis of the founder's *ipsissima verba*. Anti-Stoic authors such as Galen and Plutarch provide many examples showing that this did not prevent Stoics from being played off against Zeno or one another. For the moment suffice it to observe that the technique of starting from Zeno's definitions was standard procedure, perpetuated by later Stoics including Posidonius who also took Chrysippus' exegesis into account.<sup>29</sup>

Chrysippus first turned to Zeno's general definition of 'affection', viz. as an 'irrational and unnatural motion of the soul and an

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<sup>24</sup> I shall justify this statement more fully when dealing with the *Therapeutics* in ch. 6 below.

<sup>25</sup> Aetius, *Praef.* 2 (*SVF* 2.35): 'The Stoics said that [...] philosophy is the practice of expertise in utility.' Cf. Long-Sedley (1987), vol. 1, 161.

<sup>26</sup> D.L. 7.4. It is referred to *ibid.* 110 (*SVF* 1.211) in connection with Zeno's fourfold classification of affections.

<sup>27</sup> Galen presents what looks like a verbatim fragment from Posidonius saying that the definition of ἄτη ('baneful blindness') and 'many other affections' were pronounced by Zeno but recorded by Chrysippus (*PHP* 4.6.2, p. 280 De Lacy, *SVF* 3.481, Posid. fr. 165 E.-K.); cf. De Lacy *ad loc.* On the 'blindness' at issue here see further *infra*, pp. 178 ff.

<sup>28</sup> On which see Sedley (1989).

<sup>29</sup> See *infra*, pp. 116 ff.



excessive conation' (ἄλογον τε καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κίνησιν ψυχῆς [...] καὶ πλεονάζουσιν ὁρμήν, 4.2.8, p. 238 De Lacy).<sup>30</sup> It is a fair assumption that this definition, like those of the four generic affections,<sup>31</sup> had been advanced by Zeno in his *On Affections*. In our parallel passages the two parts of this definition are presented as alternative descriptions by means of the disjunctive 'or' instead of 'and' but it is not impossible that Galen's καὶ is to be read as explicative, with 'excessive' explaining 'irrational and unnatural' and 'conation' specifying the kind of motion meant.<sup>32</sup> On the other hand Galen also distinguishes between 'irrational and unnatural motion' and 'excessive conation', thus suggesting that we are dealing with two definitions (*ibid.* 13, p.240, ll.30-33). In his exegesis of these two definitions Chrysippus successively addressed the elements of 'irrational', 'unnatural' and 'excessive'. From this context Galen quotes the following substantial passage, 4.2.10-12:<sup>33</sup>

(10) First it should be kept in mind that the rational animal is by nature something that follows reason and acts in accordance with reason as its guide. (11) Often, however, he moves differently towards certain things and away from certain things in disobedience to reason when he is pushed too much. To this movement both definitions refer, because the unnatural motion arises irrationally in this way and so does the excess in our conations. (12) For the word 'irrational' should be taken as disobedient to reason and having turned away

<sup>30</sup> This double definition is also given by D.L. 7.110; cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 4.11: *est igitur Zenonis haec definitio ut perturbatio sit, quod πάθος ille dicit, aversa a recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. Quidam brevius, perturbationem esse appetitum vehementiorem. Ibid.* 47: *definitio perturbationis, qua recte Zenonem usum puto; ita enim definit ut perturbatio sit aversa a ratione contra naturam animi commotio, vel brevius, ut perturbatio sit appetitus vehementior, vehementior autem intellegatur is qui procul absit a naturae constantia.* Note that the second passage corrects the information in the first that the second definition was used by others than Zeno. Cicero's translation of ἄλογος (*aversa a recta ratione*) reflect Chrysippus' exegesis, on which see *infra* in text. A similar echo is found in the version presented by Stob. *Ecl.* II p. 88.8-11 Wachsmuth: *πάθος δ' εἶναι φασιν ὁρμήν πλεονάζουσιν καὶ ἀπειθῇ τῷ αἰροῦντι λόγῳ ἢ κίνησιν ψυχῆς (ἄλογον) παρὰ φύσιν. εἶναι δὲ πάθη πάντα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς. διὸ καὶ πᾶσαν πτοίαν πάθος εἶναι (καὶ) πάλιν (πᾶν) πάθος πτοίαν.* Cf. *ibid.* p.39.5 ff. (mentioning Zeno), 44.4 ff. W. Plut. *Virt. mor.* 441D: *τὸ ἡγεμονικόν [...] πρὸς τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν αἰροῦντα λόγον ἐκφέρηται.* The definition of affection as a πτοία of the soul is Zenonian as well. It was discussed by Chrysippus in the same context, see below. Plut. *Virt. mor.* ch. 3, 441C-D (*SVF* 3.459) presents an accurate account which appears to be based on Chrysippus.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. D.L. 7.111.

<sup>32</sup> Conation (ὁρμή) is itself defined as a movement (φορά) of the soul towards something, Stob. *Ecl.* II p. 86, l.19 (*SVF* 3.169).

<sup>33</sup> Compare the summary Chrysippus offered of this passage in book 4, i.e. the *Therapeutics*, as quoted *PHP* 4.4.16-17 (*SVF* 3.476).

from reason, in accordance with which movement we say in ordinary usage that certain persons ‘are pushed’ and ‘moved irrationally’, ‘without reason and judgement’. For when we use these expressions it is not as if a person is carried away by error and having overlooked something according to reason, but especially with reference to the motion which he [scil. Zeno] outlines, since it is not the nature of a rational animal to move thus in his soul but in accordance with reason (p.240, ll.18-29, SVF 3.462; transl. De Lacy’s, modified).<sup>34</sup>

Chrysippus’ point of departure is empirical. Affections are observed to deviate from the natural pattern of action of humans as rational beings.<sup>35</sup> This typical behaviour results from our innate ability to assess appearances as either beneficial or detrimental to our constitution.<sup>36</sup> The resulting pattern of responses was expressed by the Stoic in terms of conation, ὁρμή, which was defined as a movement (φορά) of the intellect towards or away from something.<sup>37</sup> This definition clearly underlies the description of action (with no differentiation between the mental and its outward manifestation)<sup>38</sup> in terms of movement (viz. ὠθείσθαι,<sup>39</sup> φέρεσθαι/φορά<sup>40</sup> and κινεῖσθαι/

<sup>34</sup> (10) δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ἐντεθυμῆσθαι ὅτι τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον ἀκολουθητικὸν φύσει ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα πρακτικόν. (11) πολλάκις μέντοι καὶ ἄλλως φέρεται ἐπὶ τινα καὶ ἀπὸ τινων ἀπειθῶς τῷ λόγῳ ὠθουμένων ἐπὶ πλεῖον, καθ’ ἣν φορὰν ἀμφοτέροι ἐχουσιν οἱ ὅροι, τῆς παρὰ φύσιν κινήσεως ἀλόγως οὕτως γινομένης καὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς πλεονασμοῦ. (12) τὸ γὰρ ἄλογον τοῦτι ληπτέον ἀπειθὲς λόγῳ καὶ ἀπεστραμμένον τὸν λόγον, καθ’ ἣν φορὰν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔθει τινὰς φαμεν ὠθείσθαι καὶ ἀλόγως φέρεσθαι ἄνευ λόγου (καὶ) κρίσεως· (οὐ γὰρ) ὡς εἰ διημαρτημένως φέρεται καὶ παριδὼν τι κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ταῦτ’ ἐπισημαινόμεθα, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα καθ’ ἣν ὑπογράφει φορὰν, οὐ πεφυκότος τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου κινεῖσθαι οὕτως κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. 4.7.32 (SVF 3.476) (from the *Therapeutics*): διὸ καὶ αἱ οὕτως ἄλογοι κινήσεις πάθῃ τε λέγονται καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι ἅτ’ ἐκβαίνουσιν τὴν λογικὴν σύστασιν.

<sup>36</sup> As expounded in the theory of familiarization (οἰκείωσις), e.g. D.L. 7.85-89 (SVF 3.178).

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Stob. *Ecl.* II p. 86, l.19 (SVF 3.169); Clem. Al. *Strom.* II, 13.57.6, p. 145 Stählin (SVF 3.377).

<sup>38</sup> This was peculiar to Chrysippus, as appears from Seneca’s account of the Stoic theory of action, *Ep.* 113.18 ff. esp. 23: *inter Cleanthen et discipulum eius Chrysippum non convenit quid sit ambulatio. Cleanthes ait spiritum esse a principali usque in pedes permissum, Chrysippus ipsum principale* (SVF 1.525; § 18 is printed as 3.169, second text).

<sup>39</sup> Cf. the term προωθοῦντα in the fragment preserved by Plut. *Virt. mor.* 450C, quoted *infra*, p. 180.

<sup>40</sup> Chrysippus often uses φέρεσθαι/φορά for psychic phenomena and especially affection on account of its sense of ‘being carried away’ which connotes the loss of control he considers typical of affection (as is also evident from his simile of the runners, *PHP* 4.2.14-18, to be quoted and discussed shortly); for more instances see 4.6.8-9 (SVF 473), 23 (SVF 3.475). Accordingly, the term indicates the impulse aspect of behaviour in particular. Our φοραί (‘impulses’, ‘impeti’) fluctuate or alternate, causing changes of attitude and especially affection, e.g. *Schadenfreude*

κίνησις)<sup>41</sup> throughout this passage. The terms φέρεσθαι and ὠθεῖσθαι ('being pushed') especially indicate the uncontrolled and undirected quality of emotional action.<sup>42</sup>

These observations are presented as common and so reflected in common parlance, witness the expressions mentioned (12). In other words, Zeno's definitions were rooted in common experience and discourse: the common expressions 'being moved irrationally' and 'without reason' or 'without judgement' are represented by the 'irrational motion' in the technical definition and 'being pushed (too much)' by the term 'excessive (conation)'. Of course this does not imply that expressions such as 'without reason' or 'without judgement' count as adequate technical descriptions. They belong to the sphere of common inarticulate reason. Hence Chrysippus stresses that we use them 'in ordinary usage'. In addition, the verbal form '(he, scil. Zeno) outlines' reminds us that Chrysippus is speaking of a preliminary determination, i.e. the 'outline account', not the technical definition resulting from the procedure of conceptual articulation (see above, p. 96). The main point of the common expressions cited seems to be that people in general distinguish the kind of irrationality involved in behaviour or action from purely cognitive mistakes (where the relation to action is absent or at least less direct).<sup>43</sup>

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turns into its opposite, pity, when persons change καθ' ἑτέρας φοράς: Chrys. *ap.* Plut. *Stoic Rep.* 25, 1046B (from the second book *On the Good*); we turn away from reason and fall prey to affection ἄλλη βιαιότερα φορὰ χρωμένους, Chrys. *ap.* Plut. *Virt. mor.* 450D (SVF 3.390), quoted *infra*, p.180. Cf. PHP 4.6.29 (SVF 3.475), a passage from *On Affections* where φοραί refers to the impulsive, emotional behaviour expected of lovers. But Chrysippus also used φέρεσθαι/φορά in the more widely attested sense of a tendency of thought or opinion, as in the *On the Soul* for the common view that the heart is the seat of the intellect, PHP 3.1.22 (φορά), 23 (ἐνηνέχθαι), 25 (φέρεσθαι) (SVF 2.886); cf. 298a, p.107.26 (indicating an instance of common *parlance* in his *Logical Inquiries*); cf. Tieleman (1996a) 160 ff. Yet for Chrysippus this usage remained linked to that of a (spontaneous) tendency of behaviour, no doubt because thought is expressed through action, see esp. PHP 3.7.25 (SVF 2.903): κατὰ τοιαύτην δέ μοι δοκοῦσι μάλιστα φορὰν καὶ οἱ τιμωρητικώτερον πρὸς τινὰς φερόμενοι ὁρμᾶν ἐπὶ τὸ ταύτην [scil. καρδίαν] ἐκσπασαι, καθ' ἣν φορὰν ἐπιτείνοντες καὶ πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν σπλάγχχνων ὁμοειδῶς φέρονται. In addition compare the use of φέρεσθαι in the account (no doubt Chrysippean) of affection, Plut. *Virt. mor.* 446F (where note that the motion occurs between two opposite affections, or between affection and reason).

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Alex. Aphr. *Fat.* ch. 13, p.181.13 ff. Bruns (SVF 2.979, ll. 27-9): πᾶν γὰρ ζῶον ὡς ζῶον κινούμενον κινεῖσθαι (τὴν) καθ' ὁρμὴν κίνησιν, ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης διὰ ζῶου γινομένην.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Chrysippus definitions as preserved by Stobaeus, *Ecl.* I, p. 165 Wachsmuth: κίνησιν μεταλλαγὴν κατὰ τόπον ἢ σχῆμα· φορὰν δὲ μετέωρον κίνησιν ὀξείαν.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. PHP 4.2.23 ff. The same distinction was made by the Stoics on a technical level between two kinds of appearances, viz. conative and non-conative ones, see

Galen presents the expressions ‘without reason’ and ‘without judgement’ as flatly contradicting the Stoic view (including the Zenonian one) of affections as judgements.<sup>44</sup> Thus he chooses to ignore not only the context in which they are located (a preliminary survey of common notions),<sup>45</sup> but also the normative sense in which the term reason (λόγος) is used throughout this passage. This is why it is called a guide which is rejected or disobeyed. But affections remain rational in the descriptive sense involved in the determination of man as a *rational* (λογικόν) animal. Still, it might be argued that Galen is exploiting a point which Chrysippus had left less than crystal-clear. Later scholastic elaborations of this section of Chrysippus’ treatise do provide the desired clarity by speaking of *preferential* reason (ὁ αἰρῶν λόγος)<sup>46</sup> or *correct* reason (*recta ratio*, i.e. ὀρθὸς λόγος).<sup>47</sup> But it cannot be excluded that Chrysippus used one or both these expressions himself in the wider context of the passage quoted.

Chrysippus echoes the above passage in his *On Disharmony* (or: *On Inconsistency*, Περὶ ἀνομολογίας). The following fragment has been preserved by Plutarch:

... Chrysippus [...] says: “Although the rational animal naturally avails himself of reason for each and every action and lets itself be guided by it, we often turn away from it, following another more forceful movement” (*On Moral Virtue*, ch. 10, p.450C, SVF 3.390).<sup>48</sup>

This snippet of text clearly reflects the first two sentences of the passage from the *On Affections*. What comes before contains further echoes, most notably the pushing impact ascribed to the affections, but adds the epistemological aspect represented by the mental appearances involved. In conjunction the two passages show clearly how the account of emotional behaviour is carefully grafted onto the

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Stob. *Ecl.* II p. 86.17-19 (SVF 3.169): τὸ δὲ κινεῖν τὴν ὁρμὴν οὐδὲν ἕτερον εἶναι λέγουσιν ἀλλ’ ἢ φαντασίαν ὁρμητικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος αὐτόθεν, τὴν δὲ ὁρμὴν εἶναι φορὰν ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τι κατὰ τὸ γένος. On this passage see also *supra*, nn. 32, 37 with text.

<sup>44</sup> E.g. *PHP* 4.2.8, 4.5.4, 7.

<sup>45</sup> The same contextual distinction is ignored and misrepresented by Galen in dealing with Chrysippus’ *On the Soul*, see Tieleman (1996a) Pt. II, esp. 183 f., 258, 288.

<sup>46</sup> Stob. *Ecl.* II p. 88.9 Wachsmuth (SVF 3.378), quoted *supra*, n. 30.

<sup>47</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* 4.11, 47, quoted *supra*, n. 30.

<sup>48</sup> ὁ Χρύσιππος « τοῦ λογικοῦ » φησι « ζῶον φύσιν ἔχοντος προσκρῆσθαι εἰς ἕκαστα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κυβερνᾶσθαι πολλάκις ἀποστρέφεσθαι αὐτὸν ἡμᾶς ἄλλη βιαιότερα φορὰ χρωμένους ». Plutarch goes on to make the same point as Galen, viz. that Chrysippus admits that reason and affection are different. See further, *infra*, pp. 180 ff.

Stoic theory of human action centred on the concepts of conation and appearance. An affection such as anger mentally blinds us, so as to render us unable to perceive obvious appearances as such. In consequence we no longer make the obvious choices, but others we then come to regret. Thus fits of anger may lead us into danger, or make us loose things or persons dear to us. In general, the kind of irrationality involved in affection prevents us from selecting what are technically called 'preferred indifferents' and avoiding their opposites. We no longer act in the way to which Nature has predisposed us.<sup>49</sup> Here the emphasis lies on making the wrong choices in the sphere of the indifferents, whereas the passage from *On Affections* highlights the aspect of excess involved in affection.

Galen presents another long passage where Chrysippus says more about Zeno's second definition. In Chrysippus' original exposition, Galen tells us (4.2.13, p.240.31-3), this passage directly followed the one he quoted first:

(14) The excess of conation has also been meant<sup>50</sup> in this sense, on account of exceeding the measure of themselves and nature. (15) What is meant could become clearer by these things, for instance in the case of walking in accordance with conation the motion of the legs is not excessive but somehow commensurate with the conation, so that one may also stop when one wishes, and change one's pace. (16) But in the case of persons running in accordance with conation this sort of thing no longer happens but the movement of the legs exceeds the conation, and they do not obediently change their pace as soon as they have started. (17) Something similar to these [scil. movements of the legs] happens, I think, also in the case of the conations because of an excess of the measure of reason, so that when (a person) exercises conation he is not obedient to it [scil. reason], if in the case of running the excess meant goes beyond conation and in the case of conation beyond reason. (18) After all, natural conation is measured in terms of reason and goes only so far as reason itself thinks right. Thus when excess arises in this respect and in this manner, it is said to be an excessive and an unnatural and irrational movement of the soul (*PHP* 4.2.14-18, *SVF* 3.462).<sup>51</sup>

<sup>49</sup> See *supra*, n. 36 with text thereto.

<sup>50</sup> Scil. by Zeno.

<sup>51</sup> (14) κατὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ὁ πλεονασμὸς τῆς ὁρμῆς εἴρηται, διὰ τὸ τὴν καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ φυσικὴν τῶν ὁρμῶν συμμετρίαν ὑπερβαίνειν. (15) γένοιτο δ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον διὰ τούτων γνωριμώτερον, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πορεύεσθαι καθ' ὁρμὴν οὐ πλεονάζει ἡ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις ἀλλὰ συναπατίζει τι τῇ ὁρμῇ ὥστε καὶ στήναι, ὅταν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ μεταβάλλειν. (16) ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν τρεχόντων καθ' ὁρμὴν οὐκέτι τοιοῦτον γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πλεονάζει παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἢ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις ὥστε ἐκφέρεσθαι καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εὐπειθῶς οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐναρξαμένων. (17) αἷς οἶμαι τι παραπλήσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρμῶν γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ τὴν κατὰ λόγον ὑπερβαίνειν συμμετρίαν, ὥσθ' ὅταν

Chrysippus' Greek is at times difficult and opaque. Yet the last sentence makes clear that the analogy of running is also relevant to the first (part of the) definition formulated by Zeno. Further we have again the idea of disobedience to Reason. Rationality is once again linked to nature, i.e. normal behaviour, but now it is further explained in terms of measure and control. Affection is an excessive impulse insofar as the soul transgresses the measure set by reason and can no longer be made to conform to this measure. Chrysippus compares excessive conation to running legs which have acquired an impetus of their own and so are no longer stoppable by a simple act of the will. In choosing this particular image Chrysippus retains the idea of motion which was so prominent in the first quotation. Psychic acts like conation are motions, or processes, no less than acts like walking and running which involve the whole organism, i.e. body as well as soul.<sup>52</sup>

### 3. *The Causes of Affection*

Chrysippus explains Zeno's first two definitions of affection through his striking analogy of the runners. His approach in this stage of his argument seems predominantly descriptive and empirical. He describes the phenomenon of affection as involving an interruption, or divergence, from the natural flow of movement typical of rational

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ὁρμᾶ μὴ εὐπειθῶς ἔχειν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ δρόμου τοῦ πλεονασμοῦ λεγομένου παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ὁρμῆς παρὰ τὸν λόγον. (18) συμμετρία γάρ ἐστι φυσικῆς ὁρμῆς ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ ἕως τοσούτου ἕως αὐτὸς ἀξιοί. διὸ δὴ καὶ τῆς ὑπερβάσεως κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὕτως γινομένης πλεονάζουσα τε ὁρμὴ λέγεται εἶναι καὶ ἄλογος κίνησις ψυχῆς.

Cf. the excerpts from Chrysippus' own summary in the *Therapeutics* quoted at 4.4.24-25, 30, 31 (SVF 476). From these partly overlapping excerpts the following continuous text can be reconstructed: οἶαι καὶ ἀκρατεῖς αἱ τοιαῦται καταστάσεις εἰσιν, ὡς ἂν οὐ κρατοῦντων ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλ' ἐκφερομένων, καθάπερ οἱ τῷ τόνῳ τρέχοντες προσεκφέρονται, οὐ κρατοῦντες τῆς τοιαύτης κινήσεως, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον κινούμενοι ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα καὶ τούτῳ οἰακίζοντες, κἂν ὅποιοσὺν ᾖ, κρατοῦσιν ἤτοι ἀπαθείς εἰσι τῆς τοιαύτης κινήσεως καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὴν ὁρμῶν [24. κρατοῦσιν τῶν κινήσεων τῶν κατ' αὐτὰς ὁρμῶν, 31], ὥστε πεισθῆναι ἐάνπερ ἐνδεικνύηται αὐτός, παραπλησίως [ἀνάλογον, 31] τοῖς περιπατοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐκφέρονται βιαίως, ὥστε οἱ κατὰ πρᾶνους θεόντες. As is indicated, Galen presents slightly different versions of the same text at 24 and 31. Such small differences (which in other cases might affect our interpretation) occur more often and may be due to Galen's own carelessness and/or way of inserting his quotations. More serious is the fact that the quotation at 30—translated in the text below—is omitted by Von Arnim.

<sup>52</sup> For affection as motion cf. also Arist. *Phys.* Γ 3.

beings. He is not explicit about the *cause*. Unsurprisingly Galen makes much of this omission, asking how reason could exceed its own measure and in general how something irrational could come from pure reason. On Chrysippus' behalf one might counter that this omission suits his approach at this stage. The question of the cause, as we shall see, receives ample attention in book 2. So it would be unfair to press for a causal explanation here. Yet the idea of *motion* central to the analogy may provide a clue. When the act of running (i.e. moving the whole body) becomes excessive and uncontrollable, the cause lies in the corporeality and weight of the body. This had also been pointed out by Posidonius (4.3.4-5 = Fr. 34 E.-K.).<sup>53</sup> But Galen turns this into an instance of the criticism directed by Posidonius against Chrysippus: just as the weight of the body is (part of the) cause of the excess in the act of running, so Chrysippus should—but fails to—specify the cause of the excess of psychic movement (*ibid.* and 4.5.12).

Of course, Galen wants to hear only one answer to the question about the cause—a non-rational power. He constantly intimates that this is what Posidonius argued too. But he fails to produce any direct evidence that Posidonius criticized Chrysippus on this score. All movements or processes (κίνησεις), including those of the soul, are of a corporeal nature, since what moves or is moved are bodies.<sup>54</sup> This is presumably what Chrysippus meant. But then Galen systematically suppresses elements pertaining to the soul's corporeality from his presentation of Chrysippus' argument.<sup>55</sup> Posidonius not only concurred with Chrysippus on the soul's substance,<sup>56</sup> but, as we have seen, also incorporated it in his own ideas on character, the affections and their therapy. So he seems to be a more reliable witness on this passage from Chrysippus.

There is a further indication that Chrysippus thought along these lines. Affections, though excessive conations, vary in intensity, or excess, from one person to another, or from one occasion to another. This was explained by the Stoics in *physical* terms, viz. as varying degrees of contraction and relaxation of the corporeal soul.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>53</sup> See *infra*, pp. 250 f.

<sup>54</sup> Aet. Plac. IV 20,1 (SVF 2.387). On the soul in particular see Iamblichus *ap. Stob. Ecl.* I, p. 371.22 ff. (SVF 2.801): οἱ σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, οἷον οἱ Στωικοί [...] Πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι σωματοειδεῖς τὰς κινήσεις αὐτῇ ἀποδιδόασιν.

<sup>55</sup> See further *infra*, pp. 114, 121 f.

<sup>56</sup> See *infra*, p. 36.

<sup>57</sup> See Plut. *Virt. mor.* ch. 10, 449D (SVF 3.468).

Galen brings the same attitude to bear on a passage from Chrysippus concerned with the third definition of affection formulated by Zeno (*PHP* 4.5.3-8). Zeno also defined affection as a ‘fluttering’ (πτοία) of the soul.<sup>58</sup> Through this term the irrationality of affection is likened to the random movements of a flock of birds in panic. The use of this noun (and its cognate verb) for states of excitement and in particular fear and terror is attested for poets and others well before Zeno.<sup>59</sup> Epicurus used it with reference to sexual arousal (fr. 458 Us.).<sup>60</sup> Plato, moreover, used the term in a relevant context (*Republic* 439D). In the case of Stoics such as Zeno and Chrysippus we should bear in mind that the term ‘fluttering’ denotes the physical *motions* characteristic of the emotional soul. As such, it is ideally suited to convey the idea that affection interrupts, or diverges from, the natural pattern of behaviour as explained by Chrysippus in connection with Zeno’s first two definitions.<sup>61</sup> Here is the relevant Chrysippean passage with its immediate Galenic context (4.5.5-7, p. 260 De Lacy ~ *SVF* 3.476):

... (5) On occasion he [scil. Chrysippus] also falls into the assertion that the movements related to the affections occur ‘at random’, which is by no means different from ‘uncaused’, if one weighs the word exactly.<sup>62</sup> (6) Thus directly after the passages I quoted a little earlier,<sup>63</sup>

<sup>58</sup> As explained by Stob. *Ecl.* II, p. 39.8-10 W. (*SVF* 1.206); cf. *ibid.* p.88.11-12.

<sup>59</sup> See *LSJ* s.v.

<sup>60</sup> One might also hear here a—more distant and less certain—echo of Plato’s comparison of the human intellect with an aviary, with elements of *knowledge* being represented by the birds, *Theaetetus* 196c-199c. Plato introduces this image shortly after that of the wax-tablet (*ibid.* 191a-195b), which was taken over by the Stoics; cf. Aet. IV 20.2, D.L. 7.50, Sext. *M* 7.228, 372.

<sup>61</sup> Sorabji (2000) 57 takes the fluttering to indicate the mind’s oscillation, too rapid to notice, between *two* alternative options on the basis of Plut. *Virt. mor.* 446F-447A (*SVF* 3.459). But Plutarch is not talking about affection in general but about mental conflict in the specific sense explained by the Platonists and Aristotelians in terms of a conflict between reason and an irrational power and by the Stoics in terms of the wavering of the rational intellect, i.e. the phenomenon of doing wrong while being simultaneously conscious of a better alternative (the Stoics, then, deny the simultaneity, arguing that there is in fact a succession of options too rapid to notice).

<sup>62</sup> The phrase echoes Pl. *Theae.* 184c.

<sup>63</sup> This must refer to the passages quoted *ibid.* 24-25, 30, 31, 32 (pp. 256-8 De Lacy) which are all from the (opening?) section of book 4 (i.e. the *Therapeutics*, *ibid.* 23, p.256, ll.2-3) where Chrysippus offered a summary of his treatment of Zeno’s definitions in book 1; cf. *supra*, n. 9. The present passage must be from the same original context, as is also indicated by the καὶ (‘also’) before πτοία and the reference to τῶν τῶν παθῶν γένει (‘the affections as a class’). Von Arnim was therefore right to print these quotations all under *SVF* 3.476. In this case, however, there is no corresponding passage from book 1.



he says: "Fluttering" too has been appropriately used to describe the affections as a class in respect of this "being agitated"<sup>64</sup> and "moving at random" '. (7) But if by "random" you mean "uncaused", Chrysippus, you are in conflict both with yourself and with Aristotle and Plato and the notions of all men and long before that you are in conflict with the very nature of things given the fact that nothing can happen without a cause ...<sup>65</sup>

Apart from failing to identify one or more causes of affection, Chrysippus is said to fly in the face of Stoic determinism, i.e. the idea of the causal nexus, or Fate, to which he surely subscribes.<sup>66</sup> By the

<sup>64</sup> The composite verb ἐνσοβέω is rare; for the passive voice LSJ only gives this occurrence in the meaning 'agitation' (no doubt in view of the article τὸ), but it is more likely that it indicates that it is used to refer to the expression as used in the context preceding the quotation, which is how De Lacy apparently takes it, putting τὸ ἐνσοβοῦν τούτου and εἰκὴ φερόμενον between inverted commas. This suggests that these terms too had been used by Zeno or, more likely, had been aduced by Chrysippus himself as items of common parlance supporting Zeno's definition of affection as a fluttering of the soul. De Lacy's translation of ἐνσοβοῦν as 'being ruffled' seems less apposite, however. The meaning of ἐνσοβέω seems identical to that of the simple verb σοβέω, whose primary meaning is 'causing a violent movement', i.e. 'drive away' or 'scare away'. The focus on movement again. The passive voice also bears the metaphorical sense 'to be excited' or 'to be agitated' and is used in connection with various forceful affections. See *LSJ s.v.* σοβέω II.

<sup>65</sup> (5) ἐμπίπτει δὲ ποτε καὶ εἰς τὸ φάσκειν εἰκὴ γίνεσθαι τὰς κατὰ τὰ πάθη κινήσεις, ὅπερ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ἀναιτίως, εἴ τις ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάζῃ τὸ ῥῆμα. (6) αἷς γοῦν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν γέγραφα ῥήσεσιν ἐφεξῆς φησιν· οἰκειῶς δὲ τῷ τῶν παθῶν γένει ἀποδίδοται καὶ ἡ πτοία κατὰ τὸ ἐνσοβοῦν τούτου καὶ φερόμενον εἰκὴ. (7) ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀναιτίως (τὸ) εἰκὴ λέγεις, ὃ Χρύσιππε, καὶ σεαυτῷ μάχη καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ Πλάτῳ καὶ ταῖς ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐννοίαις καὶ πολὺ πρότερον αὐτῇ τῶν πραγμάτων τῇ φύσει μηδενὸς ἀναιτίως γίνεσθαι δυναμένον.

<sup>66</sup> One of the fullest expositions of the principle is Alex. Aphr. *Fat.* pp.191.30-192.28 Bruns (*SVF* 2.945); cf. Gal. *Plenit.* VII, p. 526 K. (*SVF* 2.440); Sext. *M* 9.75 (*SVF* 2.311). Indeed, Galen's phrase 'Nothing happens without a cause' (μηδὲν ἀναιτίως γίνεσθαι) reflects a distinctively Stoic dictum, see Chrys. *ap. Plut. De Stoic. Rep.* ch. 23, 1045C (*SVF* 2.973); ps.Plut. *Fat.* 11, 574D (*SVF* 2.912), Alex. Aphr. *ibid.* p.191 Bruns; cf. Cic. *Fat.* 41. Chrysippus also defended it in the case of the choice between *apparently* indistinguishable things: just as weight always determines to which side the balance will tip, so there must always be a cause (whether internal or external) for our decision, even if we are not aware of the factors directing our conation one way or the other, Plut. *De Stoic. Rep.* ch. 23, 1045B-C (*SVF* 2.97). Accordingly the Stoics denied the existence of completely indistinguishable appearances, Sext. *M* 7.252 (*SVF* 2.65), Plut. *De comm. not.* 1077B, just as there cannot ever be two or more discrete objects that are exactly alike, Cic. *Ac. Pr.* 2.54, 85 (*SVF* 2.113, 114). Similarly the choice for one of two similar drachmas, Sext. *M* XI 59 (*SVF* 3.122), i.e. the same principle applies as in all other cases. On the Stoic causal theory in general see the classic article by Frede (1980; repr. 1987); see also Hankinson (1998b) 238 ff. On Chrysippus in particular see Bobzien (1999); for Galen see Hankinson (1998a). It is important to realize that the principle 'nothing happens without a cause' applies to *antecedent* causes, i.e. fated external events. The soul as the locus of our moral responsibility is seen as a *sustaining* or *complete* cause, see Frede (1980) 234 ff. (repr. 1987: 138 ff.), Bobzien (1999) 208 ff.

same token he is played off against the consensus view of Plato, of Aristotle and of people in general, the last category being included because of the familiar Stoic appeal to common notions. As Galen points out, the thesis of an uncaused motion is typical of Epicurus, who had been censured by the Stoics themselves on this score (4.35-6, p.258 De Lacy). This yields the ironic vignette of Chrysippus *contra mundum*, though with Epicurus as his sole companion. Of course this dialectical grouping of authorities cannot be justified from a modern historiographical point of view. Chrysippus associated *πτοία* with other common expressions such as 'being agitated' (ἐνσεσοβημένον) and 'moving at random' (φερόμενον εἰκῇ) in order to bring out the fact that the emotional soul moves without plan or purpose, just as birds in panic do. Accordingly, the adverb *εἰκῇ* here does not mean, at least as far as Chrysippus is concerned, 'without cause'. In fact, Chrysippus had broached the subject of causes himself, indicating two factors. Consider the following fragment from the *Therapeutics* (5.2.14, *SVF* 3.465):

It must be supposed that the disease of the soul is most similar to a feverish state of the body in which fevers and chills do not occur at regular intervals but irregular and at random, from the condition [scil. of the ill person] and at the incidence of small causes.<sup>67</sup>

This passage, too, is concerned with the random kind of motion characteristic of affection. Here Chrysippus compares it with a particular type of fever in the context of the analogy<sup>68</sup> between soul and body developed at length in the *Therapeutics* but already underlying the argument of book 1.<sup>69</sup> In this book a similar passage almost certainly featured.<sup>70</sup> Although Chrysippus' main concern here is not with the cause, or causes, of affection, we get a glimpse of the twofold causal explanation underlying his account. Chrysippus distinguishes between two causes: (1) the (physical) condition of the intellect and (2) external influences. If the soul is diseased, small influences from outside produce an outbreak of affection comparable to fever, and of one type in particular, viz. that distinguished by

<sup>67</sup> ὑπονοητέον τοίνυν τὴν μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς νόσον ὁμοιοτάτην εἶναι τῇ τοῦ σώματος πυρετῶδει καταστάσει καθ' ἣν οὐ περιοδικῶς ἀλλ' ἀτακτῶς πυρετοὶ καὶ φρίκαι γίνονται καὶ ἄλλως ἀπὸ τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ μικρῶν ἐπιγινομένων αἰτίων.

<sup>68</sup> On the sense of 'analogy' in this connection, see *infra*, pp. 142 ff.

<sup>69</sup> *PHP* 5.3.12; cf. 5.2.43.

<sup>70</sup> See *PHP* 5.3.12, quoted *infra*, p. 107.

ancient physicians on the basis of its irregular occurrence.<sup>71</sup> In the case of the soul, this underlines the irrationality of its affections.

Chrysippus also emphasizes the fact that *small* causes suffice to trigger bursts of fever. That is to say, the appearance (φαντασία) to the weak, or diseased, intellect of even relatively unimportant events triggers an excessive, i.e. emotional movement. He called this the intellect's *proneness* (εὐεμπτωσία)<sup>72</sup> to affection and used it in the context of the above passage:

Chrysippus in the first book *On Affections* confused the notion of disease by saying that disease in the soul is analogous to the state of the body, in which it is prone to fevers or diarrhoea or something of the kind (*PHP* 5.3.12, not in *SVF*).

Galen takes the idea of proneness to imply *health* prone to disease but Chrysippus consistently speaks of a condition of soul and body that is diseased already. The distinction, then, is that between the underlying diseased condition and certain crises arising from it under the influence of incidents from outside. Galen glosses over this distinction.<sup>73</sup> In Ch. 5 below I shall return to this passage in connection with the pathology underlying Chrysippus' argument.<sup>74</sup>

The external factors recur elsewhere as one of the two causes of evil, i.e. affection. In this context Chrysippus refers to them as 'the

<sup>71</sup> As opposed to 'periodical' fevers, which e.g. occur each third or fourth day, see e.g. Galen, *PHP* 5.2.7, *ibid.* 13; cf. 8.6.23; and the full account in Galen's *On Crises* (IX, pp.550-760 K.) and *On the Different Kinds of Fever* (VII, pp.273-405 K.). For the *Corpus Hippocraticum* see Langholf (1990) 82-110, 120; Jouanna (1992) 215 f. On this Chrysippean passage and Galen's comments on it, see further *infra*, p. 155.

<sup>72</sup> See the later scholastic systematizations of Chrysippus' account preserved at D.L. 7.115, Stob. *Ecl.* II p.93 Wachsmuth and, with reference to Chrysippus, Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.23-31 (see esp. 23). According to Stobaeus (*ibid.* II.1-4): 'Proneness is the propensity to slip easily (εὐκαταφορίαν) into affection or one of the unnatural actions, such as tending to distress, irascibility, enviousness, quickness to anger and the like; but proneness also concerns acts that go against nature such as theft and adultery and insolence, from which thieves and adulterers and insolent men derive their name, (cf. *ibid.* 70.21 ff., where proneness is classed as a state, or ἕξις, which means that it permits of gradations). The Chrysippean analogy between soul and body is echoed by D.L. 7.115: 'And just as certain types of proneness are mentioned in the case of the body, e.g. catarrh and diarrhoea, so propensities (εὐκαταφορίαι) exist in the case of the soul, e.g. enviousness, compassion, competitiveness and similar things.' Manifest affections like anger and pity and hate are thus distinguished from our propensity to each of them; hence the close link made by Stobaeus between affections and actions—a feature that we have found in Chrysippus also, see *supra*, p.98. On the concept of proneness see further Kidd (1983).

<sup>73</sup> See further *infra*, pp. 155 ff.

<sup>74</sup> See *infra*, pp. 155 ff.

very nature of the things' (5.5.14) or 'persuasive appearances' (φαντασίαι)<sup>75</sup> (5.6.19, p.320 De Lacy, *SVF* 3.229a).<sup>76</sup> It is a fair assumption, then, that Chrysippus took more account of the causes of affection and did so more systematically than Galen allows us to see. This would be in line with his interest in affections as motions or processes (κίνησεις)—an aspect which, as we have seen, he stresses constantly.

In fact, the same two causes may be involved in the image of the people walking—a stock example standing for all kinds of action. First, there has been a 'preliminary' cause (προκαταρκτικὸν αἴτιον) setting them in motion, viz. an (externally prompted) mental appearance inducing the conation to walk.<sup>77</sup> The 'sustaining' (συνεκτικόν) or 'complete' (ἀντοτελής)<sup>78</sup> cause of this action lies within the soul, viz. the (persisting) decision to walk.<sup>79</sup> In general, any event lasts as long as the sustaining cause is present. Hence the soul is the locus of moral responsibility.<sup>80</sup>

The related image of the runners might seem to introduce what the Stoics call an auxiliary cause, viz. the slope of the hill. Auxiliary

<sup>75</sup> Strictly, of course, an appearance is a mental phenomenon but it presupposes, and is defined by reference to, external objects.

<sup>76</sup> See on this passage also *infra*, pp. 160 f.

<sup>77</sup> Stob. *Ecl.* II p.86.17-18 (*SVF* 3.169): τὸ ... κινεῖν τὴν ὁρμὴν οὐδὲν ἕτερον εἶναι λέγουσιν ἀλλ' φαντασίαν ὁρμητικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος αὐτοθεν. On this passage see further *supra*, n. 43. The whole process is a matter of certain configurations being transmitted in the pneumatic continuum that exists between external objects and the intellect; see Frede (1980/7), esp. 145 f., Bobzien (1999) 204 ff. Accordingly, the mental presentation can also be viewed as an imprint (τύπωσις) or an affection (πάθος); but the presentation in turn stirs (κινεῖ) the conation; see esp. Aet. IV 12.1 (*SVF* 2.54); in addition D.L. 7.46, 50; Sext. *M* 7.242 (*SVF* 2.65): πιθαναὶ [scil. φαντασίαι] .. εἰσὶν αἱ λείον κίνημα περὶ ψυχὴν ἐργαζόμεναι. Cf. Cic. *Ac. Pr.* 2.37 (*SVF* 2.116)

<sup>78</sup> Complete in the sense of sufficient for causing the action in question, see the explanation by Frede (1980) 236 ff. (repr. 1987: 140 ff. ); cf. Long-Sedley (1987) vol. 1, 340 f.

<sup>79</sup> Indeed, the capacity of movement from within is held to be characteristic of animals. According to the Stoic distinction between kinds of movement preserved by Origenes, *Orat.* 6., vol. II p.311.16ff. Kō. (*SVF* 2.989): τρίτη δέ ἐστι κίνησις ἡ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις, ἥτις ὀνομάζεται ἡ ἀφ' αὐτοῦ κίνησις. οἶμαι δὲ ὅτι ἡ τῶν λογικῶν κίνησις δι' αὐτῶν ἐστὶ κίνησις. ἐὰν δὲ περιέλωμεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ζῴου τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κίνησιν, οὐδὲ ζῶον ἔτι ὄν ὑπονοηθῆναι δύναται ... Alex. Aphr. *De fato* ch. 13, p. 182.6-7 Bruns: πᾶν .. ζῶον ὡς ζῶον κινούμενον κινεῖσθαι (τὴν) καθ' ὁρμὴν κίνησιν. Cf. also the passages from Origenes printed as *SVF* 2.988, 989.

<sup>80</sup> A full discussion of Stoic ideas on this problem goes beyond the scope of the present study, although its relevance should be kept in mind. On this problem in connection with some of the texts referred to here see e.g. Long-Sedley (1987), vol. 1, 386 ff.

causes typically *intensify* an effect which would occur anyway (e.g. walking).<sup>81</sup> The point of comparison between the running and the soul's emotional response lies precisely in the aspect of intensification or excess and the consequent loss of control. The walking movement is accelerated by the slope. But the *sustaining* cause of the running motion must be the runners themselves. Indeed, the example of the runners recalls another one, viz. the cylinder rolling from a slope used by Chrysippus to illustrate the difference between 'preliminary' and 'sustaining' causes, represented by the push downhill and the cylindrical shape respectively.<sup>82</sup> In much the same way, Chrysippus argued, the complete or sustaining cause of our action is the condition of our souls, i.e. our moral qualities. The following testimony preserved by Clement takes fever as an illustration of these two kinds of cause in line with above passage from Chrysippus:

Causes are not *of* each other, but there are causes *to* each other. For the pre-existing condition of the spleen is the cause, not of fever, but of the fever's coming about; and the pre-existing fever is the cause, not of the spleen but of its condition's being intensified (*Strom.* VIII, 9.30.1 ~ SVF 2.349).<sup>83</sup>

Causes (or 'things responsible', Gr. αἰτία) are bodies,<sup>84</sup> whereas their effects are classed as predicates, i.e. what the Stoics called 'sayables' (λεκτά), and hence incorporeal.<sup>85</sup> In the above passage 'coming about' and 'being intensified' are given as examples of effects in the sense of incorporeal predicates. For our purposes it is important to note here the role of the causes, viz. the spleen and the feverish spleen respectively. These two corporeal substances function as the pre-existing (in this case sustaining) causes of their effects. In the light of the analogy postulated by Chrysippus between affection and

<sup>81</sup> See Clement, *Strom.* VIII, 9.33.1-9 (SVF 2.351).

<sup>82</sup> See Cic. *Fat.* 43 (SVF 2.974) with Frede (1980) 234 ff. (repr. 1987: 138 ff.), Bobzien (1999) 204 ff. Cf. also Rolke (1975) 330 f. Both Frede and Bobzien point out that the term 'sustaining' or 'cohesive' (συνεκτικόν, συνεχής) refers to the *pneuma* as holding together objects. On the sense of 'antecedent' (προκαταρκτικός) see Frede (1980) 243 n. 6 (repr. 1987: 369 n.7).

<sup>83</sup> ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι τὰ αἰτία, ἀλλήλοις δὲ αἰτία. ἡ γὰρ σπληνικὴ διάθεσις προϋποκειμένη οὐ πυρετοῦ αἴτιος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γίνεσθαι τὸν πυρετόν· καὶ ὁ πυρετός προϋποκειμένος οὐ σπληνός, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὔξεσθαι τὴν διάθεσιν.

<sup>84</sup> Aët. I, 11.5 (SVF 2.340), Stob. *Ecl.* I pp. 138.14-139.4 W., Sext. *M* 9.211, Clem. *Strom.* VIII, 9.26.3-4, *ibid.* 30.1-3 (= SVF 2.340, 1.89/2.336, 2.341, 2.349).

<sup>85</sup> See Clement, *Strom.* VIII, 9.26.3-4; Sext. *M* 9.211 (SVF 2.341) with Long-Sedley (1987) vol. 1, 340.

fever,<sup>86</sup> we may infer that the soul plays an analogous causal role in regard to its own παθή, viz. the affections.

Analogously, the same causal analysis is illustrated by good actions, with the virtuous soul as its sustaining or 'complete' cause.<sup>87</sup> The soul can only fulfil this causal role on account of its corporeal substance, since according to Stoic doctrine all causes are corporeal. The Stoics were primarily interested in the implications of this analysis for moral responsibility, so it should not occasion surprise if it was made to apply not only virtue but also its opposite, affection.<sup>88</sup>

Posidonius took over the Early Stoic distinction between types of cause.<sup>89</sup> In addition, we have found that his position on the affections and their cause cannot have differed significantly from that of Chrysippus. Like Chrysippus, he stressed the role of motions, or processes, in the corporeal soul. What is more, he took over Chrysippus' analogy between soul and body where disease and illness are concerned—an analogy which is not merely a metaphor used for didactic or other purpose but the expression but an actual correspondence existing in physical reality.<sup>90</sup> In this light a passage from Galen's theoretical tract *On Sustaining Causes* deserves special attention, since it not only runs parallel to the above passages from Chrysippus and Clement but further bears out the assumption that this causal analysis was applied by the Stoics to their pathology:

As for Athenaeus of Attaleia, he founded the medical school known as the Pneumatists. It suits his doctrine to speak of a sustaining cause in illness, since he bases himself upon the Stoics, and he was a pupil of Posidonius .... Athenaeus [holds that] there are three primary and most universal types of cause .... first that of the sustaining causes, then that of the antecedent causes, while the third type is comprised of the matter of preliminary causes. The last term is applied to externals whose function is to produce some change in the body, whatever this change may be. If what is thus produced in the body belongs to the class of what causes disease, then, while it has not yet actually given rise to the disease, it is known as an antecedent cause.

<sup>86</sup> That this correspondence holds good in a literal and physical sense I argue further *infra*, pp. 142 ff.

<sup>87</sup> Stob. *Ecl.* I, p. 138.17-22 (SVF 1.89); cf. Sext. *M* 9.211, Clem. *Strom.* VIII, 9.26.3-4.

<sup>88</sup> Stob. *Ecl.* I p.138.14-139.4 Wachsmuth (SVF 1.89).

<sup>89</sup> See esp. Stob. *Ecl.* I, pp. 138.14-139.8 (= Arius Didymus fr. 18 Diels)—a testimony which is taken apart in our collections of fragments but presents the Stoic doctrine on the concept of cause with reference to Zeno, Chrysippus and Posidonius (fr. 95 E.-K.). The views given to these three partly overlap and are clearly identical. On this passage see now Mansfeld (2001).

<sup>90</sup> See *infra*, pp. 142 ff.

Alterations are produced in the natural breath [i.e. the *pneuma*] by these causes and also by those which are external, leading to moisture, dryness, heat or cold, and these are what he calls the sustaining causes of diseases (CC 1.1-2.4; transl. Long-Sedley, slightly modified).

Ironically, Galen himself is one of our main sources on Stoic causal theory, although he ignores it completely in his *PHP*—a striking though not uncommon contextual difference. In the above passage there is no sign of any difference between Posidonius and other Stoics for that matter either. In fact, Posidonius features as the prime representative of the Stoic doctrine of causation—regardless of the fact that he happened to be the teacher of the founder of the Pneumatist school of medicine, Athenaeus.<sup>91</sup> This constitutes another difference from *PHP*, where Galen present Posidonius as the only Stoic with a keen interest in the causes of things (in most blatant contrast with Chrysippus, of course). Nonetheless, a closer inspection of the Posidonian material in *PHP* (ch. 5) will reveal that Posidonius conformed to the doctrine of the affections of the mind he had inherited from his predecessors, most notably Zeno and Chrysippus. The pathology outlined in the above passage also conforms to the ideas of these Stoics. In particular we may note the prominence given to disturbances of the *pneuma* and the theory of the four elementary qualities. This is found in the fragments relating to Chrysippus (most notably the *Therapeutics*) and Zeno as well.<sup>92</sup>

In the above passage changes in the *pneuma* may upset the balance between the elementary qualities, causing one of them to become dominant. The resulting physical condition is the sustaining cause of disease in a way comparable to the feverish condition of the spleen according to Clement and of the soul according to Chrysippus. The report on Athenaeus and his Stoic aetiology also confirms that external factors are described as preliminary causes, and adds a further distinction between the external factors and the inner changes effected by them. The latter are the more immediate cause of the diseased condition and are separately classed as 'antecedent' causes.<sup>93</sup> If we are entitled to relate this distinction to mental

<sup>91</sup> This is even clearer from the preceding context, where Galen refers repeatedly to the Stoics in general as defenders of the causal theory he has begun to expound there.

<sup>92</sup> On this subject see further chs. 5.2-4 below.

<sup>93</sup> On this term see Long-Sedley (1987) vol. 1, 342, who note that in Stoicism the term may indicate all causes (i.e. of various kinds) which pre-exist their effects

affections, we may see that it makes sense to distinguish between the external object and the mental appearance of it, the latter being an alteration in the mind and hence internal.

I take it that Chrysippus has carefully designed his account of the nature and genesis of affection in the light of Stoic causal theory, viz. the distinction between sustaining and preliminary causes in particular. The first is represented by the physical condition of the soul, the second by the incoming impressions (i.e. mental appearances). Since the former does not carry the cause of corruption in itself, the latter are vital to the Stoic account of the origin of evil. But once the soul has become weakened or diseased, it functions as the main or 'sustaining' cause of affections, i.e. excessive and unnatural and irrational responses to mental appearance. Our response then depends on the state of our intellect, on what Chrysippus and the other Stoics identify with the degree of its physical tension (τόνος).<sup>94</sup> This determines whether we are able to resist a particular impression and prevent our response from being excessive or give in to it, i.e. be weak-willed. This idea, along with the twofold causal schema, also underlies Chrysippus' discussion in the *Therapeutics* of examples such as Menelaos abandoning his intention to kill Helen:

One person desists when danger arises, another became slack and gave in when a reward or penalty was brought, another on encountering other such things, which are not few in number. For each of such things defeats and enslaves us, so that by yielding to it we betray friends and cities and give in to many shameful acts once the former impetus<sup>95</sup> has become slack. Euripides has presented Menelaos as this kind of person. He drew his sword and rushed at Helen to kill her but on seeing here and being struck by her beauty he let the sword drop, no longer able even to keep his hold on it. He was accordingly rebuked with these words:

'When you caught sight of her breast, you dropped your sword and accepted her kiss, fawning on the treacherous bitch.'<sup>96</sup>

.... Therefore, since all inferior men act in this way, abandoning their course and yielding for many causes, it might be said that they act in every case weakly and badly (*PHP* 4.6.7-9, 11 ~ *SVF* 3.473).<sup>97</sup>

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but that the narrower usage found here may be peculiar to Athenaeus; cf. Bobzien (1999) 233.

<sup>94</sup> *PHP* 4.5.5 (from the *Therapeutics*) ~ *SVF* 3.473.

<sup>95</sup> On the term 'impetus' (φορά) see *supra*, pp. 98 f.

<sup>96</sup> Euripides, *Andromache* 629-630.

<sup>97</sup> (7) ὁ μὲν δειμῶν ἐπιγινόμενων ἀφίσταται, ὁ δὲ κέρδους ἢ ζημίας φερομένης ἐξελύθη καὶ ἐνέδωκεν, ὁ δὲ καθ' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα οὐκ ὀλίγα. (8) ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν



This example should be read in the light of Chrysippus' idea of physical tension (τόνος) which he had introduced in the preceding context, as we know from Galen who quotes a few observations from it before presenting the above passage (*ibid.* 5-6). A soul which lacks tension, or is slack, is weak. Such a person cannot keep to his or her intentions and so abandons the most reasonable course of action. Apparently Chrysippus believes that Helen had deserved to die, and so did, initially, her deceived husband. But when Menelaus *sees* her beautiful body, he instantly drops his sword, being overcome by lust. The action that would have been preferable from a rational and moral point of view is broken off.

Here, then, we have the same twofold causal schema: mental condition (sustaining cause) and externally prompted presentation (preliminary cause) explain in conjunction the mental response—in this case the affection of appetite (ἐπιθυμία)—and the resulting action. The 'many causes' mentioned at the end of this fragment refer to the many and various preliminary causes (i.e. mental appearances) which may trigger an emotional response, as is clear from its beginning (where Chrysippus also seems to take account of the aspect of susceptibility or proneness which varies from person to person).<sup>98</sup>

To conclude. Galen's oft-repeated complaint that Chrysippus failed to give a causal explanation is entirely beside the point. Given the causal factors designated by Chrysippus, Galen's polemical

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τοιούτων τρέπεται τε καὶ δουλοῦται ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἐνδιδόντας αὐτοῖς καὶ φίλους καὶ πόλεις προδιδόναι καὶ αὐτοὺς εἰς πολλὰς καὶ ἀσχήμονας πράξεις ἐπιδιδόναι τῆς πρόσθεν φορᾶς ἐκλυθείσης. (9) οἷος εἰσῆκται καὶ τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ ὁ Μενέλαος· σπασάμενος γὰρ τὴν μάχαιραν φέρεται ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλένην ὡς ἀναιρήσων, ἰδὼν δὲ καὶ καταπλαγεὶς [εἰς] τὸ κάλλος ἐξέβαλε τὴν μάχαιραν, οὐδὲ ταύτης ἔτι δυνάμενος κρατεῖν, καθὰ καὶ ἡ ἐπιπληξὶς αὐτῇ εἴρηται αὐτῷ: << σὺ δ' ὡς ἐσείδες μαστὸν [ἐκείνης] ἐκβαλὼν ξίφος / φίλημ' ἐδέξω προδότιν αἰκάλ(λ)ων κύνα. >> .... (11) διὸ πάντων τῶν φαύλων οὕτω πραττόντων ἀποστατικῶς καὶ ἐνδοτικῶς κατὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας, ἀσθενῶς καὶ κακῶς ἕκαστα πράττειν ἂν λέγοιτο.

<sup>98</sup> For once Galen seems accurate when he too takes this expression in this way, *ibid.* 15. But here too he fails to give a proper account of the Stoic analysis in terms of the soul's weak condition on the one hand and the many incoming impressions on the other. Instead Galen plays off Chrysippus' reference to many causes against the soul's weakness as common to all the affections (*ibid.* 14). The cause cannot be both one and many. As to the many causes, Chrysippus should have brought them under a few main heads, as Plato did in laying down his tripartition (*ibid.* 16-17). Of course, we may feel, Chrysippus did just that by positing his concept of preliminary cause. And the weakness of the soul's condition is not treated by him as one and the same in all individual cases but, as we have noticed, further differentiated in terms of varying propensities. Yet, for all his distortion, Galen here effectively recognizes the twofold Stoic schema.

approach has obscured an important ingredient of the theory, viz. the fact that the Stoic assigned an all-important role to the physical condition of the soul. It may seem surprising that the medical man Galen glosses over the physical and nosological aspects of Chrysippus argument. But his approach is exclusively concerned with the question of the number of psychic powers—in according with a traditional ordering of topics which can be paralleled from extant doxographic texts (see above, pp. 23, 64 ff.).

#### 4. *The Four Generic Affections*

Having offered an exegesis of Zeno's three definitions of affection in general Chrysippus proceeded to do the same for his definitions of the four 'generic' affections under which all other affections were subsumed: distress (λύπη), pleasure (ἡδονή), fear (φόβος) and appetite (ἐπιθυμία). These four are arrived at by taking a pair of affections directed to the present and a pair directed to the future, one of each pair involving apparent goods, the other apparent evils:<sup>99</sup>

<i>Time:</i>	<u>Present</u>	<u>Future</u>	<i>Object:</i>
	Pleasure	Appetite	<u>Apparent good</u>
	Distress	Fear	<u>Apparent evil</u>

Thus distress consists in the (erroneous) opinion that an evil is present. Given this schema and the genus/species structure, the Stoics tend to explain irrational behaviour in terms of transitions between distinct and opposite affections rather than random mixtures between them.<sup>100</sup>

The relevant passages in *PHP* concerned with the generic affections have often been taken to attest to a significant innovation on the part of Chrysippus. This however is based on Galen's repeated claim that Zeno saw the affections as psychic motions *supervening* on judgements, whereas Chrysippus straightforwardly equated the affections with judgements (see above, p 86). But this claim, it has turned

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Sorabji (2000) 29.

<sup>100</sup> In these respects their account is anticipated by that of Aristotle, *Rhetoric* B 1-11, though the Stoics are more systematic. On the transitions between opposite affections, see also *supra*, p. 98 n. 40.

out, follows entirely from Galen's own distinctions between the options that are open in the debate on the number of psychic faculties. Galen's assignment of one of these options (which in fact constitutes a compromise between two of them) to Zeno is not warranted by the documented evidence, as we would be led to expect in view of present-day conventions and practices. In one striking passage as we have noticed Galen actually admits to not having checked his claim, simply because he had not been able to get hold of any treatise by Zeno (*PHP* 5.6.40-42; see above, p. 86). I am not sure whether he had tried very hard. After all, he also says that he had decided to focus exclusively on Chrysippus (*ibid.* 41; cf. 4.1.3). Still, one might read this admission as evidence that Galen had at least some sense of historiographical responsibility. Yet this is an isolated case. In the remainder of books 4 and 5 he shows absolutely no compunction about ascribing the view of affections as epiphenomena of judgements to Zeno. In general Galen's schema of options prevails over historiographical accuracy in a modern sense.<sup>101</sup>

The first relevant fragment is not taken directly from Chrysippus' treatise, but comes from Posidonius' discussion of some problems (ἀπορίαι) concerning affections that had also been discussed by Chrysippus in *On Affections*, Book 2. The fact that Posidonius went through these problems again could easily be presented as proof that he was dissatisfied by Chrysippus' solution, or the very lack of a solution. At any rate Galen claims that Posidonius actually refuted Chrysippus on fundamental points, and he works hard trying to make it look that way. I shall deal with the contents and procedure of book 2 in the next section. Suffice it to note here that Posidonius, on whom Galen bases himself, here appears to refer back to Chrysippus' exegesis of Zeno's definitions in book 1.

At *PHP* 4.7.1-11 (1-7 ~ *SVF* 3.481, Posid. F 165 E.-K.) we are dealing with Chrysippus' explanation of Zeno's definition of distress as an opinion that one is in the presence of evil. Chrysippus made this more precise by adding 'fresh' to 'opinion' to explain why after some time distress fades away. The passage follows on Galen's own discussion of fragments from Chrysippus' *Therapeutics* which bring home the sheer irrationality and repulsiveness of emotional behaviour (see ch. 4.7). The passage which concerns us here reads as follows:

<sup>101</sup> See *supra*, pp. 34, 80 ff.

(1) ... I proceed to some of Posidonius' answers to Chrysippus: (2) This definition of distress,<sup>102</sup> he [scil. Posidonius] says, and also many others [scil. definitions] that were pronounced by Zeno and recorded by Chrysippus clearly refute his [scil. Chrysippus'] view. (3) Indeed he says that distress is a fresh opinion that one is in the presence of evil. Sometimes they express it even more briefly: distress is a fresh opinion of the presence of evil. (4) He [scil. Posidonius] says that what is fresh is recent in time, and he asks that they tell him why it is that when the opinion of evil is fresh it contracts the soul and produces distress, but that after an interval it either does not contract it [scil. the soul] at all, or no longer to the same extent. (5) And yet, if Chrysippus' teachings were true, the words 'fresh' should not even have been included in the definition. It would have been more consistent with his view to call distress an opinion of the presence of a great or intolerable or unbearable evil—this is his [Chrysippus'], apparently]<sup>103</sup> usual term, rather than a fresh evil.<sup>104</sup>

Galen then renders what Posidonius must have said. But are we dealing with a verbatim quotation? And if so, how far exactly does it extend?<sup>105</sup> De Lacy's inverted commas indicate that he regards both

<sup>102</sup> The mss. give the rather improbable ἄτης ('baneful blindness') which is rejected by most editors in favour of λύπης but retained by De Lacy *ad* 280.21 on the grounds that the sentence in which it occurs may be transitional so that Posidonius may turn to distress only in the next sentence. But this seems less likely. De Lacy, following Pohlenz (1898) 616, points out that 4.5.42-44 dealing with persons who choose harmful things of their own accord may have led Posidonius to a discussion of ἄτη. But apart from the fact that nothing indicates that this passage preceded Posidonius' discussion reflected at 4.7.1 ff., the point (echoing Chrysippus, see ch. 4.6, *infra* pp. 170 ff.) at 4.5.42 ff. is precisely that the emotional people at issue are perfectly aware that what they prefer is harmful to them and so are not blinded at all. Blindness (τυφλότης) is however at issue in the section directly preceding 4.7.1 ff. But here it features in Chrysippean fragments from the *Therapeutics*, see *infra*, p. 178 ff. This seems a more likely cause for the mistaken reading of ἄτης instead of λύπης. In that case the mistake may already have been made by Galen. If so, the reading ἄτης would have to be preserved.

<sup>103</sup> However, as De Lacy notes, the terms ἀνυπομόνητος and ἀκαρτέρητος are not elsewhere attested for Chrysippus.

<sup>104</sup> Although the phrasing is presumably Galen's (see below in text), the use of the adjective 'fresh' for the bad entity instead of the opinion entails no significant distortion of the Stoic position. In fact, it is also encountered in Stoic accounts, see Stob. *Ecl.* II, p.90.14-16 Wachsmuth (SVF 3.394): λύπην δ εἶναι συστολὴν ψυχῆς ἀπειθῇ λόγῳ, αἴτιον δ' αὐτῆς τὸ δοξάζειν π ρ ό σ φ α τ ο ν κ α κ ό ν παρεῖναι, ἐφ' ᾧ καθήκει συστέλλεσθαι. Lists of Stoic definitions such as preserved by Stobaeus on the whole conform to the Chrysippean material transmitted by Galen. They give the appearance of being based on Chrysippus' version of Zeno's definitions as expounded in works like *On Affections*. Such compilations of Chrysippus' definitions were intended for scholastic use.

<sup>105</sup> In what follows I disagree with Kidd who regards the whole passage as Posidonian (albeit not wholly a verbatim quotation), see *Commentary* II (ii) 598 ff. Kidd's acceptance of Galen's presentation of the views of Posidonius and Chrysippus at issue is consistent with his overall conviction that Posidonius discerned and

§ 2 and § 3 as a direct quotation but this seems arbitrary. The addition of an alternative version of the definition of distress which 'they' use looks more like an interpolation by Galen than a reference by Posidonius to his fellow Stoics.<sup>106</sup> My impression is that this quotation is not verbatim at all. At any rate we should be extremely cautious in accepting the statement in (2) that it was Posidonius who explicitly charged Chrysippus with self-contradiction. But when, as seems plausible, we take (3) as a report on Posidonius' view, there is clearly no direct attack on Chrysippus whatsoever. Posidonius' explanation of 'fresh' as 'recent in time' need not conflict with and indeed seems faithful to what Chrysippus meant.<sup>107</sup> Moreover, the explanation of freshness in terms of the physical *contraction* (συστέλλει) produced by the opinion in question suits Chrysippus' position and can be paralleled from sources which are generally taken to state the general Stoic doctrine.<sup>108</sup> What does seem to preserve Posidonius' own distinctive contribution to the debate is that he pressed the question of exactly why the freshness disappears, and hence the distress vanishes. This approach was typical of him and did not lead to significant modifications of the view taken by Chrysippus (who had moreover raised most of the same questions already), but more often to specifications under the influence of recent philosophical and medical developments. This is not to say that Chrysippus provided no explanations at all—merely that Posidonius made them more precise or brought them up-to-date (see further ch. 5.5). According to Chrysippus, mental appearances lose their physical impact after some time. How long this takes will vary from case to case, but will at any rate depend on the degree of tension of the soul receiving the appearances, as well as on the apparent magnitude<sup>109</sup> of the evil or good in question.

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hammered out real difficulties in Chrysippean psychological monism; cf. *supra*, pp. 8f., *infra*, pp. 198 f.

<sup>106</sup> Galen may have taken such definitions from a philosophical lexicon. For a very similar example see *PHP* 2.5.17. Similarly Reinhardt (1921) 291.

<sup>107</sup> It cannot even be excluded that it is Chrysippus himself who is the 'he' who says so. On this point see Kidd, *Commentary* II (ii), p. 599.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. Stob. *Ecl.* II, p. 89.2-3 (*SVF* 3.378): τὸ δὲ πρόσφατον ἀντὶ τοῦ κινητικοῦ συστολῆς ἀλόγου (ἢ) ἐπάρσεως (the latter in the case of pleasure, ἡδονή); on the physical reactions typical of the affections, see further *supra*, pp. 112 ff.; *infra*, pp. 145 ff.

<sup>109</sup> On the importance attached by Chrysippus and the other Stoics to the magnitude of the good or evil, see *PHP* 4.5.27, 29; Cic. *Tusc.* 3.25, 28 (for which see *infra*, p. 313).

When we arrive at (5) it would be rash to assume that the rather lame criticism voiced here stems from Posidonius.<sup>110</sup> In fact, what follows from 6 onwards strongly tells against this assumption. Having inserted two different problems first raised by Posidonius concerning affections in wise and progressing persons, Galen returns to Chrysippus' addition of 'freshness' to Zeno's definition (7). Once again we learn that Posidonius raised the question why all that is unprepared and strange may trigger an affection whereas familiar or prolonged mental appearances do not cause an emotional movement (this term at least is Posidonian), or do not do so to the same extent. What we get is not an answer to this question, but Posidonius' therapeutic, or rather preventive, advice that we should 'dwell in advance' (προενδμεῖν) on images that might otherwise trigger an emotional response: by accustoming ourselves to them we may be better able to withstand them when we experience them in real life. Posidonius may have been the first to use the term 'dwelling in advance' for this mental exercise. But from a doctrinal point of view there is no departure from the Chrysippean position here.<sup>111</sup> In fact, Posidonius' advice merely confirms that Chrysippus was right to qualify 'opinion' the way he did, i.e. by adding 'fresh' to it. *Pace* Galen, Posidonius and Chrysippus were basically in agreement as to the factors involved in the occurrence and development of emotional responses.

But what is left that can be ascribed to Chrysippus? First, he explicated the definition of distress and the three other generic affections as laid down by Zeno. This need not surprise us since it was common practice to start from the definitions of the school's founder, as Chrysippus had already done with regard to Zeno's definitions of affection in general (see above, p. 96). Secondly, we know that he specified that the opinion in question had to be fresh, i.e. recent in time. Of course other factors also explain the intensity and duration

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<sup>110</sup> Reinhardt (1921) 292 sees this as a Galenic addition too; Kidd, *Commentary* II (ii), 600 considers it to be part of the argument directed by Posidonius against Chrysippus.

<sup>111</sup> Once again it is instructive to compare the parallel account offered by Cicero, *Tusc.* 3.24 ff. At 28-29 he discusses the 'freshness' of the appearance which causes and maintains an affection and the need to familiarize ourselves beforehand with it in a way that runs closely parallel to *PHP* 4.7.6 ff. Even Posidonius' examples (Anaxagoras and Euripides) can be paralleled from Cicero. In fact, the only significant difference between the account in Galen and Cicero is the fact that the former posits a disagreement between Posidonius and Chrysippus (they are not mentioned by Cicero).

of the affection in question: the soul's resilience and the dimensions of the experience, quite in line with the causal theory underlying his general conception of affection (see above, p. 102 ff.). That Galen's account stresses the factor time ('fresh' as 'recent in time') does not mean that these other factors are excluded. The reference to physical contraction at any rate points to the condition of the psychic *pneuma*, to its degree of physical tension. The scale (or the degree to which it is bearable) of the experience of evil is mentioned as well, but is played off against the factor of freshness. This, typically, is how Galen behaves when dealing with a sophisticated analysis by Chrysippus involving various factors.<sup>112</sup> This is confirmed by Cicero's less partisan account in *Tusculan Disputations* book 3, where we find scale and freshness combined in the explanation of distress.<sup>113</sup>

The second main passage concerned with Chrysippus' account of the so-called 'generic affections' (γενικά παθή) is found near the beginning of book 4, at 2.1-7 (*SVF* 3.463). In part, it runs parallel to 7.1-6, but appears to be based on Galen's own reading of the Chrysippean text. This passage does not contain a verbatim quotation. What Chrysippus said has to be extricated from Galen's polemical discussion:

(1) [...] in the first definitions that he gives of the generic affections he completely distances himself from their [scil. the ancients']<sup>114</sup> view, defining distress as a fresh opinion that evil is present. (2) For in these (definitions) he openly mentions only the rational (part) of the soul, omitting the appetitive and spirited; for he believes that opinion and expectation arise only in the rational part. (3) Nonetheless, in his definition of appetite, which he calls an irrational desire,<sup>115</sup> he touches in a way, verbally at least, on the irrational power of the soul; but here too he diverges from it in his explanation of it [i.e. of appetite], since even the desire he includes in the definition belongs

<sup>112</sup> The definition of affection in general is another example, see *supra*, p. 97 ff.

<sup>113</sup> *Tusc.* 3.25: ... *aegritudo est opinio mali praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere* (note that the *ut*-clause adds the second judgement-type of Chrysippus' analysis, see *infra*, pp. 169 f.); *ibid.* 28: *tum aegritudinem existere cum quid ita visum sit ut malum quoddam adesse et urgere videatur .... non omni malo aegritudinem effici censent [scil. Cyrenaici], sed in sperato et necopinato* (cf. *PHP* 4.7.7, p.282.7) *malo*. In spite of the attribution of this view to the Cyrenaics and Epicurus, Cicero's text runs closely parallel to *PHP* 4.7 and should be taken to expound the Stoic position; cf. also *infra*, pp. 123 ff.

<sup>114</sup> I.e. primarily Plato and Hippocrates. On the preceding context see further *supra*, p. 31 ff.

<sup>115</sup> For the same definition see ps. Andronicus, *De aff.* 1 (*SVF* 3.391).

to the rational power. (4) Thus he defines desire as ‘rational conation for something that gives pleasure to the extent it should ...’<sup>116</sup>

Galen provides no evidence whatsoever that Chrysippus spoke of anything like a rational part or power. In almost all cases where Chrysippus defines an affection as an opinion or judgement, Galen saddles him with the Platonic rational part. It is a telling witness to the machinations of Galen’s polemic that he can say that Chrysippus referred to the rational part. Likewise, the mere inclusion of the term ‘non-rational’ is here presented as pointing to the irrational power of the soul, even though here Galen is a bit more restrained, qualifying his point with the expressions ‘in a way’ and ‘verbally’. His remark concerning Chrysippus’ definition of appetite (ἐπιθυμία) as an irrational desire (ὄρεξιν ἄλογον) is somewhat different because he imputes an inconsistency to Chrysippus with regard to this term. Since the latter also defined desire (ὄρεξις) as a rational conation, he treated desire as both irrational and rational.<sup>117</sup> But this strains credulity. Galen must be confounding a wider and a more specific usage of the term, viz. desire as rational conation peculiar to adult humans (as opposed to that of non-rational animals) on the one hand and morally *correct* desire on the other (as opposed to wrong appetite, ἐπιθυμία).<sup>118</sup> In fact, the Stoics had a separate term for desire (ὄρεξις) in its normative sense, viz. will (βούλησις), which is elsewhere defined as a ‘reasonable desire’ (εὐλογος ὄρεξις).<sup>119</sup> There are more examples of

<sup>116</sup> (1) ἐν τοῖς ὁρίσμοις τῶν γενικῶν παθῶν οὓς πρῶτους ἐξέθετο, τελέως ἀποχωρεῖ τῆς γνώμης αὐτῶν, τὴν λύπην ὀριζόμενος δόξαν πρόσφατον κακοῦ παρουσίας, τὸν δὲ φόβον προσδοκίαν κακοῦ, τὴν δ’ ἡδονὴν δόξαν πρόσφατον ἀγαθοῦ παρουσίας. (2) ἀντικρυς γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς μόνου μέμνηται παραλείπων τό τ’ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές· καὶ γὰρ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τὴν προσδοκίαν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ μόνῳ συνίστασθαι νομίζει. (3) κατὰ μέντοι τὸν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὅρον, ἣν ὄρεξιν ἄλογον εἶναι φησιν, ἐφάπτεται μὲν πως ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ λέξει τῆς ἀλόγου κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν δυνάμεως, ἀποχωρεῖ δὲ κἀνταῦθα κατὰ τὴν ἐξήγησιν αὐτῆς, εἶγε καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ἦν κατὰ τὸν ὅρισμόν παρέλαβε τῆς λογικῆς ἐστὶ δυνάμεως. (4) ὀρίζεται γοῦν αὐτὴν ὁρμὴν λογικὴν ἐπὶ τινος ὅσον χρὴ ἡδοντος.

<sup>117</sup> For the same alleged inconsistency, see *PHP* 5.7.29-30.

<sup>118</sup> Note that Stob. (Arius Didymus), *Ecl.* II p.86.17 ff. (*SVF* 3.169) only recognizes the more restricted, normative sense of appetition, which, he says, is only a species of rational conation (λογικὴ ὁρμή), i.e. the conation typical of (adult) humans. But the denial by Stobaeus (or his source) that appetition should not be used to designate rational conation (i.e. the kind typical of adult humans) strongly suggests that others did use it in the latter, more descriptive sense. So implicitly the two sense at issue in Galen’s discussion are to be found in Stoabaeus’ abstract as well.

<sup>119</sup> See D.L. 7.116 (*SVF* 3.431), Cic. *Tusc.* 4.12, 14-15, ps.Andron. *De aff.* 6 (*SVF* 3.432). Βούλησις is also the counterpart of the affection (πάθος) ἐπιθυμία by being a εὐπαθεία (‘good feeling’).



the use of a particular term in both a general and a more specific sense. This seems to have been particularly often the case in Stoic classifications of moral and psychological concepts.<sup>120</sup> In the case of desire, its use as an abstract term applying to both will and appetite is justified by the fact that both kinds of desire are directed towards the apparent good.<sup>121</sup> Thus at 4.2.4-7 we read:

(4) ... In these definitions however he supposes that the affections are conations and opinions and judgements; but in some of the very next definitions he writes things that are consistent with the doctrines of Epicurus and Zeno rather than his own. (5) For in defining distress he says it is a shrinking before what is thought to be a thing to avoid and pleasure he defines as a swelling at what is thought to be a thing to choose. (6) But the shrinkings and swellings and contractions and expansions—for these too he mentions sometimes—are affections (παθήματα) of the irrational power which supervene on the opinions. Epicurus and Zeno hold that the affections have such a nature as this but Chrysippus does not. (7) And it strikes me as astounding that the man who professes to be giving both logical and precise instruction is not precise.<sup>122</sup>

This second passage dealing with Chrysippus' definitions of the generic affections reiterates the theme of 4.1.14-16, viz. the fact that Chrysippus did not operate with the correct division of options that are available in the debate. In consequence, things are muddled up, because now he takes this side, then the other, without even being aware of this tergiversation. According to this division, Chrysippus and Zeno belong in different camps, in the way indicated in the above passage. I have dealt with this schema of options and the way it functions in Galen's discussion above (ch. 2.8). Suffice it to note here

<sup>120</sup> E.g. conation (ὁρμή) designates both the psychic motion opposed to avoidance (ἀφορμή) and an abstract term applying to both, see Orig. *In Matth.* III p.446 Delarue (SVF 3.170). Likewise the term conation may indicate the soul's motion towards something (the general sense) and that of non-rational animals (the specific sense), for which no separate appellation exists, Stob. (Arius Didymus), *Ecl.* II p. 86.17 ff. (SVF 3.169).

<sup>121</sup> See Cic. *Tusc.* 3.24, 4.12, ps. Andron. *De aff.* 1, cf. SVF 3.386 with Inwood (1985) 236.

<sup>122</sup> (4) ... 'Εν μέντοι δὴ τούτοις τοῖς ὅροις ὁρμὰς καὶ δόξας καὶ κρίσεις ὑπάρχειν οἶεται τὰ πάθη, κατὰ δέ τινος τῶν ἐφεξῆς 'Επικούρου καὶ Ζήνωνι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ δόγμασιν ἀκόλουθα γράφει. (5) τὴν τε γὰρ λύπην ὀριζόμενος μείωσιν εἶναι φησιν ἐπὶ φευκτῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν τὴν θ' ἡδονὴν ἔπαρσιν ἐφ' αἰρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν. (6) καὶ γὰρ αἱ μειώσεις καὶ αἱ ἐπάρσεις καὶ αἱ συστολαὶ καὶ αἱ διαχύσεις - καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἐνίοτε μέμνηται - τῆς ἀλόγου δυνάμεως ἐστὶ παθήματα ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιγινόμενα. τοιαύτην δέ τινα τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν παθῶν 'Επικούρος καὶ Ζήνων, οὐκ αὐτὸς ὑπολαμβάνει. (7) ὁ καὶ θαυμάζειν ἐπέρχεται μοι τάνδρος ἐν ἐπαγγελίᾳ λογικῆς τε ἅμα καὶ ἀκριβοῦς διδασκαλίας οὐκ ἀκριβοῦντος.

how it is used to play off against each other the psychological and physical terms which were employed by the Stoics in describing affection. In fact, as the above definitions show and as is confirmed by Diogenes Laertius and Cicero,<sup>123</sup> the Stoics cheerfully included the corporeal and intentional aspects in one and the same definition. Galen's text reveals that Chrysippus in *On Affections* book 1 did so too. In other words, the definitions as recorded in (5) appear to be an accurate reflection of what he actually wrote. Since Galen invariably takes references to the soul's corporeal nature as pointing to an irrational power or part, we get the picture presented in the other section above: that of Chrysippus being confused and at times effectively opposed to the school's founder whose *ipsissima verba* he explains.<sup>124</sup>

### 5. Book 2: Problems Concerning Affections

In book 2 of his treatise Chrysippus treated problems raised by certain observed phenomena, for example the fact that affections abate as time goes on while the judgements remain the same. How is this possible if, as the Stoics affirm, affections are judgements? Galen complains that Chrysippus merely raised such problems but was unable to produce solutions. In this connection he repeatedly employs the term ἀπορία and the cognate verb ἀπορεῖν with reference to Chrysippus' argument. Does this mean that he posed questions without aiming at definitive solutions? On one occasion Galen says that Chrysippus *confessed* to being perplexed (ἀπορεῖν ὁμολογήσας) in regard to the main causes of affection.<sup>125</sup> Apparently, Galen exploits a term used by Chrysippus to characterize his discussion in book 2. But if he used it, it is not at all necessary to infer that he suspended his judgement on the questions at issue.<sup>126</sup> In fact, far from

<sup>123</sup> Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 4.66-67; cf. D.L. 7.114. This combination of intentionalist and physical language is also noted by Sedley (1993) 329.

<sup>124</sup> A similar attitude is adopted by Galen at *PHP* 4.3.2, 5.1.4; cf. 4.7.19.

<sup>125</sup> 4.7.16; 5.4.16, p.316.16; in addition see e.g. 4.7.23. p.284.31; 5.2.45, 47, p.304.5, 7; 5.5.9, p.318.20. At 4.5.46, p.270.8 Galen speaks of ἀπορία raised by Posidonius which Chrysippean Stoics of Galen's own day were unable to solve. This represents the same motif because Posidonius had merely discussed again the so-called ἀπορία treated by Chrysippus; see *infra*, pp. 250 ff.

<sup>126</sup> Galen himself presents a Stoic ἀπορία together with its solution at *Mot. musc.* I 7-8, IV pp. 400-1 (*SVF* 2.450). That the Stoics in employing ἀπορία followed a Peripatetic rather than Sceptical paradigm (indeed Aristotle) is suggested by Simpl.

acknowledging defeat, he formulated answers to the questions he raised. That Galen did not like the answers is quite another matter.

Having discussed Zeno's definitions in book 1, Chrysippus in book 2 treats certain problems left, or insufficiently faced, by Zeno. In the process he advances beyond the school's founder by introducing certain refinements while remaining within the Zenonian framework. The upshot is a strengthening of Zeno's doctrine rather than its revision, let alone an admission of an inability to solve the problems raised.

The direct evidence for book 2 is slim—two verbatim fragments.<sup>127</sup> Matters are further complicated by the fact that these are transmitted to us at second hand, i.e. taken by Galen from Posidonius. This does not preclude the possibility that Galen had also read book 2 himself, and was able to benefit from his own assessment of its contents. However, there is no sign that this was the case. Thus Galen appears to have read only the first of the three books he designates as the 'theoretical ones' (see above, p. 89 ff.). Of the contents of the third book, as noted, we hear nothing more. The fragments from book 2 seem to be included for no other reason than that they were part of *Posidonius'* argument.

The first of the two fragments, with Galen's introductory formula, reads as follows (*PHP* 4.7.12-17 ~ *SVF* 3.466):

(12) Chrysippus, too, attests in the second book *On Affections* that the affections are softened in time, even though the opinions remain that some evil has befallen them,<sup>128</sup> writing as follows:

(13) 'One might also inquire how the abatement of distress comes about, whether because some opinion changes or while all<sup>129</sup> persist, and why this will occur.' (14) Then he continues: 'It seems to me that an opinion of this sort remains, viz. that what is present is evil, but as the opinion grows older the contraction slackens and, I believe, the conation directed towards the contraction. (15) But perhaps even if this<sup>130</sup> persists, the things that follow will not conform to

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*In Arist. Cat.* pp.387.17-388.24 Kalbfleisch (*SVF* 2.172); cf. *ibid.* pp.214.24-215.7 (*SVF* 2.391); cf. Long (1983b) 86 ff. A few testimonies indicate that Chrysippus and other Stoics used ἀπορίαι against their opponents, Plut. *De comm. not.* 1071F (*SVF* 3.26), Sext. *M* 7.435 (*SVF* 3.657). The importance of puzzles within Stoic logic has often been observed. Twenty-eight works in Chrysippus' bibliography (D.L. 7.189ff.) were devoted to them; cf. Barnes, *CHHP* 71. Cf. also Cleanthes' book-title Περί τῶν ἀπόρων (D.L. 7.175) as well as Zeno's Λύσεις (D.L. 7.4).

<sup>127</sup> *PHP* 4.7.12-17 (*SVF* 3.466), *ibid.* 26-7, 30-1 (*SVF* 3.467).

<sup>128</sup> I.e. the people concerned

<sup>129</sup> Scil. opinions.

<sup>130</sup> Scil. the conation last mentioned.

it, because of another supervening condition of some sort which is not easily reasoned out. (16) Thus people cease weeping, and people weep against their will, when external objects<sup>131</sup> do not create similar appearances and something or nothing stands in the way. (17) For in the same way that cessation from lament and outbreaks of weeping occur, so it is reasonable that things of this sort should also occur in those other cases,<sup>132</sup> because things cause greater motion initially, as I said said with reference to the things that stir laughter, and things similar to these.<sup>133</sup>

We encounter here the twofold analysis of the cognitive structure of affection which Chrysippus seems to have introduced. Two types of judgement are involved: (1) that something (very) good or evil is present or imminent; (2) that a particular conation is appropriate.<sup>134</sup> In the case of distress we have the judgements (1) that something evil is present and (2) that it is appropriate to react through the contraction of the soul. Apparently, this involves not only the inner feeling but also such outward manifestations as weeping. One may think of the example of being bereaved of a loved one—not an evil because involving the loss of what is a preferred indifferent from the technical Stoic point of view. Wise Anaxagoras (also cited by Posidonius, *ibid.* 4.7.9) said, when someone brought him the news of his son's death: 'I knew I had begotten a mortal'. Most people in the same

<sup>131</sup> De Lacy translates 'underlying circumstances' but the word is attested in Hellenistic philosophical texts in the sense of objects as opposed to how things may appear to us, see e.g. Epicurus, *On Nature* XI, PHercl. 1042 fr. K. col. I,14-16 Sedley; cf. also Gal. *Dign. puls.* VIII p. 793 K. (SVF 2.79), Sext. M 9.352 (SVF 2.80). The term ὑποκείμενον is also used for one of the four Stoic 'genera' or 'categories' of being, see e.g. SVF 2.369, 371, with Long-Sedley (1987) vol. 1, 172 ff., but this sense seems less apposite here, since ὑποκείμενα are said to bring about (ποιεῖν) mental impressions and this is usually said about external objects, see e.g. Aët. IV 12,1 (SVF 2.54).

<sup>132</sup> Chrysippus must refer to other irrational reactions, e.g. laughing against our will, as is suggested by the subsequent reference to laughter.

<sup>133</sup> (12) ... καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περί παθῶν μαρτυρεῖ γράφων ὧδε· (13) « ζητήσαι δ' ἂν τις καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀνέσεως τῆς λύπης, πῶς γίνεται, πότερον δόξης τινὸς μετακινουμένης ἢ πασῶν διαμενουσῶν, καὶ διὰ τί τοῦτ' ἔσται. » (14) εἰτ' ἐπιφέρων φησὶ « δοκεῖ δέ μοι ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη δόξα διαμένειν, ὅτι κακὸν αὐτὸ ὃ δὴ πάρεστιν ἐγχρονιζομένης δ' ἀνίσσεται ἢ συστολὴ καὶ ὡς οἶμαι ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν συστολὴν ὁρμή. (15) τυχὸν δὲ καὶ ταύτης διαμενούσης οὐχ ὑπακούσεται τὰ ἐξῆς, διὰ ποῖαν ἄλλην ἐπιγινωμένην διάθεσιν δυσσολόγιστον τούτων γινομένων. (16) οὕτω γὰρ καὶ κλαίοντες παύονται καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι κλαίειν κλαίουσιν, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίας τὰς φαντασίας τὰ ὑποκείμενα ποιῇ καὶ ἐνιστῇται τι ἢ μὴθέν. (17) ὃν τρόπον γὰρ ἡ θρήνην παύσις γίνεται καὶ κλαυθμοί, τοιαῦτα εὐλογον καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων συντυγχάνειν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς μᾶλλον τῶν πραγμάτων κινούντων, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν τὸν γέλωτα κινούντων γίνεσθαι ἔφην, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τούτοις. »

<sup>134</sup> On this distinction (though largely based on Cicero) see esp. Donini (1995).

circumstances, however, lack his composure. They think an evil has befallen them (judgement-type 1) and that a display of mourning is appropriate (judgement-type 2). The second type of judgement is here represented by the *conation* towards the contraction. It may seem a bit odd that conations (whether excessive or not) can both be described in terms of physical motion towards or away from something and be equated with judgements. But we may recall what Chrysippus wrote in his *On Law*: conation is reason commanding us to act.<sup>135</sup> In other words, the term conation denotes reason in its motive aspect.<sup>136</sup> In fact, given Stoic materialism, it should come as no surprise that the physical and intentional are two sides of the same coin.

There is social pressure to entertain the two judgements thus distinguished—in line with the Stoic view that one of the sources of evil is social, viz. 'what people say'.<sup>137</sup> However, it is a common enough experience that, while the first judgement persists, the feeling and display of grief disappear in time. For cases like this Chrysippus pointed to the second type of judgement: one may continue to believe that the death of a loved one remains an unmitigated evil, but stop mourning on the grounds that this is no longer appropriate after a given amount of time—again a socially acceptable and indeed encouraged attitude.

Chrysippus' distinction between these two kinds of judgement seems to correspond to phenomena such as the abatement of distress. Still, Chrysippus also acknowledges cases where both judgements are in place, yet the contraction and accompanying outward signs of distress do not ensue. This phenomenon is less frequent, but certainly known to most of us and hence inescapable for Chrysippus: sometimes we think it would be appropriate to grieve but somehow do not succeed in mustering the proper feelings and behaviour. Here Chrysippus introduces the 'supervening [or: 'additional'] condition of some sort which is not easily reasoned out'—a point inflated by Galen into an admission of ignorance of why affections arise and subside. But he is clearly being unfair here.<sup>138</sup> Still, it casts some light on some of Chrysippus' wider concerns, most notably his causal

<sup>135</sup> As quoted by Plutarch, *De Stoic. Rep.* 1037F (SVF 3.175).

<sup>136</sup> Cf. Stob. *Ecl.* II p.88,1-2 W. (SVF 3.171): πάσας δὲ ὁρμὰς συθκαταθέσεις εἶναι, τὰς δὲ πρακτικὰς καὶ τὸ κινητικὸν περιέχειν. Cf. Sorabji (2000) 44.

<sup>137</sup> See *infra*, p. 134.

<sup>138</sup> See further *infra*, p. 260.

analysis in terms of the soul's physical condition and the impressions impinging on it from outside.

We should not be misled by Galen's point that Chrysippus confesses that he does not know the cause. On the contrary, the fact that Chrysippus includes a reference to an additional but unspecified condition demonstrates his insistence on causal analysis. The same trick is used by Plutarch with reference to a passage from Chrysippus' *On Appropriate Action* (Περὶ καθήκοντος) concerned with choosing between two very similar things, for example drachmas: having received contradictory advice on their respective merit, Chrysippus says, we give up further investigation and just take one of them 'according to some other reason' [or perhaps 'principle', λόγον] (Plut. *Stoic. Rep.* 23, 1045E-F, SVF 3.174). The last phrase recalls the reference to the 'additional condition that is not easy to reason out'. Chrysippus both times considers it appropriate to refer to an unspecified factor determining our action. Plutarch, like Galen, exploits this by presenting it as an admission that the choice is made at random, i.e. is uncaused, or represents a 'chance inclination'. But he cites other passages which show that the choice between very similar things must always involve causal factors, even if we are not aware of them. Thus he reports that Chrysippus insisted that in such cases 'unclear causes (αἰτίας ἀδήλων)<sup>139</sup> insinuate themselves and without being noticed by us direct our conation in one way or the other' (*Stoic. Rep.* 1045C). Chrysippus directed his argument against certain philosophers<sup>140</sup> who postulated within the soul's regent part (ἡγεμονικόν) an 'adventitious motion'. According to Plutarch's report, they thought to 'provide the conation with release from the constraint of external causes' (*ibid.* 1045B). Plutarch continues:

'Chrysippus in many places cites as evidence dice and scales and many of the things that cannot fall or incline now one way and now another without some cause and variation occurring either entirely in the things themselves or the things from outside' (*ibid.* 1045C ~ SVF 2.973; cf. 1045D, SVF 3.174).

So, despite the difference of context, the fragments from Plutarch and Galen attest to a causal explanation of mental phenomena. At the same time Chrysippus is cautious in those cases where no clear

<sup>139</sup> Likewise chance (τύχη) is called a 'unclear cause', i.e. unclear to the human intellect, see the texts assembled as SVF 2.965-7, 970-1.

<sup>140</sup> These have often been thought to have been Epicurus and his followers but the case for the Stoic Aristo has been revived by Boys-Stones (1996).

cause presents itself. Both choices that seem arbitrary and emotional behaviour which seems inexplicable fall into this category. Here we need to remind ourselves of the advice offered by Chrysippus in his *Physical Questions* regarding questions needing experience and research: we should keep silent if there is no obvious evidence.<sup>141</sup> Although I believe that Galen systematically exaggerates the difference between Posidonius and Chrysippus, the former had the reputation that he always wanted know 'why?' and he may have been less restrained than Chrysippus in this respect.<sup>142</sup>

The phenomenon in question is illustrated by ceasing to weep or weeping against our will. This happens 'when external objects do not create similar impressions'. Sorabji has submitted that Chrysippus may be appealing to conflicting appearances as to whether contraction is appropriate (i.e. judgement-type 2). Perhaps the appearances concerned are not yet those accompanied by judgements in terms of appropriateness. The point may be that the same external object sometimes prompts an appearance of evil but at other times an appearance of non-evil, i.e. one conceptualized as 'there is (no) evil' present.' This then causes contradictions in the next stage of judging which response is appropriate (judgement-type 2). At any rate one and the same external object may prompt different appearances in the same people at different times (just as it may prompt different appearances in different persons at the same time). I shall return to this question in due course.

It is true that Chrysippus does not specify whether your assent oscillates between both appearances, or whether the rival appearance (*viz.* that contraction *is* appropriate) remains without assent.<sup>143</sup> In the latter case Chrysippus will have postulated a physical first movement, that is, tears produced by the appearance independently of assent. I do not believe that Chrysippus stumbled into the matter as a side issue, because the role assigned to the appearance conforms to Chrysippus' twofold causal analysis. Indeed, appearance as the preliminary cause is far from unimportant precisely because it shocks the intellect and the resulting movement may drag the soul along and cause it to abandon pre-existing judgements—depending on its

<sup>141</sup> Plut. *De Stoic. Rep.* 1047C (SVF 2.763); see further Tieleman (1996a) 191 ff.

<sup>142</sup> On this difference between Chrysippus and Posidonius cf. also Frede (1980) 224 f. (1987: 130 f.)

<sup>143</sup> Sorabji (2000) 71.

physical weakness.<sup>144</sup> The technical expression ‘first movement’ designating the initial shock caused by appearances may have been post-Chrysippean. Sorabji may have a point in arguing that *first* movements did not have the centrality they acquired later, as is shown by Seneca’s *On Anger*.<sup>145</sup> This may be correct, but the basic idea is to be found in Chrysippus and can, on the testimony of Seneca (*On Anger* I, 16.7 ~ *SVF* 1.215) even be traced back to Zeno. Cicero, whose account is Chrysippean (see below, pp. 288 ff.), provides some additional evidence for the idea of emotional movements such as contractions existing independently of judgement (*Tusc.* 3.83).<sup>146</sup> Although he does not seem to think of initial shocks only, the important point is that these physical effects and feelings presuppose (involuntary) appearances. In sum, I hesitate to subscribe to Sorabji’s suggestion that Chrysippus will have stumbled into the matter of the first movements as a side issue.<sup>147</sup> The idea is integral to the overall framework he designed. Sorabji traces the physiological phenomena which later Stoics were to call first movements back to Aristotle rather than Zeno and Chrysippus.<sup>148</sup> I have to disagree with him on this score too. The related ideas of physical tension and weakness—which are quite prominent in Chrysippus—presuppose a particular physiology consistent with the thesis of the soul’s corporeality.<sup>149</sup> In the next chapter I shall further explain the nature and provenance of this physiology.

A few further observations may be made. Chrysippus attributes the examples of involuntary behaviour to ‘something or nothing that stands in the way’, i.e. of weeping. The ‘something or nothing’ formula clearly takes up the ‘supervening condition of some sort which is not easily reasoned out’. The fact that he speaks of a ‘condition’ (διάθεσις)<sup>150</sup> suggests that the cause must lie in the soul’s (physical)

<sup>144</sup> This influence of appearances is confirmed by the Chrysippean view of the origin of evil, see *infra*, p. 137.

<sup>145</sup> Sorabji (2000) 66 ff. referring to *On Anger*, 2.2.2; 2.2.4; 2.3.1; 2.3.4; 2.3.5; 2.4.1; 2.4.1.

<sup>146</sup> ‘... If this [scil. judgement] which is wholly voluntary is removed, that grievous distress will be removed, though *bites and certain little contractions of the intellect will remain.*’

<sup>147</sup> Sorabji (2000) 71.

<sup>148</sup> Sorabji (2000) 71f.

<sup>149</sup> Cf. Sorabji (2000) 71: ‘Aristotle too would have rejected the Stoic view that the soul is physical and substituted a physiological interpretation of the phenomena.’ But the soul’s corporeality according to the Stoics made the soul part of the physiology of the whole organism.

<sup>150</sup> Or perhaps ‘diseased condition’, cf. Ackerknecht (1982).



weakness. After all, we are dealing with emotional behaviour. But at the same time it is clear that the phenomenon in question is problematic to the extent that it is not covered by Chrysippus' general analysis, which involves *two* causes, *viz.* both the mental impression and the pre-existing condition of the soul. In fact, the responses in question react directly against the impressions received.

This does not entail that Chrysippus' general model of explanation is undermined. To a surprising extent, he succeeds in accommodating the phenomenon at issue into this model. This is clear from the last section of the fragment (§ 17), where he extends the phenomenon to many more cases, among which he mentions what might be called the opposite of weeping, *viz.* laughter. We learn that he treated of its causes in another section of book 2, which is not represented by any quotation in Galen, or another source for that matter. But Galen has fortunately preserved Chrysippus' remark that he explained the causes of laughter by pointing out that 'the things cause greater motion initially'. This must refer to external objects stirring our minds when we receive, or form, an impression of these objects.<sup>151</sup> The sudden impact of an object may trigger a first response which on closer view appears wholly inappropriate. Alongside weeping against our will, there are many familiar cases of laughing against our will, i.e. against our judgement on what is an appropriate response to a particular situation. Thus the first response to someone hurting himself may be laughter when in fact we judge it more appropriate to come to his aid. In addition, we must note the importance assigned to the soul's motions. The motions caused by impressions are initially stronger—with the implication that after some time they calm down a bit and render a more appropriate response possible. This point constitutes another piece of evidence for the physical basis for the Stoic theory of action (including affection). Once more, one is reminded of the fact that for the Stoics psychology was a part of natural philosophy.

Chrysippus was deeply interested in all forms of human behaviour. In exploring some of them he reached the limits of his causal analysis. But, contrary to what the polemicists tell us, he did not abandon the idea of causality. Rather he suspended judgement as to the precise identity of some of the causes involved in the cases under examination. Such exceptions and borderline cases bring out the fact that

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<sup>151</sup> For the idea of moving or stirring in this connection, cf. *infra*, p 193.

Chrysippus was nuanced and intellectually honest. It is difficult to see how a simple reference to one of the Platonic parts of the soul would be more illuminating as a causal explanation of the problems at issue here.

Let us now take a look at the second fragment from book 2 quoted by Galen from Posidonius (4.7.26-7, 30-1 ~ *SVF* 3.467). I add the immediately preceding context (*ibid.* 24, p.385, 1.7-25):

(24) And he [scil. Posidonius] himself shows that the affections arise from anger and desire, and he gives the reason why they subside in time, even though the opinions and judgements still continue that an evil is present or has arisen for them [i.e. for the persons in question]. (25) In support of this point he even uses Chrysippus himself as a witness, who writes as follows in the second book of his *On Affections*: (26) 'In the case of distress some people appear similarly to abandon it also as though they are sated. Thus the poet says the following also about Achilles grieving for Patroklos:

"But when he had his fill of weeping and rolling on the ground,  
and the longing had gone from his cheeks and limbs...  
[*Il.* XXIV.514, *Od.* 4.541]."

He desired to comfort Priam by showing him the irrationality of his distress.' (27) Then he [scil. Chrysippus] continues: 'By this account one would not give up hope that with the passage of time and when the emotional inflammation abates, reason, making its way in and as it were finding room, exposes the irrationality of the affection.' (28) Here Chrysippus clearly admits that the inflammation of affection subsides in time, while the supposition and opinion still persist; men get their fill of the emotional movements, and when because of this the affection has a kind of respite and grows quiet, reason gains the upper hand. (29) This is the truth, if anything is, but it is in conflict with his premises, just as the next passage which goes as follows: 'Such words are also spoken with reference to the alteration of the affections:

"Swift is the satiety of hateful distress [*Od.* 4.103],"

(30) and moreover words like these about the attraction of distress:

"Somehow for unfortunate people  
it is pleasant to weep and mourn their lot,"<sup>152</sup>

(31) and next after these Chrysippus cites:

"Thus he spoke and in all of them he stirred a longing for  
lamentation [*Od.* 4.113],"

and

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Eur. fr. 563 Nauck (p. 537); Aesch. *Prom. vinct.* 637.

"Raise up the same lament  
renew the tearful joy" [Eur. *Electra* 125-6].<sup>153</sup>

The first passage quoted (26-27) seems to support Galen's point that the affection (in this case distress) may subside while the judgement still persists. But the crucial question is: which judgement? Chrysippus does not contradict himself when he is taken to mean that the judgement that lamentation is appropriate (type 2) may fade, while the judgement that evil is present (type 1) persists. Affection, then, also requires judgements of type 2. The Chrysippean passage after the first quotation is clearly concerned with the reason why affection abates and we understand that lamentation is no longer appropriate. Chrysippus explains this in terms of the abatement of inflammation. This idea suits the view of affection as a kind of fever we have come across more than once (above, pp. 106 f.). Ancient medicine posited a close connection between the two,<sup>154</sup> sometimes regarding inflammation as a sign of fever.<sup>155</sup> It lies in the natural course of fever and inflammation to subside after some time—usually it is only then that reason will re-enter the stage.

The same account underlies Chrysippus' therapeutic advice in the *Therapeutics* (i.e. book 4) as preserved by Origen (*SVF* 3.474, second text; Origen, *Against Celsus* VIII 51 = vol. II, p. 266.18 Kō.). I shall

<sup>153</sup> (24) αὐτὸς [scil. ὁ Ποσειδώνιος] τε δείκνυσιν ὡς ὑπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας γίγνεται τὰ παθῆ καὶ διὰ τίνα τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ καθίσταται κἂν αἱ δόξαι τε καὶ αἱ κρίσεις ἔτι μένωσι τοῦ κακὸν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς ἢ γεγονέναι. (25) προσχρήται δ' εἰς τοῦτο μάρτυρι καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ Χρυσίππῳ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον Περί τῶν παθῶν ὧδε πως γράφοντι· (26) « ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς λύπης καὶ ὡς ἂν ἐμπλησθέντες τινὲς ὁμοίως φαίνονται ἀφίστασθαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ Ἀχιλλέως ταῦτα λέγει ὁ ποιητὴς πενθοῦντος τὸν Πάτροκλον· «ἄλλ' ὅτε δὴ κλαίων τε κυλινδόμενος τ' ἐκορέσθη | καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ πραπίδων ἦλθ' ἡμερος ἡδ' ἀπὸ γυίων», ἐπὶ τὸ παρακαλεῖν ὥρμησε τὸν Πρίαμον τὴν τῆς λύπης ἀλογίαν αὐτῷ παριστάς. » (27) εἰτ' ἐφεξῆς ἐπιφέρει καὶ ταῦτα· « καθ' ὃν λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἀπελπίσαι τις οὕτως τῶν πραγμάτων ἐγγχρονιζομένων καὶ τῆς παθητικῆς φλεγμονῆς ἀνιεμένης τὸν λόγον παρεισδυόμενον καὶ οἰονεῖ χώραν λαμβάνοντα παριστάναι τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀλογίαν » (28) ἐναργῶς γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ Χρυσίππος ὁμολογεῖ τὴν τε παθητικὴν φλεγμονὴν ἀνίστασθαι κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, ἔτι τῆς ὑπολήψεως τε καὶ δόξης μενούσης, ἐμπίπασθαι τε τῶν παθητικῶν κινήσεων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πᾶντινα λαμβάνοντος τοῦ πάθους καὶ ἡσυχάσαντος τὸν λόγον ἐπικρατέστερον γίνεσθαι. (29) ταῦτα γὰρ ἀληθῆ μὲν ἐστὶν εἴπερ τινὰ καὶ ἄλλα, μάχεται δὲ ταῖς ὑποθέσεσιν αὐτοῦ καθάπερ καὶ τὰ ἐπιφερόμενα τόνδε τὸν τρόπον ἔχοντα· (30) « λέγεται δὲ καὶ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὴν μεταβολὴν τῶν παθῶν· «λαϊψηρὸς δὲ κόρος στυγεροῖο γόοιο» καὶ ἔτι τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ κατὰ τὴν λύπην ἀγωγόν· «τοῖς δὲ δυστυχοῦσι πως | τερπνὸν τὸ κλαῦσαι ἀποδιδρασθαι τύχας» » (31) καὶ ἔτι τούτων ἐφεξῆς, «ὡς φάτο, τοῖσι δὲ πᾶσιν ὑφ' ἡμερον ὤρσε γόοιο» » καὶ « τὸν αὐτὸν ἔγειρε γόον | ἄναγε πολὺδακρυν ἄδονάν » »

<sup>154</sup> For the Hippocratic authors see the series of articles by Sticker (1928-30).

<sup>155</sup> Ps. Plut. (Aët.) *Plac. philos.* 5.29 (= Diocles fr. 56a-b Van der Eijk).

discuss the view of therapy implied by it in due course (see below, p. 166). Suffice it to note here that the idea of inflammation (φλεγμονή) recurs in this passage as a description of the outburst of affection, during which it is pointless to try to help the patient by attacking the value judgement underlying the affection (viz. type 1), for example the Epicurean dogma that pleasure is good. But it remains possible to calm even an emotional Epicurean by showing the inappropriateness (judgement type 2) of his behaviour in the light of his own principles. In other words, one should expose the irrationality (conceived as inconsistency with one's premises) by showing that indulging in affection is inappropriate. It is easy to regard a term like inflammation as a metaphor indicating the peak of affection. Nonetheless, it is embedded in a pattern of medical terms which make sense in terms of the corporeality of the soul posited by the Stoics. Affections or mental affections are treated as acute symptoms, or illnesses, caused by an underlying diseased or weak condition. I shall discuss this pattern more fully in Ch. 4.

The other lines of verse are cited to illustrate the elements of desire and satisfaction involved in affection. This concerns the motivational aspect of affection, i.e. its character as an (excessive) conation, or desire (note in the above fragment ὥρμησε, 'desired', § 26 [= p.286, 1.17 De Lacy]). It is natural to suppose that each conation comes to an end when its target is reached, in this case indulging in a contraction of the intellect and the accompanying repertoire of outward manifestations.

### 6. *The Origins of Evil*<sup>156</sup>

A long section in *PHP* 5 concerned with the origin of evil (5.5.1-26) is printed, with some omissions, by Von Arnim as *SVF* 3.229a in the section entitled '*De perversione rationis* (διαστροφή)', i.e. apart from the fragments from the *On Affections*. But since the Stoics equated evil with affection, it is a fair assumption that the Chrysippean ideas reflected here originally belonged with the discussion of the causes of affection in book 2. Moreover, as we have seen, Chrysippus in book 2 discussed certain problematic phenomena and the ideas about the ultimate cause of mental corruption appear to have been developed

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<sup>156</sup> For what follows cf. Kerferd (1977/8), Long (1968).

by Chrysippus in dealing with such a problem, viz. the question why even a perfect education does not prevent children from becoming corrupted and hence prone to emotion. In this matter too Chrysippus is said to have been perplexed (ἀπορεῖν) and to have been criticized by Posidonius (5.5.9).<sup>157</sup> The material from Galen can be supplemented from a rather full account in Calcidius, *In Tim.* 165-167 (SVF 3.228; cf. also D.L. 7.89, SVF 3.229).

The information supplied by Galen on this point does not come in the shape of one or more verbatim fragments. We have to cull the bits and pieces from his polemical discussion. Nonetheless, it is worth trying to establish what Chrysippus said on the origin of vice since this will cast further light on the question of the causes of affection. I hope to show that Calcidius' report not only corresponds to the relevant pages in Galen but also provides crucial indications as to Chrysippus' argument and Posidonius' response to it. According to Galen, Posidonius appealed to the problem of vice as one of the reasons why Chrysippus' monistic account was untenable. But in the light of Calcidius' testimony an alternative interpretation suggests itself.

For reasons which I hope become more obvious as we proceed, I shall first discuss Calcidius. Here we have a quite full account which may reflect certain concerns peculiar to this source, but is a far cry from the polemical discussion served up by Galen (which is further complicated by the latter's use of Posidonius). Calcidius does not mention Chrysippus but speaks of the Stoics in general. Yet the affinities between his account and Galen's (or rather that reflected by Galen) are unmistakable. Calcidius begins by remarking that each intellect, taking part of God, seeks the good by natural conation (*naturali adpetitu*). Nonetheless, it sometimes errs in the judgement of what is good and bad. Some of us consider pleasure the supreme good, others wealth, and a great many people covet fame and all other things more than the true good (ch. 165, p. 53, ll.11-15 vA).

What we have here is the tripartition of values in relation to the human soul that is also found in Galen. However, the same elements have been made to play a different role. The predilection for pleasure and fame is presented by Calcidius as a degeneration of the primal desire for the good. Galen for his part presents the last kind of striving as peculiar to Chrysippus yet treats the first two not as

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<sup>157</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 122.

symptoms of vice but as *natural*. Thus he arrives at the full Platonic tripartition—a conclusion anticipated, Galen intimates, by Posidonius.

In the second section of his account Calcidius expounds the cause of error, i.e. why people come to mistake pleasure and fame for the supreme good (ch.165-7, p.53, l.16 - p.54, l.18). The cause, he says, is manifold. But most of the ensuing explication is taken up by two causes, or ‘what the Stoics call the double perversion’ (*duplicem perversionem*, which corresponds to the phrase διττὴν τῆς διαστροφῆς τὴν αἰτίαν in the Chrysippean original, 5.7.14, pp.320-2): the things themselves and what is commonly said (*rebus ipsis ... divulgatione famae*). This corresponds to the two factors specified by Galen and Diogenes Laertius.

In what follows the distinction of three kinds of valuables (pleasure, fame and the good) is maintained: first Calcidius explains how the physical sensations to which we are exposed as new-born babies give rise to ‘an, as it were, natural opinion that everything pleasant and agreeable is good and, by contrast, what brings pain, is bad and to be avoided.’ The term natural here has to be qualified because, strictly speaking, only the striving after the good is innate: we are born immaculate. Yet the hankering after pleasure and the avoidance of pain arises, under the influence of the midwives’ bath, so early in our lives as to make it almost natural. The point as such takes up the observation made in the opening section that some people opt for pleasure as the highest good.<sup>158</sup> The bath dispensed by the midwives is a striking element in this account. Although it seems a bit odd, it coheres with fundamental physical assumptions underlying the Stoic conception of the corporeal soul and in particular the role played by the elementary qualities hot and cold. I shall return to this aspect in the course of a fuller treatment of the medical background to Chrysippus’ psychology (see further below, pp. 160 ff.). Suffice it to note here that the baby right after birth is first exposed to the cold and dry outside air. The compensatory bath provided by the midwives aims to restore the warm and wet conditions prevailing in the womb. This well-meant action has an unsettling effect on the soul of the babies since they are in quick succession exposed to opposite conditions and sensations. The physical pain and pleasure involved form the basis of

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<sup>158</sup> Likewise in his *On Ends* Chrysippus sought to differentiate carefully between the ‘first conation’ (πρώτη ὁρμή) towards which nature has predisposed us and pleasure which he describes as an epiphenomenon (D.L. 7.85-89 ~ SVF 3.178)

the adherence to the hedonist *crede* found among many people in later life.

The next subsection (ch. 166, p. 53, l.27 - p. 54, l.2) concerns the pursuit of wealth and fame. Wealth is an 'instrument of pleasure' (ll. 32-33). It is coveted out of a primal avoidance of want and pursuit of satisfaction. In short, it seems an extension of the tendency internalized in our first stage of development, viz. that of avoiding pain and seeking pleasure as being bad and good respectively. The predilection for fame and glory, too, is seen as an extension of the pursuit of pleasure. It arises at a more advanced age under the influence of the compliments and reprobations dispensed to us by our educators (*ibid.* ll. 27-33). In addition, Calcidius describes the lust for glory as a degeneration of the natural pursuit of praise and honour, for honour attests to virtue. The last point confirms that the different mistaken value-judgements are considered to be aberrations in the process of appropriation (οἰκεῖωσις) which ideally leads us towards virtue. Calcidius indicates that the achievement of this end marks the wise (*prudentes*), for they do possess an accurate perception of virtue (*ibid.* ll. ll.35-36). Just the common run mistake glory for honour, they mistake power for man's eminence above all creation, when the uninhibited exercise of power is merely a matter of lust. Likewise, they mistake pleasure for the agreeable life belonging with happiness (*ibid.* ll. 3 - p. 54.1). This concludes Calcidius discussion of the human error due to the things themselves.

Next Calcidius turns to the part of human error due to what people say (ch. 167, p. 54, ll.2-9). Here too the Platonic tripartition looms in the background. Mothers and nurses inculcate into intellects that are still young and impressionable the values associated with Plato's two non-rational parts: they wish for their children wealth and glory and their habit of comforting them is a particularly nasty source of mental disturbance (*ibid.* ll. 2-6). But the tendency to seek physical pleasure and avoid distress also receives mention as encouraged by common educational practice (*ibid.* l.8). In addition poetry and painting are listed as inculcating the same values.

But, Calcidius continues (*ibid.* ll.9 ff.), the *greatest* source of faults lies in the conjunction of body and soul: their interaction determines whether individuals are more inclined to lust or to anger—the Platonic non-rational parts again. This observation refers back to the first main cause of evil—the 'things themselves', since our propensity towards lust and avoidance of pain directly results from physical

sensations which presuppose the continuity of body and soul. It would be natural to say something about the relative influence of the two main sources of evil after the second has been treated. The point as such reflects Chrysippus' belief that even a perfect education does not prevent evil, i.e. affection, from arising. Hence the weight attached to 'the things themselves'.

After pointing to the conjunction of body and soul Calcidius adds a somewhat motley set of other distractions involved in the genesis of evil, e.g. the vicissitudes of life (*ibid.* ll. 12-15). This corresponds to the observation made at the beginning that the cause of error is manifold (p. 53.16). Calcidius ends with the conclusion that prospective Sages should be educated in isolation from the common run and through means that aid the natural progress towards wisdom (p. 54.15-18).

Let us now turn to Galen (5.5.1 ff.). Children, he notes, are seen to exhibit all kinds of affections that they should not possess on Chrysippean premises, such as the assumption that their conation is not yet supervised by reason,<sup>159</sup> or that they have no natural affinity (οἰκειώσις) with pleasure or alienation (ἄλλοτριώσιν) from pain. 'For all children rush untaught (ἄδιδάκτως) toward pleasures and turn away and flee from pains' (5.5.3). Galen lists a number of affections typical of children and animals, explained in terms of their natural affinity. These affections not only reveal a natural affinity with pleasure. Others such as anger and the ambition to win point to a natural affinity with victory (*ibid.* 4-6). Later, as they grow older, children develop an affinity toward what is right and honourable (i.e. the καλόν, *ibid.* 6, p. 318.7). They rejoice in noble acts and lay claim to justice and the other virtue. Galen concludes (*ibid.* 8-9):

Thus there are these three things with which we feel a natural affinity, corresponding to each form of the soul's parts: pleasure, through the appetitive (form); victory, through the spirited; and what is right and honourable through the rational part. Epicurus saw only the affinity felt by the worst part of the soul, Chrysippus only that felt by the best, saying that we have a kinship only with what is right and honourable (καλόν), which, he believes, is obviously also good. The ancient philosophers were the only ones who saw that we have a kinship with all three. But since Chrysippus omitted two of them, it is not surprising that he was perplexed (ἀπορεῖν) about the origin of vice.

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<sup>159</sup> The Chrysippean way of phrasing the relation between reason and conation, see O.L. 7.86 *fn.*



The above discussion seems to be based on the Chrysippean argument the *On Affections*, supplemented with Galen's own observations on the behaviour of animals (including little children) and general knowledge about views on the *summum bonum*. There is no trace of dependence on Posidonius.

In what follows (*ibid.* 9 ff.) Galen confirms his point—quoted above—that Chrysippus was at a loss about the causes of affection, i.e. moral corruption. He refers to a few facts acknowledged by Chrysippus in the light of his doctrinal presuppositions. Although Galen does not present verbatim quotations, it is clear that he draws on Chrysippus' *On Affections*. Given the human affinity (οἰκειώσις again) with moral excellence, misconduct cannot arise internally. The conclusion might then be that all corruption must have a social origin. But Chrysippus did not take this view. We learn from Galen that the Stoic further granted that children, even if raised under the exclusive care of a philosopher and never hearing or seeing an example of vice, would nevertheless not necessarily become philosophers, i.e. attain moral excellence or something close it (*ibid.* 13). This then must have been said by Chrysippus himself. But there is an even weightier and more obvious reason why moral corruption cannot be imputed to social factors only—we are left with the question how the earliest humans became corrupted in the first place, as Galen is quick to point out (*ibid.* 15). Chrysippus therefore proposed two causes, one physical, the other social:

'One arises from the conversation of the majority of men, the other from the very nature of the things' (*ibid.* 14).'

A little further on, the second cause appears under a somewhat different description:

'... He says that corruption arises in inferior men in regard to good and evil because of the persuasiveness of appearances and conversation' (*ibid.* 19)

The above information is not further explained but merely criticized: Galen complains twice that Chrysippus does not say why it is that appearances cause us to regard pleasure as good and pain as evil (*ibid.* 16, 19). If we possessed Galen as our only source, we might be tempted to believe that Chrysippus really gave no further explanation. As it is, we also have Calcidius.

We may now present a few conclusions about the relation between the two sources and the original doctrine defended by Chrysippus.

First, the structure of the argument is recognizably identical: Chrysippus explained the origin of evil in the context of his well-known doctrine of appropriation, or 'familiarization' (οἰκείωσις). Our natural development leads ideally towards virtue and honour. Evil is not innate. Yet physical factors—notably sensations of pleasure and pain—contribute to the corruption of our souls from the earliest possible stage onwards. In addition, social sources of perversion come into play. Physical and social causes conspire to hamper our natural psycho-moral development, causing us to mistake pleasure and glory for virtue and their opposites for evil. The pattern of this argument has clearly been modelled on the Platonic tripartition—the values listed correspond to each of the three parts. The Platonic postulate of two non-rational parts of the soul which feel a *natural* inclination towards pleasure and victory respectively is exposed as a concession to human error. Pleasure and lust for glory are aberrations of the natural (and normative) process directed towards virtue and true honour. Thus Chrysippus' account not only establishes the causes of evil in the context of Stoic doctrine but also refutes the Platonic position. Insofar as the inclinations towards pleasure and avoidance of pain are stressed as early forms of moral degeneration this account, obviously, is also aimed against Epicurus.

In this particular context Calcidius supplies far more doctrinal content than Galen, but the latter confirms that the ideas concerned are Chrysippean. In the light of Calcidius' account, we may now also see in what way Galen has distorted Chrysippus' argument. A familiar pattern presents itself. Chrysippus offered an alternative to the Platonic position by acknowledging the obvious fact that people often seek pleasure, likewise avoid pain, and covet honour and wealth while avoiding their opposites. Galen highlights Chrysippus' acknowledgement of these common phenomena on which he and Plato were agreed, but suppresses the crucial difference of interpretation. Once again he obtrudes on the reader the Platonic tripartition as the only viable model which can make sense of the phenomena. Galen adds the problematic denial by Chrysippus that children and other non-rational animals exhibit affections—a direct consequence of his view of affections as judgements.

Further, Galen has Posidonius enter the stage. This Stoic, he tells us, espoused Plato's doctrine in the light of the empirical facts with which Chrysippus had also grappled. His physiognomic examples pertain to what Chrysippus according to Galen and Calcidius called

the 'things themselves', i.e. physical reality as one of the two sources of moral corruption. The same point, as we have seen, is also indicated by Calcidius as the concretion of body and soul (*in corporis et animae concretione*, p. 54, l.10), which makes the relevance of Posidonius' physiognomic concerns even clearer. If the same cause of evil is stated with reference to mental appearances, we need assume no discrepancy because our physiological make-up directly affects the quality of our appearances and so our reactions to external events and circumstances. Posidonius' physiognomic observations concern precisely the general human propensity towards pain and pleasure, anger, daring and cowardice, i.e. the phenomena which Galen takes to necessitate the Platonic tripartition of the soul, but which Chrysippus explained as aberrations from normal mental development. Posidonius seems to have referred to Aristotle and Hippocrates in this connection—another exquisite opportunity for Galen to argue that Posidonius had distanced himself from Chrysippus and had joined the ranks of philosophers and scientists of a better sort (*PHP* 5.5.21-27; see also *infra*, p. 241).

Yet there may be another way of construing the set of Posidonian passages at issue here. The points of contact between Posidonius and Chrysippus as to the sources of perversion need not imply disagreement but could also have resulted from an attempt on Posidonius' part to expand and refine and so to corroborate the Stoic position as formulated by Chrysippus. It seems to have been typical of Posidonius to do so by reference to data from more specialized disciplines including physiognomy. The appeal to authoritative predecessors such as Hippocrates and Aristotle may also belong in this context. But this does not commit Posidonius to acceptance of the psychological theory of these authorities as a whole. Is the case different with Plato? Clearly an answer to this question requires a systematic examination involving the role played by what Posidonius called the 'ancient account'. Moreover, Posidonius as cited by Galen is one of our main sources for Chrysippus' *On Affections*. For this reason I shall evaluate the Posidonian material in a separate chapter (6).

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE THERAPEUTICS (BOOK IV)

#### 1. *Title, Subject-matter, Audience*

The majority of fragments from the *On Affections* come from its fourth and last book known by its separate title Θεραπευτικόν ('Therapeutics') or, less often, the Ἠθικόν ('Ethics'), but the combination τὸ Θεραπευτικόν τε καὶ Ἠθικόν is also found.<sup>1</sup> The second concept, τὸ Ἠθικόν, may define the field of application of the therapy at issue. It may also refer to disposition or character (ἦθος), on which, as we have seen, Chrysippus, like Aristotle and other predecessors, laid strong emphasis. Considered in this light, the twofold title would neatly cover both sides—therapeutic and the preventive—of his moral psychology.<sup>2</sup> But, as I have already remarked in introducing the fragments from Galen, this may also have involved a large theoretical component, i.e. technical definitions of emotion according to genus and species (see above, p. 92).

At the beginning of the *Therapeutics* Chrysippus repeated a number of theoretical points made in the first two books.<sup>3</sup> But in the fragments no reference is made to these earlier books.<sup>4</sup> Galen, while leaving no doubt about the book being the fourth of the treatise, tells us that it had been written 'separately from the rest' (*PHP* 5.7.52). In a non-polemical context, he refers to the *Therapeutics* almost as if it were bedside reading of many people including himself. Did Chrysippus diverge from his usual style and manner to present a summary of Stoic moral doctrine suitable for a wider audience?<sup>5</sup> Authors of so

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<sup>1</sup> The title Θεραπευτικόν or τὸ θεραπευτικόν βιβλίον is found at Gal. *Loc. aff.* 3.1, VIII p. 138 K. (*SVF* 3.457); *PHP* 4.5.10, 13; 5.2.21, 30 (*SVF* 3.471). Philod. *De ira* Col. I .11-20 Indelli (*SVF* 3.470), Origenes, *Contra Celsum* I 64 (vol. 1, p. 117.16ff. Kō., *SVF* 3.474, first text), *ibid.* VIII 51 (vol. 2, p. 266.18ff. Kō., *SVF* 3.474, second text, quoted *infra*, p. 166 f.). The combined title is given at *PHP* 5.7.52 (*SVF* 3.461, third text). On the relation of the *Therapeutics* to the first three books see *supra*, pp. 89 ff.

<sup>2</sup> But prevention received far more space. See *supra* p. 91 f., *infra* pp. 179, 305, 320.

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*, p. 91, n. 9 with text thereto.

<sup>4</sup> As pointed out by Pohlenz (1906) 353.

<sup>5</sup> *Loc. aff.* III 1, VIII p. 138 K. (*SVF* 3.457), quoted *supra*, p. 89. Cf. Pohlenz (1906) 355: '... und wenn auch Galen in der Hitze der Polemik ihn in Grund und

diverse a philosophical persuasion as Galen, Philodemus, Cicero and Origen knew and used the *Therapeutics*. One might therefore be forgiven for supposing that Chrysippus was indeed successful in finding this wider audience.<sup>6</sup>

The fourth book, with its separate title, may indeed have been designed to be read and used in isolation from the rest. None the less, our evidence remains slim. Caution is needed, not least because the picture of the book as intended for Stoics and non-Stoics alike might influence our view of the original nature and motivation of Stoic therapy. Thus it has been taken to offer its readers moral guidance without obtruding Stoic dogma.<sup>7</sup> To be sure, the very idea of a more or less popularizing book implies that there is another, more thorough-going mode of treatment suitable—and required—for more advanced students. But it would be inaccurate to suppose that Chrysippus suspends all Stoic theory. The theoretical passages presuppose the Stoic conception of the soul as well as the Stoic evaluation of things (viz. as good, bad, or indifferent). As to style, the fragments from the *Therapeutics* do not noticeably differ from those from the other books. The extensive use made by Chrysippus of poetic quotation formed a distinctive and indeed notorious feature of all his writing. It was not just an embellishment.<sup>8</sup>

One of the most striking features of the *Therapeutics* is the prominence of medical terminology. Here the question arises how far Chrysippus has systematically modelled his theory on any existing medical doctrine. It would help explain certain features of his account if we could reconstruct this model and identify it on the basis of what remains of the medical tradition. The medical backdrop of Chrysippus' argument has on the whole been neglected.<sup>9</sup> Part of the problem lies in a general failure to appreciate the status of the important analogy between philosophy and medicine drawn by Chrysippus.

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Boden verdammt, wo die Waffen ruhen erklärt er von Chrysipps Therapeutikos: "... es is ein Buch, nach dem wir vor allem greifen wenn es gilt, die seelischen Leiden zu helfen"'. De Lacy *ad PHP* p.238.46 (on which see below in text): 'Even Galen admits to using the Cure for treatment of affections.'

<sup>6</sup> Pohlenz (1906) 355 n.1 even knows that 'Das dreibändige Werk περὶ παθῶν ist gerade durch den θεραπευτικός verdrängt worden.'

<sup>7</sup> See Pohlenz (1906) 354; Nussbaum (1994) 318, 378, 391; cf. 322, 357. The fragments from Origen have been taken to support this reading, see *infra*, pp. 166 ff.

<sup>8</sup> See *supra*, p. 13 f.

<sup>9</sup> This holds good for Kudlien (1968), Pigeaud (1981), Voelke (1993), Nussbaum (1994).

This is a kind of no man's land. Historians of ancient philosophy do not normally venture into the field of ancient medicine. Historians of ancient medicine do not concern themselves with Stoic ethics.

In view of the questions raised above, I shall first evaluate the method and aims of Chrysippus' argument as much as possible within its Stoic context. First, I shall attempt to achieve a proper appreciation of the so-called medical analogy which is so prominent a part of the approach adopted by Chrysippus (§ 2). In the main body of this chapter I shall review sets of fragments both as embedded in their context (for the most part Galen) and in relation to other Stoic fragments, as well as a few relevant texts from Plato and Aristotle (§ 3-4, 6-8). Two related fragments preserved by Origen and a related passage in Cicero's *Tusculans* have become the focus of a scholarly discussion on the overall orientation of Stoic therapy (§ 5). In all these sections I shall not avoid pointing to medical parallels with a view to illuminating Chrysippus' meaning. But a fuller and more systematic discussion of the medical backdrop is postponed to the final section. This will concern the *Corpus Hippocraticum*, Praxagoras of Kos, and the so-called *Anonymus Londinensis* (§ 9).

## 2. *The Medical Analogy*

The idea of the philosopher as the doctor of the soul can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle and beyond.<sup>10</sup> But it became prominent in the Hellenistic period.<sup>11</sup> In the Stoa the medical analogy was first used by Zeno.<sup>12</sup> When Chrysippus in the *Therapeutics* presented the analogy, he had its Zenonian version in mind—in line with his regular procedure.<sup>13</sup> The analogy has been put in the centre of scholarly debate by Martha Nussbaum, according to whom it expresses one of the deepest concerns of Hellenistic philosophy as a whole. The schools 'debate with one another in terms organized by the analogy, commending themselves to prospective pupils as doctors belonging to rival schools of medicine would debate, proclaiming the

<sup>10</sup> See e.g. Democr. fr. 31 DK, Pl., *Lg.* 720a-e, 857c-d; see further Kudlien (1968); for Plato, see Jouanna (1978); for Aristotle see next p. and Jaeger (1957).

<sup>11</sup> In addition to the Stoic evidence, see Epicurus fr. 221 Usener (Porph. *Ad Marc.* 31, p. 209.23 N.) and, for the Sceptics, Sext. *PH* 3.280-1.

<sup>12</sup> Stob. IV 34.68, p. 845 H. (*SVF* 1.323).

<sup>13</sup> *PHPV* 2.31 (*SVF* 3.471); on the Stoic habit of starting from Zeno, see further *supra*, p. 96.

merits of their differing conceptions of the arts.<sup>14</sup> The analogy, Nussbaum argues, determined the way the philosophers styled their procedures. In this connection she speaks of therapeutic arguments, i.e. arguments designed to purge the soul of its affections but also taking their starting point from the experience of the individual patient.<sup>15</sup> One remembers Aristotle's comparison of ethics with medicine precisely in view of the fact that both disciplines are concerned with individuals (*EN* A 5.1097a11-14). Thus the Stoic therapist will not confront the patient with Stoic value judgements, at least not in the earlier stages of treatment. Obviously this would set therapy apart from other compartments of philosophy—despite the claims of the Stoics as to the systematic and indeed organic quality of their philosophy.<sup>16</sup> This reading also sits uncomfortably with repeated statements by Chrysippus to the effect that morality trickles down from the cosmic order and that philosophical ethics starts from theology.<sup>17</sup> Still, the emphasis in therapy as applied ethics may be different. I shall return to these questions in due course.

But exactly what status and function did the medical analogy have? Here we instantly run into the problems of transmission and presentation peculiar to our main sources, Cicero and Galen. Cicero takes an interest in the medical analogy as a means of making certain points about moral psychology.<sup>18</sup> The spirit of Chrysippus seems to haunt the opening section of the third book of the *Tusculans*. At § 6 we read:

There is surely a medical art of the soul—philosophy. And its aid need not be sought, as in bodily diseases, from outside ourselves. We must endeavour with all our resources and strength to become capable of doctoring ourselves.

It is noteworthy that Cicero ascribes a curative function to philosophy as a whole, not ethics alone.<sup>19</sup> This seems to exclude an independent role for ethics or applied ethics.

But even if Cicero employs the medical analogy, he dissociates himself from its peculiarly Chrysippean version:

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<sup>14</sup> Nussbaum (1994) 14.

<sup>15</sup> Nussbaum (1994) e.g. 16 ff. Similarly Sorabji (2000), e.g. 8, 178.

<sup>16</sup> See the texts assembled as L-S: 26A-D with commentary.

<sup>17</sup> Plut. *De Stoic. Rep.* 1035A-C (SVF 3,326, 3.68, 2.42).

<sup>18</sup> He employs it himself, e.g. *Tusc.* 3.5ff.

<sup>19</sup> Accordingly he speaks of *universa philosophia* in what directly follows.

... much effort is spent by the Stoics, most notably Chrysippus, in establishing the similarity between illnesses of the soul and those of the body. Let us omit these passages as wholly superfluous and investigate the substance of their doctrine (*Tusc.* 4.23).<sup>20</sup>

Cicero judges the medical analogy solely on its literary merits, criticizing the Stoic—notably Chrysippean—version as over-elaborate (cf. also § 27). He himself will state the comparison in general terms only, as at 3.6. In consequence, he thinks it possible to omit many passages without losing sight of the gist of the Stoic doctrine. This is clearly the point of his distinction between form and substance. But one may well ask whether Cicero does not throw out the baby with the bathwater. Is the analogy as developed by Chrysippus just a stylistic device which outstays its welcome? At any rate, Cicero's decision has led to the cutting out of medical and physical aspects in particular (see below, pp. 304, 310). It is time to turn to *PHP*.

At the beginning of the *Therapeutics* Chrysippus introduced the analogy as follows:

It is not true that whereas there is an art, called medicine, concerned with the diseased body, there is no art concerned with the diseased soul, or that the latter [art] is necessarily inferior to the former in the theory and therapeutic treatment of particular cases. Therefore, just as the physician of the body must be 'inside',<sup>21</sup> as people are wont to say, the affections that befall the body and the proper cure for each, so it falls to the physician of the soul to be 'inside' both of these (things) in the best possible way. And one could understand that this is the case, since the analogy with these things<sup>22</sup> was drawn from the beginning. For the parallel appropriateness<sup>23</sup> with respect to these terms will also make clear to us, I believe, the similarity of the cures and in addition the analogy that the two kinds of medicine have with each other (*PHP* 5.2.22-4 ~ *SVF* 3.471).<sup>24</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Hoc loco nimium operae consumitur a Stoicis, maxime a Chrysippo, dum morbis corporum comparatur morborum animi similitudo. quia oratione minime necessaria ea quae rem continent pertractemus.*

<sup>21</sup> I.e. knowledgeable about.

<sup>22</sup> I.e. the theory and therapeutic methods of medicine applied to the body.

<sup>23</sup> De Lacy translates ἀντιπαρατείνουσα οἰκειότης 'correlative affinity' but this seems less clear.

<sup>24</sup> οὐτε γὰρ περὶ τὸ νοσοῦν σῶμά ἐστί τις τέχνη ἣν προσαγορεύομεν ἰατρικὴν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν νοσοῦσαν ψυχὴν ἐστί τις τέχνη οὗτ' ἐν τῇ κατὰ μέρος θεωρίᾳ τε καὶ θεραπείᾳ δεῖ λείπεσθαι ταύτην ἐκείνης. διὸ καὶ καθάπερ τῷ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατρῷ καθήκει τῶν τε συμβαινόντων αὐτοῖς παθῶν ἐντὸς εἶναι ὡς εἰώθασι τοῦτο λέγειν, καὶ τῆς ἐκάστῳ οἰκείας θεραπείας, οὕτω καὶ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰατρῷ ἐπιβάλλει, ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐντὸς εἶναι ὡς ἐνὶ ἄριστᾳ. καὶ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει μάθοι ἂν τις τῆς πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀναλογίας παρατεθείσης ἀπ' ἀρχῆς. ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιπαρατείνουσα οἰκειότης παραστήσει, ὡς οἶομαι, καὶ τὴν τῶν θεραπειῶν ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἔτι τὴν ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἰατρειῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἀναλογίαν.



Chrysippus says that the medical analogy was set up 'from the beginning', that is to say, it arises *naturally* in human thought and language, not as a purely mental construct but as a reflection of reality.<sup>25</sup> The term appropriateness indicates that the words at issue here are natural or literal in this sense.<sup>26</sup> Although common language exhibits anomalies, it remains a useful tool for uncovering the structure of reality.<sup>27</sup> This includes the comparisons or analogies drawn by people in general.<sup>28</sup> This is further borne out by the following fragment which must derive from the same context:

'Just as strength and weakness, good tension and slackness are observed in the case of the body and moreover health and disease, robustness and sickness', and all the other affections, infirmities and illnesses he goes on to list.<sup>29</sup> 'In the same way,' he says, 'there are certain things in the rational soul that exist and are named analogously to all of these.' He then continues: 'I suppose that this sort of analogy and similarity has led to the sameness of their names [or: synonymy]. For we do in fact say that some persons are strong or weak also in respect of their soul, and firm or soft, and moreover ill or healthy; and we speak in this way of emotion, infirmity and the like in the soul' (*PHP* 5.2.26-7, *SVF* 3.471).<sup>30</sup>

The natural basis of the analogy is crucial. When it is said that the soul's emotion or affections (e.g. fear, desire) are *like* those of the

<sup>25</sup> Likewise Chrysippus in his *On the Soul* said that people have believed 'from the beginning' (ἀπ' ἀρχῆς) that the intellect resides in the heart; that is to say, the belief in question is 'natural' and hence true, albeit inarticulate (Gal. *PHP* 3.1.23, *SVF* 2.886); cf. Tieleman (1996a) 174 ff.

<sup>26</sup> For this use in Chrysippus see *PHP* 5.2.33 (quoted *infra*), 4.6.35 (both pertaining to common usage); 4.5.6, 4.5.13-4 (Zeno's definitions), in the first of which quoted *supra*, p.104; further examples relating to ordinary discourse come from the fragments *On the Soul* preserved by Galen, see *PHP* 3.5.5 (*SVF* 2.891); 3.5.15 (*SVF* 2.892) cf. 2.2.10, p.104.31 (*SVF* 2.895: the pointing gesture accompanying the word 'I' is directed 'naturally and appropriately' towards the chest; cf. 3.7.45 = *SVF* 2.903); cf. Atherton (1993) 96; Tieleman (1996a) 206 ff.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Atherton (1993) 92 ff. and, with special reference to Chrysippus' *On the Soul*, Tieleman (1996a) 174 ff.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Rolke (1975) 502-3.

<sup>29</sup> This insertion by Galen is worth retaining since it shows the scope of Chrysippus' analogy

<sup>30</sup> 'καθάπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος θεωρεῖται ἰσχὺς τε καὶ ἀσθένεια, εὐτονία καὶ ἀτονία, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὑγίειά τε καὶ νόσος, καὶ εὐεξία τε καὶ κακεξία,' καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἐξῆς καταλέγει πάθη τε καὶ ἀρρωστήματα καὶ νοσήματα. 'κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν', φησί, 'τρόπον ἀνάλογόν τινα πᾶσι τούτοις καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ λογικῇ συνίσταται τε καὶ ὀνομάζεται.' εἰθ' ἐξῆς ἐπιφέρων φησίν, 'ὡς οἶομαι, ἀπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀναλογίας τε καὶ ὁμοιότητος καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς συνωνυμίας γεγεννημένης· καὶ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν τινὰς λέγομεν ἰσχύειν καὶ ἀσθενεῖν καὶ εὐτόνους καὶ ἀτόνους εἶναι καὶ ἔτι νοσεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν, οὕτω πως καὶ τοῦ πάθους καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν ἀρρωστήματος λεγομένου καὶ τῶν τούτοις παραπλησίων.'

body, this should be taken to apply in an objective, physical sense. As we shall see, this analogy is based on the fact that the soul is corporeal like the body. This point—already well brought out by Rolke in his monograph on Stoic imagery<sup>31</sup>—has important implications for the therapy of the soul. We should also note the concept of synonymy employed here. Galen correctly explains its Stoic sense as entailing that the mental and bodily states listed not only have the same name but also the same definition (*ibid.* 28).<sup>32</sup>

Chrysippus was keenly interested in linguistic ambiguity and related phenomena including metaphor and other figures of speech.<sup>33</sup> In this area he may be expected to choose his terms carefully. In the above passage he speaks not of metaphor, but of analogy and parallelism and appropriateness. By contrast, he once uses the term ‘metaphorically’ with reference to the expressions ‘without sinew’ and ‘having sinew’ said of persons without and with mental stamina.<sup>34</sup> In this case, obviously, there is no physical correspondence.<sup>35</sup>

What then is the physical basis legitimizing the analogy between body and soul? First, we need to remind ourselves of his view that he soul is not only corporeal like the body, but consists of the same

<sup>31</sup> Rolke (1975) 315 ff. See esp. his conclusion: ‘Daraus geht eindeutig hervor dass die Vorstellung von den Affekten als Krankheiten kein Bild darstellt, sondern dass die Affekte als reale Krankheiten des körperlichen Seelenpneumas aufgefasst wurden’ (p. 318).

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Simpl. *In Arist. Cat.* p.36.8-11 Kalbfleisch (SVF 2.150).

<sup>33</sup> He devoted one separate treatise to the type of ambiguity involved in figures of speech and several to ambiguity in general, see D.L. 7.193 (SVF 2.14); cf. Atherton (1993) 163 ff.

<sup>34</sup> 4.55-6 (SVF 3.473): ἔτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτ’ ἴσως (ὥς) οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος λέγονται τόνοι ἄτονοι καὶ εὐτόνοι εἶναι κατὰ τὸ νευρῶδες τῷ δύνασθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ ἀδυνατεῖν ἐν τοῖς διὰ τούτων ἐπιτελουμένοις ἔργοις, καὶ ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγεται τόνος ὡς εὐτονία καὶ ἄτονία. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν δρόμῳ καὶ ἀνθέξει τινὸς καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίσις ἦδη, ἃ διὰ τῶν νεύρων ἐνεργεῖται, ἔστι τις ἐπιτελεστική κατάστασις καὶ ἐνδοτική, τῶν νεύρων προεκτελεσμένων καὶ ἀνειμένων, ἀναλόγως καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς ἔστι τοιοῦτον νευρῶδες, καθὼ καὶ κατὰ μεταφορὰν ἀνεύρους τινὰς λέγομεν καὶ νευρὰ ἔχειν. The first plural λέγομεν shows that Chrysippus appeals to ordinary usage. Note that the adverb ἀναλόγως pertains only to the mental strength indicated by the expression τοιοῦτον νευρῶδες (‘something sinewy of this kind’), not to the words ἀνεύρους and νευρὰ ἔχειν. On the not exclusively Stoic metaphor ‘the sinews of the mind’ see Vegetti (1993). On the Stoic idea of mental strength, or will-power, as instantiated by this fragment, see *supra*, pp. 38 f.

<sup>35</sup> According to the Stoic distinctions recorded by Simplicius, *Cat.* p.32.12 ff. a new name is used metaphorically if the thing receiving it has its own name as well. This too seems to apply here, since the terms strength and weakness are the proper names which are applied to the soul in the two respective conditions; cf. Atherton (1993) 164.

physical elements, in particular fire and air. Thus Chrysippus wrote in his *On the Soul*:

The soul is breath connate<sup>36</sup> with us, extending as a continuum through the whole body as long as the free-flowing breath of life is present in the body (*PHP* 3.1.10 ~ *SVF* 2.885).<sup>37</sup>

Alongside the common experience that life and respiration are co-extensive,<sup>38</sup> we find here the more technical point that the soul nourishes and maintains itself through inhalation (in addition to the exhalation—ἀναθυμιάσις—from the blood in the heart).<sup>39</sup> Accordingly, the soul's disposition, including its moral quality, depends on physiological processes in the body. The relevance of these processes is also indicated by Chrysippus' point (as quoted above, p. 144) that, whereas medicine in its ordinary sense obviously presupposes expert knowledge of the body, medicine of the soul requires knowledge of *both* body and soul. The least we can say is that this tells strongly against taking the analogy in a general metaphorical sense only, justifying 'therapeutical arguments'. In addition, we should note that Chrysippus seems to point to the need of a fairly detailed level of knowledge of bodily processes and diseases.

As we have seen, the great literary stylist Cicero has no time for the physical, or physiological, basis of the analogy. But the doctor Galen too has qualms about the analogy, albeit different ones. He complains that Chrysippus, having majestically introduced the analogy in the above passage, fails to bring it to bear on his material (*PHP* 5.2.30-38). If bodily health consists in the correct proportion of its parts (μόρτια), this should hold good for psychic health also. Chrysippus however fails to specify what are the parts in the case of the soul. Stoic psychology does not recognize psychic parts in the required sense. Of course, Plato operates with parts. In sum, the analogy as

<sup>36</sup> This refers to the Stoic view that the physical *pneuma* characteristic of the embryo turns into psychic *pneuma* under the impact of the cold air, which falls upon it when respiration starts, see *SVF* 2.802-806 and further testimonies and fragments assembled and discussed in Tieleman (1991). In fact, the *pneuma* is transmitted by both parents in the form of semen, which is secreted by the reproductive part (σπερματικόν) of the soul, see e.g. *PHP* 3.1.11 (*SVF* 2.885); cf. *SVF* 1.518, third text; 2.806, 873, 874.

<sup>37</sup> ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμα ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διήκον ἔστ' ἂν ἡ τῆς ζωῆς εὐπνοία παρῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι.

<sup>38</sup> This idea is exploited in Chrysippus' syllogistic proof that the soul is *pneuma* preserved by Calcidius, *In Tim.* 220 (*SVF* 2.879), which may well derive from the *On the soul* as well.

<sup>39</sup> See *SVF* 3 Diog. 30.

such is unobjectionable and indeed helpful since it confirms the Platonic rather than the Chrysippean conception of the soul (*ibid.* 30).

But is Galen justified in claiming that Chrysippus did not apply the analogy? In order to substantiate this argument Galen presents the following proof-texts (5.2.31-33 ~ *SVF* 3.471):

(31) '... That is indeed why Zeno's argument proceeds as it should. Disease of the soul is most similar to an unsettled state of the body. Disease of the body is said to be the lack of proportion of the [things] in it, hot and cold, dry and wet.'

(32) And a little further on: 'Health in the body is a kind of good blend and proportion of the [things] specified.'<sup>40</sup> And again subsequently: 'For in my view a good condition of the body resides in the best blend of the [things] mentioned.'<sup>41</sup>

(33) And after that: 'And these things too are said not inappropriately of the body, because proportion or lack of proportion in its components, hot, cold, wet and dry is health or disease; proportion or its reverse in the sinews is strength or weakness, firmness or softness; and proportion or the lack of it in the limbs is beauty or ugliness.'<sup>42</sup>

Although Chrysippus omits any mention of 'parts', his use of the neutre plural (here translated 'the things in it', 'the things specified', etc.) is exploited by Galen to make us believe that 'parts' are at issue. In reality, Chrysippus viewed the correct proportion to the soul as one between physical elements, or elemental qualities. The analogy as employed by Chrysippus is concerned with the *physical* similarity between body and soul. Remarkably enough, in § 33 the analogy is drawn from the soul to the body, that is to say a statement on the former (*viz.* that its condition is determined by the physical elements) is declared applicable to the latter.

Here, as elsewhere, Chrysippus presents his doctrine as an exegesis of Zeno's *ipsissima verba*. Both Stoics then attached great weight to the four elements in explaining mental life. But this feature is suppressed by Galen. His silence on the elemental qualities is typical

<sup>40</sup> *Viz.* the elementary qualities, hot, cold, dry and wet.

<sup>41</sup> See previous n.

<sup>42</sup> (31) διὸ καὶ κατὰ τρόπον προηκται Ζήνωνι λόγος· ἡ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς νόσος ὁμοιοτάτῃ ἐστὶ τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἀκαταστασίᾳ, λέγεται δὲ εἶναι σώματος νόσος ἡ ἀσυμμετρία τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ, ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ. (32) καὶ μετ' ὀλίγα· ἡ δ' ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑγίεια εὐκрасία τις καὶ συμμετρία τῶν διειρημένων. καὶ πάλιν ἐφεξῆς· οἶμαι γάρ εἶναι εὐεξίαν σώματος τὴν ἀρίστην τῶν ῥηθέντων εὐκрасίαν. (33) καὶ πάλιν ἐφεξῆς· λέγεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος, διότι ἡ ἐν θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς καὶ ὑγροῖς καὶ ξηροῖς γενομένη συμμετρία ἢ ἀσυμμετρία ἐστὶν ὑγίεια ἢ νόσος, ἡ δ' ἐν νεύροις συμμετρία ἢ ἀσυμμετρία ἰσχύς ἢ ἀσθένεια καὶ εὐτονία ἢ ἀτονία, ἡ δ' ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι συμμετρία ἢ ἀσυμμετρία κάλλος ἢ αἰσχος.

of his response to Chrysippus' argument in *PHP*.<sup>43</sup> This becomes clearer from a comparison with a long passage from his *The Capacities of the Soul Follow the Mixtures of the Body* (hereafter *QAM*), which is undoubtedly based on the same section of the *Therapeutics*.<sup>44</sup> This Galenic tract, as its title indicates, is devoted to a defence of the thesis that mental phenomena depend on bodily states—in a sense left fairly indeterminate.<sup>45</sup> This facilitates Galen's ploy of summoning a variety of authorities—Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle but also the Stoics<sup>46</sup>—in support of his conception of the soul as a mixture or temperament (κρᾶσις) of the body. The report on the Stoics runs as follows:

For they hold that the soul, like nature (φύσιν), is a kind of breath (πνεῦμα) but that [scil. *pneuma*] of nature is more humid and colder, whereas that of the soul is drier and hotter. That is why this *pneuma*, too, is a kind of matter (ὕλη) appropriate to the soul and the form (εἶδος) of the matter is such-and-such temperament (κρᾶσις) consisting in a proportion of the airy and the fiery substance (οὐσίας). For one cannot say that the soul is just air or just fire. Indeed, it would not be possible for the body of an animal to become excessively hot, or excessively cold, nor to be dominated by either of these by large excess, since, even if it exceeds the right measure (τοῦ συμμέτρου)

<sup>43</sup> Of course he knows full well about the Stoic acceptance of the four elements. Indeed at *PHP* 5.3.18 he commends the doctrine as common to Chrysippus and the rest of the Stoics, Aristotle-cum-Theophrastus, Plato and Hippocrates; that is to say, it is included in his vision of a grand tradition of good philosophy and science; cf. *supra*, p. 39. His posture at 5.3.18 is similar to that in *QAM*, on which see further in text. But this makes it all the more significant that he does not relate elementary theory to Stoic psychology and confirms the explanation for this silence I put forward in the text.

<sup>44</sup> This is not acknowledged by Von Arnim in the *SVF*, though the text is printed as *SVF* 2.787. To the best of my knowledge the affinities have not been noted in subsequent scholarship either. The *QAM* may have been written some forty years later than *PHP* I-VI, i.e. some time after 200 CE. In the Galenic corpus, as a glance at the index of the *SVF* shows, there are hardly any verbatim fragments of Chrysippean treatises other than the *On the Soul* and the *On Affections*. Galen, having once digested their contents at the time of writing *PHP* I-VI, continued to draw on them until the end of his career. In so doing he did not necessarily return to the original text but may have worked from memory or on the basis of abstracts. The subject-matter of *QAM* in particular invited him to reconsider some of the issues raised in *PHP*. Thus ch. 11, p.77.15 ff. is a reworking of *PHP* 5.5 and 7.1, with the Stoics again as the principal opponents. Stoic doctrines not covered by *PHP* I-VI but found in other Galenic tracts are almost invariably based not on direct quotation but what look like scholastic manuals and doxographies or whatever Galen had retained in the form of notes from his philosophical education. As a student of philosophy Galen may indeed have read and excerpted more Chrysippean treatises, especially on logical subjects; cf. *Libr. Propr.* c. 15.

<sup>45</sup> On the nature and purpose of the *QAM* see Lloyd (1988).

<sup>46</sup> On Galen's use of authorities in *QAM* see Garcia Ballester (1971), Lloyd (1988), both of whom however concentrate on Plato, Aristotle and Hippocrates.

just a little bit, the animal, with its surplus of fire beyond measure, becomes feverish. By contrast, it becomes cold and livid and nearly or indeed completely senseless whenever air prevails because this, insofar as this depends on it alone, is cold in itself, and by being mixed with the fiery element it becomes well-tempered. It has, then, become clear to you now that in the view of the Stoics the substance of the soul comes to be according to a particular mixture (κρᾶσις) of air and fire. And Chrysippus has been made intelligent because of the well-tempered blend of these two [elements], while the sons of Hippocrates whom the comic poets<sup>47</sup> mock for their foolishness, [have been made] swinish because of the boundless heat (*QAM* ch. 4, pp.45.5-46.1 Müller ~ *SVF* 2.787).<sup>48</sup>

Galen wants to show that these past masters find themselves in broad agreement over mixture. His account seems accurate enough. Yet nothing prepares us for the honorific mention of the *bête noire* of the *PHP*—Chrysippus. This startling difference of attitude reveals the workings of Galenic dialectic in dealing with authorities in different contexts. In consequence, the *QAM* affords a less biased glimpse of the relevant section of the *Therapeutics*. It confirms our assumption that Chrysippus explained the analogy of body and soul in terms of the elemental qualities.

There is another point to be made. Galen's criticism that Chrysippus omitted to specify the 'parts' of the soul involved in the analogy is not merely beside the point. It is simply incorrect. He explained the soul's beauty and ugliness in terms of its parts:

Therefore by analogy the soul will also be called beautiful or ugly in terms of the proportion or disproportion of certain parts of such and

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Aristophanes fr. 116 Kassel - Austin (= fr. 112 Kock). For other references to comedy by Chrysippus, see *infra*, p. 177, 180, 258. But it is not certain that this reference comes from Chrysippus since Galen intimately knew the poets of the Old Attic comedy, including Aristophanes, in whose Greek he was keenly interested: see *Lib. Prop.* ch. 17, p.124.7 ff.

<sup>48</sup> πνεῦμα μὲν γὰρ τι τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι βούλονται καθάπερ καὶ τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλὰ ὑγρότερον μὲν καὶ ψυχρότερον τὸ τῆς φύσεως, ξηρότερον δὲ καὶ θερμότερον τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς. ὥστε καὶ τοῦθ' ὕλη μὲν τις οἰκεία τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶ τὸ πνεῦμα, τὸ δὲ τῆς ὕλης εἶδος ἢ ποιὰ κρᾶσις ἐν συμμετρίᾳ γιγνομένη τῆς ἀερώδους τε καὶ πυρώδους οὐσίας· οὔτε γὰρ ἀέρα μόνον οἶόν τε φάναι τὴν ψυχὴν οὔτε πῦρ, ὅτι μήτε ψυχρὸν ἄκρως ἐγγωρεῖ γίνεσθαι ζῶον σῶμα μήτ' ἄκρως θερμὸν ἀλλὰ μηδ' ἐπικρατούμενον ὑπὸ θατέρου κατὰ μεγάλῃν ὑπεροχὴν, ὅπου γε, κἂν βραχεῖ πλεῖον γένηται τοῦ συμμετρου, πυρέττει μὲν τὸ ζῶον ἐν ταῖς τοῦ πυρὸς ἀμέτροις ὑπεροχαῖς, καταψύχεται δὲ καὶ πελιδνοῦνται καὶ δυσσαίσθητον ἢ παντελῶς ἀναίσθητον γίνεται κατὰ τὰς τοῦ ἀέρος ἐπικρατήσεις· οὗτος γὰρ αὐτός, ὅσον μὲν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, ψυχρὸς ἐστίν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὸ πυρῶδες στοιχείον ἐπιμιξίας εὐκρατος γίνεται. δῆλον οὖν ἤδη σοι γέγονεν, ὥς ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσία κατὰ ποιὰν κρᾶσιν ἀέρος τε καὶ πυρὸς γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωικούς· καὶ συνετὸς μὲν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀπείργασται διὰ τὴν τούτων εὐκρατον μίξιν, οἱ δ' Ἰπποκράτους υἱεῖς (ὕώδεις), οὓς ἐπὶ μωρίᾳ σκωπτουσιν οἱ κωμικοί, διὰ τὴν ἄμετρον θέρμην.

such a kind [...] They are the parts of the soul of which its reason and its condition consist. And a soul is beautiful or ugly in virtue of its regent part being in this or that state with respect to its own proper divisions (5.2.47, 49 ~ SVF 3.471a).<sup>49</sup>

Does 'parts' (μέρη) refer to the physical elements in which the soul's health has been said to reside? The way the second snippet (49: 'They are the parts ...') opens indicates that the subject of its first sentence had been mentioned by Chrysippus in the immediately preceding context. In other words, Galen has suppressed its identity on purpose. He himself suggests an answer by producing a statement from *another* treatise by Chrysippus, viz. his *On Reason* (5.3.1 ~ SVF 2.841):

Reason is a collection of certain notions and conceptions.

Galen rejects this, arguing that notions and conceptions are activities, not parts, and that nothing can be composed of its activities. From the Stoic point of view, however, notions and conceptions are those appearances that have been stored in the soul and hence configurations ('imprints') in its pneumatic substance rather than its activities.<sup>50</sup> In this light, one could say that notions or conceptions are the stuff of reason, or that they constitute reason.

The Stoics (including Chrysippus) referred to the elements as that of which things are composed (συνέστηκε), i.e. the term used here. They are called the smallest 'part' (μόριον) of a whole.<sup>51</sup> Conversely, in the context of logic, Chrysippus spoke of 'elements of speech' (τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα) with reference to what were more usually called 'the parts of speech' (μέρη τοῦ λόγου, *PHP* 8.3.12 ~ SVF 2.148).<sup>52</sup> What is more, Stoic elements are constitutive of quality—as is indicated here by the regent part being in a particular condition (τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μόριον ἔχον οὕτως) ἢ οὕτως, 48), or its parts being of such-or-such a kind (τοιῶνδέ, 49).<sup>53</sup>

<sup>49</sup> διὸ καὶ καλὴ ἢ αἰσχρὰ ψυχὴ ἀνάλογον ῥηθήσεται κατὰ συμμετρίαν ἢ ἀμετρίαν τοιῶνδ' ἐκ τινῶν μερῶν [...] ἔστι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη δι' ὧν ὁ ἐν αὐτῇ λόγος συνέστηκε καὶ ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ διάθεσις. καὶ ἔστι καλὴ ἢ αἰσχρὰ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μόριον ἔχον (οὕτως) ἢ οὕτως κατὰ τοὺς οἰκείους μερισμούς.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Plut. *De Comm. Not.* 1084F (SVF 2.847), Aet. IV, 11 (~SVF 2.83).

<sup>51</sup> Gal. *HNH* I, XV p. 30 K. (~SVF 2.409).

<sup>52</sup> Thus diverging from the general use of στοιχεῖα to refer to the more basic level of the letters. For this Chrysippean usage see also D.L. 7.192 (~SVF 2.13, p.6, ll. 17, 19, 20).

<sup>53</sup> See Plot. *Enn.* 2.4.1 (~SVF 2.319), D.L. 7.137 (SVF 2.580), Sext. *M* 10.312 (~SVF 2.309), ps. Gal. *Qual. incorp.* 5, XIX p. 477 K. (~SVF 2.327); cf. Gal. *CAM* 8, I pp. 251 ff. (~SVF 2.405) and the Galenic text printed as SVF 2.408, 409, 410, presenting qualitative change in terms of the varying blend of elements.

Startlingly, Galen gives away the correct reading. Abandoning his earlier suggestion that Chrysippus must mean conceptions or notions, he mentions the parts of the psychic *pneuma* distinguished by Chrysippus, i.e. the regent part *and* the rays of *pneuma* extending from it.<sup>54</sup> From Galen's point of view this is a correct use of the term 'part', although of course the Stoic conception entails a difference from his own Platonic and Aristotelian use of the same term. Yet this sense too cannot have been what Chrysippus meant, since he is concerned with the health and beauty and their opposites of the regent part, or intellect, only:

... and you<sup>55</sup> say that it is above all with reference to this [scil. regent] part of the soul that beauty and ugliness are found in it. Now this *pneuma* has two parts (μέρια), elements (στοιχεῖα), or states, that are blended with one another through and through, the hot and the cold, or, if you wish to call them by different terms derived from their substances, air and fire; and it also takes some moisture from the bodies in which it dwells (5.3.7-8).

What Galen says about the physical constitution of the regent part is a correct rendering of the Stoic doctrine. He argues that Chrysippus cannot seriously have meant that the right proportion of such parts or elements constitutes the health or beauty of the governing part:

But I would be surprised if you should wish to call the proportion of these the health or beauty of the governing part. For the health of its body is properly assigned to them, but as to the governing part of the soul, its health does not reside in them, even on your view. Thus the whole pattern is destroyed and the claim to the same name is completely gone if we cannot show that disease and health, beauty and ugliness, are constituted in the soul's regent part in the same way as in the whole body (*ibid.* 9-10).<sup>56</sup>

But this was exactly what Chrysippus wishes to do. And in doing so, he took account of the Stoic assumption that body and soul are

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<sup>54</sup> Galen seems to think of the opening section of Chrysippus' demonstration concerning the location of the regent part in the *On the Soul*, a passage he quoted at *PHP* 3.1.10-15 (*SVF* 2.886). In total Chrysippus distinguished eight such parts of which Galen mentions five only: the regent part, the vocal and generative parts and parts corresponding to the five senses. Cf. also D.L. 7.110 (*SVF* 2.828), Aët. IV 4,4 (*SVF* 2.827).

<sup>55</sup> Scil. Chrysippus.

<sup>56</sup> I.e. not the soul's corporeal substance but the body with which the soul is connected.



interrelated bodies, both of which are constituted out of the same elements (though of course in a different blend). The weakness of Galen's argument reveals itself now he has given away the correct reading, having first intimated that Chrysippus was reticent about the identity of the parts.

Galen's manoeuvring hides an awkward truth: he was not only familiar with the part played by the elements in Stoic physiology, but deeply influenced by it. He openly acknowledges this debt in his treatise *Against Julian* ch.4, pp.42.9-44.5 Wenkebach (*SVF* 1.132, 2.771).<sup>57</sup> Here the four qualities are specified in terms of the four humours, which are affected—and hence capable of being conditioned—by regimen (δίαίτα). Galen tells us here that he could, but lacks the space to, illustrate this doctrine with copious excerpts from the work of Chrysippus 'and all the other Stoics' (*ibid.* p. 43.3ff.).<sup>58</sup> Given his usual practice, this must mean that he had read Chrysippus and trusted that the same doctrine could be found when he took the trouble to go through works by other Stoics such as Zeno as well.<sup>59</sup> Accordingly, he mentions Zeno and Chrysippus together when referring to the Stoic doctrine but next speaks of Chrysippus only when turning to the question of documented evidence in what follows.<sup>60</sup> This doctrine coheres with what we have learned from the verbatim fragments from the *Therapeutics* and the testimony from *QAM* we have been discussing. It is a fair assumption that the passage from the *Against Julian* echoes Galen's reading of *Therapeutics* as well. It is important to note that this passage adds a reference to regimen which is lacking from the other quotations and testimonies reviewed so far.

The reference to Zeno seems to reflect an authentic feature of Chrysippus' procedure of starting from views and statements of Zeno,

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 8, p.70.6 ff. (*SVF* 2.355, second text).

<sup>58</sup> The motive for presenting these citations lies in his wish to refute Julian who invoked the Stoics as well as Plato and Aristotle, but whose Methodist views in fact were contrary to the view of those authorities. Note that at p. 43.9 f. Galen says it would have been wiser to content oneself to quote from Plato only, thus hinting at *PHP* (viz. book 8, which is concerned with the elements, in particular; see esp. ch. 4).

<sup>59</sup> At *PHP* 5.6.40-41, for example, in a context concerned with the structure of the soul, Galen adopts the precisely same stance when he declines to look into Zeno's position 'in order to avoid excessive length' and contents himself with referring to what he had read in Chrysippus' *On Affections*. See further *supra*, p. 85 f.

<sup>60</sup> See *ibid.* pp. 42.18-19, 43.4, 43.12 W.

which was precisely what we saw him doing at *PHP* 5.2.31. In *QAM*, by the way, Zeno makes his appearance too, viz. in an anecdote about his use of wine as a means of influencing his own mental disposition (ch. 3, p. 39.22 ff.). It may not be too fanciful to suppose that this derives from the *Therapeutics* as well.<sup>61</sup> At any rate, it also pertains to regimen (i.e. diet and exercise).

Elsewhere Galen puts the Stoics on a par with Hippocrates in connection with the theory that *pneuma* pervades the body, causing sympathy between its parts. Again the *pneuma* doctrine is connected with the fourfold division of elementary qualities. These passages have every appearance of being based on a *Stoic* source, including the reference to Hippocrates.<sup>62</sup> At any rate, they attest to Galen's profound indebtedness to Stoic physiology.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. the anecdotal reference to a *bon mot* of Zeno made by Chrysippus in his *On the Soul*, *PHP* 3.4.4 (SVF 1.282/2.891) with Tieleman (1996a) 215.

<sup>62</sup> See esp. (1) *MM* I 2, X p. 15 K. (SVF 2.411): the Stoics are closer than Aristotle to Hippocrates, because they, i.e. the Stoics, posited the complete intermingling of corporeal substances (the doctrine of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων, SVF 2.463 ff.) whereas Aristotle held that only qualities intermingle. Further, pneumatic doctrine is ascribed to Hippocrates, who said that the whole body is σύμπουν καὶ σύρπον, which may be translated as 'held together by one *pneuma* and one flow'. Similarly *Nat. Fac.* II, p. 29.17 K. On the idea of continuity of the pneumatic soul, see *PHP* 3.1.10 (SVF 2.885), quoted *supra*, p. 147. In the Hellenistic period pneumatology was seen as distinctive of Hippocratic medicine see *infra*, p. 195. The noun cognate with σύμπουν was used by Chrysippus to characterize the (coherence of the) macrocosm, i.e. in a way that corresponds to its usage on the microcosmic level in Galen, see D.L. 7.140 (SVF 2.543). The second qualification, σύρπον, recalls the Heraclitean flux-doctrine, which lends further weight to the assumption that Galen is drawing on a Stoic source. (2) At *Trem. palp.* VII, pp. 616-618 K. (printed, with some minor omissions, as SVF 2.446) Galen presents on his own behalf a Stoic account of human physiology, which may be based on the same source as the passage from *MM*. Here, too, the body is described as σύμπουν καὶ σύρπον, these two qualifications being explained by reference to Heracl. *DK* B 60 and 30 (~ fr. 51d and 33 Marcovich) respectively (p.616.10). The soul is described as a blend of the hot and the cold, which explains its cohesive nature. Digestion is explained by reference to the absorbing capacity of the innate heat or psychic *pneuma* (on the identity of which see SVF 1.127); that is to say we are dealing here with the Stoic doctrine of exhalation (ἀναθυμίασις), although the term is not used; cf. SVF 1.141 ff. For the relation construed by the Stoics between their doctrine of exhalation and Heraclitus' flux see esp. Euseb. *PE* 15.20.2 (Ar. *Did. fr. phys.* 39 Diels, SVF 1.141, from Cleanthes, though printed by Von Arnim among the fragments of Zeno): see Long (1975/6) 150ff. Gal. *Trem. palp.* VII, pp. 616-618 K. is strongly reminiscent of Cleanthes' *Wärmelehre* expounded at Cic. *ND* 2.23-4. The expression σύμπουν καὶ σύρπον can also be paralleled from the Stoic cosmology offered by Synesius, *Aegyptii sive de providentia* 2,7, l. 21; cf. ps.Plut. *Fat.* 574E. On the physiological scheme involved see further Tieleman (1991), esp. 114 f., 120 ff. *Id.* (1996a) 87 ff.

At this point we may answer the question why Galen adopts such curiously different attitudes to Stoic elementary theory. In the psychological and moral context of *PHP* a harmony between Hippocrates and the Stoics is the last thing Galen could use. In *PHP* books 4 and 5 he is concerned with the *cause* of affection and his overriding concern is to demonstrate the inadequacy of the Stoic 'monistic' explanation. Only partition along Platonic lines will do. Moreover, he claims that Plato and Hippocrates were in agreement on the structure of the soul as well. So Galen intimates that Chrysippus has *no* answers to the questions put to him.

Developing his analogy between medicine and philosophy, Chrysippus, like Zeno before him, saw the soul's health as a matter of the right blend of the four physical elements. An affection, πάθος, of the soul results from a disturbance of the equilibrium between these elements. Of special importance is the proportion between the hot and the cold. Consider the following fragment:

It must be supposed that the disease of the soul is most similar to a feverish state of the body in which fevers and chills do not occur at regular intervals but irregularly and at random from the condition [scil. of the patient] and at the incidence of small causes (*PHP* 5.2.14 ~ *SVF* 3.465).<sup>63</sup>

Galen (*ibid.* 13-19) complains that Chrysippus 'does not even grant that the disease of the soul is comparable to the state of a person who is suffering from certain periodical diseases (περιοδικαῖς νόσοις), like tertian or quartan fevers (τριταίοις ἢ τεταρταίοις πυρετοῖς) (*ibid.* 14).' But his use of the term 'diseases' (νόσοις) here blurs the distinction intended by Chrysippus, who calls the enduring diseased condition of the soul 'disease' (νόσος) and correlates its affections (παθή) to fits of fever and shivering.<sup>64</sup> The latter, as is clear from the text quoted by Galen, occur at irregular intervals. Clearly Chrysippus wishes to bring out the unpredictable and apparently random quality of emotional

<sup>63</sup> ὑπονοητέον τοίνυν τὴν μὲν νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς ὁμοιοτάτην εἶναι τῇ τοῦ σώματος πυρετώδει καταστάσει καθ' ἣν οὐ περιοδικῶς ἀλλ' ἀτάκτως πυρετοὶ καὶ φρίκαι γίνονται καὶ ἄλλως ἀπὸ τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ μικρῶν ἐπιγινομένων αἰτίων.

<sup>64</sup> At *Loc. aff.* I 3, VIII p.32 (*SVF* 3.429), in a non-polemical context, Galen follows Chrysippus' distinction, opposing νόσημα/διάθεσις and πάθος/φορά. On the difference between the disease (νόσος, νόσημα) of the soul as an enduring state and affection (πάθος) as its 'motion' or 'action' see further *SVF* 3.421, 422, 423, 424, 425, all of which are no doubt reflect *On Affections*. Diseased souls are marked by their proneness (εὐεμπωσία) to particular affections, see *SVF* 3.421 with Kidd (1983).

conduct. More or less the same point is made in terms of the soul's fluttering (πτοία):

'Fluttering' too has been appropriately used to characterize the affections as a class in view of this instability and moving at random (PHP 4.5.7 ~ SVF 3.476).<sup>65</sup>

Another feature suppressed by Galen is the physical basis of the doctrine. At PHP 5.2.13-14 the alternation of fever and shivering involves the opposition between the hot and the cold. This irregular alternation marks a soul in which the proportion between the elemental qualities is uneven. Several passages tell us that the soul *expands* in lust and desire, and *contracts* in fear and grief (PHP 4.3.2, *Tusc.* 4.15). We need not doubt that these two physical reactions coincide with the prevalence of the hot and the cold respectively. The prominence given to the opposition between the hot and the cold and their alternation reflect traditional medical lore.<sup>66</sup> The terms used to describe the physical reactions of the soul in a state of affection are derived from descriptions of diseases in medical literature.<sup>67</sup>

The weak and diseased soul typically switches back and forth between two opposite poles.<sup>68</sup> According to Chrysippus, *Schadenfreude* (a species of lust) naturally turns into pity (a species of grief)—an alternation between hot and cold emotions.<sup>69</sup> Likewise Plutarch in

<sup>65</sup> οἰκείως δὲ τῷ τῶν παθῶν γένει ἀποδίδεται καὶ ἡ πτοία κατὰ τὸ ἐνσεσοβημένον τοῦτο καὶ φερόμενον εἰκῇ. See also Stob. *Ecl.* II p.39.7-9 (SVF 1.206): ὥρισται δὲ κάκεινως· πάθος ἐστὶ πτοία ψυχῆς, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν πτηνῶν φορᾶς τὸ εὐκίνητον τοῦ παθητικοῦ παρεικάσας. Cf. *ibid.* p.88.6 ff. (SVF 3.378). Plut. *Virt. mor.* 446F (SVF 3.459, second text) uses a different metaphor, viz. the random and impulsive way in which little children move about.

<sup>66</sup> See *infra*, p. 192.

<sup>67</sup> For 'expansion' or 'relaxation' (διαχύσις, see also PHP 4.2.5-6, 5.1.4, D.L. 7.114) during pleasure compare Hp. *Morb. Sacr.* 6, p. 378.6, *Vict.* II 6, 574.14; for contraction (συστολή) as characteristic of grief and fear see further PHP 4.7.13-17, 5.1.4, 3.5.43 and compare *Morb.* III 7.132, *VM* 1.626.20, *Epid.* VII 5.376.3. Grief is typically accompanied by a 'bite' (δῆξις): see PHP 2.8.5-6, 4.3.2; cf. Hp. *VM* 1.618.13, *Aff.* 6.238.7, 248.13, 254.21, 266.1, 268.19. Related to the contraction is the 'shrinking' (ταπεινώσις, μείωσις) see PHP 4.3.2, 5.1.4, cf. 4.2.5-6 and compare Hp. *Epid.* II 5.92.10; cf. *ibid.* 5.114.10, *Morb.* 1.6.114.10. Related to expansion is the reaction called 'rising' (or perhaps 'elation': ἔπαρσις) associated with pleasure in particular, PHP 4.3.2, 4.2.5-6, 5.1.4; cf. Hp. *Epid.* II 5.108.10, 110.5.7, *Epid.* IV 5.188.2, *Prorrh.* II 9.205.

<sup>68</sup> Likewise Plut. *Virt. mor.* 446F (SVF 3.459): τὸ πάθος ... ἐνὸς λόγου τροπὴν ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρω (p.111.28-9).

<sup>69</sup> Plut. *Stoic. Rep.* ch. 25, 1046B (SVF 3.418), describing this as a natural process: καθ' ἑτέρας φυσικὰς φορὰς ἐκτρεπομένων [scil. the persons concerned]. The reference to nature in connection with affection here is quite remarkable; but cf. Plot. *Enn.* III 2.16. Chrysippus discussed contradictory attitudes typical of affectionate

his *On Moral Virtue* presents a number of the psychic reactions in terms of the following polarities: 'desiring and repenting, becoming angry and fearing, being driven to evil by lust and, being driven back again, regaining control of itself' (446F ~ SVF 3.459). Plutarch, like Chrysippus, also brings out the pettiness of the external factors which may throw the soul off balance. The unstable soul is suspended between two opposing states, viz. the excesses of hot and cold. Seen in this light, the ideal of a 'good mixture' (εὐκρασία) seems hard to attain, or to preserve.

To conclude this section: the evidence we have discussed so far reveals the importance of physical factors in the aetiology and phenomenology of affection. Of cardinal importance is the assumption that health resides in a good proportion between the four elemental qualities in body and soul alike. The so-called medical analogy is no formalistic, let alone decorative metaphor. It is based on physical realities to which the corporeal soul is no less subject than the body. In consequence, we may expect that some attention is paid to ways of conditioning and curing the soul through corporeal means. We have already come across a few indications about Zeno's interest in regimen. As we shall see, there is further evidence to this effect. But before turning to this material, I shall consider a few texts from the *Therapeutics* and elsewhere which complement the picture of Stoic physical psychology.

### 3. *The Roots of Affection*

In his *On the Soul* Chrysippus argued that people are dimly aware of the fact that psychic affections arise in their hearts:

The common run seem to me to be inclined to this view since they have, as it were, an inner awareness of the affections of the intellect occurring in the region of the chest, most notably the place to which the heart is assigned, especially in the case of sorrows and fears and anger and inflamed anger most of all; for an impression arises in us as if it [scil. inflamed anger] were evaporized from the heart and were pushing out against some parts and were blowing into the face and hands (PHP 3.1.25 ~ SVF 2.886).<sup>70</sup>

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conduct in the second book of the *On Affections*, see PHP 4.7.12-17, 25-7 (SVF 3.466, 467) and further *supra*, p. 123 f.

<sup>70</sup> Κοινῇ δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ φέρεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦθ' ὥσανεὶ αἰσθανόμενοι περὶ

It is especially the point made in the last sentence about the physical impact of impressions which concerns us here. Evaporation occurs under the influence of the heat of the soul. Elsewhere it figures as the physical mechanism (alongside inhalation) whereby soul nourishes itself; that is to say, its pneumatic substance is replenished by the vapours rising from the pure blood in the heart.<sup>71</sup> Inflamed anger is represented as a perversion of this physiological process. The underlying assumption appears to be that an excess of psychic heat causes a surplus of vapour to arise from the heart's blood. This gets compressed and seeks a way out, pushing<sup>72</sup> and blowing into the heart (which suffers from palpitation) as well as the face and the hands, which turn red under its impact. This is quite in keeping with the expansive physical reaction (i.e. of the psychic *pneuma*) typical of appetite (ἐπιθυμία), a hot affection, of which inflamed anger is a species.<sup>73</sup>

Likewise Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man* ch. 21, p.81 Morani (SVF 3.416) describes anger (θυμός) as the boiling of the blood around the heart, which occurs through a process of evaporization (ἀναθυμίασις) or bubbling up (ἀναθόλωσις)<sup>74</sup> of the bile (χολή). This process, Nemesius tells us, also explains why anger (θυμός) is sometimes called 'bile' or 'gall' (χολή, χόλος). This etymological point shows how language may contain physiological truths which, though hidden from view, are nonetheless dimly reflected in people's awareness. Such an awareness, as we have seen, is also at issue in the

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τὸν θώρακα αὐτοῖς τῶν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν παθῶν γιγνομένων καὶ μάλιστα καθ' ὃν ἡ καρδία τέτακται τόπον, οἷον μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν φόβων καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ θυμοῦ. (ὥσανεὶ γὰρ) ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ἀναθυμιωμένου καὶ ὠθουμένου ἐκτὸς ἐπὶ τινὰ καὶ ἐμφυσῶντος τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας γίγνεται ἡμῖν ἔμφασις .....

<sup>71</sup> Cf. e.g. *PHP* 2.8.44 (SVF 3 Diog. Bab. 30) and *supra*, p. 147. The theory probably derives from Praxagoras, see Fr. 32 Steckerl.

<sup>72</sup> A typical medical term in this connection, see *infra*, p. 193.

<sup>73</sup> Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* c. 21, p. 21, l.4 (SVF 3.416). The same definition of the closely related term ὀργή ('wrath') features in scholastic collections of Stoic definitions with θυμός being defined as 'incipient wrath (ὀργή)' and bile (χόλος) as 'swelling wrath (ὀργή)', see Stob. *Ecl.* II p.91.10 ff., D.L. 7.113, ps. Andron. *De aff.* 4 (SVF 3.395, 396, 397). But it was of course quite widespread, see e.g. Arist. *De an.* A 1.403a29-32, who, much like Nemesius, gives the same definition as 'dialectical' alongside a 'physical' one in terms of the boiling of the 'blood and the hot' in the heart; ps. Pl. *Def.* 415e. Cf. also the influential account of anger at Pl. *Ti.* 70a7-d7.

<sup>74</sup> A medical and in particular Praxagorean concept. When in certain diseases bubbles arise from the humours, this is only a special morbid case of what happens as a rule in digestion (viz. air developing from the humours): see fragment 13 of Praxagoras' pupil Phylotimus with Steckerl (1958) 19 f.

Chrysippean fragment. What Nemesius adds to this fragment is an explicit reference to bile as involved in psychic disease. We need not doubt that the connection between bile and anger goes back to Chrysippus as well. Galen<sup>75</sup> reports that Chrysippus illustrated anger (θυμός) by citing Homer, *Iliad* XVIII, 108-110:

And gall which drives even the very sensible to harshness  
Far sweeter than dripping honey  
It rises in men's breasts like smoke.<sup>76</sup>

The part of the *On the Soul* in which these lines figured was devoted to a defence of the Stoic cardiocentric position. *Iliad* xviii, 110 unequivocally locates mental life, or at least anger, in the chest. But the first two lines neatly illustrate a few other features of Chrysippean monism as well. Here we also have the power of bodily factors to influence even the intellect of sensible people (108)<sup>77</sup> as well as its gratifying aspect (109).<sup>78</sup> The picture of anger as waxing in the chest like smoke anticipates the accounts of the common awareness by Chrysippus and Nemesius.

As Galen himself is quick to point out, Chrysippus' account resembles the picture of boiling and upsurging anger at *Timaetus* 70c1-5 (cf. *PHP* 3.1.30-33). But what neither Galen nor later readers have seen is that other elements can be paralleled from 86e-87a. In the preceding context Plato designates a bad inherited condition of the body and ill-informed upbringing (ἀπαίδετον τροφήν)<sup>79</sup> as the two main sources of moral corruption. This is taken to prove the Socratic adage that 'nobody is willingly bad.' Plato illustrates his point by the example of mental agonies (λύπας), which he has presented (86b5-6) as one of the two main diseases of the soul alongside excessive pleasures (ἡδοναί):

<sup>75</sup> *PHP* 3.2.12, 7.52; cf. 2.2. Chrysippus consistently took χόλος in the sense of anger as distinguished from Homeric θυμός which he took, mostly correctly, in the wider sense of 'spirit' or drive of the soul; see further Tieleman (1996a) 236 ff.

<sup>76</sup> καὶ χόλος ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ χαλεπήναι ἢ ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο ἢ ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσιν ἀέξεται ἥ τε καπνός.

<sup>77</sup> Compare the representation of Zeno as a melancholic counteracting some innate traits of character, *infra*, pp. 165 f.

<sup>78</sup> This paradoxical feature of affection was much stressed by Chrysippus, see *supra*, pp. 130 ff. In these lines this very feature is encapsulated by the opposition between the bitterness of gall and the sweetness of honey.

<sup>79</sup> This is somewhat expanded at 87a-b, where Plato refers to the bad influence of evil forms of government on citizens in addition to bad education on the part of the parents.

Again where mental agonies are concerned, the soul likewise derives much badness from the body. When acid and salt phlegms or bitter and bilious humours roam about the body and, finding no outlet, are pent up within and fall into confusion by mixing the vapour that arises from them with the motion of the soul,<sup>80</sup> they induce all manner of diseases of the soul of greater or less intensity and extent.<sup>81</sup> Making their way to the three seats of the soul, according to the region they severally invade, they beget many divers types of ill-temper and despondency, of rashness and cowardice, dullness and oblivion (86e2-87a7. Transl. Cornford, slightly modified).<sup>82</sup>

The affinities between this passage and the Chrysippean account are very close indeed. We cannot dismiss them as coincidental.<sup>83</sup> In fact the whole Platonic account of moral corruption—*Tim.* 86b-89c—invites comparison with Stoic and in particular Chrysippean doctrines. I shall return to in the section concerned with the Stoic linking of affection and insanity (μανία) (§ 7). Suffice it to observe here that Plato's two sources of involuntary corruption recall the two sources of evil distinguished by Chrysippus. At *PHP* 5.5.14 (*SVF* 3.229a) we learn that he had said that the soul—which is still unperverted at birth—is corrupted by communication with the majority of men and by the very nature of the things (see above, p. 132 ff.).<sup>84</sup> Although Galen does not explicitly say from which treatise this view of Chrysippus is taken, the context makes it extremely probable that it was *Aff.* and more in particular the *Therapeutics*

Galen raises the obvious objection as to how we become susceptible to corruption in the first place, intimating that Chrysippus had no answer (for want of a non-rational part of the soul). Once again

<sup>80</sup> Chrysippus, too, speaks of the soul's motion, see *supra*, p. 99 n. 40 (φέρεσθαι); cf. also *PHP* 3.1.22 (~ *SVF* 2.886) with Tieleman (1996a) 160 ff.; Plut. *Virt. mor.* 450C (*SVF* 3.390) and *Stoic. Rep.* ch. 25, 1046B (*SVF* 3.418).

<sup>81</sup> Cf. the explanation of epilepsy as due to a mixture of phlegm and black bile confusing the revolutions of the soul, *Ti.* 85a.

<sup>82</sup> καὶ πάλιν δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς λύπας ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ ταῦτα διὰ σώμα πολλὴν ἴσχει κακίαν. οὗτου γὰρ ἂν ἡ τῶν ὀξέων καὶ τῶν ἀλυκῶν φλεγμάτων καὶ ὅσοι πικροὶ καὶ χολώδεις χυμοὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πλανηθέντες ἔξω μὲν δὴ λάβωσιν ἀναπνοήν, ἐντὸς δὲ εἰλλόμενοι τὴν ἀφ' αὐτῶν ἀτιμία τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς φορᾷ συμμερίζαντες ἀνακερασθῶσι, παντοδαπὰ νοσήματα ψυχῆς ἐμποιοῦσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ πλείω, πρὸς τε τοὺς τρεῖς τόπους ἐνεχθέντα τῆς ψυχῆς, πρὸς ὃν ἂν ἕκαστ' αὐτῶν προσπίπτῃ, ποικίλλει μὲν εἶδη δυσκολίας καὶ δυσθυμίας παντοδαπὰ, ποικίλλει δὲ θρασυτητός τε καὶ δειλίας, ἔτι δὲ λήθης ἅμα καὶ δυσμαθίας.

<sup>83</sup> It is certain that Chrysippus was influenced by the *Timaeus*; see e.g. Reydam-Schills (1999) 65 ff., Gill (1997)

<sup>84</sup> Cf. D.L. 7.89 speaking of 'the persuasiveness of external things'. Compare the persuasive presentations, which may be but need not be true, see e.g. Sext. *M* 7.169-172 with Tieleman (1996a) 277 ff.



he glosses over the physical explanation. This has been preserved in the parallel account in Calcidius' commentary on the Platonic *Timaeus* (chs. 165-168, printed as *SVF* 3.229, but without ch. 168).<sup>85</sup> Of special interest is ch. 165:

The cause of error is manifold. The first is the one which the Stoics call the double perversion. This arises both from the things themselves and from the dissemination of what people say. For to those that have just been born or fall from the womb birth occurs with a certain amount of pain, since they move from a hot and humid dwelling into the cold and dryness of the air that engulfs them. Directed against this pain and coldness suffered by the children is, by way of an antidote, the artificial measure taken by the midwives, viz. that the newly born are cherished by means of warm water and alternating baths are used and a likeness of the maternal womb [is created] through the warming up and the cuddling, whereupon the tender body relaxes and becomes calm. Thus from both these sensations, of pain as well as pleasure, arises a certain natural<sup>86</sup> opinion that everything pleasant and agreeable is good and that everything which by contrast brings sorrow is bad and to be eschewed.

Plato, too, had stressed the weak condition of the infant soul and in particular that of the newly born (44a-b). But in his account of the origins of evil, as we have noticed, he had spoken of congenital determinants alone, stressing their involuntary character (86c3-87b7). The emphasis placed on the process of birth and what follows directly, with the conspicuous role for the midwives, seems original with the Stoics. Presumably this difference results from their (i.e., probably, Chrysippus') wish to dissociate divine providence from moral evil: nature provides us with unperverted starting points on the road towards virtue, but the basis of psychic weakness is laid at the door of human ignorance at the earliest possible occasion, viz. directly after birth.<sup>87</sup> Nature as such is not to be blamed.

Inspired by medical practice,<sup>88</sup> the midwives try to reduce the unpleasant experience of birth by bathing the infant, i.e. restoring the

<sup>85</sup> On this passage see also *supra*, pp. 132 ff. Waszink (*ad* 198.20) rightly points out that the account of Stoic doctrine extends to c. 168, p.199,6 *numen*.

<sup>86</sup> On this term (which is here weakened by *quaedam*) in a similar context, see *supra*, n. 69.

<sup>87</sup> This is made clear at the outset of the Calcidius account, ch. 165: *dicunt porro non spontanea esse delicta, ideo quod omnis anima particeps divinitatis naturali adpetitu bonum quidem semper expetit, errat tamen aliquando in iudicio bonorum et malorum*. Cf. the way this account summarised by D.L. 7.89 (*SVF* 3.228): διαστρέφεσθαι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον ποτὲ μὲν διὰ τὰς τῶν ἔξωθεν πραγμάτων πιθανότητας, ποτὲ δὲ διὰ τὴν κατήχησιν τῶν συνόντων, ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις ἀφορμὰς δίδωσιν ἀδίασ-τροφους.

<sup>88</sup> Note *loco medicinae* (*SVF*, p. 53, l. 21).

conditions prevalent in the womb. The babies thus undergo a violent transition coming on top of the first one (from a warm environment to a cold one and back again), which upsets their susceptible souls. This extreme experience leaves its marks in later life: they will mistake physical pleasure for good, and pain for evil. It seems to be taken for granted here that physical instability in terms of hot and cold persists. The prominent role imputed to the midwives may seem a bit odd. Perhaps it became overemphasized as a result of the selections made by Calcidius or his source from a fuller original account. But it cannot be denied that birth is a particularly critical moment. The midwives intervene in a natural process involving the hot and the cold. The physical *pneuma* of the embryo solidifies on cooling at the first intake of air after birth, thus acquiring the characteristics of *psychic* *pneuma*, in particular the proper degree of tension and strength.<sup>89</sup> By counteracting this natural process of cooling the midwives, with the best intentions, weaken the soul's strength at the outset.

Stoic moral theory, with its emphasis on responsibility, holds that one can in principle strengthen one's soul the better to respond to all kinds of experiences—whether physical or social—in an appropriate manner. But how could this be effected? Through therapeutic argument? The 'healing' impact of rational argument cannot be discounted, especially where socially imparted forms of corruption are concerned. But there is another, less familiar side to Stoic therapeutics, more closely related to sensory experience and the 'external things' mentioned by our sources as the second factor involved in the initial corruption of our souls.

#### 4. *Regimen*

The soul's dependence on the body for its nourishment lends crucial importance to the care for one's bodily health; this, indeed, effectively coincides with the care for one's soul. Accordingly, the Stoics were keenly interested in regimen, that is to say in diet and exercise—an area which was subsumed under 'appropriate actions' (*καθήκοντα*). These also included all sorts of mundane activities, which yet possessed moral value. Still, their significance is indicated by the detailed

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<sup>89</sup> SVF 2.806 with Tieleman (1991)

and indeed overelaborate quality of the practical injunctions preserved by our sources. It is not altogether surprising that this aspect of Stoic moral theory—attesting to a *souci de soi* in a wider sense—has been largely obscured in the course of transmission, and in particular the exact function of regimen in the context of Stoic moral thought as a whole.<sup>90</sup>

An interest in regimen is attested for Chrysippus, but our sources are seldom explicit about its theoretical justification. Chrysippus advocated a plain and simple diet, citing on many occasions a few Euripidean lines (fr. 892 Nauck<sup>2</sup>) to this effect (SVF 3.706). He found it necessary to excuse the predilection of Homeric heroes for meat, arguing that a different menu would have been unsuitable in their special case. In addition, he pointed to their pride in cooking their own meals, setting their simplicity against the reliance on servant labour prevalent in his day (SVF 3.708).<sup>91</sup> One may feel that this is fairly trivial stuff, or that it is far removed from the central concerns of philosophy. Still, we should not dismiss too quickly the remarkably large number of texts dealing with care for the body. Chrysippus may have recommended it in conscious opposition to the Cynics, or to Cynicizing Stoics like Ariston of Chios.<sup>92</sup>

A related set of fragments deals with inebriation—a stock topic in discussions about the relation between body and soul. Chrysippus called drunkenness (μέθη) 'little madness' (μικρὰν μανίαν, SVF 3.713). The same assessment is attested by D.L. 7.127 (SVF 3.237),

<sup>90</sup> Many relevant testimonies and fragments have been assembled by Von Arnim as chapter X (nrs. 685-768: *Vitae agenda praeepta*, i.e. *de singulis mediis officiis*) of the third volume of the SVF, one of its seldom frequented slum areas. The injunctions extend as far as table manners, see SVF 3.717, 711 (note in both cases the reference to the καθήκοντα).

<sup>91</sup> The preference for simple food also appears from the praises of lentil-soup he sang, in a light-hearted tone, in the wake of Crates of Thebes and Zeno, see Athen. *Deipn.* IV p. 158a (SVF 3.709a, Timon of Phlius fr. 787 Lloyd-Jones-Parsons). 7.26. On the Stoic ideal of simplicity in general cf. Vischer (1965) 61-71.

<sup>92</sup> The view that a bodily condition harms our soul (including its moral well-being) was famously anticipated by Plato, *Ti.* 86e1-2: κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἑκὼν οὐδείς, διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἔξιν τινὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφήν ὁ κακὸς γίνεται κακός. It is likely that the section on psychic disease in this dialogue influenced Chrysippus' treatment of the same subject, cf. *supra*, pp. 159 f. Note that τροφήν in the sentence from Plato most probably designates nourishment only (not education, since social factors are introduced only at 87a7), and that Plato goes on to present an account of bodily induced psychic affections like distress (λύπη) in terms of morbid humours like bile, whose vapour interferes with the soul's movements; no doubt this part of his account too influenced the Stoics, see *supra*, pp. 159 ff.

where we read that he differed from Cleanthes in holding that virtue could be lost due to drunkenness and melancholia.<sup>93</sup> This report may also be taken to attest Chrysippus' pronounced interest in bodily factors.<sup>94</sup> All human knowledge—including its perfected condition embodied by the Sage—remains subject to limitations and liabilities beyond our control or responsibility. Accordingly, a parallel report adds loss of virtue due to medical drugs (*SVF* 3.238, ἐν φαρμάκων λήψεσι): the Sage will take medicaments to restore his health or prevent illness, but undesirable side-effects may ensue.<sup>95</sup> So when Chrysippus allows for the possibility of the Sage getting drunk, he may be thinking of the analogous situation that he lapses unintentionally into intoxication because of certain unpredictable causes, whether arising from his own body or the wine. By envisaging the situation that the sage drinks wine, Chrysippus implies that it is a normal, indeed usually wholesome, habit.<sup>96</sup> It was the prevalent medical opinion of his day that wine strengthens body and soul alike, provided one exercises prudence as to amount and quality. In terms of elemental qualities, wine is hot and capable of conditioning of the temperature of the organism for better or for worse, depending on

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<sup>93</sup> καὶ μὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος μὲν ἀποβλητὴν, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἀναπόβλητον· ὁ μὲν ἀποβλητὴν διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν, ὁ δὲ ἀναπόβλητον διὰ βεβαίους καταλήψεις.

<sup>94</sup> See also *SVF* 3.238, second text, and 239, adding further kinds of mental disorders—e.g. lethargy and stupor—which lie clearly beyond the wise person's control. Note that *SVF* 3.28, first text, as well as 241 (a testimony from the comic poet Theognis) present the earlier, Cleanthean position as distinctively Stoic.

<sup>95</sup> Health counts as a preferred indifferent (ἀδιάφορον προηγμένον), *SVF* 3.117, 127, 191.

<sup>96</sup> A compromise between the positions of Cleanthes and Chrysippus is struck by the source of D.L. 7.118: 'And he [scil. the sage] will drink wine but not get drunk, nor will he go mad either. Nonetheless strange impressions will on occasion befall him due to melancholy or delirium, which do not belong by definition to things to be chosen but which are contrary to nature.' It should be noted that (whatever its possible consequences) wine-drinking is here ascribed to the Sage, i.e. recommended to all of us. This is no doubt common ground between the Stoics and fits the stories about Zeno's use of wine, for which see *infra* in text. The positions ascribed to Cleanthes and Chrysippus are also opposed in the final part of Philo's *On Noah's Work as a Planter* (§§ 142-177, a few excerpts of which are printed as *SVF* 3.712): 'Whether or not the wise man will get drunk'. The first view expounded by Philo takes drunkenness (μέθη) in the sense of 'foolish talk' (ληρεῖν). Drunkenness in this sense certainly involves the loss of virtue. Accordingly, the wise man avoids heavy drinking since this may result in drunkenness even against his will. The opposite view holds that the wise man will not get drunk, since his virtue is proof against *all* affections, including those produced by alcohol in other people (142-144).

the disposition of the drinker as well as environmental circumstances.<sup>97</sup>

That Chrysippus discussed these matters in the *On Affections* follows from D.L. 7.111 (SVF 3.456):

They hold the affections (πάθη) to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his *On Affections*: avarice being a belief that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness (μέθη) and licentiousness (ἀκολασία) and likewise the other affections.

Here drunkenness is associated with affective dispositions like greed (a species of desire, ἐπιθυμία); and the related idea that drunkenness is said to be a (wrong) judgement, which is consonant with its definition in terms of madness (3.713, see above) as well as its association with foolish talk (λῆπειν) at Philo, *Plant. Noe* § 142.<sup>98</sup> In view of the rest of our evidence, we should not dismiss this report as being garbled. Rather, it presents several concerns discussed in Chrysippus' treatise in a condensed fashion.

In the *Therapeutics*, as we have noticed, Chrysippus invoked Zeno's account of disease in terms of elemental qualities (*PHP* 5.2.31, SVF 3.470, see above). His treatise *On Impulse* (Περὶ ὀρμῆς) bore the alternative title *On the Nature of Man* (Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως).<sup>99</sup> This title, with its Hippocratic ring, expresses his aim to set the treatment of man's mental life firmly in the context of his whole physique, i.e. the conjunction of body and soul. The testimonies concerned with the influence of bodily factors on mental life (SVF 1.285-7) are all anecdotal. Still, they may be taken to attest to his conviction that one can, and should, influence one's mental and hence moral disposition through diet and exercise. Zeno emerges as a melancholic trying to counteract certain unpleasant traits of his character.<sup>100</sup> Leading the life of an ascetic, he was opposed to heavy drinking. But as he was harsh<sup>101</sup> of temper and irritable, he used to consume moderate amounts of wine, whereupon he would grow more mellow. Thus diet

<sup>97</sup> See Jouanna (1996), esp. 434.

<sup>98</sup> Similarly Stob. *Ecl.* II 7, p. 109.5 ff. (SVF 3.643).

<sup>99</sup> SVF 1.179; cf. Inwood (1985) 1. Zeno was the first to define (mental) affection or affection as excessive impulse (ὀρμή), see SVF 1.205 ff.

<sup>100</sup> The portrayal of Zeno as a melancholic is no doubt intended to mark him out as a man of genius, in accordance with current views as reflected by [Arist.] *Probl.* XXX.1, where outstanding philosophers receive separate mention. On ancient conceptions of melancholy see e.g. Müri (1953); Flashar (1966); on *Probl.* XXX.1 cf. Van der Eijk (1990).

<sup>101</sup> Cf. *Il.* xviii.108-110 as quoted by Chrysippus, see *supra*, p. 159.

may serve to reduce certain excesses and deficiencies inherent in one's physique: Zeno's too dry and cold soul is brought into balance by means of wine (which was generally considered a hot liquid). Later schematizations notwithstanding, his general attitude to alcohol seems not to have differed all that much from Chrysippus'.

Other attested statements of Zeno bear out his wide-ranging interest in medicine (*SVF* 1.286-287). We should not brush these testimonies aside as purely apocryphal. In default of biographical data anecdotes of this sort were often concocted on the basis of the extant writings of a philosopher. The underlying assumption is that a philosopher's life is, or should, be consonant with his teaching.<sup>102</sup> One could characterize testimonies of this kind as 'personified doctrine'. As such, they reflect doctrines actually held by the philosopher in question.

### 5. *Emotional Opponents*

It is a witness to the long-standing influence of the *Therapeutics* that Origen in his *Against Celsus* (written c.249 CE) quotes two passages from it which seem to derive from the same original context:<sup>103</sup>

But in my view Chrysippus has acted more humanely than Celsus in his *Therapeutics Concerning the Affections*, where he wishes to cure the affections as pressing on and troubling the human soul, preferably by means of arguments which seem sound to him but in the second and third instance even by means of doctrines which he does not hold:

'For even if,' he says, 'there are three kinds of good things, even so the affections have to be cured; but one should not at the moment of inflammation of the affections bother about the doctrine which has previously won over the person troubled by the affection: the available therapy should by no means at an inconvenient time be wasted on overthrowing the doctrines which have occupied the soul first.' And he says: 'Even if pleasure is the good and this is the view taken by the person controlled by the affection, nonetheless

<sup>102</sup> On this ancient assumption see Mansfeld (1994) 183 ff.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Origen's paraphrase at I 64, vol. I, p.117.16 ff. Kō. = *SVF* 3.474, first text); a few other snippets from Origen's commentary on the *Gospel According to Matthew* are also printed by Von Arnim among the fragments from the *Therapeutics* (vol. III Delarue, pp. 591-2 = *SVF* 3.477). These attest to Origen's knowledge of the well-known Stoic (and Chrysippean) tenet that children, being not yet completely rational, do not exhibit emotions in the full sense but something analogous to them. But we are not dealing with verbatim fragments and nothing compels us to ascribe the information contained in these texts to Origen's reading of the *Therapeutics*.

he should be helped and it should be shown to him that even for those who consider pleasure to be the good and indeed the end any affection is inconsistent' (VIII, 51: vol. II, p.266.18 ff. Kō. ~ SVF 3.474, second text).<sup>104</sup>

As I have indicated in the opening section of this chapter, far-reaching conclusions have been drawn from this text. Nussbaum takes it to confirm her thesis that Stoic therapy starts from the individual with her own views and needs. It does not obtrude a dogmatic world-view on the sufferer from emotion. In particular it does not presuppose the Stoic doctrine of what is good, bad and indifferent. This last implication is also accepted by Sorabji.<sup>105</sup> It follows from this reading that therapy was or could be divorced from the other compartments of Stoic philosophy, even though Chrysippus elsewhere posits a connection between ethics and physics, most notably the crowning science of theology.<sup>106</sup> We should think twice before accepting this reading and all that it implies as to the overall orientation of Stoic therapy. We have already come across a few indications from Cicero that the whole of philosophy remains involved (see above, pp. 91, 95).

Clearly we are dealing with two different though related snippets of Chrysippean text. The first seems to take an adherent of the Peripatetic<sup>107</sup> but later more general position that there three kinds of good things—psychic, bodily and external—whereas the Stoics accepted only the first. The way the fragment opens strongly suggests that ideally the patient is to be reminded of the Stoic doctrine of the value of things. Of course this could take the form of a reference to

<sup>104</sup> ἀλλὰ φιλανθρωπότερον οἶμαι Κέλσου Χρύσιππον πεποικέναι ἐν τῷ Περὶ παθῶν θεραπευτικῷ, βουλόμενον θεραπεῦσαι τὰ πάθη ὡς κατεπεύγοντα καὶ ἐνοχλοῦντα τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν, προηγουμένως μὲν τοῖς δοκοῦσιν αὐτῷ ὑγιεῖσι λόγοις, δευτέρως δὲ καὶ τρίτως κἂν τοῖς μὴ ἀρεσκουσι τῶν δογμάτων· «Κἂν γὰρ τρία», φησὶν, «ἢ γένη τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ οὕτω θεραπευτέον τὰ πάθη· οὐ περιεργαζόμενον τῷ καιρῷ τῆς φλεγμονῆς τῶν παθῶν τὸ προκαταλαβὼν δόγμα τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους ἐνοχλούμενον· μή πως τῇ ἀκαίρῳ περὶ τὴν ἀνατροπὴν τῶν προκαταλαβόντων τὴν ψυχὴν δογμάτων σχολῇ ἢ ἐγγωροῦσα θεραπεία παραπόληται.» Φησὶ δὲ ὅτι «κἂν ἡδονὴ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοῦτο φρονῇ ὁ ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους κρατούμενος· οὐδὲν ἦρτον αὐτῷ βοηθητέον καὶ παραδεικτέον, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἡδονὴν τάγαθον καὶ τέλος τιθεμένοις ἀναμολογούμενον ἐστὶ πᾶν πάθος.»

<sup>105</sup> Sorabji (2000) e.g. 2, 8, 178; however cf. 169 ff. for doubts. By contrast Donini (1995) 305 ff., esp. 308, starting from the parallel at Cic. *Tusc.* 3.76-77, argues that the injunctions issued by Chrysippus do not form a *complete* therapy. Earlier Inwood (1985) 300 (n.110) had made more or less the same point by speaking of 'first aid.' As will transpire in the course of my argument I side with Donini and Inwood.

<sup>106</sup> Plut. *Stoic. Rep.* 1035A-C ~ SVF 3,326, 3.68.

<sup>107</sup> Cf. e.g. D.L. 5.30.

the Stoic definition of the affection from which he or she is suffering. Knowing that what is happening to you results from a wrong value judgement can be therapeutic. When the text starts Chrysippus next raises the question which line should be taken in regard to someone who does not accept the Stoic doctrine in the first place, for example because he is an Aristotelian. In envisaging an emotional Peripatetic Chrysippus is having a bit of fun. As is well known, Aristotle saw the emotions or affections (παθή) as natural elements of our psychic make-up. He had even argued that anger could be useful (*EN* Γ 11: 1116b24 ff., Δ 11: 1126a 20 ff.).<sup>108</sup>

In the case of an angry or otherwise emotional Peripatetic, offering him an elementary course in Stoic philosophy is clearly no use. Affection is explained in terms of inflammation (φλεγμονή). This recalls the fragment where Chrysippus explains that with the passage of time the 'affective inflammation (παθητικῆς φλεγμονῆς) abates, whereupon reason may re-enter the mind (*PHP* 4.7.27 ~ *SVF* 3.467, quoted above, p. 130). In the light of this passage it is easy to see that Chrysippus sees little prospect for treatment by philosophical instruction, because he sees affection as a moment of crisis in which one is unreceptive to reason. Hence he says that this would come at 'an inconvenient time.' It is implied that there will be a convenient time when the affection has abated. Then the doctrine that there are three kinds of good things can be subverted.

Chrysippus' point is that something should and can be done at the height of emotion as well. What this is we do not learn in connection with the Peripatetic but this may be due to the way the first fragment has been marked off. For this we have to turn to the second one.

Here the next representative of a competing school enters the stage. The Epicurean creed is equally incapable of preventing emotion. Here the underlying belief is that pleasure is the good. (Indeed it is the highest good, or End, τέλος). According to the Stoic doctrine, pleasure is either bad if the generic affection is meant or something indifferent if it refers to an epiphenomenon of corporeal well-being.<sup>109</sup>

What shall we do about an Epicurean whose pleasure-directed actions are thwarted so that affection ensues? To be sure, the good

<sup>108</sup> For this reason Seneca in books 1 and 2 of his *On Anger* directs several of his arguments at the Aristotelian position in particular.

<sup>109</sup> See above, p. 114 (the affection); D.L. 7.85-6 (the epiphenomenon), where note the anti-Epicurean purport.



Stoic should help him. I find here not so much evidence for Nussbaum-style compassionate philosophy but rather a piece of irony.

Here too it is pointless to address the underlying philosophical conviction. Instead we should show that the affection is not conducive to attaining pleasure; that is to say, we should inculcate the insight that the affection is inconsistent (ἀναμολογούμενον) with his Epicurean position on the End.<sup>110</sup> Apparently, an appeal to inconsistency may still penetrate the emotion by which the Epicurean is controlled; his irrationality is not so complete as to preclude this possibility. In addition, we note that here, as elsewhere, inconsistency appears as the hallmark of affection (see pp. 98 n. 40, 100, 170 ff.). Further, it is implied that the realization of this inconsistency is sufficient to put an end to the crisis, viz. the emotional outburst.

As Donini (1995) and others have shown, the proposed therapeutic measure presupposes the twofold distinction between types of judgement necessary for the occurrence of an affection. What Chrysippus in effect proposes is to subvert type 2, viz. that an emotional response is appropriate. The reason is that one cannot do the same for the judgement of type 1, which in this case is the wrong value judgement that pleasure is the good. This borne out by a relevant passage in *Tusculan Disputations* book 3. Speaking about grief and consolation, Cicero tells us:

Chrysippus holds that the main point (*caput*, Gr. κεφάλαιον) in consoling is to take away from the grieving person that opinion which makes him believe that he is fulfilling the right and due obligation (3.76).

Here it is spelt out that the opinion of type 2 is a mistaken choice of appropriate action, i.e. what the Stoics from Zeno onward technically call a καθήκον and define as an action that has a reasonable justification (see D.L. 7.107~SVF 3.493).

In what follows Cleanthes is criticized for offering consolation to those who are already wise and so do not need consolation in the first place (§ 77). Cleanthes, Cicero explains, wants to convince mourners that there is no unhappiness apart from moral vice. Cicero's point

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<sup>110</sup> The counterpart of this argumentative move is found in a passage from Chrysippus' *On Justice*, which is transmitted by Plutarch, *On Stoic Contradictions* 1040E (SVF 3.24), arguing that the choice of pleasure as the end for man does not entail the removal of all the virtues: these are not choiceworthy in themselves but by being related to the end, even if one identifies this as pleasure. Analogously, what is opposite to virtue should be avoided in the light of the same end.

that Cleanthes offers consolation to the wise seems to be mistaken. None the less, we may infer that Cleanthes still addressed judgements that Chrysippus was to assign to type 1; in other words Cleanthes still lacked this distinction. That this does not work for people who are undergoing an emotion may indeed have inspired Chrysippus' refinement. But it cannot have been the only reason. We may recall the problem discussed by Chrysippus in *On Affections* book 2 as to why affections often fade in time while the mistaken value judgement is still in place (e.g. that the death of a loved one is a great evil). This too can be solved by reference to the distinction between the two types of judgement. Further, Cicero goes on to point to another problem for which Cleanthes had no answer, namely the case of Alcibiades who was convinced by Socrates that he was a bad person yet did not lapse into distress (*ibid.* 77). When one realizes one is a bad person, one entertains the kind of judgement stipulated by the Stoic definition of distress, viz. that one takes oneself to be in the presence of evil, viz. one's own bad soul. This too is a type 1 judgement, of course.<sup>111</sup> But as it is, persons in Alcibiades' situation typically do not find an emotional response appropriate (judgement-type 2) and hence are incapable of becoming emotional.

To conclude. The passages we have reviewed pertain to one specific stage of therapeutic treatment and even point to the need for instruction in Stoic philosophy after the affection is over. Philosophy aims to strengthen the soul by inculcating correct beliefs about the value of things, and so may help prevent outbreaks of emotion. These passages presuppose the distinction between affection as a momentary crisis and the underlying diseased condition of the soul, as well as the distinction between the two types of judgement which we have already found to have been introduced by Chrysippus in book 2.

#### 6. *Turning One's Back on Reason*

Another set of fragments is concerned with the contradictory behaviour of people in emotional conditions. Chrysippus cites familiar situations and expressions—often illustrated by means of lines from contemporary drama—showing people acting against their better judgement but persisting in their attitude though and being fully

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<sup>111</sup> On this and related problems, see also *infra*, pp. 315 ff.

aware of their emotional state. For Galen such cases of mental conflict are only explicable by reference to two different psychic forces or entities, the one rational, the other non-rational. Thus Chrysippus can be said to contradict himself.

The first text to be considered is 4.6.19-20 (SVF 3.473). I add the immediate Galenic context:

... thus the soul of Menelaus, as presented in tragedy, abandoned its decision<sup>112</sup> because it was beguiled by his desire, Medea's soul because it was forced by anger. Somehow in her case Chrysippus is unaware that that he cites Euripides' words against himself:

I understand what kind of evils I am going to do  
But anger is stronger than my [sound] considerations  
[Medea 1078-9].<sup>113</sup>

If Euripides was to give evidence in support of the doctrines of Chrysippus, he should not have said that she understands but the very opposite, that she does not know and does not understand what kind of evils she will do. But knowing this and being overcome by anger—what is that but the act of a man who introduces two causes (principles, sources, ἀρχάς) for Medea's conations (ὁρμῶν) (transl. De Lacy's, modified).

The above lines by Euripides form the conclusion of Medea's great speech. From the same original context, Galen cites a few further passages, the first of which affords a glimpse of how Chrysippus may have read these lines:

But Chrysippus does not notice the contradiction here, and he writes innumerable other statements of this kind, as when he says: 'This movement, irrational and turned away from reason, is, as I think,

<sup>112</sup> I.e. to kill his unfaithful wife Helen. Menelaus' case is discussed from 4.5.7 onward (including Chrysippus' quotation of E. *Andromache*, 629-630), see *supra*, p. 112.

<sup>113</sup> καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά, / θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσω τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων. Some scholars have argued that κρείσσω means 'is master of, controls' and that βουλευμάτων means here what it means elsewhere in the *Medea*, namely, her plans, i.e. to kill her children (see e.g. 372, 769, 772, 1044, 1048); see Diller (1966), Gill (1983). However, all ancient authors who quote or parody these lines clearly speak of the opposition of reason and emotion, see e.g. Epict. *Diss.* 1.28.7, Lucian, *Apol.* 10, Clem. Alex. *Stromat.* II, 15.63.3, Greg. Naz. (?), *Christus patiens* (λύπη δὲ κρείσσω τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων). Moreover, Euripides always uses κρείσσω with the genitive in the sense of 'better than' or 'stronger than', see e.g. *Med.* 965, *Or.* 806, *Hec.* 608. Even so, the alternative reading would not rule out an interpretation on Platonic lines, i.e. one which sees here a conflict between two distinct elements in Medea's soul. In particular, one may see the conflict between reason and emotion as expressed here by the opposition between μανθάνω and θυμός.

something very common, by reference to which we say that some people are moved by anger' (4.6.23 ~ SVF 3.475).<sup>114</sup>

Although Galen presents this as one among many such statements, it gives every appearance of belonging with Chrysippus' exegesis of *Medea*, ll. 1078-9 (note the reference implied by 'this movement'). Apparently, these two lines and the above excerpt from Chrysippus' exegesis belonged to a section concerned with the phenomenology of anger.<sup>115</sup> In this context, then, the idea of turning away from reason featured. Chrysippus explains Medea's anger in terms of incontinence (ἀκρασία).<sup>116</sup> Further, he described it as an uncontrollable type of movement, in line with the prominence given to the latter concept throughout the *On Affections*. In particular one recalls the analogy of the runners (see above, p. 101). Thus Medea is 'moved by anger', i.e. anger at Jason's injustice towards her.

Since this is a case of incontinence, the better course of action still presents itself to her mind. In other words, 'correct' reason remains present simultaneously with wrong reason. This explains why her mind is said to have 'turned away from' reason (represented by the 'considerations' as well as her words 'I understand'), just as elsewhere emotion is said to involve disobedience to (right) reason.<sup>117</sup> Of course this simultaneous opposition between anger on the one hand and reason on the other provides Galen with ammunition for his point that Chrysippus abandons, indeed is forced to abandon, his thesis that emotions are judgements (*ibid.* 26). But clearly these two lines represent the emotional intellect judging and articulating its options. As precisely these lines make clear, Medea's giving in to her anger is a considered choice and in this sense fully rational. Indeed, Chrysippus speaks of her mental state as being very common.<sup>118</sup> Still,

<sup>114</sup> (Only Chrysippus' words:) ἔστι δὲ ὡς οἶμαι κοινότατον ἢ ἄλλοις αὕτη φορὰ καὶ ἀπεστραμμένη τὸν λόγον, καθὼ καὶ θυμῷ φαμέν τινὰς φέρεσθαι.

<sup>115</sup> Gill (1983) 139 f. alternatively submits that Chrysippus used these lines in his explanation of the difference between emotion and an error of reasoning (ἀμάρτημα), as quoted and paraphrased at *PHP* 4.2.1-27 from the beginning of *On Affections* book I.

<sup>116</sup> Note that this term is cognate with Euripides' κρείσσω. For emotion as incontinence, 4.4.24, quoted *supra*, p. 102 n. 51.

<sup>117</sup> See from the same original context, 4.6.43, quoted *infra*, p. 178; see *supra*, pp. 97 ff. Similarly Gourinat (1996) 102, 105 f., who argues that the conflict is between her preconceptions about what is morally right and her mental appearance that revenge is appropriate.

<sup>118</sup> One may suppose that Medea is rather exceptional for the articulate self-consciousness with which she reflects on her deliberate plunge into anger and vengeance. As a rule people do not seem capable of this state of mind. So Medea

the idea of turning away from reason leaves a few pressing questions unanswered. But the piece of text next presented by Galen seems to have followed in Chrysippus' discussion as well:

And again: 'Therefore we behave in the case of these persons who are in a state of emotion as we do towards persons who are out of their minds and we speak to them as to persons who are twisted and are not in their right minds or in control of themselves.' The n, explaining again this last point: 'This twisting and withdrawing from oneself occurs in accordance with nothing other than the act of turning away from reason' (*PHP* 4.6.24-5 ~ *SVF* 3.475).<sup>119</sup>

The terms and expressions used by Chrysippus here all point to the fact that we behave towards emotional people as changed and somehow not their normal selves. Thus Chrysippus once again appeals to common parlance as consistent with our behaviour towards the people in question. Since emotional people are not receptive to reason, we do not even attempt to inculcate sense into them but rather wait until their emotions abate. This seems to confirm Gill's view that Chrysippus did not read Medea's speech in terms of different elements in the soul but in terms of the whole person alternating between two sides and supporting either with both reason and emotion.<sup>120</sup>

A little further down (*ibid.* 34, p.276.33 ff.) Galen reports that Chrysippus explained the common expressions 'not in their right minds' (οὐ παρ' ἑαυτοῖς) and '(not) in control of themselves' (οὐδ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντας) as follows:

Persons thus angered are also appropriately said to be carried away, like those who are carried too far onward in races, the similarity being in the excess, which in the runners goes counter to their conation in running and in the persons angered counter to their own reason. For they could not be said, like those who are in control of their movement, to be moving in conformity with themselves but instead to be

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may seem an inappropriate illustration of the general truth Chrysippus wishes to analyze, see Gill (1983) 144. Nonetheless, Chrysippus did maintain that emotion often occurs in the way and for the reasons illustrated by these two lines. In addition, as Gill (1983) 144 acknowledges, Chrysippus also discussed 'blind' emotion, in which people are not aware of, let alone capable of articulating, the mental state they are in, see *infra*, pp. 178 ff.

<sup>119</sup> << διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶνδε τῶν ἐμπαθῶν ὡς περὶ ἐξεστηκότων ἔχομεν καὶ ὡς πρὸς παρηλλαχότας ποιούμεθα τὸν λόγον καὶ οὐ παρ' ἑαυτοῖς οὐδ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντας. >> καὶ ἐφεξῆς δὲ πάλιν ἐξηγούμενος αὐτὰ ταῦτα, << ἡ δὲ παραλλαγή γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀναχώρησις οὐ κατ' ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἀποστροφὴν, ὡς προείπομεν. >>

<sup>120</sup> Gill (1983) 138, 141.

moving in conformity with some force external to themselves (*ibid.* 35 ~ *SVF* 3.478; transl. De Lacy).<sup>121</sup>

This explanation in terms of excessive and uncontrollable motion picks up the image of people running down a slope which Chrysippus first used at the beginning of Book 1 to illustrate Zeno's definition of emotion as an excessive conation (πλεοναζούσα ὁρμή).<sup>122</sup> I have discussed the main concepts (e.g. Stoic causal theory) employed here in connection with the relevant fragments from the first book of the *On Affections* (see above, pp. 102 ff.).

This précis of the runner analogy brings out the idea of a person's own reason (λόγος) as normative in accordance with the sense borne by reason in the other fragments from this particular context of the *Therapeutics*. But there is another point to be made. In the opening section of book 1, Chrysippus had described emotion as an interruption of our normal, purposeful behaviour—i.e. a pattern of action that is rational in the descriptive sense applicable to all members of our species. Here Chrysippus introduces the idea of the self, that is, the individual person, which he links to reason in the normative sense, that is to say what other Stoic sources call 'right' (ὀρθός) or 'preferential' (προηγούμενος)<sup>123</sup> reason. In order to drive home his point, Galen coalesces these two senses of reason: '... all such expressions clearly testify against the view that the emotions are judgements and that they arise in the rational powers of the soul' (*ibid.* 26). But Chrysippus adds to the idea of emotion as a species of madness (see below, pp. 178 ff.) a new and important insight, which, he claims, is warranted by the *opinio communis* including common parlance: when we turn away from reason in the normative sense, we so to speak lose ourselves (cf. 4.6.46). Accordingly, we are no longer treated by others as the people we normally are, i.e. persons who are capable of following right reason. There is a cosmic dimension involved in reason in this second, normative sense. The self is rooted in cosmic reason, each individual being a particle of the greater whole. It is a fundamental tenet of Stoic theology that the cosmic intellect, which is

<sup>121</sup> οἰκείως δὲ καὶ ἐκφέρεσθαι λέγονται οἱ οὕτως ὀργιζόμενοι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν δρόμων προεκυρομένοις παραπλησίως κατὰ τὸ πλεονάζον τῶν μὲν παρὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ τρέχειν ὁρμήν, τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον. οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως (ὥς) οἱ γε κρατοῦντες τῆς κινήσεως καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἂν κινεῖσθαι λέφοντο, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ βίαν ἐξωθεν αὐτῶν.

<sup>122</sup> See *supra*, pp. 101 ff.

<sup>123</sup> On this term see Plut. *Virt. mor.* 9: 449C (*SVF* 3.384); Stob. *Ecl.* II, p.85.1 (*SVF* 1.192 = 3.128).

equivalent to God and Nature, cannot be but good. Being off-shoots of universal nature, we are disposed towards rather than against the whole, that is disposed to virtue rather than vice.<sup>124</sup> Accordingly Chrysippus defined the human End as bringing one's individual nature in agreement with universal Nature (D.L. 7.85-89).<sup>125</sup>

From the same original context we have the following fragments, all of which point to the self-conscious rejection of right reason, or one's better self, shown by people when in a state of anger, love or related emotions. I omit the immediate Galenic context, because this contains nothing new. Galen indicates that these fragment formed a continuous, or very nearly continuous, text (where a small gap seems probable, this is indicated by dots):

(4.6.27) This is why it is possible to hear utterances of this kind both in the case of people in love and persons with other fervent desires, and of angry persons, that they want to gratify their drive and to let them be, whether it is better or not, and to say nothing to them, and that this must be done by all means, even if they are wrong and if it is disadvantageous to them ... (29) ... Loved ones expect that their lovers have impulses of especially this kind towards them, that their attitude should be rather ill-considered and with concern for reason and furthermore that they should defy admonitory discourse [or: reason, λόγος] or rather do by no means whatsoever bear hearing any discourse [or: reason] of that kind. (30) They keep so far away from the (admonitory) discourse [or: reason] that it is not out of place to say to them such things as these:

'For even when censured Cypris does let go;  
indeed, if you use force, she loves to strive even more.  
Eros, when censured  
presses more heavily.'<sup>126</sup>

(31) Furthermore they reject the (admonitory) discourse [or: reason] as an untimely censor, unsympatetic to the affairs of love, like a man who is held to admonish unseasonably, at a time when even the gods are thought to permit them to swear false oaths. (32) Permit us - they say - to do what occurs to us and follow our desire (SVF 3.475).<sup>127</sup>

<sup>124</sup> On the relation between right reason and God see e.g. Gourinat (1996) 108; cf. also Scott (1995) 201 ff. and esp. 209, on God-given (moral) preconceptions as typical of Stoic 'dispositional innatism'.

<sup>125</sup> The two aspects of reason—descriptive and normative—coincide with the first two roles or *personae* distinguished by Cicero in his *On Duties* I.110-4. Cicero is very likely drawing on Panaetius but this does not make Panaetius the inventor of this theory. The material we are reviewing strongly indicates that this doctrine was well under way by Chrysippus' time.

<sup>126</sup> Euripides, Fr. 340 Nauck.

<sup>127</sup> (27) διὸ καὶ τοιαύτας ἔστιν ἀκοῦσαι φωνὰς ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐρώντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλως σφόδρα ἐπιθυμούντων καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ θυμῷ θέλουσι χαρίζεσθαι καὶ ἔαν αὐτούς, εἴτε

The persons concerned are all capable of recognizing right reason as such. It is typical of their mental state that even so they reject it. Chrysippus' main point must have been that it is difficult, and indeed often useless, to offer sound advice to someone at the height of emotion. He presents his examples as warranted by experience and common parlance. Far from subverting the idea of the therapeutic treatment of emotion, Chrysippus may have wished to bring out the need for preventive measures, and at any rate for applying at the right time whatever treatment is deemed fit. His examples provide a vivid illustration of the irrationality and force of emotion (cf. also the fragments following at *ibid.* 43-46). Erotic infatuation may even become stronger when thwarted (30).

One theoretically interesting point stands out, if only because it is harped on by Galen, viz. the fact that persons overcome by emotion decline right reason—even though this does not imply the presence of a non-rational faculty simultaneous with and opposed to reason. Thus people in love self-consciously decline the good advice offered by others, whatever the price may be (27). Here, clearly, the voice of (right) reason is represented by other members of the community.<sup>128</sup> It should however be noted that as the text proceeds the notion of admonitory λόγος (reason/discourse) gets more and more divorced from other people actually offering it. In section 31 it is conceived of as an entity in its own right to such a degree that it is actually *compared* to a *person* offering advice. Clearly the emphasis is not on the other persons who offer counselling, but on the emotional person's capacity of recognizing right reason as such, even when rejecting it. There is no difficulty in the idea that this person may also remind him or herself of the proposals of right reason. In fact, this holds also good

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ἄμεινον εἴτε μή, καὶ μὴθὲν λέγειν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ὡς τοῦτο ἐκ παντός γε τρόπου ποιητέον, καὶ εἰ διαμαρτάνουσι καὶ εἰ ἀσύμφορόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ... (29) οἷας μάλιστα φορὰς καὶ οἱ ἐρώμενοι ἀξιοῦσι πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐραστάς, ἀπερισκεπτότερον καὶ ἄνευ ἐπιστροφῆς λογικῆς ἱσταμένους καὶ ἔτι τοῦ παραινούντος λόγου αὐτοῖς ὑπερβατικὰς ὄντας, μᾶλλον δ' οὐδ' ὅλως ὑπομονητικὰς ἀκοῦσαι τίνος τοιούτου ... (30) οὕτως τε μακρὰν ἀπέχουσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου, ὥς ἂν ἀκοῦσαι ἢ προσέχειν τινὶ τοιούτῳ, ὥστε μὴδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπὸ τρόπου ἔχει(ν) γ' αὐτοῖς λέγεσθαι· «Ὁ Κύπρις γὰρ οὐδὲ νοθετομένη χαλὰ· / ἂν γὰρ βιάζῃ, μᾶλλον ἐντείνειν φιλεῖ. / ... νοθετοῦμενος δ' Ἔρως / μᾶλλον πιέζει». ... (31) ἔτι δ' ὥσπερ ἄκαιρον ἐπιτιμητὴν καὶ οὐκ ἐπιγνώμονα τοῖς γινομένοις ἐν τῷ ἔρῳ ἀποκλίνουσι τὸν λόγον, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ἀκαίρως δοκοῦντα νοθετεῖν, ἡνίκα δὴ καὶ οἱ θεοὶ δοκοῦσιν αὐτοῖς ἐφίεσθαι ἐπιτορκεῖν ... (32) ἐξεῖν - φασὶν - αὐτοῖς τὸ ἐπὶ πόνῳ ποιεῖν ἀκολουθοῦσι τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ...

<sup>128</sup> Here Long's idea of the Stoic 'community of reason' applies, see Long (1983).



for Medea who had kept her plans all to herself and deliberates by herself.

Both solitary deliberation and advice procured by others are at issue in the quotations drawn by Chrysippus from Menander, Euripides and Homer and preserved by Galen in the section which comes after the fragments we have just been discussing:

I got my intellect in hand  
and stowed it in a pot.

(4.6.34, *SVF* 3.478, Menander fr. 702 Körte-Thierfelder.)

Two Euripidean lines are presented by Galen a little further, *ibid.* 38 (*SVF* 3.478). Euripides, *Alcestis* 1079, has Heracles say to the bereaved Admetus:

What would you gain if you let yourself grieve forever?

According to Stoic moral theory the loss of a relative technically counts as 'dispreferred' indifferent. Here, then, Heracles represents the voice of right reason. His advice, however, is ill-timed, witness Admetus' answer:

I too know that but a certain love distracts me (1080).

Galen goes on to reproduce a similar passage from Homer used by Chrysippus (*ibid.* 40). At *Il.* XXIV 549-551 Achilles offers consolation to Priam, saying:

Bear up and do not let the grief in your spirit be inflexible.  
You will achieve nothing by mourning for your son.  
You will not make him rise up; sooner you will suffer yet another evil

Galen adds: 'He [scil. Chrysippus] says that Achilles says these things 'speaking in his right mind' (παρ' αὐτῷ διαλεγόμενον)<sup>129</sup>—these are the very words he wrote—but that Achilles not infrequently abandons these same judgements in adverse circumstances and does not have power over himself when overcome by emotions' (*ibid.* 40-41 ~ *SVF* 3.478). This last piece of information may be somewhat more helpful than may appear at first sight. Here not wrong timing is at issue but something else. People may represent right reason in their advice to others, but this does not of course mean that they always bring their advice into practice themselves, witness Achilles' own outbursts of emotion, in particular his excessive grief over the death of Patroclus.

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<sup>129</sup> This expression is the opposite to that employed for people in a state of emotion, see *supra*, p. 173.

But since it does not often happen that everyone around is in an emotional state at the same time, it remains possible to listen to the voice of reason as represented by persons speaking one after the other.

Having discussed rejection of right reason in the case of anger and erotic desire, Chrysippus turned to pleasure (ἡδονή):

That in us which is agitated and changed and disobedient to reason arises no less in the case of pleasure (*ibid.* 43, *SVF* 3.478).<sup>130</sup>

The summarizing remark encapsulates three related key elements in Chrysippus' portrayal of emotion: agitation, loss of our (better) selves, and disobedience to correct reason.

### 7. *Madness and Mental Blindness*

In emotion we cut ourselves off from right reason, thus losing something essential to our true identity as human beings and forsaking the role Nature has ordained for us. A few fragments from the *Therapeutics* bring out yet another aspect of Chrysippus' analysis of emotion that has not received the attention it deserves, viz. its epistemic side, in line with the cognitive nature of emotion and the causal explanation we encountered in the 'logical' books. This epistemic aspect is expressed in terms of madness and a concomitant mental *blindness* (τυφλότης) to what is obvious. In what follows I shall consider the relevant fragments in the light of both Galen's treatment and relevant Chrysippean material from other sources. In addition, these fragments invite comparison with medical and other philosophical sources, notably Plato and Aristotle.

The set of related fragments to be examined followed those discussed in the previous section, that is to say, Chrysippus went on to explain the idea of losing oneself in terms of mental blindness and, what amounts to the same thing, of madness. This appears from the following three snippets of text, which according to Galen formed a continuous whole (4.6.44-6, *SVF* 3.478; Galen's transitional formulas are indicated by dots):

(44) We take such leave of ourselves and get so far outside of ourselves and are so completely blinded in our frustrations that

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<sup>130</sup> τὸ γὰρ δὴ σεσοβημένον καὶ παρηλλαχὸς ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἀπειθὲς τῷ λόγῳ οὐχ ἦττον ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καταγίνεται.

sometimes if we have a sponge or a piece of wool in our hands we lift it up and throw it as if we would thereby accomplish anything. If we had happened to have a knife or some other object, we should have used it in the same way [...] (45) Often in this kind of blindness we bite keys and beat against the doors when they are not quickly opened, and if we stumble on a stone we take punitive measures, breaking it and throwing it somewhere, and all the while we use the strangest language. [...] (46) From such actions one would grasp both the irrational nature of the affections and how blinded we are on such occasions, as though we had become different persons from those who had earlier engaged in philosophical conversations.<sup>131</sup>

Galen (*ibid.* 48) tells us that Chrysippus subsumed such instances of irrational behaviour under the heading of 'moving about like a mad-man' (κινεῖσθαι μανιωδῶς). His vivid portrayal of anger and other emotions is clearly designed to bring home their repulsiveness and sheer foolishness. In fact similar descriptions are often encountered in Stoic and non-Stoic tracts alike.<sup>132</sup> Philodemus (*De ira*, col. I.10-20) reports that they took up a lot of space in Chrysippus' *Therapeutics*. This is very valuable information. As we have seen (§ 5), people in an emotional crisis are not (or less) receptive to reason, and cannot be easily helped. This lends additional weight to preventive measures, like these repellent descriptions of emotional people which are calculated to change our judgements of the second type, viz. that a particular emotional response is appropriate in a given situation should it befall us. They advise us to brace ourselves for the onset of emotion by adopting better judgements.

In the passage quoted above the sheer irrationality of emotion is illustrated by a failure to grasp the identity of things: one mistakes a sponge for something suitable for throwing, or a door for a

<sup>131</sup> (44) οὕτω γὰρ ἐξιστάμεθα καὶ ἔξω γινόμεθα ἑαυτῶν καὶ τελέως ἀποτυφλούμεθα ἐν τοῖς σφαλλομένοις, ὥστε ἔστιν ὅτε σπόνγον ἔχοντες ἢ ἔριον ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ τοῦτο[ν] διαράμενοι βάλλομεν ὡς δὴ τι περ[α]ίνοντες δι' αὐτῶν. εἰ δ' ἐτυγχάνομεν μάχαιραν ἔχοντες ἢ ἄλλο τι, τοῦτο ἂν ἐχρησάμεθα παραπλησίως. (45) πολλάκις δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην τυφλότητα τὰς κλεῖς δάκνομεν καὶ τὰς θύρας τύπτομεν οὐ ταχὺ αὐτῶν ἀνοιγομένων πρὸς τε τοὺς λίθους ἐὰν προσπταίσωμεν, τιμωρητικῶς προσφερόμεθα καταγνύντες καὶ ριπτοῦντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τινὰς τόπους καὶ ἐπιλέγοντες καθ' ἕκαστα τούτων ἀτοπώτατα. (46) ἐννοήσεις δ' ἂν τις ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀλογιστίαν καὶ ὡς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀποτυφλούμεθα καιροῖς ὡς ἂν ἑτεροὶ τινες γεγονότες τῶν προ[σ]διαλεγισμένων. Cf. *Cic. Tusc.* 3.11.

<sup>132</sup> For blindness in anger cf. Philod. *De ira* col. XXXIII.3 Indelli. The example of biting the key of a closed door and that of throwing a piece of wool are also mentioned by Philodemus (Fr. 8 Indelli). On injuries inflicted in anger cf. Gal. *Aff. Dig.* 4, p.13 De Boer and the further references collected by De Lacy *ad PHP* 278.32-280.1. A prime Stoic example is the preface to Seneca's *On Anger* expounding the horrors of this affection (I, 1). See also *infra*, p. 320 n. 69 with text thereto.

punishable living being. Reason malfunctions in no longer recognizing the obvious as such. This is compared to blindness. The epistemic purport of this simile becomes clearer from a precious fragment from his *On Inconsistency* or *On Disharmony* (Περὶ ἀνομολογία)<sup>133</sup> quoted by Plutarch. Here Chrysippus appends a general observation to the more traditional phenomenology of anger:

‘... Anger is something blind and often it does not allow us to see what is obvious and often it stakes out a screen before what is grasped....’ And a little further on he says: ‘The ensuing emotions expel the calculations and what appears differently, pushing us forcibly toward the opposite course of action.’ Next he avails himself of Menander as a witness saying:

‘Oh how wretched am I: where in my body  
was my wit at that time  
when I chose not this but that?’<sup>134</sup>

And again a little further on he says: ‘Even though what has the nature of a rational animal uses its reason in each individual instance and is steered thereby, we often turn our backs on it, being subject to another, more powerful motion [scil. than that of reason].’ (Plutarch, *On Moral Virtue* 450C, SVF 3.390).<sup>135</sup>

This fragment adds a few clues as to how Chrysippus conceived of emotion from an epistemological point of view. Anger obscures what is ‘obvious’ (ἐκφανῆ),<sup>136</sup> i.e. no obvious presentations occur that can be reliably accepted. The image of the screen put in front of the

<sup>133</sup> I.e. at once with oneself and with cosmic reason (λόγος). With reference to the end (τέλος) Zeno spoke of ‘living consistently’ or ‘harmoniously’ (ὁμολογουμένως) *tout court*, see SVF 1.179 ff, cf. 3.2 ff. With what follows also keep in mind that the noun ὁμολογία could be equivalent to ἁρμονία and συμφωνία; cf. Pl. *Sym.* 187b with Long (1991) 97 f.

<sup>134</sup> Fr. 567 Kock/743 Körte.

<sup>135</sup> ἐν δὲ τοῖς Περὶ ἀνομολογίας ὁ Χρύσιππος εἰπὼν ὅτι τυφλὸν ἐστὶν ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ πολλάκις μὲν οὐκ εἶδ’ ὁρᾶν τὰ ἐκφανῆ, πολλάκις δὲ τοῖς καταλαμβανομένοις ἐπιπροσθεῖ. μικρὸν προελθὼν· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιγιγνόμενα, φησὶ, πάθῃ ἐκκρούει τοὺς λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ ὡς ἐτέρως φαινόμενα, βιαίως προωθοῦντα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐναντίας πράξεις. εἴτα χρῆται μάρτυρι τῷ Μενάνδρῳ λέγοντι· Οἴμοι τάλας ἔγωγε, ποῦ ποθ’ αἱ φρένες ἡμῶν ἐκείνον ἦσαν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ τὸν χρόνον, ὅτ’ οὐ ταῦτ’, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖν’ ἠρούμεθα; καὶ πάλιν ὁ Χρύσιππος προελθὼν· τοῦ λογικοῦ, φησι, ζῶον φύσιν ἔχοντος προσχρῆσθαι εἰς ἕκαστα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κυβερνᾶσθαι, πολλάκις ἀποστρέφεσθαι αὐτὸν ἡμᾶς, ἄλλῃ βιαιότερα φεραῖ χρωμένους.

As we have noticed, the last quotation reiterates a passage from the opening section of book I: see *supra*, p. 100. A few further echoes in the Plutarchean context are included by Von Arnim among the fragments of the *On Affections*, viz. at 450b and 449d (~ SVF 3.468).

<sup>136</sup> The typically Chrysippean term ἐκφανής refers to the clarity distinctive of cognitive presentations, see e.g. *PHP* 3.1.15 (SVF 2.885) with Tieleman (1996a) 143f.

things that are normally grasped (τοῖς καταλαμβανομένοις) illustrates this mental clouding, or blindness. Emotion prevents the occurrence of cognition (καταλήψεις) in its technical sense of assent to an obvious, or 'cognitive', presentation. Given the latter's status as criterion of truth, one could also say that we no longer perceive the true as true. This serious disorder then explains the irrational behaviour on which Chrysippus is so eloquent in *On Affections*.

Secondly, emotion puts an end to deliberation, expelling alternative presentations (φαίνόμενα) and leaving only one option which *ipso facto* becomes irresistible—a point which recalls the conception of rational thought as an internal dialogue between two mental voices, one of which represents 'right reason' (see below, pp. 268 ff.). The phrase 'the ... emotions expel the calculations' can be paralleled almost exactly from Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* Γ.12: 1119b10. A coincidence? That seems unlikely.<sup>137</sup> It is worth quoting the phrase in its Aristotelian context. Having described incontinence in regard to desire as peculiar to children, Aristotle continues:

If, then, it [scil. desire] is not going to be obedient and subject to what rules [or: the ruling principle], it will go to great lengths; for in an unthinking being the desire for pleasure is insatiable and tries every source of gratification, and the exercise of appetite increases its innate force, and if appetites are strong and violent they even expel calculation. Hence they should be moderate and few, and should in no way oppose reason [...] the appetitive should live according to reason ... Hence the appetitive in a temperate man should harmonize with reason .... (*ibid.* 1119b7-15; New Oxford translation, modified).<sup>138</sup>

Chrysippus would surely not have used the substantivized neutre 'the appetitive' (which our translators usually supplement with 'part' or

<sup>137</sup> I agree with Sandbach (1985) e.g. 57 that we should never proceed on the assumption that the Stoics will have known Aristotle and so must have been influenced by him. However, I consider it legitimate to adduce Aristotelian passages in those cases where this seems to provide the best explanation of a particular feature of Stoic philosophy (whether we assume direct dependence on Aristotle's original exposition or an intermediary source or tradition); in other words, Aristotelian influence should not be precluded in principle. For responsible comparisons of Aristotle and Stoic ethics and psychology see Long (1968), Rist (1969) ch. 1 and Inwood (1985) ch. 1. For further discussion of possible Aristotelian influence see *infra*, pp. 273 ff.

<sup>138</sup> εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἤξει· ἄπληστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὐξομένη συγγενές, κἂν μεγάλα καὶ σφοδρὰ ὦσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτάς καὶ ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ ἐναντιοῦσθαι. [...] ξῆν [...] καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν ...

‘element’) on his own behalf.<sup>139</sup> This term clearly belongs to Aristotle’s dualistic model. But in all other respects this passage closely resembles the Stoic account, both in its picturing of desire and the need to achieve psychic harmony and in the very terminology used.

Chrysippus, too, defines desire (ὄρεξις) as the correct form of conation (ὁρμή) and appetite (ἐπιθυμία) as its aberrant and excessive form (see above, p. 120). He too explains appetite and other emotions in terms of disobedience to reason. For him reason is not a separate faculty, as for Aristotle, but the discrepancy is surely mitigated by the fact that according to the latter human desire too is rational in the sense that it is in principle receptive to the voice of reason (Aristotle explains this in the final chapter of the first book, A.13). Clearly this lends a normative value to reason. As all readers of Aristotle know, its optimal functioning represents the virtue of practical wisdom (φρόνησις). But another way of referring to this aspect is in terms of ‘right reason’ (ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος). This is reason determining the right mean between excess and deficiency.<sup>140</sup> It constitutes the ‘measure’ in terms of which the excess is defined: hence desire in the temperate man should harmonize with reason. For Chrysippus and other Stoics, too, the virtuous man lives ‘in harmony’ and he does so when he obeys right reason, an expression they adopted.<sup>141</sup> The term λόγος is here (as often elsewhere) translated as ‘reason’ but its range of meaning includes the idea of measure, as is also clear from the Aristotelian passage. This should also be kept in mind with respect to the Stoic concept of right reason and the harmony it brings.<sup>142</sup> Being the right measure, it precludes the excess which marks emotion according to the Zenonian definition. It seems to be this complex of ideas on which Chrysippus focused in his *On Inconsistency* (or *On Disharmony*).

<sup>139</sup> He does so *ap. Gal. PHP* 4. 1.7-10 (SVF 2.905), but this is in an argument directed against Plato, turning the latter’s terminology against him. The Stoic τὸ ἡγεμονικόν is one of the soul’s parts according to the Stoic division, see e.g. Chrys. *ap. Gal. PHP* 3.1.10-15 (SVF 2.885). The Stoics also used terms with the same root as Aristotle’s τὸ ἄρχον for their ruling part, see e.g. Chrys. *ap. Gal. PHP* 2.2.19 (SVF 2.895, i.e. from the *On the Soul*): ἐν ταῖς συγκαταθέσεσιν ἐπινεύοντες τὴν κεφαλὴν, ἐφ’ ὃ φέρομεν αὐτὴν μέρος, ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἂ ρ χ ἢ ν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπάρχειν ἐνδεικνύμεθα. Cf. *ibid.* 2.3.4: ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ὥς καὶ αὐτοὶ βούλονται, τὸ κ α τ ᾱ ρ χ ο ν αἰσθησεως τε καὶ ὁρμῆς.

<sup>140</sup> See esp. *ENZ*.1: 1138b18-34

<sup>141</sup> See D.L. 7.88; Stob. *Ecl.* II, 75.11 ff. W. and *supra*, n. 133.

<sup>142</sup> On the term λόγος as ‘measure’ in connection with psychic harmony, see Long (1991), esp. 102 f.

The quotation from Menander represents the third stage of emotion: the recovery from the mental clouding. By the same token we regain our capacity for the internal dialogue that marks the proper functioning of reason. Thus two alternative options again present themselves for comparison, and the speaker now wonders why at the crucial moment he had lost sight of the reasonable and preferable one. In the last snippet of text, which seems to state a general conclusion, we must note an additional reference to another *motion* that can be more powerful than that of reason which normally rules. This is the kind of element which, if found in Zeno or Posidonius or even Chrysippus, would have been seized upon by Galen to argue that a non-rational power of some sort is acknowledged. But of course this is not what Chrysippus meant. The intellect is capable of processes which are irrational in the normative sense, i.e. from the perspective of correct or right reason. The answer to the question why and how this is possible should in my view be found in the soul's corporeality. Indications to this effect have been encountered in our treatment of fragments from the earlier books (see above, pp. 102 ff., 132 ff.).

In what follows we shall have to keep this physical basis of the Stoic conception in mind. But in the set of fragments at issue here the epistemic aspect—lacking from Aristotle's account of emotion—seems predominant. This becomes clear from the aspect of the obviousness of mental appearances that is repeatedly referred to. Obviousness is the mark of the class of appearances called 'kataleptic' or 'cognitive' (φαντασῖαι καταλεπτικά).<sup>143</sup> This technical concept, in common with all appearances, encapsulates both an objective and a subjective aspect. It presupposes an actual state of affairs independent of us and a contribution on our part, viz. the mental assent we *normally* grant such presentations. People who suffer mental disease are typically unable to have such presentations owing to the defective quality of their souls. This seems to be the main symptom of what Chrysippus understood by madness (μανία).

The topic of madness also features in epistemological contexts and in particular in accounts of mental appearance (φαντασῖα) in its various forms. Madness may involve the formation of an appearance without there being a object outside us causing it (i.e. what we call hallucination).<sup>144</sup> This is explained by our sources in terms of 'the

<sup>143</sup> See *supra*, n. 136.

<sup>144</sup> Sext. *M* 7.249 (*SVF* 2.65). On the modern distinction between hallucination and illusion (on which see further below in text), Pigeaud (1987) 97

affections within us' (τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν)<sup>145</sup> or 'movements of the mind itself',<sup>146</sup> for which phenomenon the Stoics used the technical expression 'vacuous attraction' or 'vacuous pull' (διάκενος ἑλκυσμός).<sup>147</sup> This was also called upon to explain situations in which an external object exists but is perceived incorrectly, i.e. what we would rather call 'illusion'. One of the Stoics' favourite examples was the passage from Euripides' *Orestes* where its insane hero mistakes his own sister Electra for a Fury (*Or.* 264 ff.).<sup>148</sup> For our purposes this type of situation is more interesting than hallucination. Affections in the sense of violent emotions also involve misjudgement due to a weak, diseased condition of the soul—indeed one to which according to the Stoics the majority of humankind is all too prone. I believe that we should not dismiss strong terms such as 'madness' as mere rhetoric. These terms stand for theoretical concepts belonging to the epistemological framework I have indicated.

There can be no doubt that both the epistemological account of madness and the characterization of the affections in terms of this account go back to Chrysippus.<sup>149</sup> Of particular interest is the reference to the vacuous attraction or pull as something the weak or diseased soul may undergo. This idea was to be picked up by Posidonius in his elaboration of the concept of 'affective pull'.<sup>150</sup>

Madness as ignorance with reference to moral action is at issue in a passage from Arius Didymus, which may be taken to be indebted to

<sup>145</sup> Sext. *M* 7.241 (*SVF* 2.64); cf. 245. This expression is taken up by κατὰ παθός said of melancholy and phrenitis, *ibid.* 247; it is not feasible to take the expression κατὰ παθός as referring to the passivity which is at issue as a feature of presentations in the preceding context; cf. e.g. Bréhier (1951) 88. Rather the term must cover affections in the broad sense covering anger, fear and other emotions as well as inebriation, melancholy and frenzy.

<sup>146</sup> Cic. *Luc.* 48: *mens moveatur ipsa per sese ... per se motu mentis aliquo ...*

<sup>147</sup> Sext. *M* 7.241, 245 (*SVF* 2.64, 65); Aëtius IV, 12.1 (*SVF* 2.54).

<sup>148</sup> Sext. 7.244-5 (*SVF* 2.65); Aëtius IV, 12.1 (*SVF* 2.54); cf. Gourinat (1996) 40-2 (note that Gourinat subsumes cases where an external object is present but incorrectly represented under 'hallucination').

<sup>149</sup> Our two main sources Aëtius IV, 12.1 and Sextus *M* 7.241-249 run closely parallel. But Aëtius, unlike Sextus, refers to Chrysippus and preserves two quotations from Euripides and a reference to Homer (*Od.* v 350-7). This feature may reflect the original Chrysippean exposition. From which treatise it derives is a moot point. The *On Affections* cannot be ruled out but it is worth noting that the second book of the *On the Soul* contained a discussion of mental appearance (see D.L. 7.50 ~ *SVF* 2.55). In typical fashion Chrysippus also derived the term for appearance (φαντασία) from that for light (φῶς / φῶς), an etymology anticipated by Aristotle, *De an.* 429a (Aët. *ibid.* Cf. Sext. *M* 7.162). As to the Early Stoic provenance of this material see also Sextus *M* 7.255 (referring to the older Stoics); cf. *ibid.* 8.67 ff.

<sup>150</sup> See *infra*, pp. 231 ff.



Chrysippus (note also the presence of Zeno's definition of affection as a 'fluttering' of the soul):

... Further, they say that every inferior person is mad,<sup>151</sup> being ignorant of himself and of the things that concern him—which is what madness is.<sup>152</sup> [They hold that] ignorance is the vice opposite to wisdom: this [scil. ignorance] is madness, because, being disposed in relation to something, renders the conations disorderly and fluttering; this is why they give this outline of madness: fluttering ignorance (Arius Didymus *ap. Stob. Ecl.* II 7.5b p.68.18-23 Wachsmuth = *SVF* 3.663).<sup>153</sup>

Madness, then is an ignorant condition as opposed to the irregular conations arising from it, i.e. the affections or emotions. This of course agrees with Chrysippus' likening of affections to irregular fevers as opposed to the underlying diseased state (see above, p. 155). Furthermore, the Chrysippean ontological genus of 'being disposed in relation to something' is used to relate the ignorant condition to a specific object of conation and hence action.<sup>154</sup> Indeed, the genus of relative disposition features more often in the Stoic account of 'appropriation' (οἰκείωσις), that is to say, how we naturally choose or avoid (the two main kinds of conation) particular things.<sup>155</sup> Here, then, the Stoics appealed to our soul being disposed, favourably or otherwise, in relation to these objects. This disposition explains natural and appropriate actions (i.e. the so-called καθήκοντα).<sup>156</sup> The

<sup>151</sup> Cf. Plut. *Stoic. Rep.* 31; 1048E, D.L. 8.124, Cic. *Tusc.* 4.54; cf. 3.10.

<sup>152</sup> Pigeaud (1987) 86 points to a very similar definition from Aretaeus of Cappadocia, *SD* 1.3.2, p.38.6-7 Hude. Yet Aretaeus (c. 150-200 CE) is an exponent of the Pneumatist school of medicine which drew on Stoicism for much of its physiology. In consequence, it is more likely that Aretaeus' definition reflects the Stoic one than that the latter reflects a common medical tradition.

<sup>153</sup> Ἐτι δὲ λέγουσι πάντα φαῦλον μαίνεσθαι, ἄγνοιαν ἔχοντα αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ μανία. Τὴν δ' ἄγνοιαν εἶναι ἐναντίαν κακίαν τῇ φρονήσει· ταύτην δὲ πρὸς τί πως ἔχουσιν ἀκαταστάτους καὶ πτοιώδεις παρεχομένην τὰς ὁρμὰς μανίαν εἶναι· διὸ καὶ ὑπογράφουσι τὴν μανίαν οὕτως· ἄγνοιαν πτοιώδη.

<sup>154</sup> For an excellent account of this Stoic 'genus', with a translation of the most important texts, see Long and Sedley (1987) vol. 1, 176-179, who argue cogently that all four genera were introduced by Chrysippus (p. 178 f.).

<sup>155</sup> Hierocles 2.1-9; Hierocles *ap. Stob.* IV p.671.7-9, *Anon. in Plat. Theaet.* 5.18-6.31.

<sup>156</sup> Note that the formulation τῶν καθ' αὐτόν in the second part of the definition echoes the explanation given by Zeno of the technical term καθήκον he coined: κατανομάσθαι δὲ οὕτως ὑπὸ πρώτου Ζήνωνος τὸ καθήκον, ἀπὸ τοῦ κ α τ ἄ τ ι ν α ς ἢ κ ε ι ν τῆς προσονομασίας εἰλλημμένης. ἐνέργημα δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκείον (D.L. 7.107). Assessing what is or is not appropriate to one's constitution presupposes the self-knowledge referred to in the first part of the definition. On self-knowledge or self-perception in the doctrine of

condition of insanity means that the process of appropriation has become disturbed. Hence the definition of insanity as ignorance both of oneself and the things that concern one. One is no longer able to relate external things to oneself and assess them as to whether they are conducive or harmful to our well-being. The vices that count as forms of madness are characterized by their proneness to one kind of external thing. Examples are not given, in line with the condensed nature of Stobaeus' exposition. But what is lacking can be easily supplemented from the *On Affections* itself:

For these infirmities are not spoken of as being in the judgement that each of these things is good but also in respect of being given to them beyond what is natural, for which reason it is quite reasonable that some are called 'woman-mad' and 'bird-mad' (*PHP* 4.5.21-2 ~ *SVF* 3.480).<sup>157</sup>

Chrysippus points to common expressions such as 'woman-mad' as referring to the morbid state of being excessively attracted to one particular kind of object.<sup>158</sup> The excess which marks the madness is once again measured in terms of the natural (see above, p. 101). Of course value judgements of type 1 are involved (even though Galen tries to play down this aspect in order to intimate that Chrysippus contradicted himself).

The term infirmity, or weakness (ἀρρώστημα), refers to the lack of physical strength or of 'tension' of the corporeal soul.<sup>159</sup> This explains its excessive behaviour, though not the particular predilection involved. This was designated as a 'disease' (νόσημα) of the corporeal soul.<sup>160</sup> Disease is a state in which the mistaken judgment

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appropriation, see D.L. 7.85, Hierocles 1.34-9, 51-7 (= LS 57C), 9.3-10 (LS 57D); cf. Plut. *Stoic. Rep.* 1038B.

<sup>157</sup> οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ κρίνειν ἀγαθὰ ἕκαστα τούτων λέγεται ἀρρωστήματα ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον ἐκπεπωκέναι πρὸς ταῦτα τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν. ὅθεν οὐκ ἀλόγως γυναικομανεῖς τινες λέγονται καὶ ὀρνιθομανεῖς

<sup>158</sup> Chrysippus made the same point in a work entitled *Introduction to the Treatise [or: Study] Concerned with Good and Bad Things*, see Athen. *Deipn.* XI, 464d (~ *SVF* 3.667). He listed pairs of commonly used synonyms, one of each pair having the prefix φιλο- ('-loving'), the other ending on -μανής ('mad for'), e.g. the doublet φίλοινος / οἰνομανής. The name madness, he affirms, is used 'not inappositely' in the case of these people, 'erring as they do in a mad way (μανικῶς) and being to a greater extent [scil. than others] disconnected from the truth'.

<sup>159</sup> See the fragment quoted at 5.2.27 (*SVF* 3.471), where ἀρρώστημα is associated with mental strength and tension analogous to those of the body.

<sup>160</sup> The corporeal nature and causes are indicated by the fact a physical addiction such as alcoholism is listed among its species.

about something becomes a strong and persistent desire for it. Lack of the power to resist makes the disease an infirmity as well.<sup>161</sup>

Chrysippus' appeal to common parlance in justifying his use of the term 'madness' for emotional dispositions is a typical element of his philosophical method. But not only did he link up with common experience; he also modelled his doctrine on contemporary medicine. In medical authors from the Hellenistic period onwards madness or insanity (μανία) is defined technically as a chronic mental disorder without fever (as opposed to so-called phrenitis).<sup>162</sup> Fever may supervene, however.<sup>163</sup> Another point worth noting is the fact that madness not only disturbs the capacity for judgement but is linked to emotion, or at least to certain emotions. It is marked by either elation or depression, i.e. pleasure or pain according to ancient classifications.<sup>164</sup> Chrysippus may well have modelled his distinction between madness as an enduring disease and the emotions as its feverish outbursts on medical sources.

If so he was not the first philosopher to do so. An earlier example of the philosophical use of the idea of madness occurs in a key

<sup>161</sup> Chrysippus' doctrine is no doubt reflected at D.L. 7.115 (SVF 3.422): ὥς δὲ λέγεται τινα ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀρρωστήματα, οἷον ποδάγρα καὶ ἀρθρίτιδες, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς φιλοδοξία καὶ φιληδονία καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. τὸ γὰρ ἀρρώστημά ἐστι νόσημα μετὰ ἀσθενείας, τὸ δὲ νόσημα οἷσιν σφόδρα δοκοῦντος αἰρετοῦ. See also Stob. *Ecl.* II p.93.6-10 (SVF 3.421): νόσημα δ' εἶναι δόξαν ἐπιθυμίας ἐρρηκυῖαν εἰς ἕξιν καὶ ἐνεσκιρωμένην, καθ' ἣν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὰ μὴ αἰρετὰ σφόδρα αἰρετὰ εἶναι, οἷον φιλογυῖαν, φιλοινίαν, φιλαργυρίαν· εἶναι δὲ τινα καὶ ἐναντία (τούτοις) τοῖς νοσήμασι κατὰ προσκοπὴν γινόμενα, οἷον μισογυῖαν, μισοινίαν, μισανθρωπίαν. τὰ δὲ νοσήματα μετ' ἀσθενείας συμβαίνοντα ἀρρωστήματα καλεῖσθαι. See the parallel treatment in Cic. *Tusc.* 4.23-31 (SVF 3.424, 427, 425, 426). The diseased state was also designated by the term διάθεσις, on whose medical provenance see Ackermann (1982). What Galen, *Aff.* I, 3, VIII p.32 K. (SVF 3.429) says about διάθεσις in a different context in a different work conforms to the above Stoic definitions of the soul's diseases: κινήσεως δ' οὔσης κατὰ γένος διττῆς, ἀλλοιώσεώς τε καὶ φορᾶς, ὅταν εἰς μόνιμον ἀφίκηται διάθεσιν ἢ ἀλλοίωσις, ὀνομάζεται νόσημα, παρὰ φύσιν οὐσα δηλονότι διάθεσις· καταχρώμενοι δ' ἐνίοτε καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν ὀνομάζομεν πάθος. The last is exactly what Galen does with respect to a Chrysippean passage where the διάθεσις/πάθος distinction is used in the proper sense. Disease and infirmity in the above senses are treated by the same sources inconjunction with 'proclivity' (εὐεμπτώσια), viz. to species of distress (e.g. pity) or anger; on which see further Kidd (1983).

<sup>162</sup> Cf. ps. Gal. *Def. med.* XIX, p.416 K., Aretaeus *SD* 1.6.1, p.41.12-18 Hude, Caelius Aurelianus *M.C.* I 5, 146, 150, all of which, though dating from the Imperial period, no doubt reflect an earlier stage of the history of medicine. See Pigeaud (1987) 67 ff.

<sup>163</sup> Cf. Pigeaud (1987) 34.

<sup>164</sup> An early witness is the Hippocratic tract *The Sacred Disease*, ch. 17. From a much later date but important in view of its probable connection to Stoicism (cf. *supra*, n. 152) is Aretaeus of Cappadocia, *SD* p. 41 Hude; cf. Pigeaud (1987) 74 ff.

passage in the Platonic *Timaeus*, 86b-88d. I believe that this passage, too, looms behind some of the Stoic texts we are considering. In what follows I hope to show that the resemblances concerned are sufficiently close and numerous to warrant this assumption. Again, my aim is not mindless source-hunting but drawing comparisons which would bring into relief the specific nature and motivation of the Stoic position. In other words, once the resemblances have been established, the differences stand out more clearly.

At 86b1-2 Plato turns to diseases of the soul (τὰ ... περὶ ψυχῆν νοσήματα), which he straightforwardly ascribes to the condition of the body (διὰ σώματος ἕξιν). The issue of the soul's (according to Plato incorporeal) substance is left out of account. Plato continues:

It must be granted, then, that folly (ἄνοια) is the disease (νόσον) of the soul, and of mindlessness there are two kinds. One is madness (μανίαν), the other is ignorance (ἀμαθίαν). So when someone suffers from any affection (πάθος) that involves either of these, it must be called a disease (νόσον); and as the gravest diseases for the soul we must rank excessive pleasures and (mental) pains (ἡδονὰς ... καὶ λύπας) (86b2-7).

A Stoic reader would find little to object to here. Here too madness is classed as a form of ignorance, viz. in the sphere of action. It is moreover the underlying condition causing affections, i.e. outbursts of emotion, just as those described in the passage from Arius Didymus we have quoted. Indeed this anticipation of the Stoic equation of mental affection, folly and madness is so complete as to make Platonic influence fairly plausible. Plato also anticipates the distinction drawn by Chrysippus between affection and ignorance as two different kinds of irrationality (see above, p. 98). Moreover, we should note the distinction between madness as an underlying condition and affection as its manifestation. The similarities can be multiplied from what follows. Plato goes on to explain the nature of excessive pleasure and pain as follows:

When a man enjoys himself too much or, in the opposite case, when he suffers pain, and he exerts himself to seize the one and avoid the other in inopportune ways, he can neither see or hear anything aright but goes raving mad and is at that moment least capable of rational thought (λογισμοῦ) (*ibid.* b7-c3).

This too is very similar to how Chrysippus describes the effects of mental affection in the passages we have just quoted and elsewhere. Affection is described in terms of excess. It causes irrational

appetition (in the case of pleasure or enjoyment) and avoidance (in the case of mental pain). It affects his perception—a point also stressed by Chrysippus but absent from Aristotle. Further, Plato repeats that it represents madness and that it knocks out rational thought.

In what follows Plato expatiates on the bodily causes of such mental states, focusing on sexual incontinence. At 86d7-e2 he concludes that 'no one is willfully bad, but the bad man becomes bad as a result of one or another corrupt condition of his body<sup>165</sup> and an uneducated upbringing.' This amounts to associating the Socratic adage that no one errs willingly with the medical and physical account that is being offered. The correspondence between the two causes of corruption mentioned here correspond to those mentioned by Chrysippus, viz. physical ones connected to how we are born and social influences, starting from our educators (see above, pp. 132 ff.). Plato does not mean to absolve anyone from moral responsibility for his or her moral state—and of course Chrysippus didn't either.<sup>166</sup> Common to them seems to be wish to identify those causes which may explain differences between individuals and which may guide our efforts in removing the deficiencies in question.

Plato goes on to explain first the physical cause in terms of the familiar medical theory of the bodily humours (86e5-87a7). When these turn pathogenic, they cause evaporations to rise from them and mingle with the soul's movements, thus bringing about mental diseases—a mechanism which strongly recalls Chrysippus' account of anger as quoted from his *On the Soul* by Galen, *PHP* 3.1.25 (*SVF* 2.886).<sup>167</sup> These are again specified: various kinds of bad temper and depression, recklessness and cowardice and moreover forgetfulness and ignorance. Clearly this account amounts to the same as that adumbrated at the beginning of the section (86b), where we have found the same distinction between ignorance and emotion as disposition and momentary outbursts respectively.

Secondly, Plato dwells a bit on the social causes of moral badness, distinguishing between educators in the domestic sphere and society at large. He concludes that just as the beauty and functionality of

<sup>165</sup> This repeats 86b1-2, from the beginning of the section, referred to *supra* in text.

<sup>166</sup> For Plato see esp. what follows at 87b, where he urges that each person must do his utmost 'both by nurture and intellectual pursuits to escape from badness and seize the contrary' (87b7-8).

<sup>167</sup> See *supra*, p. 157.

bodies depend on the good proportion of their parts, so a proportion should reign between body and soul, as these are closely interwoven and given their intensive interaction—a fact which brings out the need of good regimen (διαίτα) (*ibid.* 87b-c). Soul and body, as he expresses the point a little further on, are ‘grown together’ (συμφυές), 88a8. Exactly the same is said about the interrelationship between body and soul by Chrysippus *ap. Gal.* *PHP* 3.1.10 (*SVF* 2.885), who likewise drew conclusions as to the importance of diet and exercise—how unphilosophical we might consider this side of his doctrine today. I have discussed this aspect above (p. 162 ff.). But here it is even more important to consider the role played by the idea of proportion, symmetry, or measure. This too can be paralleled from the Chrysippean fragments we have been discussing. The main difference between Plato and Chrysippus is of course that Plato applies this idea to the relation between soul and body whereas Chrysippus applies it to the parts of the soul itself (see above, pp. 145 ff.). But it should be recalled that for Chrysippus the soul itself is corporeal making a possible an analogy between it and the body in terms of their parts.

The need to bring body and soul into mutual harmony is not the only moral lesson drawn by Plato from his physiological account of mental disease. He concludes by pointing to a cosmic perspective when he urges us to model the movements and processes of both body and soul to those of the universe at large, stressing the fact that as individuals we are parts of this greater whole (*ibid.* 88c7-8, d6, e2-3). One cannot fail to be reminded of the same parts-and-whole schema Chrysippus expounded to draw the same conclusion about the human End (D.L. 7.87-8). This last point of contact and the others constitute a pattern of dependence and inspiration. Even if we prefer to be more cautious on this score, it remains important to acknowledge that the Stoic approach to mental affection in terms of madness was undeniably anticipated by earlier medicine and philosophy alike.

#### 8. *The Medical Backdrop: Hippocratic and Other Writings*

To prevent an already dense discussion of Stoic material from becoming too cumbrous, I have so far avoided a full-scale discussion of the medical backdrop. At this juncture we may compare some

relevant doctrines which belong to the medical tradition. In the programmatic passage from the beginning of the *Therapeutics* Chrysippus affirmed that the philosopher ought to be familiar with affections of the body also (*PHP* 5.2.23, quoted above, p. 144).<sup>168</sup> This should occasion no surprise given the literal sense in which his version of the medical analogy should be taken. Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect Chrysippus not to have remained content to model his discussion loosely on current medical theories but to have taken them into account in a more integral fashion. Chrysippus will have taken his own exhortation to heart and to have studied the medical literature of his day.

There is no explicit evidence connecting Chrysippus to any of the writings of the *Corpus Hippocraticum* as it survives today.<sup>169</sup> Zeno, anticipating Chrysippus' medical analogy,<sup>170</sup> applied the famous first sentence of the *Aphorisms* ('Life is short, but art long') to the 'art capable of curing the diseases of the soul'.<sup>171</sup> About the general *Rezeptionsgeschichte* of the *Corpus Hippocraticum* in its Hellenistic fase we know very little.<sup>172</sup> But it seems certain that the name of Hippocrates had gained ever more prestige since his own lifetime. As a repository of Greek medical tradition we cannot dispense with the *Corpus* when it comes to forming a impression of the kind of influences to which

<sup>168</sup> Accordingly, the sage is also his own best doctor, Stob. *Ecl.* II p. 109.1 ff. W. (*SVF* 3.656, that this concerns both body and soul is implied by the term φόσις, the health of which he is said to take care of); cf. *ibid.* 114.10 ff. (*SVF* 3.602), according to which he speaks about healthy and morbid conditions as well as things to do with dietetics.

<sup>169</sup> A scholion in Urbinas ms. 68 fol. 24v.—first published and accepted as reliable by Ch. Daremberg (*Notices et extraits des manuscrits médicaux* [Paris 1853] 200ff) refers to a gloss made by Chrysippus on the distinction between καίρος and χρόνος at *Praec.* 30.2 Heiberg. But today this scholion is generally regarded as a Renaissance fabrication inspired by Galenic passages, see Diller (1933) 174 ff. Galen, *Hipp. Epid.* XVIIIB, p.246 K. (*SVF* 2.782) refers to interpreters who explained the *Epidemics* in line with Stoic and Praxagorean physiology. But since their identity must remain uncertain, this does not prove anything about Chrysippus or any of the other luminaries of the early Stoa; cf. Steckerl (1958) 20. There are a few more passages in Galen where the name of Hippocrates is associated with essentially Stoic physiological doctrines: see *supra*, pp. 154 f. But it is difficult to decide in these cases whether the reference to Hippocrates was inserted by Galen or already made in his source. It seems impossible to establish the precise identity of this source anyway.

<sup>170</sup> See *supra*, p. 148.

<sup>171</sup> See Stob. *Flor.* IV 34.68, p.845 Hentse (*SVF* 1.323); cf. Kassel (1958) 21.

<sup>172</sup> Most evidence discussed by Kudlien (1989) pertains, despite its title, not to the Hellenistic era but to the 5th and 4th centuries BCE and to the Imperial era. Langholf (1986) demonstrates the use made of *Flat.* by Anonymus Londinensis, Callimachus (c.305-340 BCE) as well as the comic poet Antiphanes (c.400-330 BCE).

Chrysippus may have been exposed. But it should be stressed that comparisons from a doctrinal point of view not backed up by explicit attribution impose the need to be extremely cautious in drawing conclusions about influences and historical relations.

In addition we should certainly compare the fragments of Praxagoras of Kos (*flor.* later 4th century BCE),<sup>173</sup> whose influence on Stoic physiological ideas—in relation to the soul in particular—is well known. But he wrote extensively on therapy and regimen as well.<sup>174</sup> So one may be excused for feeling encouraged to compare the *Therapeutics* with his doctrines (or rather what can still be known about them, since the state of transmission of his work is no less fragmentary and derivative than that of Chrysippus). Moreover, it is pertinent to ask how original or distinctive the therapeutical ideas of Praxagoras himself were. A native of Kos, he firmly belonged with the Hippocratic tradition especially where clinical medicine was concerned.<sup>175</sup> In any case, a careful inventory of all medical elements should precede any conclusions about the authorities inspiring them.

Like a number of Stoic texts we have been reviewing, the Hippocratic writings treat affections like fear and grief in close connection with disorders like melancholia or phrenitis as well as bodily illnesses. Thus in ch. 17 of the *On the Sacred Disease* (VI 386 ff. L.) a wide variety of mental affections including lust (ἡδονή) and grief (λυπή) are said to be amenable to the same explanation as epilepsy. This explanation is based on the same broad model as we have encountered in the Chrysippean fragments: elements, humours and *pneuma*. Thus the author of *On the Sacred Disease* holds that the occurrence and intensity of lust and grief are determined by the elementary qualities, with an important intermediate role being played by phlegm and bile. He moreover relates fear (φόβος) to the cold and shivering (φρίκη) (13, VI 380 L.).<sup>176</sup> Elsewhere in the Hippocratic corpus the same physical effects alternate with 'hot' symptoms in descriptions of fever.<sup>177</sup> This

<sup>173</sup> On the question of his dates see now Von Staden (1989) 44 ff.

<sup>174</sup> See the fragments edited by Steckerl (1962), Bardong (1954), Capriglione (1983). On Praxagoras' views on regimen see in particular Wöhrle (1990) 170-3. On Praxagoras and Stoicism see Tieleman (1991) 122 f. with further references.

<sup>175</sup> He was the most famous representative of the Coan school after Hippocrates. Cf. Steckerl (1958) 1, Capriglione (1983) 13.

<sup>176</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 9, VI 370 L. But the idea is common in the *C.H.* Cf. e.g. *Epid.* 7.45 (V 412ff. L.) and elsewhere, see Zink (1962).

<sup>177</sup> *Epid.* 1.2 (II 608 L.), 3.4 (III 116 L.), 3 (III 142 L.), where note also the occurrence of λυπή, *Aphor.* 7.4 (IV 578 L.). The swiftness of the alternation between the hot and cold states is stressed by the Hippocratic authors and the Stoics alike, see



is exactly what we find in the fragment where Chrysippus explains the physical effects attendant upon affection (*PHP* 5.2.14, quoted above, p. 106).

It is also worth comparing Chrysippus' account of inflamed anger (*PHP* 3.1.25, *SVF* 2.886, see above, p. 157) with passages such as *On Winds* 7-9 (VI.98-104 L.). Here fever is said to occur because of a surplus of nutriment relative to bodily exercise. The food obstructs the whole abdominal region, and the winds which normally circulate freely are trapped and compressed in the other parts of the body. The currents of air cool the blood in these organs, whereupon the blood retracts towards the hottest regions of the body. When the blood is concentrated, it becomes hot again. It evaporates as *pneuma*, which pushes violently against the skin, causing transpiration.<sup>178</sup>

This account presents the hot and the cold as occurring simultaneously or in quick alternation. It is closely similar to the description of anger by Chrysippus, particularly where the role of *pneuma* and its evaporation and blowing and pushing effects on the body are concerned. Note also the pathological role of ill-functioning digestion. The author of *Flat.* does not assign any role to bile or other humours, stressing the role of air or breath instead. But in the *Nature of Man* and the *Diseases*<sup>179</sup> the proportion of the humours—often in relation to temperature—holds centre-stage in the aetiology of disease.

The author of the Hippocratic *On Affections* (Περὶ παθῶν) argues that bile and phlegm produce diseases when one of them becomes too moist, too dry, too hot, or too cold—the imbalance of the elemental qualities again. As the causes of the heating and chilling he specifies—apart from internal ones such as food and drink—sensory experiences such as sight, smell, and hearing.<sup>180</sup> Elsewhere psychic affections such as fear, lust and anger, including their attendant bodily effects, are said to result directly from both sight and hearing.<sup>181</sup> For our purposes this is very interesting indeed. We may recall the causal role accorded by Chrysippus to mental appearances in the

e.g. *Vet. med.* 16, *SVF* 3.459, cf. 2.405.

<sup>178</sup> Cf. also Hp. *Epid. II*, 3.11 with Langholf (1990) 357f. and the Chrysippean fragment quoted *supra*, p. 157.

<sup>179</sup> *Morb.* 1.24, p. 162 Potter (VI, 188ff. L.) 1.2 (VI, 142 L.); *Nat. hom.* chs. 4, 15 (pp. 172.13ff., 202.10ff. Jouanna).

<sup>180</sup> *Aff.* 1, p.6 Potter (VI, 208 L.); cf. Flashar (1956) 31.

<sup>181</sup> *Hum.* 9 (V, 488 L.), *Epid.* 5.81 (V, 250 L.) = 7.86 (V, 44 L.); see further Flashar (1956), esp. 26 ff.

genesis of affection (above, pp. 137, 124 ff., 137). He also spoke of the persuasiveness of presentations as a cause of psychic corruption. Perception may trigger an outbreak of affection directly, or it may weaken the soul in the long term.<sup>182</sup> The latter possibility is instantiated by the notorious midwives' bath (above, p. 161 f.). In the Hippocratic treatises baths are repeatedly made the subject of medical considerations. They appear both as potentially unhealthy and as therapeutic. In *On the Nature of Man* ch. 21, we get a piece of advice on how to bath babies. This advice is designed to maintain a moderate temperature and avoid drastic changes in this respect. This coheres with the passage from Calcidius (where also note the reference to medicine, above p. 161). Its picture of birth as a harsh experience liable to cause disease strongly recalls *On Eight Months Children* chs. 2-3.<sup>183</sup>

The testimony of Cicero, *On Fate*, chs. 7-9 (*SVF* 2.950-1) proves that Chrysippus acknowledged the influence of environmental and climatic conditions on the formation of intellect and character.<sup>184</sup> Whether he touched on this idea in the *Therapeutics* cannot be ascertained. Still, it is worth observing that he was, in principle, prepared to taken environmental factors into account. This side of his psychophysics (to borrow Sedley's apt term)<sup>185</sup> also reveals the influence of current medical theories. An obvious example is the Hippocratic *Airs Waters Places* whose author explains mental disposition as due to the differing ratios between the hot and the cold that are peculiar to the various climates in which people live; hence the differences of national mentality.<sup>186</sup> Cicero's testimony ascribes to Chrysippus the same line of explanation, though with even greater emphasis on the quality of the air peculiar to certain places. In particular we may recall the role assigned by Chrysippus and other Stoics to the very first inhalation in shaping the psychic *pneuma*.<sup>187</sup> The quality of the outside air breathed in at this crucial moment will have been one of the determinants of the resulting mental disposition.<sup>188</sup>

The role of the *pneuma* in the *Corpus Hippocraticum*, as connected with humoral theory, is often underestimated in present-day

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<sup>182</sup> See Sedley (1993) 325.

<sup>183</sup> See esp. p. 86.4-12 Grensemann.

<sup>184</sup> See Chr. *ap. Cic. Fat.* 7-9; cf. *ND* 2.17.

<sup>185</sup> Sedley (1993).

<sup>186</sup> See esp. *Aer.* 16.1, 24.3, pp. 62.1-5, 78.17-23 Diller.

<sup>187</sup> See *supra*, p. 162.

<sup>188</sup> *Esp. Fat.* 7. Cf. Sedley (1993) esp. 319, 331.

reconstructions.<sup>189</sup> But it received great emphasis in the Hellenistic reception of Hippocratic medicine. This is particularly clear from the medical papyrus known as Anonymus Londinensis.<sup>190</sup> This account is largely based on the *On Winds*, which was regarded as authentically Hippocratic in Hellenistic times and beyond.<sup>191</sup> The central concept<sup>192</sup> of Hippocratic medicine is taken by Anonymus to be breath, πνεῦμα or φύσα,<sup>193</sup> for

Breath (πνεῦμα) is the most necessary and supreme component in us, since health is the result of its *free flow* (εὐροία), and disease of its *impeded* passage. We in fact present a likeness to plants. For as they are rooted in the earth, so we too are rooted in the air by our nostrils and by our whole body (Anon. Lond. col. VI.13-21; cf. 30-1).<sup>194</sup>

Disease is caused by φύσαι arising from residues of food; that it to say, it arises from difficulty of digestion, whether due to the quantity or nature of the food taken (V.37-VI.12). Further, the breaths rising from the undigested food are described as vapours (ἀναθυμιαθεῖσαι) causing diseases. This causes them to be trapped inside the organs so that they start pressing violently against organs in the body in an attempt to find an outlet (VI.35). This conforms to the account of *On Winds* (see above). But, unlike its author and in agreement with Chrysippus (see above, p. 158), Anonymus stresses changes *in the breaths themselves*:

<sup>189</sup> The balance has to some extent been redressed by Langholf (1990).

<sup>190</sup> Presumably a draft rather than the remains of a published treatise. It was written somewhere between the later first cent. BCE and the middle of the second cent. CE. Cf. Manetti (1990).

<sup>191</sup> Its author (who is presumably to be dated to the first cent. CE) says that he draws the first part, i.e. cols. IV.18-XXI.9, from 'Aristotle' (col. V.37), which has traditionally been taken to mean the Ἰατρικά by Aristotle's pupil Menon. There is a flood of literature on this matter. See now Manetti (1999) esp. 128, 139 ff., who shows that Anonymus is here drawing on an early (i.e. pre-third century BCE) Peripatetic account.

<sup>192</sup> The prominence accorded to the *pneuma* as a mainstay of Hippocratic medicine may seem less obvious to us, yet it is more often found in ancient sources, see e.g. Celsus, *Prooem.* 15 with Langholf (1986) 17 n.60. In fact, *pneuma*-lore and humoral theory are often part of the same theoretical framework in many Hippocratic treatises, including the older ones. In other words, in the Hippocratic writings the *pneuma* is more important as a theoretical concept than has often been supposed: see Langholf (1990).

<sup>193</sup> Anonymus uses the two terms interchangeably. In *Flat.* φύσα is defined, more specifically, as πνεῦμα within the body; outside the body it is called air, ὁ ἀήρ, *Flat.* 3 (VI 94.1 L.).

<sup>194</sup> Cf. *Flat.* 4 (VI 96.1 L.), 5 (VI 96.13 L.).

The change of breaths too gives rise to diseases; they change in two directions, either towards excessive heat or toward excessive cold (col. VI.38-40).

Anonymus goes on (VI.43 ff.) to introduce bile and phlegm as factors which cause disease through excessive heating and chilling.<sup>195</sup> But in this passage breath (πνεῦμα) and regimen retain their importance for the aetiology of disease. Thus Anonymus refers to the distinction drawn in *Nat. Hom.* between internal and external sources of the pneuma, viz. the food and the outside air respectively.<sup>196</sup> This recalls the dual origin of παθή and, correspondingly, the dual mode of the soul's nourishment postulated by Chrysippus (see above, p. 147).

In fact, the Anonymus combines all the main elements encountered in the Chrysippean fragments: the relation between unimpeded flow of breath and health (above, pp. 147, 190); vaporization in digestion and its morbid variety (above, pp. 157 f.); the pushing (ώθουμένου) and blowing (έμφυσώντος) impact of the morbid pneuma on organs as remote from the heart as the face and the hand (above, pp. 98 f., 157, 180); the proportion between the hot and the cold as the main determinant of health or disease (above, pp. 148 ff., 158, 161 f.). These close similarities—which make up a coherent set of doctrines—indicate that Chrysippus reflects the *Rezeptionsgeschichte* of Hippocratic medicine in the Hellenistic period. In designing his moral theory, Chrysippus availed himself of a coherent and authoritative paradigm of medicine.

### 9. Conclusion

Our main sources for the *Therapeutics*, Galen and Cicero, have obscured its physical and medical basis. Their one-sidedness is reflected in modern discussions. We may conclude, however, that Chrysippus' medical analogy rests on the assumption that the body and the soul are governed by the same physical principles. This is borne out by the constant emphasis placed by Chrysippus on physical factors. Psychic health, strength, beauty and their opposites are defined in terms of the four elemental qualities, particularly the hot and the cold as constituents of the psychic *pneuma*. Therapy is aimed at restoring and maintaining the balance between these factors. Given the close

<sup>195</sup> See esp. *Morb.* I.2 (VI 142 L.).

<sup>196</sup> *Nat. hom.* 9.3, p.188.10 ff. Jouanna (VI 52, 54 L.).

connection between body and soul, it also involves preventive measures in the sphere of regimen based on the same physical principles. Stoic therapy and regimen were grafted on physiology including embryology. Thus the cause of affection was explained in relation to theories on the digestive process and childbirth. In the account of anger a distinctive role was assigned to overheating as a consequence of a surplus of bile.

All this is not to deny the therapeutical value of philosophical arguments. The point is that in Stoic ethics the mental and the physical are really two sides of the same coin. This explains why the Stoics used intentional and physical terms interchangeably.<sup>197</sup> It is typical of polemicists such as Galen to exploit the aspectual distinction involved by playing the two aspects off against one another and treating the physical elements as if they pertained to—unacknowledged—non-rational powers.

A number of Hippocratic writings deal with mental affections in terms similar or identical to the Chrysippean fragments we have been reviewing. Of course, the central notion of the balance of the four elements and its therapeutic relevant are fairly common notions. Without a doubt, it had become absorbed by intellectual circles well before Chrysippus, as is clear from Plato, Aristotle and other authors. But we have been able to trace more specific correspondences, in particular with *On Winds* and *On the Nature of Man*. The relevant passages in the Anonymus Londinensis suggest that Chrysippus' view of Hippocratic medicine, with its stress on *pneuma*, reflects a general feature of its reception in the Hellenistic era. Even if it is not feasible to identify one or more Hippocratic writings as Chrysippus' immediate source, it remains useful, indeed mandatory, to take them into account as an important part of the medical *traditions* to which he was indebted.

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<sup>197</sup> See Sedley (1993) 329.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### POSIDONIAN PUZZLES

#### 1. *Introduction*

The real hero of Galen's cast of characters is Posidonius of Apamea (c.135-55 BCE), the Stoic who valued truth more highly than the dogmas of his own school. If we may believe Galen, he abandoned the unitary conception of the intellect and returned to the 'ancient account', i.e. the Platonic tripartition. Indeed, Galen tells us, he had formally directed his *On Affections* (Περὶ παθῶν) against Chrysippus' treatise of the same title.<sup>1</sup> Galen moreover appeals to the authority of Posidonius in claiming that Cleanthes and Zeno had postulated permanent non-rational factors in the soul. Among the Stoics featuring in *PHP* 4 and 5 Chrysippus emerges as an isolated case, though an admittedly influential one. The great majority of the Stoics Galen had encountered clung to the Chrysippean model—which explains why Galen deals with Chrysippus so extensively.<sup>2</sup>

Two substantial fragments of Chrysippus' *On Affections* are quoted by Galen not directly from that work but from that of Posidonius (see above, pp. 8 f.). In addition we find in *PHP* 4-5 long stretches of text in which Galen quotes from, or at least frequently refers to, Posidonius—so much so that a great number of these passages (some several modern pages long) have found their way into Edelstein-Kidd's Posidonius.

Galen's obvious interest in playing off Posidonius and Chrysippus against each other does not entail that he is unreliable. The evidence he produces needs to be assessed bit by bit. Indeed it has convinced many modern students that the above picture of the development of

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<sup>1</sup> See *PHP* 5.6.45. Cooper (1998), 89-90, 101 n.10 tends to subscribe to this view but admits that it depends entirely on information supplied by Galen. Gill (1998) 129 f., too, argues that Posidonius was concerned to address real problems in Chrysippean thinking (viz. through his introduction of the concept of 'affective movements'), though this did not amount to the root-and-branch rejection of Chrysippean psychology claimed by Galen.

<sup>2</sup> *PHP* 4.4.38 = Posid. T 59 E.-K. quoted *infra*, p. 207.

early Stoic psychology is broadly correct.<sup>3</sup> Here, as elsewhere, the verbatim quotations produced by Galen have lent an irresistible plausibility to his case. *PHP* books 4 and 5 were influential, if not decisive, in the elevation of Posidonius to the status of the pivotal thinker, who brought about the transition between the school's founding fathers and Imperial Stoicism.<sup>4</sup> This assumption also served to justify the periodisation in which Posidonius and his teacher Panaetius feature as the main representatives of so-called Middle Stoicism.

Today, however, the picture constructed by Galen in *PHP* 4-5 is no longer accepted without reservations. The evidence for Zeno and Cleanthes to be found in other sources is slim, but most historians doubt whether Chrysippus differed from them to any significant degree.<sup>5</sup> Further, the alleged 'unorthodoxy' of Posidonius has been questioned by Fillion-Lahille (1984)<sup>6</sup> and Cooper (1998).<sup>7</sup> In general, other sources than Galen are brought to bear on the question. Fillion-Lahille is right in pointing out that Posidonius often defended *other* Stoic doctrines formulated by the first generations of Stoics.<sup>8</sup> (I might add that sources such as Diogenes Laertius frequently list him as a witness to the Stoic position *tout court*, and alongside 'early Stoics' according to the modern periodisation).<sup>9</sup> Cooper, though accepting some form of divergence on Posidonius' part, points out some far-reaching and, for a Stoic, awkward consequences for ethical theory, if Galen's claims about his psychology are taken for

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*, n. 2 and e.g. Reinhardt (1953/4) 662, Laffranque (1964) 395 ff., Kidd (1971) 203 ff., Glibert-Thierry (1977) 423ff., Long-Sedley (1987), vol. 1, 422, Mansfeld (1991) 119 ff., Gourinat (1996) 27, Boys-Stones (2001) 46.

<sup>4</sup> Today few would subscribe to Theiler's (1935) view that Posidonius was the crucial link in the evolution of Neoplatonism; yet Posidonius is still widely assumed to have been syncretistic in outlook.

<sup>5</sup> As was influentially defended by Pohlenz (1933) and anew, in certain ways, by Sorabji (2000). Long-Sedley (1987) vol. 1, 321 express scepticism about the possibility of tracing Chrysippean monism back to his predecessors.

<sup>6</sup> Fillion-Lahille (1984) 153 ff.

<sup>7</sup> A rather different line of interpretation is taken by Stevens (1995). Although his approach is promising insofar as he takes dialectical moves on Posidonius' part into account, I am not convinced by his thesis that Posidonius' strategy is to attribute to Chrysippus 'subtly altered representations of Carneades' views' (322), that is to say, to parody Academic attacks on the Chrysippean theories in order to strengthen the Stoic position—while at the same time adopting tripartition as more in line with common sense.

<sup>8</sup> See Fillion-Lahille (1984) 153, 316 n. 5, pointing to F 170, 175, 187 E.-K.

<sup>9</sup> E.g. D.L. 7.39, 40, 41, 54, 60; see further Kidd-Edelstein's Index of sources (vol. I, p. 259).

granted.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, it is a signal, though often disregarded fact that his secession is not mentioned by sources such as Cicero and Plutarch.<sup>11</sup> One testimony (ps. Plutarch, *Whether Appetite and Distress Belong to the Soul or the Body*, ch. 6 = F 154 E.-K.) ascribes to Posidonius the view that affections such as desires, fears and fits of anger depend upon 'judgements and assumptions'—i.e. the view that Galen presents as the distinctively Chrysippean position abandoned by Posidonius. I shall return to this report in due course (below, p. 278). Further, the extent to which Galen misrepresents the argument of Chrysippus' *On the Soul* has been underestimated.<sup>12</sup> Even so it has never been doubted that Galen misrepresents the main argument of Chrysippus' *On Affections*. Why, then, have interpreters so eagerly and uncritically accepted his assertions with respect to Posidonius?<sup>13</sup> Can it be that we tend to sympathize with any attempt—such as ascribed by Galen to Posidonius—to mitigate hardcore monism and to do more justice to the irrational side of mental life?<sup>14</sup>

Both Fillion-Lahille and Cooper argue that Galen's evidence, if carefully examined, does not support his far-reaching claims about Posidonius' divergence. Posidonius remains firmly within the Stoic camp insofar as he views affections (παθής) as excessive impulses (ὁρμῶν) caused by an act of assent and hence typical of the rational (i.e. adult human) soul. Yet, according to their reading, he also allowed a causal role for certain non-rational factors or powers, which should not be identified with powers or parts in the Platonic sense as defined by Galen, i.e. as involving impulses of their own—a sense which results in an altogether different conception of mental phenomena such as weakness of will. In sum, Posidonius took an intermediate position between the theories of Plato and Chrysippus—theories which, one agrees with Cooper, are so complex and intricate that it would be surprising if there were no interesting and plausible alternative positions to be found somewhere between the two.<sup>15</sup> To complicate matters further: how certain can we be that we understand these two, Chrysippus and Plato, or at least understand the way they were read by the ancients themselves? At any rate both Fillion-

<sup>10</sup> Cooper (1998) 94 ff.

<sup>11</sup> Mentioned by Cooper (1998) 72.

<sup>12</sup> This follows from the conclusions of my study of *PHP* 2-3 in Tieleman (1996a); see *supra*, pp. 12 ff.

<sup>13</sup> Cooper (1998) 103.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Price (1995) 175 ff.

<sup>15</sup> Cooper (1998) 72 f.



Lahille and Cooper argue that Posidonius, though considering reason basic, recognized non-rational ‘forces’ or ‘*sorts of power*’ that are causally involved in the genesis of affection.<sup>16</sup> However, one wonders whether Posidonius could really have got away with indeterminate expressions of this sort in this long-standing debate, which was marked by well-defined options.

The disagreement on Posidonius’ position still persists. Sorabji<sup>17</sup> argues in favour of an important difference of position between Zeno and Chrysippus with respect to the structure of the soul. In this respect his monograph constitutes a return to the reading of an earlier generation of scholars who were willing to swallow Galen’s account. Sorabji also goes along with Galen by taking Posidonius to differ from his predecessors as to the irrational forces in the soul. In the case of Plato, of course, the evidence is not fragmentary and permits us to read the same works as the ancients did. But in exactly what way was Plato read by those ancient readers who interest us most—Chrysippus and Posidonius?<sup>18</sup>

In what follows I shall examine Galen’s treatment of Posidonius in order to throw more light on the positions not only of Posidonius and Galen but also of Chrysippus. I shall argue not merely that the difference between Posidonius and Chrysippus (and other predecessors) is less significant than Galen claims, i.e. the line taken by Fillion-Lahille, Cooper and Gill (1998). *Pace* these scholars and Sorabji, I believe that there is no doctrinal difference between them concerning the non-rational factors. Part of the solution, I believe, is to realize that we are dealing with a scheme in which authorities and views have been arranged in a definite pattern—a scheme in which, as we have seen (above, p. 34) Posidonius too was given a place. Galen could saddle Posidonius with the Platonic tripartition (albeit in terms of powers rather than parts) by seizing an opportunity provided by the Stoic’s references to Plato. I shall argue that Posidonius saw the Platonic model as an (imperfect) anticipation of the accurate doctrine as it had been first formulated by Zeno and Cleanthes and further developed by Chrysippus. This yields a picture completely different from Galen’s story about Posidonius’ transfer from the Stoic to the Platonic camp.

<sup>16</sup> Fillion-Lahille (1984) 154, Cooper (1998) 73; cf. also Gill (1998) 127 (‘kinds of function’), Boys-Stones (2001) 46 n. 4 (‘kinds of desire’).

<sup>17</sup> Sorabji (2000).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Gill (1998).

In order to expound and defend this thesis I shall first consider a few questions of terminology in connection with the position ascribed by Galen to Posidonius (§ 2). Next I shall study the use made by Posidonius of the so-called ‘ancient account’ as represented by Plato and other predecessors (§ 3-5). More immediate predecessors come next: Diogenes of Babylon and Panaetius are directly relevant to the question of Posidonius’ place in the development of the Stoic doctrine of the soul (§ 6). Thereupon I shall try to assess the evidence for his alleged criticism of Chrysippus concerning the cause of affections (§ 7). Posidonius’ appeal to Cleanthes is examined on the basis of the latter’s versified dialogue between Reason and Anger (§ 8). Finally I shall adduce two important testimonies from other sources, one from Seneca, and that from ps. Plutarch I have just mentioned (§ 9). Conclusions will be drawn in the final section (§ 10).

## 2. *Did Posidonius Speak of Psychic Powers?*

The views concerning the soul and the affections ascribed by Galen to Posidonius form part of a schema of possible options underlying Galen’s argument in *PHP* 4-5 as a whole. I have discussed this schema in Ch.1 (see above, p. 34 ff.). As we have seen, it is based on a scholastic Platonist-cum-Peripatetic conceptual apparatus involving the terms part (μορίον, μέρος), form (εἶδος), power (δύναμις) and being (or essence, οὐσία). The division into parts or forms presupposes their spatial separation, and conversely, as in the case of the Platonic tripartition-cum-trilocation. Galen manages to ascribe this position to Hipocrates as well. Those philosophers who assign a plurality of psychic functions to one particular bodily organ *ipso facto* take them to be powers (δυνάμεις) of a single form or essence. This holds good for Aristotle, whose formal position is taken to be that the soul has powers, not parts, and that their centre is the heart. Chrysippus also assigns the psychic functions to the heart, but since he subsumes all of them under reason, he is taken to accept this as the only power. Posidonius agreed with his fellow-Stoics about the heart being the central organ, but since he differentiated between reason and other non-rational factors (or ‘movements’) in the soul, his position is linked to that of Aristotle not Chrysippus. I have pointed to the dialectic and hence schematic nature of this description and its relation with certain traditional procedures adopted by Galen. Moreover, we

have noticed that it does less than justice (to say the least) to Hippocrates and Chrysippus, while saddling Plato with an emphasis on spatial separation which goes further than what is to be found in the relevant dialogues, most notably the *Timaeus*. The presentation of Aristotle's position does justice to his frequent, though by no means exclusive, use of the concept of power. But Galen's inflated claim that the powers distinguished by Aristotle correspond to the Platonic trifold division (i.e. reason, anger and desire) is at best based on a handful of passages from ethical contexts. He links Posidonius to Aristotle as representing the same position, viz. that the soul has three *powers*: reason, anger and desire.<sup>19</sup> And he repeatedly speaks of powers in connection with Posidonius.<sup>20</sup>

Other sources attest Posidonius' Aristotelizing tendencies in the field of causal theory and physics (T 85, 100; cf. T 42, 73 E.-K.). But from Galen we hear little more about Posidonius' use of Aristotle, whether in psychology or otherwise (but he may have referred to Aristotle in connection with physiognomy, see *infra*, pp. 240 f., *supra* p. 139). In books 4 and 5 the focus is not on the ontological status of the psychic functions, i.e. the power/part distinction, but on their division.<sup>21</sup> Accordingly, he tends to stress the agreement of Posidonius (and Aristotle) with Plato. Indeed, he supplies evidence as to Posidonius' direct use of Platonic dialogues. The relevant fragments do not explain how this relates to his alleged preference for Aristotle where the parts/power distinction is concerned. In fact, Posidonius in the verbatim quotations never the uses the term power (δύναμις),<sup>22</sup> while the terms affective motions (κινήσεις) and 'the affective' (? element ?aspect) (τὸ παθητικόν) do appear to be originally Posidonian. Thus Galen may well have foisted the term power on Posidonius. Whether or not he was justified in doing so will depend on our findings in regard to the Posidonian concepts of psychic motions and the παθητικόν. Most modern accounts take Posidonius' use of the term δύναμις for granted. Edelstein-Kidd's generous inclusion of extensive passages from *PHP* supposedly reflecting Posidonius' discussion may have made those who use them less alert

<sup>19</sup> See esp. *supra* pp. 36 ff. Cf. p. 83 f.

<sup>20</sup> *PHP* 5.4.1-3, 6.2.5; cf. Frs. 32, 34, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 157 E.-K.

<sup>21</sup> At 5.7.1 ff. Galen argues, rather lamely, that Plato in *Republic* book 4 drew the same distinction, i.e. differentiated the powers but did not yet establish their status as separate essence or parts. Accordingly, he may use the term powers to describe the position of Plato, see 5.4.3; cf. *supra*, p. 28.

<sup>22</sup> As noted by Cooper (1998) 106 n.32; Gill (1998) 141 n.58.

to this than is appropriate. Galen's failure to present a proof-text with the term in the relevant sense is really remarkable. For what is at issue is the main point of difference between Posidonius and Chrysippus, which is crucial to Galen's case.

That it was Galen who associated Posidonius' affective motions (παθητικαὶ κινήσεις) with the concept of power (δυνάμεις) is strongly suggested by the following passage:

Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise *On Affections* attempts to prove that the affections are certain judgements of the reasoning part. Zeno however held that the affections are not the judgements themselves but the contractions and expansions, risings and shrinkings of the soul that supervene on judgements. Posidonius disagreeing with both, praises and accepts the Platonic view and argues against Chrysippus, showing that the affections are not judgements and do not supervene on judgements; they are certain motions (κινήσεις) of other, irrational powers (δυνάμεων), which Plato called desiderative (ἐπιθυμητικὴν) and spirited (θυμοειδῆ) (*PHP* 5.1.5; cf. 4.2.4-6).

Elsewhere we get a straightforward ascription of the concept of δύναμις to Posidonius (F 32, F 34 = *PHP* 8.1.14-15, 4.3.3). But in the above passage (which is no more verbatim than the other passages featuring the term) Galen's phrasing for once is a bit more circumspect. Indeed, it implies that Posidonius did not use the term (nor 'desiderative' and 'spirited') on his own behalf, i.e. in a formal statement of his own position. The indeterminate expression "*certain* motions" is strikingly at odds with the simple ascriptions of the Platonic tripartition to Posidonius elsewhere. We need not doubt, however, that Posidonius mentioned Plato in a relevant context, viz. as part of what I hope to show was his attempt to present the Platonic tripartition as an anticipation of the Stoic doctrine. Galen seizes the opportunity to sell this as a full-blown identity of the two positions and an unqualified acceptance of the Platonic doctrine on Posidonius' part.

The common element highlighted by Posidonius was clearly that of the soul's motions—a linkage certainly encouraged by Plato's references to the desire and indeed conation of the parts of the soul. The Platonic term for the soul's motive aspect, at least in Galen's eyes, is ἐπιθυμία, which, in its wider sense, is applicable to each of the three parts.<sup>23</sup> At 5.5.1-9, however, Plato's attribution to each part of

<sup>23</sup> Cf. esp. *Quod animi mores*, *SM* II, c.2, p. 35.3-36.8 Müller. In fact, as *Rep.* 9.580d ff. and other passages show, Plato's vocabulary for voluntary motion is

its own kind of motivation is couched in the (originally Stoic !) terms of ὁρμή ('conation') and οἰκεῖωσις ('familiarization'). I shall return to this passage in due course.<sup>24</sup>

The emphasis placed by Posidonius on the motive aspect is reflected in Galen's discussion in *PHP* 4-5.<sup>25</sup> This should be recognized whenever he speaks of powers (δυνάμεις)—a term which he identifies with the Stoic term impulse, or conation (ὁρμή) (*PHP* 5.7.1). Plato in *Rep.* IX uses the cognate verb ὁρμηθεῖν when he argues that each of the three parts of the soul has its own specific desire and pleasure (580d ff., cf. 4.436b2). A passage (581e6-582a2) from precisely this Platonic context is quoted at 6.2.12, i.e. in connection with the schema of options underlying Galen's discussion (6.2, see above).<sup>26</sup> In his description of Posidonius' view (one central organ and three δυνάμεις) Galen uses the verb cognate with the Stoic term for conation, or impulse, namely ὁρμωμένης (6.2.5, p. 368, l.24). This striking usage is absent from the parallel version of the schema of options. It seems to represent an originally Posidonian element which facilitated Galen's translation of the Stoic's position in terms of δύναμις and his concomitant alignment with Aristotle. But there is even a passage where Galen says that Chrysippus and the ancients concurred in taking πάθος as an unnatural and irrational motion of the soul (5.2.2). This statement (which is found just before the text printed as Posid. F 163) may stand as a reminder that when Posidonius considered earlier views from the angle of the motive power of the soul, i.e. what the Stoics called its ὁρμή, this in itself need not imply that he disagreed with Chrysippus. Chrysippus and other Stoics of the first generations, after all, defined ὁρμή in terms of a motion (κίνησις, φορά) of the soul.<sup>27</sup>

In Galen's conceptual apparatus δύναμις is the power (or potential) to do or bring about something. A key passage from book 6 does much to explain the conceptual links involved:

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rather varied. Galen himself applauds Plato for not being a stickler for words on this very point (5.7.32).

<sup>24</sup> Incidentally, it should also be noted that Galen provides no explanation as to how the assignment of ὁρμαί to each of the separately located parts can be squared with the central role of the nervous system in his theory of voluntary movement. On this problem see Mansfeld (1991) 136 ff.

<sup>25</sup> Similarly his ethical tract *De moribus*, p. xxviii Kraus; *QAM* ch. 2, pp. 35-6 Müller.

<sup>26</sup> The same conjunction is found at *De moribus* p. xxvi Kraus, a passage no doubt based on the relevant section of *PHP*, cf. also *supra*, p. 28 n. 41.

<sup>27</sup> *SVF* 2.458, p.150, l.22-3; 3.169, 377.

... Anger and desire will be called both affections (παθή) and actions (ἐνέργειαι); for since they are certain immoderate and unnatural motions (κινήσεις) of the innate powers (δυνάμεις) of the soul, they are actions of the powers because the powers have their motions from themselves; but because the motions are immoderate, they are affections ... (PHP 6.1.21).

The point at issue in this context is the ambiguity of the term πάθος. It may denote an affection in the sense of undergoing an action; but it can also mean an unnatural motion or action, as in the case of the affections of the soul. The above quote explicates this latter sense. Whether Galen is right to apply it to Posidonius as categorically as he does is a moot point, especially in view of the Posidonian concept of the παθητικόν. The term παθητικόν had been used by Posidonius.<sup>28</sup> However, we should not be too quick to understand it in the sense in which it is taken by Galen, i.e. as a non-rational 'part' (as it is translated here) or power in a Platonic or Aristotelian sense.<sup>29</sup> As we shall see, there are good reasons to take παθητικόν as used by Posidonius in another sense (see below, pp. 211 ff.).

### 3. The 'Ancient Account'

In his *On Affections* and other works Posidonius showed a pronounced interest in what the 'the ancients' (οἱ παλαιοί) had said: not only the founders of his own school, but also Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle and others. As we have seen, Galen argues that Posidonius actually returned to the 'ancient account' (ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος) according to which the soul contained non-rational elements, or powers. This, Galen tells

<sup>28</sup> See esp. 5.5.21 (Posid. Fr. 169), 5.6.31, 33, 36 (Fr. 166); on the last text see *infra*, pp. 223 ff.

<sup>29</sup> See 2.7.18, where Galen links it with τὸ ἀλόγιστον and τὸ πάσχον, opposing them to τὸ λογιζόμενον; similarly 3.2.8, 3.7.23, 4.7.33 (Posidonian context, Fr. 158 E.-K.), 5.5.32 (Posid. F 31), 5.6.22 (Posid. Fr. 168), 5.5.21 (Posid. Fr. 169). However, it is worth noting that the term παθητικόν is more often used in a sense that is non-committal with regard to the question of the soul's division and so can also be used to describe the Early Stoic view of affection, as at Stob. *Ecl.* 2, p.39.5 ff (SVF 1.206, first text), where the definition of the soul's fluttering (see *supra*, pp. 105 ff.) is said to have been picked by Zeno in view of the 'mobility of the παθητικόν'. Here the term indicates the soul's emotional state (unless one wishes to side with the old view of Pohlenz and treat this as evidence for Zeno's division of the soul). Likewise Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 441C (SVF 3.459) uses the expression τὸ παθητικόν καὶ ἄλογον in an accurate account of Stoic monism. He may be imposing his Platonic-Aristotelian outlook on the Stoic material but it seems more likely that he has deliberately chosen non-committal terminology.

us, was the position taken by all important philosophers before Chrysippus, that is to say also that defended by the founder of Stoicism, Zeno, and his pupil Cleanthes. In this context, to judge from Galen's account, he appealed to Plato in particular (though, as we have noticed, Galen also links Posidonius to Aristotle, see above, pp. 34 ff.). But can we believe Galen's claims about Posidonius' relation to Plato and other predecessors? In this section I shall discuss part of the evidence concerned with 'the ancients'. What exactly was involved in Posidonius' appeal to them? First consider this passage:

Now Posidonius, a man reared in geometry, as I believe, and trained more than the other Stoics to follow demonstrative proofs was ashamed of Chrysippus' conflict with the evident phenomena and of his self-contradictions and *he attempts* (πειρᾶται) *to bring over not only himself but also Zeno of Citium to the side of the Platonists*. Just about all the other Stoics, however, somehow endure following Chrysippus' errors rather than choose the truth (PHP 4.4.38, Posid. T 83, 99 59 E.-K.).

This testimony is usually glossed over, but its cautious wording is exceptional. The verb πειρᾶται is striking since it suggests that the Zenonian/Posidonian and Platonist positions are in fact different. Still, on the positive side, Galen refers to what could have been a genuine attempt on Posidonius' part to compare and indeed reconcile the Stoic and Platonic positions. Now compare the following passage:

... the best [view] Hippocrates and Plato were the very first to expound. Posidonius says that Pythagoras also held this view; he infers this from the writings of some of Pythagoras' pupils, as no work of Pythagoras has been preserved up to our time (PHP 5.6.42-3 = Posid. T 91 E.-K.).

In another passage Posidonius is said to have pinpointed Pythagoras as the first to differentiate between the rational and the non-rational in the human soul. This division, he added, 'was made complete' by Plato (*ibid.* 4.7.39 ~ T 95 E.-K.). A doxographic parallel strongly suggests that what Posidonius meant was that Plato had proceeded to divide the non-rational part into anger and appetite.<sup>30</sup> Not only does his term παθητικόν imply the same basic bipartition, but so does his substitution of Plato's image of the chariot (*Phaedrus* 246a6 ff.) for that of a rider on a horse (5.6.31 ~ F 166 E.-K.).<sup>31</sup> Whether this

<sup>30</sup> *Rep.* 4.436b ff., esp. 439e2 ff.

<sup>31</sup> Posidonius' discussed this passage from the *Phaedrus* in the context of Plato's views on the proper education of the soul, see 5.5.34-35 (F 31 E.-K.). Here too the

reading of Plato does justice to the latter's intention is questionable. Yet the parallel from the *Placita* and others indicate that it was quite common.<sup>32</sup>

Posidonius, then, included a survey of earlier views, in line with what seems to have been his more regular procedure.<sup>33</sup> The inclusion of Zeno and Cleanthes made sense because he could then trace a continuous tradition from Pythagoras-cum-Plato via the school's founders to contemporary Stoicism. (On Cleanthes' dialogue between Reason and Anger, see below § 5). The views of these fore-runners testify to a particular view of the progression of science and philosophy, a view in which the understanding of earlier theories contributes to one's own development. The attempt to appropriate Greek *paideia* was typical of Stoicism right from the start. Chrysippus and other earlier Stoics formally conceived of their project as an articulation of existing notions—a conception based on their views about universal truth as reflected in the mind of laymen and experts alike.<sup>34</sup> But Stoic epistemology aside, there lies an obvious dialectical advantage in accommodating rival doctrines into one's own, thus effectively neutralizing them—a ploy by no means confined to the Stoics. But in neither case would a reference to Plato entail unconditional agreement on the part of Posidonius (see below, on his having written an 'epitome'). Thus we know that on certain physical matters he took his starting points (ἀφορμαί) from Aristotle and Theophrastus (T 42, 73, 100 E.-K.). This did not, of course, preclude disagreement with the same philosophers on other points (F 49, 1.17 ff., F 220). Thus he praised and summarized what Plato wrote on regimen in the *Laws* (F 31, see below), but criticized the same dialogue on another occasion (F 178). Posidonius' interest in what Galen calls the 'ancient account' was genuine and based on specific ideas on knowledge and history.<sup>35</sup> But this by no means implied an indiscriminating

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main point is the distinction between rational and irrational. On this passage see further below.

<sup>32</sup> See *supra*, p. 65.

<sup>33</sup> For Posidonius' reference to Plato see also the Galenic passage printed as Posid. F 31 E.-K. discussed *infra* in text. In addition, the long overview of geographical tenets held by Posidonius' predecessors, Frs. 285 (natural philosophy, from Strabo); 49 (Strabo); F 130, F 131a-b (cosmology), 137a (meteorology). The same kind of Posidonian overview may be reflected in Frs. 139, 149 (psychology) 200a-b, 216, 222.

<sup>34</sup> On this procedure as exemplified by the fragments from the *On the Soul* see Tieleman (1996a) 201, 268.

<sup>35</sup> Relevant testimonies are Seneca's 90<sup>th</sup> *Letter*, which in large part draws on



acceptance of what the ancients had said or written. In his *On Affections* his concern with the ancients belongs firmly in the context of a preliminary procedure of reviewing relevant theories. Here, it seems, their relevance was assessed primarily in terms of their anticipation of the Stoic definition of affection as an excessive conation (ὁρμή). So there is good reason to be cautious when Galen says that Posidonius accepts the ancient account or follows it in everything.<sup>36</sup>

In line with ancient conventions, his exegesis may have involved the assimilation and indeed outright adaptation of Platonic (and other) doctrines to Stoicism. In other words, the situation may have been quite the reverse of what Galen suggests at 4.4.38 (quoted above) and elsewhere. Corroboration for this assumption comes from a few other sources, which attest Posidonius' interpretation of the Platonic *Timaeus* in the context of the question of the substance of the soul. Galen conveniently glosses over the fact that Posidonius accepted the traditional Stoic view that the soul consists of hot *pneuma* (D.L. 7.157, F 139, where also note that Posidonius is conjoined with Zeno), i.e. is corporeal. Not only does Galen have no use for instances of agreement between Posidonius and earlier Stoics in this matter, but the doctrine would greatly complicate his case in *PHP* 4 and 5 and in particular his linking of Posidonius and Aristotle with respect to the powers of the soul. Moreover, it would reveal that the Stoic concept of corporeal οὐσία ('substance') does not fit his schema of options in which the same term is employed in the Aristotelian sense of substance, viz. being or essence (see above, p. 34).

But Posidonius also did something which completely subverts the image of him cast by Galen in *PHP* 4-5. He set out to reconcile the Platonic *Timaeus* with the Stoic doctrine of the psychic *pneuma*. Thus we read in a scholion on the Homeric *Iliad* that according to Posidonius in the third book *On the Soul*, the psychic *pneuma* is scattered throughout the bones—an insight anticipated by Homer. Here he also referred to Plato's statement (*Tim.* 73b) that the soul's 'chains'

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Posidonius' *Kulturgeschichte* marked, among other things, by a rule of *sapientes* and a generally higher level of wisdom at the beginning of time (cf. also Sext. *M* 9.28, referring to 'some of the later Stoics'). As Kidd remarks (*Comm.* II.ii, p. 971), this need not have precluded a view of philosophy as the end to which mankind progresses. Posidonius' ideas about pristine wisdom may help explain his interest in the wisdom of thinkers preceding those whom we call philosophers. Thus he traced the atom theory back to one Mochus, a Sidonian who lived before the Trojan war (F 285, 286). Also he anachronistically explained Homer in a way congenial to the Stoic doctrine of *pneuma*; see *infra* in text.

<sup>36</sup> See T 101, 102

are 'in the roots of the bone' as amounting to the same thing (F 28a, cf. 28b). In sum, Posidonius traced anticipations for the Stoic position on the soul's substance in a way involving an in our eyes rather forced exegesis of such authorities as Homer and Plato. The appeal to Homer was as old as Stoicism. That to Plato may have been more prominent in Posidonius than in other Stoics. Indeed, these testimonies seem to imply that Posidonius foisted onto Plato the Stoic (and his own) view of the soul's pneumatic substance. This would be startling since it would stand the Platonic key doctrine of the soul's incorporeality on its head. Yet that Posidonius went so far is strongly suggested by his interpretation of *Tim.* 35a-b as preserved by Plutarch, *On the Creation of the Soul in the Timaeus* 1023B (1023B-D = Posid. F 141a E.-K.). Here Plutarch has preserved an intriguing piece of Posidonian exegesis of what Plato in the *Timaeus* said on the nature and status of the soul. This text, which is printed by Edelstein-Kidd as Fr. 141a, is dense and difficult, not least because Plutarch offers not a report but a critique of what Posidonius said. In other words, what Posidonius originally said or meant must be inferred from Plutarch's critical remarks. Nonetheless, this testimony, if used with caution, may aid our understanding of how Posidonius read Plato. In addition, it provides an important indication with respect to his concept of the so-called παθητικόν.

First of all, it is important to see why Plutarch introduces Posidonius in the first place. In the text immediately preceding Fr. 141a Plutarch points to the fact that Plato in the *Timaeus* discusses the creation of soul before introducing his theory of matter. This is because Plato had no need of matter when he was generating the soul (1023B; the point is repeated at 1023C). In other words, the soul is incorporeal. Then the text of the so-called fragment begins as follows:

Similar objections can be made also to Posidonius and his followers,<sup>37</sup> for they did not withdraw far from matter ...

Posidonius, unlike Plutarch, assumed that matter was involved in the creation of soul. Although Plutarch's wording is rather circumspect (especially when he says 'did not withdraw far from matter'), this can

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<sup>37</sup> This expression translates τοῖς περὶ Ποσειδώνιον. The standard formula with περὶ may mean Posidonius, his followers or both, see Cherniss' discussion *ad loc.* (note g, p. 218). As Cherniss indicates, the phrase may betray the fact that Plutarch simply drew on an intermediate source for the Posidonian interpretation of *Tim.* 35a-b.

only mean that Posidonius took the soul as described by Plato to be corporeal.

Plutarch's subsequent discussion is dense and at times hard to follow, not least because Posidonius' original interpretation has to be extracted from his critical treatment. An example of how he misrepresents Posidonius' meaning is when he says that Posidonius regarded the soul as 'the idea of what is every way extended' (τὴν ... ἰδέαν ... τοῦ πάντῃ διαστατοῦ, 1023B), taking idea in the sense of Platonic Idea or Form (cf. 1023C). This information is not only highly unlikely in itself but also incompatible with his subsequent observation that the soul according to Posidonius (quite in line with Plato) is *intermediate* between the intelligibles and the perceptibles. Presumably, Posidonius used the term in the same sense as Plato himself at *Tim.* 35a7 ('form', 'entity').<sup>38</sup> Indeed, an admittedly late testimony ascribes the definition of soul as an idea to Posidonius (F 140; for the usage as form cf. 256, *ad fin.*). This difficult passage from Plutarch has received various modern interpretations. Yet a few points that are directly relevant to our purposes may be taken to be certain.<sup>39</sup>

Posidonius argued that, like the mathematical,<sup>40</sup> the soul is situated between the intelligible and perceptible realms, 'possessing (in Plutarch's words) the everlastingness of the intelligibles and the passivity of the perceptibles.' The word I have rendered 'passivity' (following Cherniss) is to παθητικόν.<sup>41</sup> Obviously it cannot mean the non-rational section of the soul here. But we need not doubt that it indicates the soul's passive aspect which in the context of (early) Stoic philosophy is related to corporeality. Thus in his *On Affections* Posidonius raises the question of what *causes* the excessive conation (ὁρμή). How could reason exceeds its own acts and measures? (4.3.4-5 ~ F 34 E.-K.). In this context he pointed not to non-rational powers in the soul but to Chrysippus' image of the runners: here, in Galen's report, 'the cause that makes the running exceeds the measure set by

<sup>38</sup> See Cherniss ad 1023C (n. d) and at 1012C (n. b).

<sup>39</sup> See esp. Cherniss' comments *ad loc.* in the Loeb Plutarch (XIII, part 1) as well as Kidd *ad loc.* (II.1, 529 ff., both with ample discussion and further references.

<sup>40</sup> Plutarch objects that Plato regarded the soul not as number but as being ordered by number (1023D), thus implying that Posidonius had argued otherwise. Plutarch, then, suggests that Posidonius considered, or at least interpreted, the (Platonic) soul as a body, a transcendent Idea and a number.

<sup>41</sup> Similarly Kidd *ad loc.* (= *Commentary*, p. 536): 'Posidonius was appealing to the authority of Plato [...] for the soul having characteristics both of permanency and of affection or passivity (παθητικόν).'

choice is irrational, namely the weight of the body.’ The corporeal soul behaves analogously. Its excesses are due to its corporeality.

Posidonius links the soul’s passivity (παθητικόν) to its perceptibility as well as its corporeality. This is consonant with general Stoic doctrine as laid down by the school’s founders. Like Plato, the Stoics linked body and perceptibility (SVF 2.794), which they contrasted with intelligibility (SVF 2.81, 195). Thus if the soul is corporeal it is also perceptible (think of the distinctive Stoic idea of self-perception, i.e. the soul’s perception of itself), then this holds good especially for the soul’s πάθη (SVF 3.85). That Posidonius subscribes to this complex of ideas is confirmed by Galen’s testimony at *PHP* 5.7.84 (F 156), where we have the same connection between the affections and perceptibility. Here the affections illustrate a methodological, or epistemological, point made by Posidonius: obvious phenomena or things ‘which provide an indication lying close to perception *such as the affections of the soul* do not need lengthy discourses or detailed demonstrations, but a simple reminder of what we experience on each occasion.’

Moreover, it is not hard to recognize in Posidonius’ interpretation an echo of the Stoic definition of body as that which is capable of acting (ποιεῖν) and being acted upon or affected (πάσχειν) (SVF 1.90, 98, 2.387). In addition, we find three-dimensionality as a defining characteristic (SVF 2.315, 381, 357). The definition was used in proofs of the soul’s corporeality (SVF 1.518). Indeed, when applied to the soul and the cause of its πάθη, it goes some way to explain the dual origin of evil, i.e. a bad soul, specified by Chrysippus and Posidonius alike, viz. the influence of impressions coming from outside and what other people say. I shall return to this point presently.

But how could Posidonius advance a credible *interpretatio Stoica* of the Platonic doctrine that the soul is intermediate between the perceptibles and intelligibles? As a Stoic, he may have interpreted the Platonic intelligibles in terms of the Stoic *lekta* (‘sayables’), which exist (or, as the Stoics said, ‘subsist’, the term existence being confined to corporeal reality) only in relation to the human soul. In this sense the intellect can be said to be intermediate between the two realms.<sup>42</sup> The *lekta* are the hallmark of its rationality, which derives from the eternal cosmos, i.e. its intellect which is identified with God.

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<sup>42</sup> On the contrast drawn between what is perceptible (αἰσθητόν) and what is intelligible (νοητόν) see SVF 2.81 (Chrysippus). On the intelligibles as ‘sayables’ (λεκτά) see SVF 2.195.

This connection is referred to by Posidonius when he speaks of our intellect being oriented towards the ‘*daimôn* within us.’ (Fr. 187, ll. 6-7).

Admittedly, Plutarch fails to mention Posidonius’ view concerning the kind of corporeal substance of which the soul consists. Other sources unequivocally confirm that he subscribed to the general Stoic view that the soul is *pneuma*.<sup>43</sup> But there is one Platonist source which not only reflects the Posidonian exegesis at issue in Plutarch but also implements the Posidonian definition of the term of *pneuma*: D.L. 3.67 gives as Plato’s definition of the soul: ‘the form of *pneuma* extending to all sides’ (ιδεάν τοῦ πάντα διεστῶτος πνεύματος).

The *pneuma*-doctrine is also crucial to the Stoic scale of nature. This too was brought by Posidonius to bear on his reading of the *Timaeus*, viz. in a passage which is one of Galen’s main-proof-texts in his attempt to attribute the Platonic tripartition to Posidonius.

A related piece of exegesis of the Platonic *Timaeus* may have been preserved by Achilles, *Introduction to Aratus* 13 (Posid. F 149 E.-K.), on the conception of the stars as living things (ζῳδία), i.e. possessed of a soul. This view is attributed to Plato in the *Timaeus* (40b), Aristotle in the second book of his *On the Universe* (292b) and Chrysippus in the *On Providence and the Gods* (SVF 2.687).<sup>44</sup> Achilles then continues:

The Epicureans say that they [i.e. the stars] are not living beings (ζῳδία),<sup>45</sup> since they are contained by bodies, but the Stoics hold the opposite view. Posidonius says that the Epicureans do not know that the bodies do not contain the souls but the souls contain the bodies, just as glue holds both itself and things external to it.

As in Diogenes Laertius and elsewhere, Posidonius represents the general Stoic position, just as Chrysippus does a little earlier in the same passage. The view in question, viz. that the soul contains the body and not vice versa, also derives from the *Timaeus* (34b, 36d-e).<sup>46</sup> The simile of glue however is not Platonic and may well be Posidonian. One recalls ἔξις, the Stoic principle of cohesion which, being

<sup>43</sup> See Frs. 28a+b, 21, ll.5-6 E.-K. (= D.L. 7.138).

<sup>44</sup> A work of this title is not attested elsewhere, though Chrysippus wrote treatises known as *On Providence* (SVF 3, App. II, nr. XLVIII) and *On the Gods* (*ibid.* nr. XXIII). The phrasing in Achilles might represent either a conflation of these two, or perhaps an alternative title of the former. On the Stoic doctrine of the stars as ensouled and rational see e.g. Stob. *Ecl.* I 25.3 (Arius Didymus, *fr. phys.* 33 Diels, SVF 1.120).

<sup>45</sup> I.e. the demunitive which is used to indicate the signs of the Zodiac.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Plut. *De gen. an. in Tim.* 1023A-B.

the lowest level of *pneuma*, is also included in soul. In early Stoic texts, too, its function is often described in terms of containment.<sup>47</sup> Posidonius himself, moreover, is on record as subscribing to the early Stoic scale of nature in terms of three kinds, or levels, of *pneuma*—cohesive, physical and psychic (i.e. πν. ἐκτικόν, φυσικόν, ψυχικόν).<sup>48</sup> Posidonius, then, used a Platonic view in the service of a Stoic doctrine; that is to say, he assimilated Plato to Stoicism.

The relevance of the concept of conation (ὁρμή) to Posidonius' position can also be inferred from two passages concerned with the scale of nature, one from Diogenes Laertius (7.85-87; 86-87 ~ Posid. F 185), the other from Galen (*PHP* 5.6.37-38 ~ Posid. F 33 E-K). The former presents a concise though integrated account of mental development in terms of the Stoic idea of familiarization (οἰκείωσις), from the so-called 'first conation' (πρώτη ὁρμή) directed towards self-preservation to the pursuit of virtue as the End (τέλος) of man. In this context the concept of ὁρμή is used to explain the difference between living creatures. The principle governing the existence of plants is φύσις ('nature'), i.e. the principle of nourishment and growth.<sup>49</sup> Animals (ζῷα) are marked by their possession of conation (as well as perception).<sup>50</sup> In animals plant-like processes do occur, but for them conation comes on top of it (ἐπιγενομένης), enabling them to move themselves towards what is appropriate (viz. to their nature). We must keep in mind this reference to locomotion (πορεύεται). In rational creatures (i.e. adult humans) reason (λόγος) 'through a more perfect dispensation' (viz. of divine Nature) comes

<sup>47</sup> On ἔξις, i.e. πνεῦμα ἐκτικόν, containing (συνέχειν) bodies see *SVF* 2.368, 473 (p.155.29-30), 540, 716; cf. 2.439; on the hierarchy of levels of *pneuma* see e.g. 2.458.

<sup>48</sup> Fr. 21 = D.L. 7.138, linking Chrysippus' *On Providence* (*SVF* 2.634) and Posidonius' *On the Gods*. Here the levels of *pneuma* are explained in terms of the difference in quality or intensity of the divine intellect. At its lowest level it is *hexis*, at its highest human intellect. Although the levels of *physis* and *psychê* do not receive separate mention, it is clear that Posidonius drew on the threefold hierarchy of kinds of *pneuma* developed by his predecessors. Cf. also F 23 on the cosmos as ensouled and the heaven as its *hégemonikon*. The reference to Chrysippus may indeed be due to the fact that Posidonius included it in his treatise.

<sup>49</sup> Plants therefore have no soul: see *PHP* 6.3.7 (*SVF* 2.710), where note that Galen nonetheless proceeds to equate Stoic *physis* with the Platonic *appetitive* part and the Aristotelian nutritive power of the soul; cf. also *SVF* 2.708-13, 718. In addition, we may note that the mode of being indicated by the term *physis* is often explained as a principle of κίνησις, a term which is often rendered as motion but can be used in the wider sense of 'process', see the rather full *scala naturae* presented by Philo, *SVF* 2.458, 1133.

<sup>50</sup> Similarly the fuller account of Philo printed as *SVF* 2.458

on top of conation; it takes over as a ‘craftsman (τεχνίτης) of conation’. The last point serves to indicate an entirely different relation between reason and conation than is expressed in terms of powers or parts of the soul.

This *scala naturae* can be summarized as follows:

<u>Class of living things:</u>	<u>Mode of being:</u>
Plants	Nature ( <i>physis</i> )
Non-rational animals	Nature and soul with conation and perception
Rational animals (humans) <sup>51</sup>	Nature and soul with <i>rational</i> conation and perception

This account serves to underpin the Stoic formula of the human End, ‘living according to nature’, as being equal to ‘living according to virtue’. Since Nature has bestowed intelligence upon us, it also leads us to virtue; hence it is appropriate and natural for us to pursue virtue. This latter point is established with reference to Zeno in his *On the Nature of Man* (SVF 1.179), Cleanthes in his *On Pleasure* (SVF 1.552) and Posidonius and Hekaton in their *On Ends*. In other words, Posidonius features (as so often in Diogenes) as one of the authorities who may be called upon to attest a particular doctrine distinctive of Stoic philosophy in general. In this case he subscribes to the above scale of nature turning on the concept of conation.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>51</sup> The Stoics considered the soul of children still non-rational, thus putting them on a par with animals, see SVF 3.477, 512, 537. (In consequence, they have no real affections—a point much criticized by Galen, e.g. PHP 5.1.10 = SVF 3.476 and cf. *supra*, p. 138 ff.). Children become rational at about the age of fourteen (although seven is also mentioned), see SVF 2.764, 149 (from the texts assembled here it is also clear that the Stoics stressed that this was a gradual process). In fact, the development of a human being from conception onwards may be formulated in terms of the *scala naturae*, since the embryo is governed by *physis*, see SVF 2.756–761, 806 with Tieleman (1991). The process of growth, then, for the human being traverses the stages of *physis-psyche-reason* (i.e. rational *psychê*).

<sup>52</sup> Not only this cluster of references is included by Edelstein-Kidd but (in view of διόπερ, l.7) also the text of § 86 from ἐκ περιττοῦ onwards. However, this breaks the scale of nature into two. In consequence F 185 begins with the animals and omits the plants. It is therefore more preferable to include the preceding sentence as well, i.e. from οὐδέν τε, φασί, διήλλαξεν ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ τῶν φυχῶν κτλ. The plural verb φασί (if correct) suits the plurality of authorities concluding the passage, underlining that we are dealing with a general Stoic view. So it is preferable to keep the exposition of the scale of nature intact and together with the authorities mentioned in conclusion. Accordingly the scale of nature is attributable to Posidonius as well.

Galen ascribes a similar *scala naturae* to Posidonius alone, but his report serves as another piece of evidence that the Stoic had espoused the Platonic tripartition:

Chrysippus does not believe that the affective part of the soul is other than the rational and he deprives the irrational animals of their affections, although they are clearly governed by desire and anger, as Posidonius too expounds about them at length. He says that all animals that are not easily moved and are like plants<sup>53</sup> attached to rocks or the like, are ruled by desire alone; but all other animals make use of both powers, the appetitive and the spirited; and only man employs three (powers), for in addition he has acquired the rational principle.<sup>54</sup> Posidonius was correct in what he said about this and about much else in the whole of his treatise *On Affections* (5.6.37-8 = Posid. F 33).<sup>55</sup>

It may be helpful to schematize the *scala naturae* ascribed to Posidonius as follows:

Class of animals:

Parts of the soul:

immobile animals and plants (?)	~	appetitive part
mobile non-rational animals	~	appetitive and spirited parts
rational animals (= humans)	~	appetitive and spirited and rational parts

Apart from the obvious point that this hierarchical schema has been modelled on the Platonic tripartition, a few terms echo the *Timaieus*

<sup>53</sup> Plato ascribed (a rudimentary form of) desire as well as sensation to plants, *Tim.* 77b. The Stoa by contrast differentiated sharply between plants and animals: plants are not ensouled (ἔμψυχα) but have nature (φύσις); they lack the defining characteristics of soul and hence animals, viz. perception (or presentation, αἴσθησις or φαντασία) and conation (ὁρμή), including desire: see *SVF* 2.458, 2.708, 2.177.32 f. and esp. *PHP* 6 3.7, where Galen notes that the Stoics do not give the governing principle of plants the name 'soul' at all but 'nature', but nonetheless equates Stoic nature with the Platonic appetitive soul and the Aristotelian nutritive-cum-generative soul. The same equation seems to be behind the present passage.

<sup>54</sup> Similarly Plato, *Lg.* 897b.

<sup>55</sup> 'Ο δὲ Χρύσιππος οὐθ' ἕτερον εἶναι νομίζει τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἀφαιρεῖται τὰ πάθη φανερώς ἐπιθυμία τε καὶ θυμῷ διοικουμένων, ὥς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ὑπερ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ πλεόν διεξέρχεται. ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν ζώων δυσκίνητα τ' ἐστὶ καὶ προσπεφυκότα δίκην φυτῶν πέτραις ἢ τισιν ἑτέροις τοιοῦτοις, ἐπιθυμία μόνῃ διοικεῖσθαι λέγει [αὐτά], τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰ ἄλογα σύμπαντα ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἀμφοτέραις χρῆσθαι, τῇ τ' ἐπιθυμητικῇ καὶ τῇ θυμοειδεῖ, τὸν ἄνθρωπον δὲ μόνον ταῖς τρισὶ, προσειληφέναι γὰρ καὶ τὴν λογιστικὴν ἀρχήν. ταῦτα τε οὖν ὀρθῆς εἴρηται τῷ Ποσειδωνίῳ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα καθ' ὅλην τὴν Περὶ τῶν παθῶν πραγματείαν.



and other dialogues, thus lending the passage a Platonic colouring.<sup>56</sup> Yet this hierarchy cannot be paralleled directly from Plato. Plato's attribution of the soul's third part to plants (*Tim.* 77b) is here applied to immobile animals, e.g. sponges, shell-fish and the like. In other words these animals are plant-like insofar as they are immobile. Still, Plato in the *Timaeus* makes a few remarks about animals which can be connected to our passage. Although he does not *explicitly* attribute one, or two, non-rational parts to animals, this can be inferred from two passages. First, in discussing the nature of man (69d-72b), he introduces the two non-rational functions as necessary concomitants of man's earthly existence, which involves self-preservation, nourishment, procreation, etc.<sup>57</sup> Humans are given these functions in addition to the immortal (i.e. rational) principle. This might have been taken by ancient interpreters to imply that the soul of the non-rational creatures has the two non-rational parts only.

We enter firmer ground when we take a look at the grand carousel of metempsychosis expounded by Plato at *Tim.* 91d-92c. Terrestrial animals descend from men who neglected the 'circuits in the head' (i.e. reason) in favour of 'those parts of the soul that are in the breast' (91e). So in their next lives they come back in a form that is degraded, but appropriate to their previous lifestyle. The reference to the breast may be taken to mean that land animals possess the spirited part. And if they are animals, one may further infer, they are bound to possess the appetitive part as well, if only because of its nutritive function. Here as elsewhere in the *Timaeus*, Plato is more concerned with morality than with biological taxonomy. But the underlying hierarchy of living creatures in terms of the distribution of the three parts is easy to discern.

The following point is of special importance. Plato subsequently (92b) states that aquatic animals, notably fish and shell-fish, are the most inferior kind and come from the stupidest type of humans. It is natural to infer that fish and shell-fish have no spirited part, but only the appetitive. After all, they must stem from people who lived according to appetite, as distinguished from others who lived according to the spirited part. This inference too seems unavoidable.

In sum, whatever its precise provenance, the scale of nature ascribed by Galen to Posidonius represents a systematization (involving

<sup>56</sup> See Kidd *ad loc.* (= *Comm.*, pp. 164 ff.) and *supra*, n. 31, pp. 208, 210.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *Tim.* 91c2.

interpretative inference) of the relevant statements in the *Timaeus*.<sup>58</sup> However, there is also an important point of difference between his account and the Platonic text. The case of the shell-fish makes this clear. Being immobile, they are ranked with plants which according to Plato (not the Stoics) possess appetite (ἐπιθυμία), i.e. the third part of the soul. By the same token the perfectly mobile fish must have the spirited part (in addition to the appetitive part) according to the Posidonian schema and contrary to the Platonic text. This adaptation of the Platonic schema in terms of locomotion seems to reflect the emphasis placed upon this function in the Stoic *scala naturae* as presented by Diogenes Laertius, 7.85-87. Here, as we have noticed, animals are marked by sensation, but above all by conation, viz. ὁρμή, explained in terms of locomotion.<sup>59</sup> Since conation and perception are the defining characteristics of soul, plants have no soul but *physis*—the principle governing growth and generation.

Plato had accorded plants (a limited form of) desire-cum-sensation and hence soul (*Tim.* 77b). Posidonius is primarily concerned with classes of animals. Shell-fish are animals although they are said to be like plants on account of their immobility. Strictly speaking, he does not say that plants have desire, although the Platonic context of the passage seems to make this inference probable. As we have seen, the Stoics did not even use the term soul in the case of plants but preferred 'nature' or 'physique' (Long-Sedley).<sup>60</sup> Desire has nothing to do with this. For them desire is a form of conation and as such involved in many types of action and locomotion.<sup>61</sup> In this respect, then, Posidonius presented the Platonic position as different from the Stoic one. Still Posidonius must have been attracted to the relevant Platonic passages. Why? I submit that Posidonius, in line with the

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<sup>58</sup> Nemes. *De nat. hom.* ch. 1, pp. 3-4 Morani presents a similar (though much fuller) *scala naturae*. Unsurprisingly, the similarities between this text and *PHP* 5.6.38 have been taken to point to Posidonius as their common source. Yet the similarities are only superficial: although Nemesius too pays much attention to immobile animals, it should be noted that he credits them with the sense of touch, i.e. a limited form of sensation, whereas Galen/Posidonius ascribes to them desire. On the question of the source of this account in Nemesius see Reinhardt (1954) 777 with further references. It is worth noting that the wording of the passage is strongly reminiscent of Galen. Nemesius is agreed to have used the *PHP*, so he may have drawn this account from the lost section of book 1. There, Galen tells us at *PHP* 4.7.35, he discussed the psychic functions of the lower animals. (Other Galenic works cannot be excluded, of course).

<sup>59</sup> *SVF* 2.458, 2.708, 2.177.32f., *PHP* 6.3.7 (on which see in text) and *infra* in text.

<sup>60</sup> See *supra*, n. 53.

<sup>61</sup> See *SVF* 2.458, 2.708, 2.177.32 f., *PHP* 6.3.7.

general Stoic schema, reinterpreted Platonic appetite (ἐπιθυμία) and drive (or anger, θύμος) in terms of Stoic conation (ὁρμή). When Plato assigned these to animals, he was assumed to have merely anticipated the Stoic position on this matter.

But this is not how Galen wishes to read Posidonius. If three different kinds of animals (two classes of non-rational animals, viz. mobile and immobile, and humans) are each marked by one psychic function which the lower kind lacks, these functions must represent separate powers.<sup>62</sup> This reading represents a stock argument from the traditional repertory of anti-Stoic polemic. As such, the argument instantiates the tack of 'inversion' (περιτροπή), since it turns the Stoic *scala naturae* against Stoic psychology as expounded by Posidonius. Galen found this ploy irresistible when he came across Platonic terminology in Stoic authors.<sup>63</sup> Posidonius' employment of the terms belonging with the Platonic tripartition is just such a case. What is more, the argument as such is traditional. This can be inferred from the following passage from Plutarch's *On Moral Virtue*.<sup>64</sup>

In general they themselves say—and this is obvious—that of existing things some are governed by cohesion, others by nature, others by non-rational soul and again others by a soul that also has reason and intellect, of all of which man partakes at once and he exists in all the different kinds mentioned; for he is both held together by cohesion and nourished by nature and uses reason and intellect. In consequence, he also partakes of the non-rational and he has the principle of affection within as something innate, because it is not adventitious but necessary, and not to be eradicated completely but in need of therapy and education (ch. 12, 451B-C ~ SVF 2.460, part).<sup>65</sup>

This schema resembles the Stoic chain of being as presented by Diogenes. Plutarch even offers all three main varieties of all-pervading *pneuma*, adding ἔξις, i.e. the cohesive principle, to the vegetative and

<sup>62</sup> This is accepted by Cooper (1998) 106 n.32 (though he is generally reluctant to accept that Posidonius spoke of powers in the sense indicated by Galen, see *infra*, p. 201).

<sup>63</sup> See *infra*, p. 274.

<sup>64</sup> For a fuller discussion of this treatise and the history of its interpretation see Babut (1969b).

<sup>65</sup> καθόλου δὲ τῶν ὄντων αὐτοὶ τέ φασι καὶ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἔξει διοικεῖται τὰ δὲ φύσει τὰ δ' ἀλόγῳ ψυχῇ τὰ δὲ καὶ λόγον ἐχούσῃ καὶ διάνοιαν, ὧν ὁμοῦ τι πάντων ὁ ἄνθρωπος μετέσχηκε καὶ γέγονεν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς εἰρηνόμεναις διαφοραῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἔξει συνέχεται καὶ φύσει τρέφεται καὶ λόγῳ χρῆται καὶ διανοίᾳ. μέτεστιν οὖν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου, καὶ σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀρχήν, οὐκ ἐπεισόδιον ἀλλ' ἀναγκαίαν οὖσαν, οὐδ' ἀναιρετέαν παντάπασιν ἀλλὰ θεραπείας καὶ παιδαγωγίας δεομένην.

psychic ones. The Galenic testimony deviates from the other two through its Platonic colouring but this results from the Platonic exegesis by Posidonius. Of the Stoic schema, the important element of locomotion has been preserved. The basic schema is the same in all three accounts. Moreover, it is clear that Plutarch and Galen put it to the same polemical use.

Like Galen, Plutarch turns the Stoic *scala naturae* against the Stoics by deducing from it that humans also have a non-rational (part of the) soul. It is inessential to the gist of the argument that Galen divides this part further into anger and desire as characteristic of two classes of non-rational animals. Both authors use the scale of being to make a special point about the make-up of the human soul in particular, viz. that it has a non-rational part in addition to *and separate from* reason. This non-rational part is the cause of affections in the full sense as applicable to adult humans. In actual fact, however, the Stoics are not vulnerable to this part of the argument because they do not accept the concept of part of the soul, and have a different view of the affections and their cause. They claim that non-rational animals (including children) exhibit no affections in the strict sense at all, but merely something analogous.

### 3. *Children and Other Animals*

I now turn to another class of non-rational animals, at least according to the Stoics—children (5.5.1-29). This whole section is printed by Edelstein and Kidd as a fragment of Posidonius' *On Affections*. But again it is worth asking to what extent this generous demarcation is warranted. That children exhibit a natural kinship to pleasure and victory, Galen argues, is evident from their affections. And the same holds good for animals. Children develop a natural kinship to virtue when they reach the age of reason (1-7).<sup>66</sup> At the end of the passage (*ibid.* 9) Posidonius is said to have 'castigated and refuted' Chrysippus. I do not believe that we should take statements like this for granted. Terms such as 'castigate' and 'refute' in connection with Chrysippus, like 'admire' and 'accept' in connection with Plato, may result entirely from Galen's creative interpretation of Posidonius. What exactly is going on in this passage?

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<sup>66</sup> See *supra*, n. 51.

The term translated here as ‘natural kinship’ is the Stoic technical term οἰκεῖωσις. As we have seen, it is a well-attested early Stoic doctrine that non-rational animals exhibit a ‘first conation’ towards self-preservation, i.e. they feel a natural kinship towards themselves. Chrysippus specifically argued that it was self-preservation not pleasure which motivated them (D.L. 7.85-6, on which see above, p. 214). This applies to animals and to children until their reason reaches maturity. This last element of the early Stoic account has been preserved in Galen’s testimony. However, the fact that non-rational animals are said to display affections runs counter to the early Stoic position. What lurks behind this point is of course the Platonic tripartition: pleasure would indicate the existence of the appetitive part and ambition that of the spirited. When Galen at *PHP* 5.6.38 argues from the affections displayed by animals to the presence of corresponding powers in their souls, his strategy is the same. In both cases the point is clear: attaining the age of reason does not remove the appetitive and spirited parts that cause the typical patterns of behaviour and affections evident before that age. But the early Stoics conceived differently of the way reason takes control over our souls. With them, the difference is that between non-rational and rational conation. The affections play no part whatsoever.

The affections are constantly stressed by Galen, but in fact nothing compels us to assume that Posidonius was concerned with affection rather than conation. In other words, what interested him in Plato was the fact that this past master foreshadowed the Stoic approach to the soul in terms of conation. This of course did not commit him to the acceptance of Platonic-style tripartition. Galen even goes so far as to speak of ‘parts’ (μορίων) and ‘form’ (εἶδος) in this connection (8, p.318.12). Kidd ad Fr. 33, p.165 says that Galen foists the term ‘parts’ on Posidonius here. But then this not a ‘fragment’, in however wide a sense one chooses to use the term. It is a piece of devious polemic. If Galen is capable of foisting the Platonic concepts of part and form on Chrysippus, then, why, should he be incapable of foisting the Aristotelian concept of power on him too? In our passage he also ascribes to him the view that our only οἰκεῖωσις is directed towards virtue, i.e. the morally good—a gross oversimplification.<sup>67</sup> In adult humans too the idea of οἰκεῖωσις covers all types of behaviour which are reasonable and appropriate even in non-rational animals, for example self-

<sup>67</sup> As is also pointed out by Cooper (1998) 107 n.35, with whose conclusion that §§ 1-8 do not give us Posidonius’ position I find myself in agreement.

preservation. Or do we stop eating once we have become fully rational at the age of fourteen? Did Posidonius offer this picture of οἰκείωσις? I believe not. That the argument of ll. 1-8 is Galenic and not Posidonian is further indicated by the fact that Galen says that the ‘ancient philosophers’ were the *only* ones who held that we have affinity (οἰκείωσις) with all three things, viz. pleasure, victory and virtue. The expression ‘ancient philosophers’ must refer to Plato and Aristotle; it cannot pertain to Posidonius.<sup>68</sup> So Galen seems to stop pretending that Posidonius ever shared this view. What appears to be the case is that for once Galen reproduces what Posidonius said about the ancients without making it look like wholesale and unqualified support for the latter.

Still, the mention of Posidonius’ name in what follows has led most interpreters to ascribe the idea of three οἰκείωσεις to Posidonius, which is especially tempting once we have bought Galen’s story that Posidonius had accepted the Platonic tripartition, albeit in terms of powers.<sup>69</sup> As such, this idea becomes a cornerstone in the reconstruction of Posidonian ethics. I assume that it is merely an inaccurate reflection of his reading of Plato in the context of a preliminary investigation into anticipations of the basic and distinctive Stoic doctrine, which dispenses with separate powers or parts.

What interested Posidonius in Plato was not only the latter’s anticipation of the Stoic concept of conation (ὁρμή). Plato had also spoken about the impact of corporeal factors on mental phenomena. For Posidonius this foreshadowed another Stoic concern. One of clearest testimonies on this point is found at *PHP* 5.5.30-40, printed whole by Edelstein-Kidd as Posid. F 31. This is a motley collection of various anti-Chrysippean points, only some of which in one way or other exploit things Posidonius said.

According to Galen Posidonius in the first book of his work admired Plato for what he said about the care required for the seed and the embryo, i.e. about the regimen of the prospective father and mother alike (*ibid.* 30). Regimen as a way of conditioning the soul through physical means had been advocated already by Zeno (see p. 165). From a Stoic point of view care for the semen of prospective fathers makes perfect sense because semen is a portion of soul (secreted by the part of the soul called σπερματικόν).<sup>70</sup>

<sup>68</sup> Similarly Cooper (1998) 107 n.35.

<sup>69</sup> Thus influentially Kidd (1971) and (1988) 616-618,

<sup>70</sup> See Chrys. *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 3.1.11 (*SVF* 2.885).

Posidonius, Galen tells us, wrote ‘a kind of epitome’ of what Plato had said<sup>71</sup> about raising and educating children ‘in order that the affective and non-rational [aspect] of the soul (τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς) may exhibit due measure in its motions and obedience to the commands of the rational (τὸ λογιστικόν)’ (*ibid.* 32).<sup>72</sup> The term ‘motions’ can only apply to what Posidonius called the affective motions (παθητικαὶ κινήσεις). In other words, he was interpreting Plato in his own Stoic terms (rather than the other way round, as Galen would have it). Posidonius may well have used the substantivated neutre forms τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ἄλογον as well as the Platonic term τὸ λογιστικόν. Even so, these terms are neutral with regard to the number and ontological status of the sections into which the soul is divided. Galen of course invites us to read these expressions in terms of separate and permanent powers (δυνάμεις). But Posidonius more often used the substantivated neutre to distinguish our rationality and its opposite, using various terms (*PHP* 5.5.4 = F 187 E.-K.). Galen may have substituted these with more theoretically laden terms such as τὸ λογιστικόν. This term may have featured in the original Posidonian exposition, but Galen seems to have blurred the distinction between Posidonius’ report on Plato—referred to as an ‘epitome’—with his Stoicizing interpretation. But certainty is hard to achieve, since we are dealing with an indirect and biased reflection of the original exposition.

§ 35 attests to Posidonius’ view that ‘this’ (scil. the λογιστικόν) becomes mature around the fourteenth year—a well-attested early Stoic view.<sup>73</sup> Then it takes control over the two non-rational parts just as a charioteer rules two horses—the celebrated image of the Platonic *Phaedrus* (246a6 ff.). This is connected with a point about the proper education of the soul; whereas the charioteer benefits from rational instruction, his horses receive their proper virtue from a kind of non-rational habituation. That Galen blurs the distinction

<sup>71</sup> Pl. *Lg.* VII, 789a-e, 792e.

<sup>72</sup> The next explanatory sentence (*ibid.* 33) is taken by Edelstein-Kidd as a direct quotation from Posidonius: αὕτη γὰρ ἀρίστη παίδων παιδεία[ς], παρασκευὴ τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ἂν ἐπιτηδαιοτάτη ἢ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λογιστικοῦ. But one cannot be sure whether the γὰρ signals direct quotation. Cooper (1998) 91 follows Edelstein-Kidd in taking the statement as a direct quotation (91) and hence λογιστικόν as deriving from Posidonius (p.106 n.32). Cooper infers that if Posidonius used this rather archaic Platonic term, he will also have used the standard Platonic terms for the other two powers. But even if this were the case, it remains crucial to take account of the original context in which these terms were embedded.

<sup>73</sup> See e.g. *SVF* 1.149, 3 Diog. 17 and *supra*, n. 51.

between Plato and Posidonius with respect to imagery and the doctrines thus illustrated is strongly indicated by the latter's simile of a runaway horse carrying off its rider until it is brought under control (5.6.31 = F 166.10 ff.). It is hard not to see in this simile a deliberate substitution for Plato's, which of course suits a tripartite conception of the soul.

From § 36 onwards Galen is no longer rendering what he has read in Posidonius. But does he still depend on the latter's argument? Edelstein-Kidd print another five paragraphs (36-40) dealing with the plurality of virtues and Chrysippus' inability of accounting for them—a traditional anti-Stoic point which can be paralleled from Plutarch, *On Moral Virtue* 441 (SVF 3.255). But there is nothing in this section to prove Posidonian provenance.<sup>74</sup>

Another passage in Galen, referring to Plato's discussion in the *Republic* of the virtues as related to the different powers of the soul, has been printed by Edelstein-Kidd among the fragments illustrating Posidonius' 'relation to other philosophers' (5.7.9-10 = Posid. T 96 E.-K.). But Galen merely says that Posidonius agreed with Plato (and Aristotle!) and distanced himself from Chrysippus in these matters. This passage does certainly not reflect (nor is it even meant to reflect) an original statement of passage in Posidonius lending explicit support to the Platonic tripartition, let alone attesting his use of the *Republic*. But its inclusion among this particular group of fragments attests to the tendency of inferring too much from Galen's repeated talk of Posidonius 'following' or 'agreeing with' Plato when we are mostly dealing with dialectical groupings based on a pre-existing schema of options (see above, p. 34). In consequence, the very status of such passages as testimonies is dubious. Edelstein-Kidd print the passage as a 'fragment' because of their criterion of the presence of the name Posidonius, but (as they realized only too well) this leaves open quite a few possibilities.

We seem to be on slightly firmer ground when we come to *PHP* 4.7.23, printed by Edelstein-Kidd as their next testimony attesting to Posidonius' relation to Plato (T 97). Having said that Chrysippus failed to indicate the cause of the affections and so the mode of their therapy, Galen continues:

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<sup>74</sup> Kidd, in his commentary, p. 161 f. expresses doubt about the provenance of this section.



And yet Plato described these matters admirably, as Posidonius too points out, admiring the man and calling him divine since he held in honour Plato's doctrines about the affections and the powers of the soul and all that he wrote on the subject of the soul's affections not arising at all, or, once having arisen, ceasing very quickly.<sup>75</sup>

This is not a verbatim fragment either, though the point about Posidonius calling Plato 'divine' seems reliable. But the implication of the rest for the model of the soul defended by Posidonius is unclear. The only thing we may take for granted is that Posidonius made use of Plato in the context of the affections and spoke quite favourably about him.

The phase of the history of the Stoic school called by the modern historiographical term 'Middle Stoicism' is known for its receptiveness to Platonic and Aristotelian concepts—the implication being that this marked a turn towards a more syncretistic attitude. However, we must realize that this picture is largely based on the Galenic passages at issue here. If the Stoics referred to Plato, what exactly did this imply? Professed admiration does not preclude assimilation to one's own doctrine. On many points we do not even know for sure how the Stoics read Plato. The emphasis placed by Posidonius on Plato's concern with prenatal regimen is indeed an unexpected point. There may be more in Plato which could be seen as anticipating Stoic corporealist psychology. Think for example of *Tim.* 86–88, with its similar stress on the influence exercised by the body upon mental phenomena (see above, pp. 188 ff.). In the context of his interpretation of the *Timaieus*, as we have noticed, Posidonius seems to have argued that according to Plato the soul is corporeal, or at least explained the Platonic text in a way congenial to the Stoic position (see above, p. 209 ff.).

But is there any evidence from other sources concerning Stoic attitude towards Plato around this time? Clement, *Strom.* V, 97.6 (*SVF* 3 Ant. 56) tells us that Antipater devoted three books to the thesis that Plato subscribed to the Stoic thesis of the self-sufficiency of virtue and 'presented more doctrines [viz. of Plato] as consonant with the Stoic ones'. Here too we have no return to Plato but rather an assimilation of Plato to the Stoic position. If we abandon our supposition that the early Stoics were always categorically hostile to Plato,<sup>76</sup> it becomes

<sup>75</sup> On these phenomena as discussed by Posidonius and Chrysippus see *infra*, pp. 225 f.

<sup>76</sup> See Barnes (1991), esp. 120, who, in a review of Dörrie (1990), argues persuasively that the conventional story of an early Hellenistic hostility towards Plato

possible to see Posidonius' use of Plato as an instance of the standard Stoic procedure of appropriating earlier wisdom.<sup>77</sup> On other issues, as we have noticed, Posidonius chose other past masters as his point of departure, notably Aristotle.

Let us now draw a few threads together. We have found no direct evidence in support of Galen's claim that Posidonius endorsed the Platonic tripartition and parted company with Chrysippus. Still, Posidonius did refer to Plato and Galen may have capitalized on the fact that he did so more extensively—and more favourably—than Chrysippus and other Stoics had done. Yet the motivation behind this concern with Plato was crucially different from what Galen would have us believe. Posidonius interpreted the Platonic soul as an anticipation of the Stoic governing part of the soul, that is to say, he took the latter as comprising all three Platonic parts. Given his moral subject-matter Posidonius was concerned with conation in particular, i.e. with the motive aspect of the soul. This is also clear from his interest in affinity or appropriation (οἰκείωσις), which constitutes a pattern of conation and was associated by Posidonius with the Platonic tripartition. Thus he understood the movements of the Platonic non-rational parts as prototypes of Stoic conation. As we have seen, there are Platonic passages which encourage such a connection.<sup>78</sup> Indeed, as to *human* conation—described by the Stoics as conation directed by reason (see D.L. 7.85-89, discussed above)—Posidonius could also have found support in Platonic passages which ascribe beliefs to the non-rational parts.<sup>79</sup>

Contrast Galen's version of the Platonic tripartition. This involves a sharp separation between the parts of the soul which is not unlike the schema given by later Platonist handbooks but goes beyond

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(which ended by the time of so-called Middle Stoics such as Posidonius) does not stand up in the light of an unbiased scrutiny of the evidence.

<sup>77</sup> Panaetius is called Φίλοπλάτων (as well as Φίλαριστοτέλης) and said to have 'relaxed' some Zenonian doctrines, Philod. *Stoic. hist.* Col. LXI.1-6 Dorandi (= fr. 1 van Straaten/T 1 Alesse); cf. Cic. *Fin.* 4.79 (= fr. 55 v. Str./T 79 Alesse). But Philodemus' report may be biased the same way Galen's is. See further Barnes (1991) 120, cited in the previous n. This means that the so-called Middle Stoics do not mark the end of a period of hostility and the beginning of one of admiration. Testimonies attesting to the knowledge of Plato among earlier Stoics usually concern criticism of Platonic views, see Plut. *Stoic Rep.* 1034E, D.L. 7.36, Gal. *PHP* 3.1.14 and the other references collected by Barnes (1991) 122.

<sup>78</sup> See *supra*, p. 205.

<sup>79</sup> Plato, *Rep.* 442b-d, 574d, 603A, *Laws* 644c-d, 645a. They are described as counsellors at *Timaeus* 77a-c; cf. Sorabji (1993) 10-12.

anything to be found in the Platonic texts, which are more centred on the interaction between the parts.<sup>80</sup> This is something of a blind spot in Galen, linked, it would appear, to his anatomy with its three main *archai* : brain, heart and liver. Secondly, Galen focuses on the *affections* —anger and desire—typical of the non-rational parts and indeed establishes their status as powers distinct from reason.<sup>81</sup> No such inference is cogent from the Stoic point of view adopted by Posidonius. And Galen distorts the latter's interest in the motive aspects of the Platonic soul in order to present it as being concerned with the affections and non-rational powers. As we have seen (ch. 2.3.), there is some evidence that Posidonius postulated a scientific division of psychic functions which suited his acceptance of the Stoic view of the soul's pneumatic substance and involved a number of parts different from the Platonic triad. In his *On Affections* the Platonic tripartition functions in a *moral* context concerned with human conation. Posidonius' remarks about Plato in this text are not amenable to conclusions about the structure of the soul. This contextual distinction, as we have noticed, is flouted by Galen—much in the same way as he does in respect of Aristotle.

Apart from the conation/affections ambiguity involved, I should point to another feature of Posidonius' exposition which may have given Galen an opportunity to present him as a Platonist of sorts. In Posidonius we come across terms for psychic phenomena or states—especially substantivated neutre adjectives such as παθητικόν—which can easily be supplemented by terms such as 'part', but which in themselves are neutral as to ontological status. In fact, we have seen that they can be explained in the context of the Stoic doctrine of Posidonius' predecessors, viz. of their corporealist account of the soul.

In this connection it is interesting to compare the τέλος-formula ascribed by Clement of Alexandria to Posidonius (*Strom.* II.21.129. 1-5 ~ Posid. F 186 E.-K.). Among other things, it says that we should not allow ourselves to be led by 'the non-rational part (ἄλόγου μέρους) of the soul.' This unmistakably echoes Posidonius' own formulation in the verbatim fragment presented by Galen, *PHP* 5.6.4-5

<sup>80</sup> See esp. Pl. *Rep.* 438a-444b. But Galen and the handbooks reflect in particular the account of the soul's trilocution at *Tim.* 67c-72d; cf. also *supra*, p. 7.

<sup>81</sup> It is indeed a problem how Galen accounted for the coherence and interaction between the three parts, upon whose separation he insists so strongly; cf. Mansfeld (1991) 139 ff.

(Fr. 187). There is however one crucial difference: Posidonius uses the substantivated neutre forms ἀλόγου (as well as κακοδαίμονος καὶ ἀθέου), i.e. without the addition of μέρους or any other noun. It is Galen who adds this term (*ibid.* 8), thereby assimilating the position of Posidonius to that of Plato. But in his formal statement on Posidonius' position he declares that Posidonius posited Aristotelian powers as opposed to Platonic parts (6.2.5; see above, p. 34). Such fluctuations on Galen's part bring home the need to be extremely cautious in using his words to draw inferences as to the ontological status and division of psychic faculties advocated by Posidonius. We may assume that Posidonius treated the relation between the rational and the irrational; but as to the terms in which he did so and what is implied by them, we had better stick to his own words as quoted verbatim by Galen in the passage I have just mentioned, and elsewhere. Accordingly, Clement's use of the term 'part' is no surer guide to Posidonius' view on the soul's structure than Galen's.

If we turn to the verbatim quotations, we find that Posidonius consistently uses substantivated neutre adjectives, not 'powers' or 'parts'. He does so in contexts where he could hardly have failed to use one of the latter terms if they had belonged to his terminological apparatus.<sup>82</sup> It is worth quoting one of the key passages, *PHP* 5.6.4-5 (part of Fr. 187 E.-K.), in full:

The cause of the affections, i.e. of inconsistency and the unhappy life, is not to follow in everything the divinity [or 'guardian spirit'] within oneself who is of the same stock and has a similar nature to the one who governs the whole cosmos but at times to allow oneself to be distracted and carried along by what is worse and beast-like. But those who overlook this have neither got the cause of the affections right in these matters nor the correct view with respect to happiness and consistency; for they do not see that this consist first of all in not being led in anything by what is irrational and unhappy and godless in the soul.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Another important witness in this matter is to be found at 5.6.28 (F 174 E.-K.), where Galen presents a direct quotation from Posidonius: καὶ μὴν οἱ προκόπτοντες μεγάλα κακὰ δοκοῦντες ἑαυτοῖς (παρεῖναι) οὐ λυποῦνται· φέρονται γὰρ οὐ κατὰ τὸ ἀλογον τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ λογικόν. Here too Posidonius' neutre adjectival phrases can be easily construed as evidence for psychological dualism; but this is by no means compelling. Kidd's cautious rendering '(irrational ... rational) *aspect*' is therefore to be preferred to De Lacy's 'part'. Cf. also 5.6.22 (F 168), 24 f. (F 162).

<sup>83</sup> τὸ δὴ τῶν παθῶν αἴτιον, τουτέστι τῆς τε ἀνομολογίας καὶ τοῦ κακοδαίμονος βίου, τὸ μὴ κατὰ πᾶν ἐπεσθαι τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ δαίμονι συγγενεῖ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικοῦντι, τῷ δὲ χείρονι καὶ ζφωδῇ ποτὲ συνεκ-

Galen comments: 'Here Posidonius has clearly expounded how far Chrysippus and his adherent go astray, not only in their arguments concerning the affections but also in regard to the end.' In light of the other fragments and testimonies, Kidd and earlier commentators see no option but to subscribe to this interpretation.<sup>84</sup> Accordingly Kidd identifies the anonymous opponents who overlook the crucial point at issue as 'the Chrysippeans'.<sup>85</sup> In fact, that Posidonius is referring to Chrysippus and his followers (or just Chrysippus)<sup>86</sup> has been accepted ever since the sentence was printed by Von Arnim in the third volume of his collection, i.e. among the Chrysippean-cum general Stoic fragments on ethics (*SVF* 3.460). The criticism he is supposed to bring to bear upon the Chrysippean line is that they do not recognize a separate non-rational part of the soul, so do not recognize that unhappiness consists in being carried along by this part.

But is this really the only possible reading of this passage? Let us suppose that the anonymous opponents are not Posidonius' fellow-Stoics, as Galen claims, but adherents of a dualist conception of the soul, i.e. Platonists and Peripatetics. In that case Posidonius criticized them for including the irrational, 'godless' aspect of the soul (i.e. what *they* call 'part' or 'power') in their conception of happiness, or the end. According to both Plato and Aristotle happiness consists in bringing the non-rational parts (Plato) or powers (Aristotle) in tune with reason; if desire or appetite obeys reason the soul is harmonious and happy. That this model is Posidonius' target explains why he argues that happiness consists in being led *in no way* by the irrational; that unhappiness consists in not following our guardian spirit *in everything* but being led by what is worse and animal-like *from time to time*. The translated expressions I have italicized bring out the fact that Posidonius and the Platonic-cum-Aristotelian opposition are agreed insofar as reason's leading role is concerned. The difference is that the latter still accommodate the irrational in their conception

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κλίνοντας φέρεσθαι. οἱ δὲ τοῦτο παριδόντες οὔτε ἐν τούτοις βελτιοῦσι τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν παθῶν οὔτ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ὁμολογίας ὀρθοδοξοῦσιν· οὐ γὰρ βλέπουσιν ὅτι πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ κατὰ μηδὲν ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου τε καὶ κακοδαίμονος καὶ ἀθέου τῆς ψυχῆς.

<sup>84</sup> Kidd *ad loc.* (= vol. II.ii, pp. 677 f.) with further references.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. also Kidd, vol. III, p. 248 n. 157.

<sup>86</sup> The combination οἱ περί plus name may stand for just the person indicated by that name, see Dubuisson (1976/7). But the ambiguity does not affect our argument.

of the harmonious soul. Posidonius by contrast defends an exclusive conception of reason which should be followed absolutely. This also explains why he can say that his opponents do not understand the real cause of the affections. This is because they attribute them to non-rational parts or powers.

I submit that Posidonius' argument is the exact opposite of the argument attributed to him by Galen. It closely resembles Chrysippus' exposition in the first book of his *On Ends* as produced by Diogenes Laertius (7.87-8). Here we find the same emphasis on attuning our inner *daimôn* to the governor of the universe.<sup>87</sup> We may compare Plato's description at *Tim.* 90a of our intellect as an inner *daimôn*, in recognition of our kinship with the heavenly realm. We need not doubt that both Chrysippus and Posidonius were familiar with this passage.<sup>88</sup> For them, as Stoics, in Kidd's apt words, 'the demonic aspect of our mind is actually a concentration of the active creative rational principle that directs the universe, and which is physically immanent throughout it (the Stoic god).'<sup>89</sup> The term 'aspect' is apposite because the Stoic texts present the soul *tout court* as *daimôn*, not one particular part or function of it.<sup>90</sup> The Platonic backdrop lends additional point to Chrysippus' and Posidonius' emendation of the dualist model and its implications for the end. To readers familiar with the same Platonic passage it will have been obvious that Posidonius, as Chrysippus before him, was improving on Plato.

In sum, Posidonius is advocating the Chrysippean position without adding any doctrinal elements of his own. Accomodating one or more non-rational parts or powers as permanent components of our natural psychic make-up leads to a wrong view on the end and on the happy life.

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<sup>87</sup> Kidd *ad loc.* (vol. II.ii, p.676) discerns 'a slightly different emphasis; the Diogenes passage seems to stress the outside agency and its will ..., the law of Zeus. Posidonius stresses the internal daimon.' But as to the point at issue here, Kidd *ibid.* acknowledges: 'Both agree on the relationship.'

<sup>88</sup> As also noted by Kidd *ad loc.* (vol. II.ii, p.675)

<sup>89</sup> Kidd (1995) 223, referring to Marcus Aurelius, V.27 (the soul as 'offschoot' (ἀπόσπασμα) of the divine mind), Epictetus I, 14.1 ff., Sen. *Ep.* 41.2; on Epictetus cf. also Bonhoeffer (1894) 81 ff.

<sup>90</sup> See esp. Sextus, *M.* IX.74, with Kidd (1995) 223; Long-Sedley (1987) vol. 2, p. 391 (ad 63C).

#### 4. *Posidonius on the Causes of Affection*

*PHP* 5.5.21 is but a small section of the considerable chunk of Galenic text printed by Edelstein-Kidd as F 169. But it stands out as what seems to be a paraphrase of how Posidonius himself explained affection:<sup>91</sup>

... Indeed, Posidonius censures [scil. Chrysippus] also in these matters, and he tries to show that the causes of all false assumptions lie in the theoretical sphere through the affective pull, but that false opinions precede this [i.e. the pull], because the rational has weakened with respect to judgement. For conation is generated in the animal sometimes as the result of the rational but often as the result of the movement of the affective (5.5.21 ~ F 169 E.-K., ll. 77-84).<sup>92</sup>

This is a difficult passage. Most scholars are agreed that it needs supplementing at one particular point, assuming that Posidonius distinguished between error in the purely cognitive sense, indicated by the phrase ἐν τῷ θεωρητικῷ ('in the theoretical sphere'), from wrong judgement in the sphere of action, i.e. the type of judgement which may trigger affection. Kidd, De Lacy and others, following Pohlenz,<sup>93</sup> posit a lacuna after ἐν μὲν τῷ θεωρητικῷ and propose additions which would confine the working of the affective pull to practical reasoning as opposed to 'theoretical' thought. Thus De Lacy adds: <γίγνεσθαι δι' ἀμαθίας, ἐν δε τῷ πρακτικῷ >, which would yield: '...the causes of all false assumptions arise in the theoretical sphere through ignorance, but in the practical sphere through the affective pull ...' But as Fillion-Lahille<sup>94</sup> rightly points out, we need not assume a lacuna once we see that the expression πασῶν τῶν ψευδῶν ὑπολήψεων ('all false suppositions') does not mean all false suppositions in general, but those at issue in this particular context, viz. the suppositions which involve action including sometimes affective reactions.<sup>95</sup> So we should try to make sense of the text as it stands. Here the central issue, it

<sup>91</sup> On this passage see also Pohlenz (1898) 560; 564-5; 621 n.1; *id.* (1948) vol. II, p. 113; Gill (1998) 126 f., Sorabji (2000) 118.

<sup>92</sup> καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταῦθ' ὁ Ποσειδώνιος μέμφεται καὶ δεικνύναι πειρᾶται πασῶν τῶν ψευδῶν ὑπολήψεων τὰς αἰτίας ἐν μὲν τῷ θεωρητικῷ διὰ τῆς παθητικῆς ὀλκῆς, προηγέσθαι δ' αὐτῆς τὰς ψευδεῖς δόξας ἀσθενήσαντος περὶ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ λογιστικοῦ· γεννᾶσθαι γὰρ τῷ ζῳῳ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ κρίσει, πολλὰς δ' ἐπὶ τῇ κινήσει τοῦ παθητικοῦ.

<sup>93</sup> Pohlenz (1898) 560 ff.

<sup>94</sup> Fillion-Lahille (1984) 156, followed by Cooper (1998) 107 n.37.

<sup>95</sup> Müller's addition of γίγνεσθαι after ὀλκῆς makes the text smoother, but is not necessary either; γίγνεσθαι or εἶναι is to be understood; cf. Cooper (1998) 107 n.37.

seems to me, is the meaning of the phrase ἐν τῷ θεωρητικῷ in the undisputed part of our text. Does it express the idea of theoretical, as opposed to practical, thought?

As is well known, Aristotle used the same terms in distinguishing between the contemplative and practical intellect. But if we prefer to look for Stoic parallels, the contrasting pair θεωρητικῷ/πρακτικῷ also occurs in Stoic and Chrysippean texts on the contemplative and practical life (e.g. D.L. 130 ~ SVF 3.687). This distinction, however, is not relevant to the question of the soul's structure, and so does little to illuminate the Posidonian passage at issue here. It seems more apt to compare D.L. 7.125 (SVF 3.295) referring to Chrysippus' *On Virtues* (Περὶ ἀρετῶν), Hecaton's *On Virtues* as well as the *Physics*<sup>96</sup> of Apollodoros of Seleucia, who was a pupil of Diogenes of Babylon and so belonged to the same generation as Panaetius. Hecaton of Rhodes, like Posidonius, was a pupil of Panaetius (c.185-109 BCE) (Cic. *Off.* 3.63 ~ fr. 1 Gomoll).<sup>97</sup>

The reference at issue is found in the second half of D.L. 7.125 and opens a section on virtue (or 'excellence', ἀρετή) (125-9), which is appended to a list of properties of the Sage (*ibid.* 117 ff.). According to Diogenes, Chrysippus and Hecaton held that the virtues entail one another on the grounds that they have their θεωρήματα (concepts, ideas) in common.<sup>98</sup> Right after the supporting cluster of references it is explained (note γάρ) that the excellent person is capable both of contemplating (? considering?) and of doing what ought to be done (τὸν γὰρ ἐνάρετον θεωρητικὸν τ' εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν ποιητέων).<sup>99</sup> I take it that the genitive τῶν ποιητέων also depends on θεωρητικόν. Clearly, the difference between thought and action indicates two different aspects, or stages, of the same process of making a correct decisions and acting accordingly. One recalls the

<sup>96</sup> The *Physics* and *Ethics* to which Diogenes repeatedly refers were presumably sections of the work entitled *Introductions to the Doctrines* (7.39), which seems to have offered a comprehensive and standard exposition of Stoic philosophy. The evidence (in large part from D.L.) is collected by Von Arnim, SVF 3, pp. 259-61.

<sup>97</sup> The evidence does not permit a more exact dating of Hecaton; cf. Dorandi, s.v. Hecato, *Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy*. The most recent collection of his fragments (with discussion) is Gomoll (1933); cf. the critical review article by Pohlenz (1935). See further Philippon (1935) 385 ff., Pohlenz (1948), vol. 1, 240 f., vol. 2, 123 f.

<sup>98</sup> Similarly Stob. *Ecl.* II p. 63.6-8 (SVF 3.280); cf. Mansfeld (2003).

<sup>99</sup> In Stobaeus' account (cf. previous n.) the same is said, in slightly different words, in explanation of the virtue of practical wisdom (φρόνησις) in particular, *ibid.* 11-12.



Chrysippean distinction between two types of judgements, one purely cognitive, the other involving conation (see above, p. 169). No difference between psychic functions is at issue here. On the contrary, the unity of the virtues is based on the unitary intellect. Therefore the main point at issue cannot be the difference between contemplative and active lifestyles (though the connection between the two terms may include the suggestion that from the Stoic point of view the two are not differentiated at all, as is proved by the Sage combining them).

This argument, it has to be recalled, is attributed to both Chrysippus and Hecaton. An analogous difference between theoretical and practical excellence (or virtue) is ascribed to Hecaton's teacher Panaetius (D.L. 7.92 ~ Fr. 67 Alesse: Παναίτιος ... δύο ἀρετάς, θεωρητικὴν καὶ πρακτικὴν). Does this distinction presuppose a difference between permanent functions? It is legitimate in principle to use evidence concerning the virtues to draw inferences concerning the underlying conception of the soul. Posidonius said that the inquiry into the virtues depends directly on that of the affections (*PHP* 5.6.2 = F 30 E.-K. Cf. 4.7.24 ~ F 150a E.-K., where Galen ascribes to Posidonius the conviction that all ethics depends on one's view on the soul's *δυνάμεις*). But in fact Panaetius' distinction is not decisive for any particular position as to the soul's structure on his part, let alone for that of Posidonius. After all Aristotle too ascribed the practical and contemplative virtues to one function. On the basis of other texts Panaetius is often taken to have espoused a dualist model but, as I shall argue presently (below, p. 245 ff.), these texts warrant no such assumption.

That we have to look in a different direction is indicated by a further testimony on Hecaton. At 7.90 Diogenes Laertius turns to the Stoic account of virtue, and Hecaton is among the first authorities quoted (89 goes back to Chrysippus). Hecaton counts as one of the representatives of so-called Middle Stoicism. Yet in the context Diogenes cheerfully draws on him (90, 91), Cleanthes (89) Chrysippus (89, 91) and Posidonius (91) alike, presenting a picture of Stoic unanimity. The section deriving from Hecaton reads as follows:

(90) Virtue is in one sense the perfection of each thing in general, say, of a statue;<sup>100</sup> and there is non-theoretical perfection, such as health, and theoretical such as wisdom. For Hecaton in the first book

<sup>100</sup> At this point Von Arnim, followed by Marcovich, assumes a lacuna, see *SVF* vol. I, p. xxxix, in my view unnecessarily (Diogenes' style is often rather jerky).

of his *On Virtues* says that scientific and theoretical are those [virtues] which consist of theorems, such as wisdom and justice; non-theoretical are those that are regarded as co-extensive with those consisting of theorems, such as health and strength. For it is the case that health is concomitant and co-extensive with temperance, which is theoretical, just as strength supervenes on the building of an arch. (91) They are called non-theoretical insofar as they do not involve acts of assent but supervene, and occur even in the case of the non-wise, such as health and courage ...<sup>101</sup>

First of all it should be noted that Diogenes must be talking about the health and strength of the *soul* as opposed to that of the body. But health and strength are physical characteristics related to the soul's corporeal nature. The addition of courage is less odd than it might seem at first glance. Whereas the other three generic virtues (practical wisdom, temperance and justice) appear here as 'theoretical' (or perhaps 'cognitive'), courage is different insofar as it pertains to the soul's physical strength. One recalls Panaetius' substitution of magnanimity for courage in the traditional quartet of principal virtues and his ascription of courage to non-rational animals.<sup>102</sup> Hecaton's treatment of the same virtue coheres with the relevant testimonies concerning Panaetius.<sup>103</sup> The same Panaetian line of thought seems to be reflected by the point that the non-theoretical virtues occur in the non-wise also. The theoretical virtues by contrast presuppose the non-theoretical ones, the latter 'being co-extensive with' and 'supervening on' the former. The application of the concept of virtue to the non-wise (and by Panaetius apparently even the non-human, see above) represents a striking departure from Chrysippus. On the other hand, the latter had already spoken of the strength and beauty of the soul (see above, p. 145). Indeed, Chrysippus too used the

<sup>101</sup> Ἀρετὴ δ' ἡ μὲν τις κοινῶς (ἐν) παντὶ τελείωσις, ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντος· καὶ ἡ ἀθεώρητος, ὥσπερ ὑγίεια· καὶ ἡ θεωρηματικὴ, ὡς φρόνησις. φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Ἑκάτων ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ἀρετῶν ἐπιστημονικὰς μὲν εἶναι καὶ θεωρηματικὰς τὰς ἔχουσας τὴν σύστασιν ἐκ θεωρημάτων, ὡς φρόνησιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην· ἀθεωρήτους δὲ τὰς κατὰ παρέκτασιν θεωρουμένας ταῖς ἐκ τῶν θεωρημάτων συνεστηκυῖαι, καθάπερ ὑγίαν καὶ ἰσχύν. τῇ γὰρ σωφροσύνῃ τε θεωρημένη ὑπαρχούσῃ συμβαίνει ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ παρεκτείνεσθαι τὴν ὑγίαν, καθάπερ τῇ ψαλίδος οἰκοδομίᾳ τὴν ἰσχὺν ἐπιγίνεσθαι. καλοῦνται δ' ἀθεώρητοι ὅτι μὴ ἔχουσι συγκαταθέσεις, ἀλλ' ἐπιγίνονται καὶ περὶ φαύλους γίνονται ὡς ὑγίεια, ἀνδρεία.

<sup>102</sup> Cic. *De off.* I 50 (fr. 91 Alesse); cf. *ibid.* 15 (fr. 56 A.). In Early Stoic schemas magnanimity features as subspecies of courage, e.g. *SVF* 3.264. Since Diogenes indicates that each non-theoretical virtue was made to correspond to a theoretical one (e.g. psychic strength is linked to temperance), we may assume that courage and magnanimity remained thus linked as well.

<sup>103</sup> Similarly Gomoll (1933) 38 ff.

terms 'supervening on' and 'being co-extensive' to explain the relation of 'theoretical' to physical aspects of the soul. Hecaton seems to have elevated the non-theoretical aspects to the status of virtue without altering the substance of the doctrine he had inherited from Chrysippus (whether or not directly).<sup>104</sup> In fact, the account offered by Diogenes gives every appearance of being grafted on to Chrysippean doctrine. If one should characterize Hecaton's contribution, one could say that he expanded and formalized the position of his great predecessor.

These assumptions are borne out by the parallel account offered by Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II pp. 62.15-63.5 Wachsmuth (which directly precedes a notice on the unity of all virtues corresponding to D.L. 7.125, see above, p. 232). Whereas Diogenes lumps together so-called 'Early' and so-called 'Middle Stoics', Stobaeus mentions no names at all. This may explain why his account has on the whole not been contested as evidence for Early Stoic and in particular Chrysippean doctrine (cf. *SVF* 3.278).<sup>105</sup> The parallel with Hecaton did not escape Wachsmuth<sup>106</sup> and others,<sup>107</sup> though it plays no part in more recent attempts at reconstructing Posidonius' position against the backdrop of contemporary Stoicism:

These ... virtues, they [scil. the Stoics] say, are complete in the sphere of life and consist of theorems (θεωρημάτων); but others supervene on these because they are no longer forms of expertise but certain powers that are acquired through training, for instance the soul's health and soundness as well as its strength and beauty. For just as bodily health is a good blend of the hot, cold, dry and wet elements in the body, so too psychic health is a good mixture of the doctrines in the soul. And in the same way that bodily strength consists in sufficient tension in the nerves, so too psychic strength is sufficient strength in judging and acting or not acting. Just as the beauty of the body is the symmetry of its members existing in it with regard to both one another and to the whole, so too the beauty of the soul is the symmetry of the reason (τοῦ λόγου)<sup>108</sup> and its parts<sup>109</sup> in respect of the whole of it [scil. the soul] and towards one another.

<sup>104</sup> Similarly Pohlenz, vol. 1, 240 f.

<sup>105</sup> But cf. Gomoll (1933) 38 ff.

<sup>106</sup> in *apparatu ad loc.*

<sup>107</sup> Philippson (1930), esp. 374 ff., Gomoll (1933) 38 ff. Cf. Pohlenz, *GGA* (1935) 108.

<sup>108</sup> I.e. reason in the sense of *doctrine* or *theory* incarnated; cf. Epict. *Diss.* 4.8.12 with Mansfeld (2003).

<sup>109</sup> I.e. the theorems of which 'reason' (see prev. n.) consists, see the first sentence of this passage.

This explanation of the soul's strength and beauty in analogy to the body was also given by Chrysippus in his *On Affections*, as is witnessed by both Galen and Cicero (see above, pp. 148 ff., below 301). Here, as in Hecaton *ap.* Diogenes, the supervening qualities or powers of the soul feature as virtues. This constitutes a point of difference from Chrysippus, though one that is less significant than it might seem at first glance.

Here too we are dealing with the systematization based by Hecaton on Chrysippus' *On Virtues*.<sup>110</sup> What is said about the soul's strength and beauty could have been repeated by Chrysippus in the former work, in which it will have come up naturally. What Stobaeus adds to the testimony of Diogenes is the characterization of the soul's strength, soundness etc. as powers (δυνάμεις) in the Stoic sense of this term, as different from Aristotelian-style faculties. Here the powers are contrasted with the virtues as forms of expertise (τέχναι). This is in keeping with the Stoic definition of expertise (τέχνη) as a collection of theorems, or conceptions (θεωρήματα or καταλήψεις).<sup>111</sup> This particular element is not brought out by Diogenes, but he does make clear that 'theorematical' virtues such as practical wisdom and temperance presuppose assent, a concept which in Stoic epistemology is linked to that of cognition or conception (κατάληψις) since it is said to lead to the latter. In addition we may note that the soul's powers are said to come about through training, i.e. good habit or the constant practising of virtue in the proper sense. This too conforms to standard definitions of expertise, which include the element of training (i.e. of the conceptions or theorems).<sup>112</sup> Galen and other sources standardly associate training with psychological dualism. The present passage shows that it could be, and was, accommodated within the Stoic monistic framework as well. That the Stoic concept of expertise looms behind this passage is further borne out by the 'theorematical' virtues being said to be 'complete'

<sup>110</sup> For example of Hecaton's use of Chrysippean ideas in a different context, see Seneca, *De beneficiis* I 3,9.

<sup>111</sup> SVF 3.214 (Anecdota graeca Paris. ed. Cramer, vol. I, p. 171) (on how people become good and bad): Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ φύσει καὶ ἔθει καὶ λόγῳ· ἀμέλει καὶ οἱ Στωικοί· τέχνη γὰρ ἡ ἀρετή. πᾶσα δὲ τέχνη σύστημα ἐκ θεωρημάτων συγγεγυμνασμένων· καὶ κατὰ μὲν θεωρήματα ὁ λόγος· κατὰ δὲ τὴν συγγυμνασίαν τὸ ἔθος· φύσει δὲ πάντες πρὸς ἀρετὴν γεννώμεθα, καθ' ὅσον ἀφορμὰς ἔχομεν. Sextus, *M* 8.280 (SVF 2.223): θεωρήματα τέχνης ἴδιον. Cic. *De fato* 11 (SVF 2.954): *etenim si est divinatio, qualibusnam a perceptis artis profiscitur (percepta appello quae dicuntur Graece θεωρήματα)*. For expertise as a σύστημα καταλήψεων (συγγεγυμνασμένων), see SVF 2.93-97.

<sup>112</sup> See prev. n.

(τελείας) with a view to life. This recalls the last element of the standard definitions which also specify that expertise is geared towards a useful end (τέλος) in life (SVF 2.93-97).

These passages are not concerned with the opposition between psychic functions in the sense intended by any of the current dualist models. Nor do they postulate a distinction between theoretical and practical reason. Rather they reveal a distinction between the intentional and the physical in the context of the Stoic monist and corporeal conception of the soul. Certain qualities of the soul cannot be *directly* influenced by reason, i.e. through acts of assent. Strength of character and inner harmony lend an additional quality to mental life; hence they are said to 'supervene on' the theoretical virtues. But it does not stand to reason that this distinction was drawn with respect to virtue only. In fact we already encountered it when we noticed how the cognitive, 'judgmental' side of affection was distinguished from the physical effects 'supervening' on it. We have also seen that Galen construed these two aspects as psychic functions or faculties—one rational, the other non-rational—thus fabricating contradictions between the statements of Chrysippus or between him and Zeno (above, p. 86).

Where does this bring us with regard to Posidonius? The text of *PHP* 5.5.21 as it stands becomes more understandable in the light of the distinction drawn by other Stoics in the texts I have referred to. The phrase ἐν τῷ θεωρητικῷ belongs to this distinction. It should not be translated 'in the theoretical sphere' but rather 'in the sphere of knowledge'. The proposed additions involving ἐν τῷ πρακτικῷ ('in the sphere of action') yield a different distinction and so obscure the real sense of θεωρητικῷ. The idea opposed to ἐν τῷ θεωρητικῷ is twice expressed by the term 'affective' as used in the expressions 'affective pull' and 'the movement of the affective' (παθητικῆς ὁλκῆς, τῇ κινήσει τοῦ παθητικοῦ). This term indicating the soul's susceptibility to external influences, its passive side, whereas the active aspect is represented by the act of giving or withholding assent to mental appearances. The corporeal soul may yield under the impact of appearances entering from outside: whether it does or not depends on the soul's capacity to give or withhold assent.

The train of thought expressed may be summarized as follows. The wrong judgements of our conscious mental functioning are caused by the affective pull. But when the intellect is weak already, wrong judgement may lead the way, i.e. some affections are triggered by

decisions made in full consciousness. This much is stated by the first sentence. It may have been clearer in the Posidonian original, since Galen has an interest in intimating that the affective pull represents a non-rational psychic faculty opposed to the λογιστικόν, or 'rational part', the distinctively Platonic term he uses. But what Posidonius himself must have wished to bring out and is still clear from Galen's rendering is the intricate interplay between the mental and physical. Thus if wrong judgements may initiate the affective pull sometimes, these judgements themselves result from the physical weakness of the soul. This merely underlines that the mental and the physical are two sides of the same coin. This is the traditional Stoic schema.

Posidonius was not the only Stoic to distinguish between the theoretical and physical aspects of Galen presents an interesting observation on how Chrysippus conceived of the relation between these two aspects, or factors, involved in the genesis of affection, at *PHP* 4.6.2-3 (*SVF* 3.473, part; cf. *LS* 65 T):

Some of men's wrong actions he [scil. Chrysippus] refers to wrong judgements, others to the soul's lack of tension and its weakness, just as their correct actions are guided by right judgement together with the soul's good tension. In persons of the latter sort, as the judgement is the work of the rational power, so the good tension is the strength and the virtue of a power other than rational. This power Chrysippus himself calls 'tension' [or: 'tone']; and he says that at times we let go of correct judgements because the tension of the soul gives in and does not persist to the end or carry out fully the commands of reason.

This is a revealing passage. It appears to reflect what Chrysippus said about the interplay between two factors: physical tension and judgement. Of course Galen interprets this as amounting to an admission of two separate powers. This is a familiar motif, since he often takes Stoic references to the soul's corporeal substance—here represented by the soul's physical tension—as pointing to the presence of an irrational power. The similarity between this report on Chrysippus and that on Posidonius (5.5.21) is very striking. It strengthens the assumption that what Posidonius was talking about was the interplay between 'theoretical' and physical factors in a way very similar to Chrysippus. Posidonius' affective pull or movement simply results from a lack or insufficient degree of tension.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> For this reason I cannot agree with Gill (1998), 127, that Posidonius' concept of 'affective' or 'emotional movements' constitutes a real innovation. According to Gill, the view that belief-based explanations need to be combined with these move-

Enough unadulterated Chrysippean doctrine shimmers through in the above passage to enable us to see that he offered a clear alternative to the 'faculty approach' in explaining the occurrence of mental affections. This reveals that Chrysippus was prepared to refer to the soul's physical constitution as initiating an affective response, causing our mind to abandon its initial judgement. As Galen subsequent quotation shows, Chrysippus mentioned the example of Menelaos forgetting about his intention to punish Helen as soon as he saw her. He was struck by her beauty and fell into love again. In Stoic technical terms: his soul lacked the tension to resist the impact of this mental appearance and was swept along by desire. In Posidonian terms, this affection was initiated by the 'affective pull'. We may safely assume that Chrysippus meant that the initial judgement was replaced by another one, e.g. that Helen was still worth loving. Galen plays off against one another the two factors by intimating that the difference pertains to two different groups of people. But his immediately following testimony that correct, persisting judgements according to Chrysippus are based on a combination of physical strength and sound judgement (as of course it has to be on Chrysippus' monistic premises) indicate that in weak souls and in states of affection the physical and mental aspects correspond to one another. The point is that the soul's physical condition is called upon to explain how a correct initial judgement can be abandoned. One could perhaps speak here of an irrational factor, though non-rational would be preferable. At any rate this has nothing to do with Platonic-(or Aristotelian-)style powers.

As to the relation between Chrysippus and Posidonius we may note that Galen's testimonies on what each has to say on the way affection comes about are closely similar. Both Stoics operate with two aspects—the intentional and the physical—and a close correspondence and intricate interaction between these. In the case of Chrysippus Galen uses this account to argue that this Stoic contradicts himself; in the case of Posidonius that he sides with the defenders of the dualistic model of mind.

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ments is a 'limited view' as compared to the picture of his wholesale rejection of Chrysippus' theory drawn by Galen. Moreover, it was 'inserted into a basically Chrysippian framework' (p. 126). I would suggest that we should go further and say that what was Posidonian in origin was the technical term rather than the idea.

The picture of overall Stoic unity is borne out further by the evidence relating to Hecaton. This minor Stoic was no innovator. He seems to have remained more faithful to the Chrysippean formulation of the Stoic creed than his teacher Panaetius did. He reconciled certain Panaetian modifications (e.g. concerning the status of courage) with what he had read in Chrysippus. He belonged to the generation of epigons who systematised Chrysippus' arguments, producing a more easily digestible body of Stoic doctrine for teaching and missionary purposes. It is the work of Stoics such as he that underlies much of what we find in the extant texts of, say, Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus. That such was Hecaton's historical place may seem surprising in view of the role traditionally assigned to his teacher Panaetius as having inaugurated a new period in the school's history called Middle Stoicism. Are we to believe that just after the turning point brought about by Panaetius the decidedly second-rate figure Hecaton bypassed his master and harked back to the latter's predecessors? Of course not, but for the reason that there was no such dramatic turning point. Panaetius too, like Posidonius, stayed within the overall framework as it has been laid down by Zeno and Chrysippus.<sup>114</sup>

I append a few further testimonies which illuminate the role of corporeal factor in Posidonius' account of the genesis of mental affection. The first of my passage immediately follows the important passage at *PHP* 5.5.21 (note the first sentence):

Posidonius plausibly attaches to this discussion [scil. the argument paraphrased at § 21] the observations of the physiognomist: men and

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<sup>114</sup> With reference to the development of Stoic philosophy after Panaetius Pohlenz says in his review of Gomoll (1933), *GGA* 197 (1935), p. 111: 'Es ist merkwürdig, daß trotz des Wirkens so stärker Persönlichkeiten, wie es Panaitios und Poseidonios waren, sich allmählich Chrysipps Rechtgläubigkeit wieder durchsetzte. Verständlich wird das nur dadurch, daß auch in der Zeit der mittleren Stoa die echten Scholastiker es als ihre Aufgabe betrachteten, so viel wie möglich vom alten Stoa zu retten und weiterzugeben. Unter ihnen hat Hekaton den hervorragendsten Platz gehabt.' Pohlenz was too familiar with the evidence to miss Hecaton's dependence on Chrysippus, but he clung to the idea that Panaetius and Posidonius, both 'strong personalities', had diverged from the latter in fundamental ways. So he had to invent this weak explanation of the motivation of Hecaton and other Stoics younger than Panaetius for retaining the Chrysippean formulations. Ironically, Pohlenz in the same review points to the fact that our sources do not know about Middle Stoicism, but uses this insight to issue a warning against taking the agreement between the two 'Middle Stoics' Panaetius and Posidonius for granted. In fact, the testimony of our sources issue an equally strong warning against taking for granted the disagreement between Chrysippus and Zeno on the one hand and Panaetius and Posidonius on the other (*ibid.* p. 104).



animals that are broad-chested and warmer are all by nature more irascible but those that have wide hips and are colder are more cowardly. He also says that according to habitat people's characters differ greatly in cowardice and daring, in love of pleasure and of toil, on the grounds that the affective motions of the soul in each case follow the disposition of the body, which is altered in no small degree by the mixture [scil. of elements] in the environment. For indeed the blood in animals, he says, differs in warmth and coldness, thickness and thinness and in many other properties, which Aristotle discussed at length (*PHP* 5.5.22-3 ~ Posid. F 169 E.-K.).

Galen once again associates the affective motions with non-rational psychic powers but there is no trace of them in the Posidonian passage he is reproducing. Now see the following passage:

... my argument is with Chrysippus and his followers, who know nothing else that pertains to the affections, nor yet that each mixture in the body produces its own set of affective motions: for this is how Posidonius is wont to *call* them (5.5.26; my italics).

So Posidonius spoke of affective motions. If he had called them irrational powers, Galen would have had every reason to say so. But he does not. This lends additional weight to my assumption that when Galen does ascribe powers to Posidonius, this entirely results from his creative exegesis.

Galen's late treatise *The Powers of the Soul Follow the Temperaments of the Body* picks up several themes from *PHP* 5 but is devoid of the polemic concerns pervading the latter tract. It has been helpful before (see above, p. 149 f.). On p.78.8 ff. Müller we read:

... neither does Posidonius hold that vice enters humans from outside, having no root of its own in our souls starting from which it sprouts and grows but quite the opposite ...

From the context it is clear that Posidonius ascribed temperamental flaws and affections to the mixture of corporeal elements. In other words, the same doctrine underlies both the latter testimony and the passage from *PHP*. The terminology of vice 'starting' or 'arising' (ὀρμωμένη) from within as well as the herbal metaphors of 'sprouting' (βλαστάνει) and 'growing' (αὐξάνεται) recall further passages echoing Posidonius' original position. The first recurs in Galen's version of a traditional schema of options to which the view of Posidonius is tagged on (*PHP* 6.2.5, on which see above, pp. 34 ff.):

... Aristotle and Posidonius ... say that there are powers of a single being (or 'substance', οὐσία) which arises (ὀρμωμένης) from the heart ...

Obviously this refers to the soul's pneumatic *substance* with its close physical relation and interaction with the heart—standard Stoic doctrine from Zeno onwards. Our translation however fails to render the ambiguity of οὐσία, viz. between Stoic (corporeal) substance and Aristotelian essence or being which makes it possible to align Posidonius and Aristotle and present their common view as it is given here (see above, p. 34 ff.). Still the conspicuous phrase that the substance of the soul arises from the heart must preserve a crucial feature of Posidonius' original viewpoint. So once again we come across the soul's corporeality and its physical continuity with the body.

And a similar Posidonian colouring is found in the ps.-Plutarchean, *Whether Appetite and Distress belong to the Soul or the Body*, ch. 9 (p. 47.24 ff. Sandbach):

All affections and weaknesses sprout forth from the flesh as from a root (τὰ δὲ πάθη πάντα καὶ τὰς ἀσθενείας ὥσπερ ἐκ ρίζης τῆς σαρκὸς ἀναβλαστάνειν).<sup>115</sup>

Nowhere else is the conception of the soul as organically connected to the body associated with non-rational powers. This then is a Galenic move. Posidonius represents the standard Stoic position, using some new terms of his own. His plant imagery brings out the soul's attachment to the body. According to Stoic physical doctrine this continuity is based on the *pneuma* which pervades human animals in different gradations of purity, thus explaining the hierarchy of vital and psychic functions: vegetative, perceptive-cum-motive and rational. This hierarchy of functions corresponds to the Stoic *scala naturae*. Seen in this light, the vegetative metaphors in fact point to physical reality, i.e. express an actual correspondence or analogy.

### 6. *Intermezzo: Diogenes of Babylon and Panaetius*

At this juncture it is worth saying something about Posidonius' immediate predecessors. Their position on these issues forms the immediate backdrop against which Posidonius' conception of the soul should be considered. Indeed, Posidonius and his teacher Panaetius are believed to have entertained the same doctrine of the soul and its

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<sup>115</sup> Cf. the Posidonian fragment at ch. 6 (= Posid. Fr. 154 E.-K.), for a full discussion of which see *infra*, pp. 278 ff. The same Posidonian botanic terminology describing the relation of the soul to the body is also found (though admittedly without mention of Posidonius) at Plutarch, *On Moral Virtue* 451a as well as Marcus Aurelius V, 26.1. On these parallels cf. Theiler (1960) 79; Babut (1969) 57.

affections. Indeed, the view that they are the main exponents of a distinct phase in the history of Stoicism, viz. so-called Middle Stoicism, is mainly based on this assumption.

Galen complains that most Stoics of his day cling to Chrysippus' model of the soul instead of following the lead of that other great Stoic, Posidonius.<sup>116</sup> He says nothing about Panaetius, though the latter is today usually credited with having introduced psychological dualism in Stoic philosophy and thus to have anticipated Posidonius. In fact, premonitions of psychological dualism have been traced back further to Panaetius' teacher Diogenes of Babylon. From the reflections of the latter's *On Music* in the often badly damaged papyrus of Philodemus' treatise of the same title, it emerges that Diogenes accorded to music a salutary influence and described it as conducive to the virtues; music 'by nature moves' us (IV.5, cols. VII.22-9, VIII 15-17 Neubecker). Galen standardly associates music and other forms of non-verbal conditioning of the soul (e.g. diet and exercise) to the dualistic model, viz. that which accommodates non-rational faculties. He refers to the therapeutic role accorded to music by Plato and Posidonius (*PHP* 5.6.19-23 ~ F. 168 E.-K.). Indeed, Philodemus' account indisputably resembles what Galen says about Posidonius on this point. So Nussbaum<sup>117</sup> sees Diogenes as anticipating what she, like others, believes to be the dualistic psychology of Posidonius. And Obbink and Vander Waerdt<sup>118</sup> take him to have been a dualist

<sup>116</sup> *PHP* 4.4.38. In other passages he says that 'almost all' or 'many' Stoics rejected the idea of separate psychic faculties, but here he may be thinking of the scholars and their books rather than of contemporary Stoics whom he knew and with whom he discussed these books; cf. also 3.3.27, 5.7.42 2.5.7, 22, 47, 74; 3.4.12, 7.16; 4.1.3

<sup>117</sup> Nussbaum (1993) 115 ff., esp. 120 f. ('a Posidonius in the making').

<sup>118</sup> Obbink and Vander Waerdt (1991) 355 n. 2, adducing four passages from the final part of Philodemus' *On Music* book IV as restored by Delattre (1989), viz. cols. 56, 57.40-1, 69.3, 73. But none of these is conclusive (in most cases the crucial terms moreover are conjectural): if Philodemus in these passages referred to the parts of the soul or the affections (though this is by no means certain), this does not prove that Diogenes abandoned the Chrysippean model. Janko (1992) restores an intriguing passage from book IV (on the basis of PHerc. 411 and 1583) which though not explicitly mentioning Diogenes may be taken to describe his position as well. In any case the argument rendered clearly is Stoic. Two points are worth noting. First, Diogenes spoke of the natural affinity we feel towards certain types of music, comparing other sensible things. As Janko rightly points out (p. 126), Chrysippus associated natural affinities (οἰκείωσεις) with sensation, see Plut. *De Stoic. Rep.* 1038B-C ~ SVF 2.724; cf. Sen. *Ep.* 121.21, Porph. *De abstin.* III, 19. Similarly Cornutus, ch. 32 speaks of the close connection between music and our faculty of hearing in connection with an allegorical interpretation of myth known to have been advanced by Cleanthes, see *infra* in the text. Secondly, Diogenes said that

throughout. This is a mistake, however. It has been pertinently asked why the Stoic unitary model should preclude the influence of music on the mind.<sup>119</sup> In fact, Philodemus criticizes Diogenes precisely for making the intellect (διανοίας) central to his explanation of how motions are caused by music (*ibid.* col. VIII 26-7). We hear nothing about any appeal to non-rational powers on Diogenes' part. So he seems to have explained the influence of music in terms of the intellect and auditory perception (cf. *ibid.* col. VIII.43). His emphasis on the physical impact of auditory perception involved recalls passages from Chrysippus' *On Affections* dealing with mental functioning and the genesis of affection in particular. This impact can be harmful in stirring the affections, but can also be used in a salutary and therapeutic matter. Plato, in the *Republic*, had expressed a similar view, but this does not commit Diogenes and Posidonius to a similar model of the soul. Here, as elsewhere, Galen is an unreliable guide.

The marriage between psychological monism and music has early credentials. Already Zeno and his immediate successors defined the soul's virtue in terms of a musical 'harmony' or 'symphony'.<sup>120</sup> Cleanthes—whose monism is uncontroversial—recommended poetry and music (i.e. presumably poetry supported by music) as more suitable for the most elevated themes than philosophical prose. For this reason he is attacked by Philodemus (col. XXVIII.1-14 Neubecker ~ SVF 1.486).<sup>121</sup> Cleanthes also offered an allegorical (i.e. cosmic) explanation of Apollo's (i.e. the sun's) cithara-playing which brings out its harmonious and rational aspect (SVF 1.502, 503).

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'enjoyments, affections and sensations' arise through music. Janko suggests that this looks like a departure from 'orthodox Stoic theory' on the grounds that these mental phenomena are 'irrational and therefore hostile to virtue'. But this suggestion is by no means compelling—as Janko (p. 126 n.18) acknowledges with reference to Posidonius, fr. 168 E.-K. (i.e. bringing in Posidonius as a representative of orthodoxy!). In fact, the reference, once again, to sensation (if Asmis' conjecture followed by Janko, though not in the text he prints, is correct) points in a different direction. Through sensation music may exert a forceful impact upon the mind, which may be either salutary and conducive towards virtue (see *supra* in text), or harmful and triggering affections. Hence the affection of enchantment is defined in pseudo-Andronicus' lexicon of affections as 'pleasure enchanting through hearing; or pleasure occurring through speech and music or through deceit' (κίλησις δὲ ἡδονὴ δι' ἀκοῆς κατακλυοῦσα· ἢ ἡδονὴ ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ μουσικῆς ἢ δι' ἀπάτης γινομένη), SVF 3.401.

<sup>119</sup> Cf. Reydam-Schils (1999) 102 n. 42.

<sup>120</sup> See e.g. D.L. 7.88, Stob. *Ecl.* II, p. 75.11 ff. with Long (1991b) 97 f. Cf. also Aristo *ap.* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* II.20.108.1 (SVF 1.370) with Ioppolo (1980) 247, Long (1991b) 104 ff.

<sup>121</sup> Cf. Neubecker (1956) 84 f.

Diogenes' pupil, Panaetius of Rhodes (c. 185-109 BCE), too, is credited with an independence of outlook. In line with his concern with applied ethics, he is on record as having abandoned or questioned a few theologico-physical tenets which had been distinctively Stoic from Zeno onwards.<sup>122</sup> This suits the notice by Philodemus that Panaetius was fond of Plato and Aristotle and under their influence revised some of Zeno's doctrines.<sup>123</sup> But Philodemus was an Epicurean, who in his *On Music* and elsewhere, directed an extensive critique against Panaetius' mentor Diogenes of Babylon. Like Galen, he was out to expose alleged deviations from the official Stoic line. Cicero too has been used too quickly as a witness in favour of the assumption that Panaetius was a dualist. Other passages from Cicero however do seem to state a dualist position. But can we ascribe this to Panaetius? The question of his position bears directly on that of his pupil Posidonius. If Panaetius abandoned monism in favour of dualism or indeed its Platonic tripartite variety, we more readily believe Galen's claims about Posidonius. Galen in *PHP* never mentions Panaetius but he may have seen nothing of him.<sup>124</sup>

The general view<sup>125</sup> that Panaetius' accepted some form of dualism is mainly based on a few passages from Cicero's *On Duties*. First we must note that Cicero mentions Panaetius' *On Appropriate Action* (Περὶ καθήκοντος) as his main model, 'whom in these books I have largely followed, not translated (*quem multum in his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus*, *Off.* II, 60).<sup>126</sup> Cicero makes it clear that he does not translate Panaetius. Nor did he *slavishly* follow Panaetius (note the qualification *multum*). Given his general working method (more on which see below, p. 289) he may be expected from time to time to

<sup>122</sup> Panaetius preferred the idea of the indestructability of the cosmos to periodical conflagration and eternal recurrence: Philo, *On the Eternity of the World* 76 (Test. 131 Alesse); he is said to have voiced doubts about astrology: Cic. *Div.* 1.6-7 (Test. 137 A.), or to have rejected it outright, *ibid.* 2.88 (Test. 140 A.). Criticism of divination is also implied, *ibid.* 1.12 (Test. 138 A.). But in other cases his admiration for Plato did not prevent him from sticking to the Stoic view, for instance that the soul is not immortal, see Cic. *Tusc.* I, 79-80 (Test. 120 A.)

<sup>123</sup> *Stoic. hist.*, *PHerc.* 1018 col. LXI Dorandi; cf. Cic. *Tusc.* I, 79 (Test. 120 A.).

<sup>124</sup> Panaetius is never mentioned in the entire Galenic corpus.

<sup>125</sup> See Alesse (1997) 194 ff. with further references. Alesse is among those who assume that Panaetius accepted some form of psychological dualism. The wide support still enjoyed by this assumption is surprising in view of the argument advanced by Van Straaten (1976).

<sup>126</sup> Other testimonia on this work are collected by Alesse, Test. 92-103; cf. also Dyck (1996) 18 ff. On Cicero's general attitude to (naming) sources see further *infra*, p. 290.

diverge from Panaetius and follow his own predilections as to doctrine or formulation.

Further, the fact that Cicero opted for a work by Panaetius rather than another Stoic as his chief *Vorlage* should not in itself be taken to imply that Panaetius differed from his predecessors on the subject at issue. Cicero simply turned to this work as one of the most up-to-date treatments available.<sup>127</sup> This was common practice among ancient authors of works of a scholarly nature. In fact Panaetius' work stands in a long line of Stoic treatises of the same title,<sup>128</sup> which followed the well-worn procedure of starting from the definitions and arguments of the founders, explicating, refining and updating them. Hence the references in Cicero's work to Zeno and Cleanthes most probably derive from Panaetius' work.

The main witness in favour of the assumption that Panaetius was a dualist is *On Duties* Book 1, 101 (Test. 122 Alesse):

For the power and nature of souls is twofold: one part is located in appetite, which is *horme* in Greek, which drags a man back and forth, the other (part) (is located) in reason, which teaches and explains what should be done and what should be avoided.<sup>129</sup>

At face value this seems to be an exposition of psychological dualism.<sup>130</sup> Conation is described as an irrational part separate from reason. Human action involves both and ideally they act in concert, with reason bringing order and guidance to appetite and appetite lending motive power to reason. The picture of reason as *teaching* and *explaining* the proper course of action to appetite invites comparison with Aristotle's account of their interaction in the final chapter (13) of the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Here, it may be recalled, the appetitive or desiring element, though irrational, is said none the less to share in reason insofar as it listens to and obeys reason's instructions (1102b29-1103a3).<sup>131</sup> But Zeno and Chrysippus too

<sup>127</sup> On this compository practice see *supra*, p. 51.

<sup>128</sup> Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus all wrote an *On Appropriate Action* (Περὶ καθήκοντος, i.e. the term translated by Cicero as 'officium', 'duty'): see D.L. 7.4 (cf. 7.107 f.), 7.174; Sextus, *M* 11.194; cf. *DPhA* II 358, nr. 184, 411, nr. 15.

<sup>129</sup> *Duplex est enim vis animorum atque natura: una pars in appetitu posita est, quae est horme Grace, quae hominem huic et illuc rapit, altera in ratione, quae docet and explanat quid faciendum fugiendum sit.*

<sup>130</sup> For what follows see also Van Straaten (1976) 104 ff., who argues that this passage does not permit us to ascribe to Panaetius a non-rational faculty distinct from reason.

<sup>131</sup> In § 102 (= Panaetius Test. 123 Alesse) Cicero takes up the last sentence of the text of 101: appropriate action requires that appetite is *obedient* to reason, i.e. it

explained the irrationality of the emotional response as disobedience to right reason (above, p. 97). Such resemblances do not preclude fundamental differences, but they will have facilitated the syncretist tendencies of Cicero (and of others whose works he may have consulted). Thus we also find Stoic elements here. In addition to *hormê*, the expression 'what should be done and what avoided' recalls the Stoic definition of practical wisdom (φρόνησις).<sup>132</sup> Moreover, the reference to a single power recalls the Stoic usage of the term, viz. in the sense of the soul's 'strength'.<sup>133</sup> In fact, Cicero's division of this power (*vis*) into two parts (*partes*) makes a muddle of the technical and precise distinctions used by ancient sources to define the respective positions of Platonists, Aristotelians and Stoics on the structure of the soul.<sup>134</sup>

So is this Cicero's formal presentation of the position of Panaetius? The lack of explicit attribution should make us pause, especially in the light of Cicero's own attitude to the traditional question of the parts of the soul. This attitude is clearly illustrated by *Tusculan Disputations* 4.10-11. Here Cicero expresses a predilection for the Platonic (and, he says, Pythagorean) tripartition, which he presents as a specification of the bipartite division in terms of rational/non-rational. He then cheerfully proceeds to reconcile this bipartition-cum-tripartition of the soul with a predilection for the Stoic monistic account of its affections, presenting a version based on Chrysippus' *On Affections* (*ibid.* 10-33; see ch. 6.3). Impatient with what he sees as mere technicalities, Cicero sees no serious discrepancy from the perspective of his overriding moral purposes. From the explanation of the affections as contrary and hostile to reason according to the tripartite schema he passes on smoothly to Zeno's definition of affection as contrary to right reason and involving particular judgements (*ibid.* 11). In sum, he tends to assimilate the two psychologies and to speak of the cause of affection in bipartite terms. If we want to look for a model or precursor for this type of assimilation of Platonism and

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should do what reasons tells it to seek or avoid.

<sup>132</sup> SVF 3.262, 268.

<sup>133</sup> See *supra*, p. 38.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. e.g. the scholastic schemas used by Galen (*PHP* 6.2.5) and others, on which see *supra*, pp. 34 ff. Dyck *ad loc.* accepts the dualist reading of Panaetius' psychology but notes that 'Cicero would have been more accurate to speak of *vires* (= δυνάμεις) of the soul, as Panaetius doubtless did after Chrysippus; cf. SVF 2.220.23 ...'. Dyck's view that Panaetius must have agreed with Chrysippus in speaking of two powers (rational and non-rational) is remarkable.

Stoicism, it is natural to think of Antiochus of Ascalon (see further below, pp. 294 ff.).

*On Duties* I, 101 is comparable with *Tusculan Disputations* 4.10-11 insofar as it shows the same facility in combining positions whose difference is central to Galen's argument. Indeed, Cicero and Galen are at the opposite ends of one and the same spectrum, with the former playing down and the latter exaggerating the differences at issue. Cicero is interested in the general distinction between the rational and the irrational from a moral point of view. I take it that *On Duties* I, 101 is his own peculiar expression of this distinction. The passage should not be used as a reliable and precise testimony for the position taken by Panaetius.

Look at the way how he explains the twofold division later on in book 1. Here we do not hear about parts or powers but about two kinds of motion:

The motions of souls are of two kinds: one is that of thought, the other of conation. Now thought is primarily concerned with seeking the truth whereas conation induces to action. We should take care then that we use thought for the best of purposes while we make conation obedient to reason (*Off.* I, 132 ~ T 121 A.).<sup>135</sup>

Here again reason and conation are opposed—not as two parts but as two kinds of motion: the term preferred by Posidonius (see above, p. 204), and already prominent in the Chrysippean fragments (above, p. 97 f.). Further, we again come across the aspect of obedience or its opposite, which also belong in Chrysippus' explanation of what it means to have turned away from reason, as Zeno had stated in his definition.<sup>136</sup>

In sum, we should not be too quick to ascribe psychological dualism to Panaetius on the basis of what Cicero tells us. A closer look reveals that his evidence is less unambiguous than is often supposed. There is Cicero's own dualist tendency, which he does not consider

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<sup>135</sup> *Motum autem animorum duplices sunt: alteri cogitationis, alteri appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur, appetitus impellit ad agendum. Curandum est igitur ut cogitatione ad res quam optimas utamur, appetitum rationi oboedientem praebemus.*

<sup>136</sup> Cic. *Off.* I, 90 (Test. 124 A.) is associated by Alesse (1994) 196 f. with the metaphor of the horse disobedient to its rider—a metaphor which suits the dualist schema; cf. *supra*, p. 207. But what Panaetius is reported to have said is: just as unruly horses are turned over to tamers, so too incontinent and uncontrolled people should by listening to reason and philosophical doctrine come to see the frailty of human affairs and the vagaries of fortune: both the description of their plight and the therapy are thoroughly rationalist and monistic and hence conform to Chrysippus' position.



incompatible with important Stoic moral doctrines, such as that concerned with the affections. And the emphasis here, as elsewhere in Cicero's philosophical work, is on morality, not on the intricacies of scientific psychology. Van Straaten may have hit the nail on the head when he argued that Cicero merely wishes to make the moral point that the appetites should be subordinated to reason, so that the Ciceronian passages do not permit us to draw inferences as to the nature of ὁρμή according to Panaetius.<sup>137</sup> In fact, as we have seen, Chrysippus too spoke in term of obedience to reason and its reverse in the same connection. But fortunately Cicero is not our only source in this matter.

Nemesius, having described the early Stoic division—attested for Chrysippus—of the soul into eight parts, i.e. the regent part and the rays of psychic pneuma extending from it, goes on to mention two changes proposed by Panaetius: the phonetic part should be subsumed 'under movement according to conation' (τῆς καθ' ὁρμὴν κινήσεως); and the reproductive part belongs not to the soul but to *physis*, i.e. the physical pneuma ('vegetative pneuma') responsible for digestion and growth.<sup>138</sup> This leaves six parts of the original schema.<sup>139</sup> The movement of conation is an action of the regent part, or intellect. The close connection between speech on the one hand and the intellect as the source of meaning on the other may have motivated Panaetius. This connection was stressed by Zeno, Chrysippus and Diogenes of Babylon in their argument which linked the seat of the intellect to the source of speech, viz. the heart (see *PHP* 2.5). His adjustment is moreover congenial to advances made in contemporary medical science, which explained the mechanism of speech by reference to the nervous system rather than the transmission of imprints in the *pneuma*.<sup>140</sup> But essentially the Stoic framework has remained intact. Given the relation between human rational speech and the intellect it is difficult to follow Alesse who sees in the reference to the movement of conation here another witness to a non-rational psychic function. Nor does the relegation of reproduction to

<sup>137</sup> Van Straaten (1946) 106 f. Similarly Voelke (1973) 116, who acknowledges the lack of direct evidence but believes that Panaetius must have been a dualist all the same.

<sup>138</sup> For how the Stoics conceive of the relation between soul (ψυχή) and nature (φύσις) in individual animals see Tieleman (1996a) 98 f.

<sup>139</sup> Panaetius is also credited with six parts by Tert. *De an.* 14 (= Panaetius T 128 A.), discussed *supra*, pp. 66 ff.

<sup>140</sup> Cf. Tieleman (1996a) 191, 51 ff.

nature (φύσις) have anything to do with non-rational functions typical of humans and associated with affection.<sup>141</sup> Nemesius (or his source) is clearly following the tack of noting a dissident within the Stoic camp, and all he comes up with are these fairly minor adjustments. If there was a return to the Platonist and Aristotelian dualistic schema, this is about the most unclear way of reporting it. Panaetius' adjustment of the inherited schema was of quite a different order.

In sum, the evidence relating to Panaetius does not tell in favour of a dualistic reading. On the contrary, there are good reasons to assume that he remained within the Chrysippean framework. What we know about Diogenes and Panaetius therefore provides no corroboration for the assumption that Posidonius abandoned the unitary model of the mind of the founding fathers of their school.

### 7. *Posidonius and Chrysippus' Aporiai*

Like Chrysippus, Posidonius took his starting point from the Zenonian definition of affection as an excessive impulse (ὁρμὴ πλεοναζούσα, 4.3.4).<sup>142</sup> Given this definition, he pressed the question what is the *cause* of the excess concerned. It is worth quoting the relevant passage:

Posidonius [...] does not regard the affections as judgements or as supervening on judgement [i.e. the views ascribed by Galen to Chrysippus and Zeno respectively] but he believes that they come about by the spirited and appetitive power, thus following the ancient account in every respect. And on no few occasions in his treatise *On Affections* he asks Chrysippus what is the cause of the excessive conation. For reason could not exceed (πλεοναζεῖν) its own realities and measures

<sup>141</sup> Pace Alesse (1994) 202 ff. That this modification should not be taken as evidence for his supposed dualism has been argued by Van Straaten (1976) 95 ff., followed by Gourinat (1996) 26.

<sup>142</sup> The agreement between the Chrysippus and Posidonius on this point is rightly stressed by Kidd (1971) 204. Cf. *PHP* 5.2.2: 'That affection is an unnatural and irrational motion of the soul is acknowledged not only by the ancients but also by Chrysippus.' This statement presumably goes back to Posidonius whose views are discussed in what immediately follows (*ibid.* 3 ff. = F 163 E.-K.). The definition in question is the standard Stoic one, although Galen makes it appear as though Chrysippus took it over from the ancients, i.e. most notably Plato; see *SVF* 3.377, 378. That it is Zenonian may be inferred from the fragments from Chrysippus' exegesis of this definition, 4.2.10 ff. (*SVF* 3.462). The statement at 5.2.2 thus reflects Posidonius' concern with laying bare a continuous tradition from the ancients—notably Plato—to the founders of the Stoa and up to himself. It moreover confirms his particular interest in the soul's motive aspect, i.e. what the Stoics called conation (ὁρμή).

(πράγματα τε καὶ μέτρα). Thus it is evident that some other irrational power causes conation to exceed the measures set by choice is non-rational, viz. the weight of the body (*PHP* 4.3.3-5, Posid. Frs. 157, 34 part).<sup>143</sup>

The expression 'some other irrational power' in the part of this quotation which is based on Posidonius' treatise is odd after the confident attribution of the Platonic non-rational powers to Posidonius (though note that Galen here too speaks of the spirited and appetitive power in the singular).<sup>144</sup> It might be thought that it reflects a passage where Posidonius had inferred the need to postulate an irrational power, but had not yet revealed this as the power, or powers, postulated by Plato. But if so, why did not Galen turn to one of the passages where Posidonius was more explicit about his preference for the Platonic tripartition? The reason seems to be that there simply was no such passage. Where Posidonius was concerned with the 'ancient account' (i.e. most notably Plato), he did not 'follow it in every respect' but merely looked for anticipations of the official Stoic doctrine. Remarkably enough, the only thing said here to explain the power Galen wanted to find is that it resembles the weight of the body in the act of running. But this is an element from the image of the runners used by Chrysippus precisely to illustrate the notion of excess in Zeno's definition (*PHP* 4.2.14-18 ~ *SVF* 3.462). It is ill-suited to serve as an analogy for a psychic power in the Platonic-cum-Aristotelian sense, i.e. as existing next to and distinct from other such powers. In fact, Chrysippus used his analogy to illustrate the opposite idea, viz. that the soul is a unity and so becomes *wholly* disturbed and uncontrollable when in a state of affection.<sup>145</sup> The runners' bodies stand for the irrational aspect involved. As such they are suggestive of

<sup>143</sup> Fr. 34 extends from the immediately preceding context of the quoted passage to a somewhat arbitrarily chosen point in the following discussion, i.e. 4.3.1-10. Galen uses Posidonius' name at § 8 but the very phrasing here (with the future tense) indicates that he is not rendering what Posidonius actually said but continuing his polemic in his spirit ('Posidonius will again ask what is the cause of the excess ..'). The point at issue is Chrysippus' alleged contradiction that both he called the affections judgements and said they occur 'without judgement'. But, as I have shown, the latter expression is an item of common parlance explained by Chrysippus in a different context, see *supra*, pp. 98 ff. Seen in this light, the section following the passage quoted in the text (§ 6-9) should not be part of any reconstruction of what Posidonius actually said. On Edelstein-Kidd's editorial principles, see pp. xv ff. of their edition.

<sup>144</sup> Elsewhere however Galen does maintain that Posidonius distinguished between, and accepted, Plato's three parts, see *supra*, p. 34, 204.

<sup>145</sup> See *supra*, pp. 101 ff.

the soul's own corporeality. So I doubt whether the expression 'some irrational power' is actually derived from Posidonius at all. After all, we are dealing not with a verbatim quotation but with an indirect rendering in Galenic terms.

Nonetheless, the question of the *cause* of the excessive movement seems to reflect an authentic and well-known interest of Posidonius (cf. T 85). According to Galen, Chrysippus was really at a loss to explain the cause of affection: on occasion he admitted this but bypassed most of the awkward questions which Posidonius had the courage to raise. It was these questions which, Galen claims, pointed to the one correct answer, viz. Platonic-style powers. We may be sceptical about Galen's claim that Posidonius espoused the Platonic tripartition warts and all. But he cannot have entirely made up this part of his story. Posidonius raised problems (ἀπορίαι)<sup>146</sup> concerning phenomena that had not been sufficiently explained by Chrysippus. Most of the relevant passages are to be found in the large section *PHP* 4.5.24-46, printed whole by Edelstein-Kidd as fragment 164. Here we do find verbatim fragments from Posidonius, together with their immediate Galenic context. We may contrast the extended stretches of Galenic text that have also found their way into the Edelstein-Kidd collection on account of their invocation of Posidonius' name, but whose relation to the original Posidonian exposition is much thinner.<sup>147</sup>

The first point at issue is the addition of 'great' to 'good' and 'evil' in the definition, advanced by Chrysippus (§ 26, ll.18-19), of psychic infirmity (ἀρρώστια) as the belief that something (money, women) is a great good or evil. The addition was necessary for Chrysippus in order to explain the obsessive behaviour typically designated by such expressions as madness and love (e.g. 'women-mad' and 'love of money'). In the background looms Chrysippus' twofold analysis of the cognitive structure of affection. If one considers women to be not a good, but the greatest good in the world (judgement-type I), one considers it appropriate to be moved (κινεῖσθαι, i.e. to act or behave) passionately when they appear and one refuses to accept any reason (or argument, λόγον) for behaving otherwise (judgment-type II).<sup>148</sup>

<sup>146</sup> *PHP* 4.5.26, 41, 46 (Fr. 164, e.g. ll. 12, 85, 108).

<sup>147</sup> This holds good for parts of the texts printed as fragments 31 and 34, see *supra*, p. 272 and n. 143.

<sup>148</sup> See § 27, ll.22-25, which clearly constitutes the Chrysippean premise on which Posidonius bases his *aporia* concerning the wise and those making progress.

In other words, Chrysippus introduced a quantitative factor to explain the step from judgement type I to that of type II: it is the 'magnitude' of the apparent good which is said to 'move' or 'stir' (κινεῖ) this second judgement, i.e. which causes one to make it. In addition, one should note both the role of appearance (φαίνεσθαι)<sup>149</sup> and the idea of moving and being moved<sup>150</sup> here. From the passive point of view it is also expressed by the verb 'to be affected', i.e. πάσχειν. That the mind's πάθος or affection is described as something one undergoes is a point to be noted. In other words, the sense of 'affection' should not be lost sight of. (See also above, pp. 211 ff., below p. 281.)

This account is based on the verbatim fragment from Posidonius offered by Galen at *PHP* 4.5.26-28. It forms the basis of the ἀπορία raised by Posidonius and does not seem to contain any serious distortions of Chrysippus' intention. In the same fragment Posidonius discusses certain problems attached to the notion of the Sage. He argues that if Chrysippus is right, then Sages who must consider themselves in the presence of the greatest good (viz. their own virtuous soul) will also react emotionally, i.e. they will take *excessive* delight in their situation. Likewise those making progress would realize that they are in the presence of the greatest evil (their still imperfect soul) and respond by falling into excessive grief. That is to say, they would regard inner sinkings as an appropriate reaction to their situation. Obviously, this would remove them still further from being a Sage. But this, Posidonius notes, is not observed to happen. But is this really a devastating point scored against Chrysippus? Did Chrysippus have an answer to these cases or did he ignore them?

Historians have tried to infer Chrysippus' answer, though mostly on the basis of Cicero's account in the *Tusculan Disputations*, where we come across the same ἀπορία concerned with the person making progress without reference to Posidonius.<sup>151</sup> White and Sorabji have argued that the novice, though he is right as to the first judgement, would be wrong to add the second judgement, viz. that it is appropriate to respond with a sinking.<sup>152</sup> Even the novice, Sorabji adds, can recognize a sinking as something it would ideally be better not to

<sup>149</sup> *ibid.* I. 23 φαίνομενῶν; cf. I. 24.

<sup>150</sup> II. 21, 25

<sup>151</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* 3.61; 3.68; 3.70; 3.77-78; 4.61.

<sup>152</sup> See White (1995) 219-46; Sorabji (2000) 32f.

have.<sup>153</sup> Indeed, one of the main reasons Sorabji believes why Chrysippus introduced the second type of judgement was that it enabled him to help the distressed. It is true that Chrysippus believed that one can convince a person in a state of affection that his reaction is inappropriate even while he continues to entertain a wrong opinion about the moral value of what has befallen him or her (see above, pp. 166 ff.). Thus the distinction between the two types of judgement has therapeutic relevance. But this still does not answer the point advanced by Posidonius.

Cicero does not indicate how Chrysippus met this problem nor does he present an answer on the Stoic's behalf. Is there any information to be gleaned from the Posidonian material preserved by Galen? At *PHP* 4.5.29-33 he goes on to quote the text that followed in Posidonius. The discussion focuses on the degree of emotional behaviour involved. Psychic infirmity or disease is translated into *excessive* behaviour in respect of one particular thing that is supposed to be a *great* good or evil. In other words, the excessive degree of emotional behaviour corresponds to the magnitude of the supposed good or evil. (Apparently such behaviour is judged excessive in comparison with other affections of the same person or the same kind of affection by others.) So the problem raised by Posidonius is that on Chrysippean premises the progressing person would fall not merely into distress but *immoderate* distress (*ibid.* 28). Next he records a riposte by a plurality of anonymous Stoics who represent the Chrysippean position: in addition to the magnitude of what appears (φαίνομένων), weakness (ἀσθένεια) of the soul is also to blame (*ibid.* 29). This explains why the Sage is free from affections altogether whereas those with a 'large degree of weakness' are not. Though the text of this last point about all non-Sages is uncertain, the defense must amount to saying that among them there exist degrees of weakness. In this case those suffering from an infirmity (ἀρρώστημα) are at one extreme of the scale where the affective response is excessive. Though it is not made explicit by Posidonius, this seems to imply that those who have made progress find themselves in a section of the scale where the emotional response, though perhaps inevitable, is more moderate. I take it that this would also mean that these persons have a correspondingly lesser estimate of the magnitude of the good or evil that happens to them.

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<sup>153</sup> Sorabji (2000) 33.

For Posidonius, however, the Chrysippeans dodge the question at issue: 'For all agree that people fall into affections because of an illness of the soul; but the question asked is how the soul has been moved and what motion it causes, but this is not indicated (*PHP* 4.5.30).' This amounts to saying that the appeal to varying degrees of weakness is unsatisfactory and uninformative. But it does seem to be what Chrysippus said, or would have said. Posidonius next rejoinder is beside the point:

'To suppose that a person has been moved in this way in accordance with his estimate of events, so that the rejection of reason indicates a great affection, is to suppose wrongly ; for this also happens through a moderate and small one' (32).

But Chrysippus had in mind only those who suffer from an infirmity (ἀρρώστημα) in its technical sense, which involves the judgement that a particular thing is a *great* good or evil.

In regard to the Sage, the Chrysippean riposte would be even simpler: an affection is a *wrong* belief about the value of *indifferents*, whereas the Sage is right to consider himself in the presence of the greatest good, viz. his own perfect soul. What he feels are called εὐπαθείαι ('good feelings') that are designed as analogous to but crucially different from the παθή.

In what follows (§ 33-36) Posidonius posits a situation where people who have the same weakness and receive a similar presentation respond differently: the one turns emotional (ἐν παθεῖ γίγνεται), whereas the other does not. Further the same person responds differently on different occasions (*ibid.* 33). Apparently here too Posidonius supposes that the degree of weakness of this person remains constant. Further he notes the apparent influence of habituation: one is seized more easily by affection when confronted by an unaccustomed thing .

A Chrysippean might respond by denying that these difference could occur if the degree of weakness is exactly the same. In other words, no two persons are exactly alike in terms of psychic weakness. There is moreover no need to assume the psychic weakness in individuals remains at a constant level.<sup>154</sup> Further, a soul more habituated to situations where there is a greater risk of responding emotionally

<sup>154</sup> This becomes even more obvious in the light of the physical processes involved in the organism. For their influence on the mental and moral condition of humans see *supra*, pp. 162 ff.

may count as stronger.<sup>155</sup> This time, however, we hear nothing about such a response.

Posidonius proceeds to a Homeric example illustrating the difference between people of equal weakness not in the way affection strikes them but in the way affection abates. Because of a rout all Greek heroes had been struck by ‘unspeakable grief’ (*Il.* ix, 3,9). But Agamemnon, when this affection abated, went to see Nestor for advice (x.17-20). Still, when he addresses the old man, he speaks of his fear and its physical effects (his heart leaps, his limbs tremble, x.91-95). Posidonius appears to indicate that Chrysippus’ explanation of this passage is unsatisfactory so these quotations formed part of the latter’s discussion, i.e. on the irrational and often contradictory behaviour typical of affections in book 2 of his *On Affections*. Posidonius infers:

If he is present taking counsel while his heart is thus shaking with fear, then people in emotional [or: affective] states who do not think it is in accord with their estimate of what has happened to accept no reasoning are being moved affectively (*PHP* 4.5.40).

Although the Homeric passage stresses the physical effects attendant upon fear,<sup>156</sup> Nestor also says ‘*I* fear’ (x.18)—so Posidonius is probably correct in his analysis of what happens here according to the Chrysippean analysis, most notably the distinction between the two types of judgement. Agamemnon, then, still makes judgment-type one: he fears, that is to say he considers himself in the proximity of a great evil, viz. another setback suffered by the Greek army. But what about the second judgement? In his account of the Chrysippean position (see above, p. 252), Posidonius had designated the rejection of reason as a distinctive feature of judgement-type II. The other distinctive feature was that of being moved affectively, or emotional behaviour. In grief this is more internal; in fear which is at issue here this will be expressed in outward action as well. Posidonius regards the physical effects described by Agamemnon as indicative of his ‘being moved emotionally (or affectively)’. Is this correct from a Chrysippean point of view? Other sources are keen to differentiate affective, or emotional, movements both from the judgements and

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<sup>155</sup> Remarkably enough Posidonius seems to indicate so himself according to § 34: the more vicious (or weaker) differ from the more experienced ones by being more quickly seized by their affections.

<sup>156</sup> These are differentiated by the Stoic from the affection itself (i.e. the judgement) so need not by themselves imply the full-fledged affection, see *infra*, p. 282 ff.



from the bodily effects.<sup>157</sup> At any rate Posidonius' point is clear: the two distinctive features of judgement-type II do not appear in conjunction in Agamemnon's case: on the one hand he is receptive to counselling but on the other he is still 'emotionally moved'. In other words, Chrysippus' analysis would seem to be too crude to cover cases like this. In the latter's defense it might be countered that it is doubtful whether he would characterize Agamemnon's state as still 'being emotionally moved'. In this case he would have abandoned judgement type II. His soul is no longer being emotionally moved—it is only his body that suffers from the after-effects. Agamemnon's behaviour indicates that he is no longer moved by grief or fear. The fear-related physical effects suffered by Agamemnon are in fact what are technically called 'first movements'<sup>158</sup> caused by mental appearances of past events.

But did Posidonius read his Chrysippus in this way? And did he find this solution satisfactory? He returned to the point raised at the outset of this discussion of Agamemnon's behaviour: why do people of equal mental strength react so differently? But why, one may well ask, do we need to suppose that Agamemnon was just as weak as the other heroes? His behaviour befitted the commander of the army and is explicable by reference to his habituation in this capacity. Besides, Chrysippus had raised the issue of the soul's weakness in connection with the nature of infirmity, which is marked by an intensified propensity to a particular affection in some people. The soul of these people, then, is assumed to be weaker. However, the affections (distress, fear) of Agamemnon and the other heroes do not seem to result from psychic infirmity in this technical sense. Chrysippus may have discussed the Homeric passages to illustrate a different point, viz. the contradictory elements in emotional behaviour, for instance when affection abates and reason gradually gains ground again.<sup>159</sup> Nonetheless, Posidonius says: 'He [i.e. probably Chrysippus] has not given the cause of the affection in its entirety'. Chrysippus, then, left something unexplained.

But is this serious enough to abandon the monistic model and go over to Platos? Nothing in these passages suggests so—in accordance with our assumption that the connection between Posidonius and

<sup>157</sup> See the Posidonian classification presented by ps. Plutarch, *Whether Distress and Desire Belong to the Soul or Body*, quoted *infra*, p. 278 ff.

<sup>158</sup> On this concepts see *infra*, pp. 282 ff.

<sup>159</sup> On this process see also *supra*, p. 183.

Plato argued by Galen always goes back to, and depends on, Posidonius' dialectical overview of his predecessors. In harping on the account of the cause Posidonius rode his hobby horse. He may have found the Chrysippean appeal to mental strength insufficiently specific. But would his queries be met by appealing to non-rational powers in the soul? The answer formulated in terms of powers would have been liable to the same criticism. Would it make things better to submit that Agamemnon's spirited power was better (one almost says stronger) than that of the other heroes? Some forms of behaviour, even typical ways, are best left to individual make-up. If affections are irrational, one should not expect a full rationalization. Chrysippus appears to have understood this better than both Posidonius and Galen.

That Posidonius' prime concern was more with raising interesting problems than with denouncing Chrysippus also follows from the last example he presents of irrational behaviour (*ibid.* 42-43. Chrysippus may have been his point of reference here as well, if the latter quoted and discussed the following line from comedy (anonymous):

Let me perish: this is now beneficial to me (*ibid.* 43, fr. 217, III, p. 450 Kock).

Here Posidonius sees a contradiction similar to that in the case of Agamemnon. The affection in question is desire. The character speaking here wishes to pursue the object of his or her desire and is in no state to listen to reason. Thus, the speaker clearly adopts judgement of type II. He or she also considers the object a benefit, i.e. a good or even a great good—which involves judgement-type I. At the same time, however, the first part of the line allows for the possibility that he or she is drawn to an unmitigated evil, or at least (from a Stoic point of view) something not to be preferred (technically death counts as an indifferent to be avoided under normal circumstances). Thus the contradiction concerns an ambivalence at the level of value-assessment, i.e. the first judgement. Despite this ambivalence the second judgement follows: the object is pursued come what may. In consequence, Posidonius remarks, the cause cannot lie in judgement-type I. There is no criticism of Chrysippus here. The question simply remains open (44). Galen has no answer either. But neither do others, distinguished Stoics among them (45).

Posidonius insisted on knowing the cause. This recurrent feature is inflated by Galen into a fundamental attack on Chrysippus. That, on

the contrary, Posidonius remained within the Chrysippean framework is borne out further by a long text printed as F 165 E.-K, viz. *PHP* 4.7.1-45. Although we are dealing with a reasonably coherent piece of text, large parts can best be characterized as a Galenic discussion based on Posidonian ideas. Here too we find strong terms used to characterize Posidonius' response to Chrysippus (e.g. 'refutes', 4.7.2, 'contradicts doubly', *ibid.* 6) but little in the way of direct evidence supporting these terms. A few problems are raised. Posidonius took his starting-point from Zeno's definitions, and in this context criticized Chrysippus' explication in the *On Affections*. Zeno had defined distress as 'a fresh opinion that evil is present' and Chrysippus had explained the adjective 'fresh' (πρόσφατος) as 'recent in time'. Here Posidonius had expected learn why it is that when the opinion is fresh, it contracts the soul and produces evil (*ibid.* 3-5). But we do not hear what explanation he favours—only that he recommended to 'dwell in advance' (προενδημεῖν), i.e. to imagine in advance what might happen and bring about a gradual habituation to it, as to something that had happened before (*ibid.* 8). But this is no cause but a means of prevention belonging to the repertoire of therapy (cf. below pp. 311 ff.).

Chrysippus discusses problematic types of affectional behaviour in a long verbatim fragment from book 2 of his *On Affections* (*ibid.* 12-17 ~ *SVF* 3.466),<sup>160</sup> which has been lifted whole by Galen from its Posidonian context. From this fragment it is clear that Chrysippus does explain why affections such as distress abate over time. He refers to the abandonment of the conation (which is also a judgement of type II)<sup>161</sup> towards the contraction. And he even proceeds to explain why it is abandoned: three further quotations from Chrysippus (*ibid.* 10-33 ~ *SVF* 3.467)<sup>162</sup> demonstrate that he sought an answer by approaching distress in terms of longing and satiety—an idea he illustrates with Homeric passages (see above, pp. 130 ff.).

So it is simply unfair to charge Chrysippus with saying nothing or being at a loss about the causes—which is all the more unjustified since he made the discovery of the causes of affection the unifying perspective in both theory and therapy (*ibid.* 21). Of course Chrysippus was not that sloppy. True, his explication of Zeno's definition in

<sup>160</sup> On this fragment see further *supra*, p. 123.

<sup>161</sup> On conation as judgement, see Plut. *Stoic. Rep* 1037F (*SVF* 3.175) and *supra*, p. 276.

<sup>162</sup> On this fragment see further *supra*, p. 130

book 1 did not include a causal analysis. He merely explained the term 'fresh', among others. But he did address causal factors in book 2, introducing a new analysis of his own. He only designated as more problematic certain less frequent phenomena such as people weeping, or ceasing to weep, against their will. He made a similar point about laughter (*ibid.* 17-18). Here the twofold schema of judgement types is insufficient. Chrysippus appeals to 'another diseased condition (διάθεσις)<sup>163</sup> of some sort which comes in addition and is not easily reasoned out' and 'underlying circumstances creating unlike presentations' (*ibid.*). Both expressions point, it seems, to the corporeal nature of the soul. Galen for his part blows this up into an admission of complete ignorance of the 'causes', the 'causes of such things' (*ibid.* 19) and, a little later on, simply 'the cause' (i.e. of affection *tout court*, *ibid.* 20). A related example of the working of Galenic polemics is his treatment of the term 'difficult to reason out' said by Chrysippus of the disposition involving certain phenomena such as weeping against our will which seem to lie outside the scope of the explanation in terms of two types of judgement. First he applies this to the abatement of affection in time (*ibid.* 18), although Chrysippus considers this explicable in terms of the two types of judgement. A little later on (*ibid.* 34) he goes a step further, saying that Chrysippus in the quoted passage considers the cessation of affections 'incapable of being reasoned out', substituting the privative prefix α- for συν-. And he repeats this misrepresentation one more time (*ibid.* 38). This is very naughty.

There is one snippet of text which may count as a testimony about what Posidonius actually said on the problem raised in connection with his twofold cognitive analysis, viz. the case of people weeping or ceasing to weep against their will:

Posidonius again asks why ordinary men often weep when they do not wish to and are unable to check their tears, while in others the tears stop before the wish—obviously because the affective motions press so hard that they cannot be controlled by the will, or are brought to so complete a halt that it can no longer arouse them (*PHP* 4.7.37).

Galen takes this as a statement about the conflict between reason (here represented by the will) and affection along dualist lines. But the idea of the will, as several other elements here, takes up the idea of conation in the Chrysippean passage quoted at § 13-17: the

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<sup>163</sup> De Lacy translates 'disposition'. But the term διάθεσις also has the more specific medical meaning 'affection', 'diseased condition', see Ackerknecht (1982).

phenomena in question do not conform to the *conation*, viz. the second type of judgement. But where Posidonius does advance beyond Chrysippus is in the introduction of the expression 'affective motions' as a substitute for the 'disposition which it is difficult to reason out'. Thus Posidonius can be said to have made Chrysippus' remark on the phenomena in question more specific. But it remains to be seen whether this constitutes a real modification of the latter's doctrine. As Cooper has observed,<sup>164</sup> the fact that Posidonius introduced the technical expression 'affective motion' instead of opting for one of the available Platonic or Aristotelian alternatives certainly seems significant.

But the explanation ascribed to Posidonius alongside habits mentions also time. What he means becomes clear from the second half of this passage: desires abate in time by being satisfied. Apparently the assumption is that each and every affection involves an element of desire. Still, as a causal account it is weak and certainly no improvement on the account offered by Chrysippus, who in fact said more or less the same thing. Galen's elevation of time as one of the main causes for the abatement of affection in the course of time constitutes no high point in the history of philosophical analysis.

A handful of testimonies concerning mental presentation (φαντασία) likewise points to harmony between the two Stoics. Consider this passage, presented by Galen in the second half of book 5 but which in its original Posidonian context directly followed upon the treatment of the *aporiai*, viz. *PHP* 5.6.17-26 (omitting comments inserted by Galen):

... (17) And the discovery of the cause of the affections taught (us) the sources of distortion in what is to be sought and avoided. ... (19) When the cause of the affections was recognized it distinguished the methods of training ... (22) It cleared up the difficulties about the conation that arises from affection. ... (24) For I suppose that you have long observed how men do not experience fear or distress when they are rationally persuaded that evil is present or is approaching, but they do so when they receive a mental presentation of those same things. (25) For how could you stir the irrational by means of reason, unless you place before it a picture, as it were, that resembles a picture perceived by the eye? (26) Thus some people fall victim to desire as a result of a verbal account, and when realistically ordered to flee the charging lion, even though they have not seen it, they are afraid (transl. De Lacy's, modified).<sup>165</sup>

<sup>164</sup> Cooper (1998) 89 f.

<sup>165</sup> Though it is not entirely beyond doubt that the pieces of text translated here

Given the fact that according to Stoic doctrine affection and virtue are mutually exclusive, the discovery of the causes of affection may contribute to the virtuous life. The gerundives in the technical expressions ‘what is to be sought’ (αἰπετοῖς) and ‘what is to be avoided’ (φευκτοῖς) indicate the types of conation distinctive of *virtuous* action. Hence the cause of affection reveals also ‘the sources of distortion’ (διαστροφή), which distracts the soul from virtue. All this is standard Stoic doctrine and terminology.<sup>166</sup> Elsewhere too Posidonius had pointed to the relevance of his analysis of affection to the subject of virtue (4.7.24 = fr. 150a E.-K.) The expression ‘the discovery of the cause of the affections’ must refer back to Posidonius’ discussion of Chrysippus causal analysis and its limitations. In addition to the two types of judgement employed by Chrysippus, certain problems (in part raised by Chrysippus as well) had led Posidonius to introduce the concept of ‘affective motions’ or ‘processes’ (παθητικαὶ κινήσεις). Looking back at this discussion, he can hardly suppress his pride at this feat. The second snippet of text, dealing with training, echoes Galen’s related discussion on habituation, which is inspired by what he read in Posidonius (4.7.40 ff.). ‘The difficulties about the conation that arises from affection’ pertain to the cases of involuntary behaviour as weeping against your will discussed in the preceding context. Posidonius regards his idea of affective motion as an appropriate solution to these cases in particular.

Having thus concluded his earlier discussion, Posidonius further develops the theme of the soul’s perversion by focusing on appearance (φαντασία) as a key factor in irrational behaviour. The point came up earlier in Galen’s discussion when he mentioned Posidonius advice to train one’s mind and so prevent outbreaks of affection by ‘dwelling in advance’ on a mental picture of something terrible or distressing. This preventive measure is not loosely based on common experience but grafted onto another Stoic doctrine that antedates Posidonius, viz. that certain appearances set the intellect in motion

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formed one continuous passage (hence the dots between them), they are clearly derived from the same context. My impression is that Galen cannot have omitted much that was in between. Edelstein-Kidd however present them separately as Frs. 161, 168, 162 respectively.

<sup>166</sup> The phrase used by Posidonius echoes the school definition of one virtue in particular, viz. moderation (σωφροσύνη), see *SVF* 3.262; cf. 1.563 (Cleanthes). On the concept of αἵρεσις as directed to the good/virtue in particular, see *SVF* 3.88, 89, 91, 92, 131, 208; on αἵρεσις as a type of ὁρμή (conation), see *SVF* 3.173; cf. Inwood (1985) 239f. On διαστροφή: *SVF* 3.228-236

and, if assented to, trigger conation and action. This is explicitly expressed in the philosophical manual of Arius Didymus as preserved by Stobaeus:

What stirs conation is nothing else, they say, but the conative<sup>167</sup> appearance of what is immediately<sup>168</sup> appropriate, and in general conation is a movement of the soul towards something in general (Stob. *Ecl.* II, p. 86.17-19 Wachsmuth, *SVF* 3.169, part).<sup>169</sup>

Arius Didymus goes on to specify the terminology used for (adult) humans in particular: ‘rational conation’, ‘desire’ (ὄρεξις) and ‘intellect’ (διάνοια). Thus a ‘rational conation’ is ‘a movement of the intellect towards something in the sphere of action (πράττειν).<sup>170</sup> Obviously its very rationality entails propositional content and judgement. The physical process involved is indicated by the terms ‘stirs’ and ‘movement’. These terms indicate that numerous mental appearances are directly caused by external stimuli. As these appearances seem directly relevant (καθήκον) to our well-being, they invite a response, i.e. a conation. Whether the proper response is given depends on our mental condition, or ‘conative disposition’, as it is labelled a little further on (*ibid.* p. 87,11). Hence the need for preparation, training<sup>171</sup> as well as regimen<sup>172</sup> stressed by Posidonius. One form of conditioning, which according to Galen Posidonius derived from Plato,<sup>173</sup> is music, i.e. auditory appearances (5.6.20-2 = Posid. F 168; see above, p. 243). But again it is highly doubtful whether there is reason to assume any substantial doctrinal divergence from his predecessors. Posidonius’ concept of ‘affective movements’ seems to cover the motions stirring and conditioning our conation in the account offered by Stobaeus. This impression is confirmed by a few related testimonies from Galen concerned with the problem of the origin of evil, i.e. the soul’s distortion through affection, which is

<sup>167</sup> Or: ‘motivating’, as ὀρμητικὴν is aptly translated by Sorabji (2000) 43.

<sup>168</sup> Or: ‘obviously’.

<sup>169</sup> τὸ δὲ κινεῖν τὴν ὁρμὴν οὐδὲν ἕτερον εἶναι λέγουσιν ἀλλ’ ἡ φαντασίαν ὀρμητικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος αὐτόθεν, τὴν δὲ ὁρμὴν εἶναι φορὰν ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τι κατὰ τὸ γένος.

<sup>170</sup> The verb πράττειν strictly speaking applies to humans only, see Inwood (1985) 52, 227.

<sup>171</sup> See *infra*, p. 312.

<sup>172</sup> See *supra*, p. 222 f.

<sup>173</sup> There is no exact parallel in Plato for this passage on music but the idea as such is certainly traceable, see *Rep.* III: 411a5-412a. Posidonius moreover referred to Plato in connection with other means of regimen as well, see F31 E.-K.

mentioned by Posidonius as cited at *PHP* 5.6.17 (quoted above, p. 261).

### 8. *Cleanthes' Dialogue Between Reason and Anger*

According to Galen at *PHP* 5.6.33-39, Zeno and Cleanthes explained the affections in terms of an 'affective element' (παθητικόν) in the soul—a position crucially different from that of Chrysippus. Galen's only piece of evidence are four lines of verse composed by Cleanthes, constituting a dialogue between reason (λογισμός) and anger (θυμός)<sup>174</sup> (*PHP* 5.6.35, p.332.25-28 De Lacy ~ *SVF* 1.570, Posid. F 166 E.-K., F 417 Theiler):

- Τί ποτ' ἔσθ' ὃ βούλει, θυμέ; τοῦτο μοι φράσον.  
 2 Ἐγώ, λογισμέ; πᾶν ὃ βούλομαι ποιεῖν.  
 (Νῆ)<sup>175</sup> βασιλικόν γε· πλὴν ὅμως εἶπον ἅλιν.  
 4 Ὡς ἂν ἐπιθυμῶ, ταῦθ' ὅπως γενήσεται.

'What', Anger, 'is it that you want? Tell me that.'  
 'I, Reason? To do everything I wish.'  
 'Why that is royal; but still, say it once again.'  
 'In whatever way I desire, that this will come about.'

This vignette of mental conflict is quoted not directly from Cleanthes but via Posidonius. According to Galen, this dialogue presupposes a distinct παθητικόν, 'since Cleanthes portrayed reason talking to anger, as two different things' (*ibid.* 36). Again, one may ask whether a dualistic reading involving separate parts or powers is compelling, or at least more plausible than a monistic one. Today most scholars do not treat the dialogue as conclusive proof that Cleanthes was not a monist the way Chrysippus was—whatever interpretation Posidonius may have attached to it. Usually they leave it at that. So we should raise two main questions: what did Cleanthes wish to demonstrate? and: Why did Posidonius quote these lines?

Students of ancient Stoicism have usually taken Cleanthes as a quite docile follower of Zeno. Galen is no exception. No separate

<sup>174</sup> Long-Sedley (65I) translate 'passion'. Of course, θυμός covers a wider semantic field than 'anger', see—with special reference to *PHP*—Manuli (1988); Tieleman (1996a) 236 ff. But in view of Cleanthes' allusion to the Aristotelian (and Platonic) tripartition, 'anger' is more apposite here; see *infra* in text.

<sup>175</sup> (Νῆ) *Prosopopoiie in Marc. gr. 11.22* Naí *Prosopopoiie in Par. gr. 2465* (Meineke *coni.*); cf. Kotzia-Panteli (1981) 178 ff. De Lacy (whose text I follow in all other respects) prints a blank here.



proof-text is given on behalf of Zeno; that from Cleanthes serves to illustrate the position of both. Galen says that Posidonius says that Zeno sided with Plato (5.6.34, 4.4.38, Posid. Test. 59 E.-K.). Yet Galen apologizes for not being in a position to inspect the textual evidence regarding Zeno (5.6.40 ff.). Apparently, Posidonius failed to produce any proof-text from Zeno.

The verse dialogue of Cleanthes featured prominently in Pohlenz' reconstruction of Stoic psychology, which resembles Galen's story in a number of ways.<sup>176</sup> Zeno acknowledged a separate non-rational power, viz. impulse (ὁρμή), whose excessive or unnatural manifestations are the affections (παθή) of the soul.<sup>177</sup> However, Pohlenz did not follow Galen in ascribing the Platonic tripartition to Zeno (and Cleanthes), relying on Posidonius' reference to the παθητικόν instead.<sup>178</sup> The tripartite scheme has been read into the poem by other modern exegetes. I shall return to this point in due course.

According to Pohlenz, the 'hardline' monism which was to become standard Stoic doctrine was introduced by Chrysippus, who however made his deviation resemble a faithful elaboration of Zeno's position. A serious weakness of Pohlenz' account is that it cannot be based on straightforward evidence regarding Zeno. In particular, it is far from obvious that Zeno's use of the concept of ὁρμή implies a power in the sense required by Pohlenz' thesis. So Pohlenz highlighted our dialogue as implying a dualistic model of the soul taken over by Cleanthes from Zeno, in line with the former's traditional reputation as a loyal, not too bright, pupil.<sup>179</sup> We should also bear in mind that the purported Posidonian support for the dualistic reading (*ibid.* 5.6.36) counted for a great deal with Pohlenz and his contemporaries.

<sup>176</sup> Pohlenz (1938) 195 f., *id.* (1948-9) 89 ff.

<sup>177</sup> See D.L. 7.110 (*SVF* 1.205), Cic. *Tusc.* 4.11, 47 (*SVF* 1.205), Stob. *Ecl.* II p.39.5ff. W. (*SVF* 1.206); cf. Chrysippus exegesis of Zeno's definitions, *PHP* 4.2.8, 14 (*SVF* 3.462).

<sup>178</sup> For Galen's reading, see also, with reference to Posidonius, *PHP* 8.1.14 (*SVF* 1.571, Posid. T 92 E.-K.); cf. also *supra*, pp. 34, 204.

<sup>179</sup> This reputation stems in large part from the hostile biographical traditions as represented by our main source, Diogenes Laertius, 7.168 ff. (Cleanthes a dunce at school) and 7.179 (outshone by his star pupil Chrysippus). The dominant trait emerging from D.L. is cowardly obtuseness. A rather different note is struck by Timon of Phlius, who alludes to a bent for dialectic involving an over-subtle and devious cast of mind, see D.L. 7.170 (Timon Fr. 41, p.87 Di Marco; *SVF* I Cleanthes 463) with Lapini (1995), esp. 297, 299.

Today most experts in the field consider the case for Zenonian dualism weak.<sup>180</sup> As usual, Cleanthes is considered incapable of independent behaviour vis-à-vis Zeno. His individual position has seldom been studied. A few testimonies however tell clear in favour of his subscribing to him the monist position.<sup>181</sup> In particular, a neglected fragment from his *Physical Notebooks* preserved by Plutarch, *On Stoic Self-Contradictions* 1034D (SVF 1.563) shows how he explained the plurality of virtues by appealing not to divisions within the soul but to one psychic power<sup>182</sup> which is applied to different spheres of action.<sup>183</sup> This position is clearly designed as a monistic response to the Platonic and Aristotelian accounts. In fact, we know that the plurality of the virtues was a problem raised against the Stoic unitarian conception by its opponents.<sup>184</sup> Another such challenge was the phenomenon of mental conflict.

It will not be necessary to dwell on the debate that raged over the views of Pohlenz, although they still cast their shadow here and there. Thus Inwood, though rejecting Pohlenz' ascription of a dualistic model to Zeno, nevertheless argues that we may have to see capabilities such as conation (ὁρμή) and representation (φαντασία) as enduring *powers* (δυνάμεις) of the soul which represent an aspect of plurality involved in mental conflict. Clearly, this re-introduces an element familiar from Pohlenz' account of pre-Chrysippean Stoicism, extending it to the period after Chrysippus as well. The upshot is a kind of soft monism as opposed to the strictly monolithic variety ascribed by

<sup>180</sup> Not only is there no compelling evidence in regard to Zeno's alleged dualism, there are positive counter-indications: see esp. Cic. *Ac.* 1.39, *Tusc.* 3.74-5, Plut. *Virt. mor.* 440E-441D, where Zeno (whose name is here clearly not a label for the Stoic school as a whole) is associated with the monistic view. In his own day Pohlenz' reconstruction met with criticism from Philipsson (1937), reiterated more recently by Inwood (1985) 27 ff. Cf. also Long-Sedley (1986) vol. 1, 422, Donini (1995).

<sup>181</sup> In addition to SVF 1.563, see SVF 1.576-577 (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.76-7) pointed out by Von Arnim (1921) cols. 572f.: Cleanthes gave the advice to *persuade* mourning people that what has happened to them is no evil. SVF I 526, 563, 573—also referred to by Von Arnim—are to my mind unconvincing with respect to the monist/dualist distinction.

<sup>182</sup> The term δυνάμις here designates the soul's physical (tensional) *strength* rather than an Aristotelian-style 'faculty'. See *supra*, p. 38.

<sup>183</sup> Cf. also Chrys. *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 7.2.9-11 (SVF 2.256). Cleanthes' recasting of Zeno's definitions of the cardinal virtues in terms of wisdom (φρόνησις) was meant to bring out the mind's rationality: see Plut. *SR* 1034C-D (SVF 1.200; cf. Plut. *Virt. mor.* 441A, SVF 1.201). Mental strength (or 'will-power') reflects an emphasis peculiar to his moral thought, see *infra*, pp. 271 f.

<sup>184</sup> See Plutarch., *Virt. mor.* 440e ff., Galen, *PHP* 7.2.

Pohlenz to Chrysippus and his successors.<sup>185</sup> As I have explained in one of the earlier chapters, I believe that there is insufficient textual support for this interpretation, and several indications against it, particularly where the early Stoic concept of δύναμις is concerned.<sup>186</sup>

Inwood's account at least illustrates that the fundamental questions raised by Pohlenz are still with us today. They require an answer based on a careful sifting of all the available textual evidence, including the dialogue between reason and anger by Cleanthes. But can these lines really cast more light on the monistic position? This question is usually answered in the negative. In most cases, the dialogue is disarmed as a piece of poetic dramatization, or simply ignored; that is to say, it is deemed of little, if any, evidential status in regard to doctrinal issues.<sup>187</sup> If this is true, we are under no obligation to subscribe to the dualist reading. Meanwhile, Pohlenz' reading, in one version or another, continues to attract defenders.<sup>188</sup>

Cleanthes recommended poetry as a medium for philosophical insights in virtue of its *clarity*.<sup>189</sup> He followed his own advice, as most famously in his *Hymn to Zeus* (SVF 1.537). Pohlenz rightly insisted that the dialogue between reason and anger should be taken seriously from a doctrinal point of view.<sup>190</sup> In particular, we face the challenge posed by Posidonius, viz. how to conceive of the presence of two interlocutors within a monistic framework. The dialogue, in other words, seems to presuppose some form of mental division which seems incompatible with the conception of the mind ascribed to the early Stoics. As is well known, the early Stoics are credited with a view of weakness of will (ἀκρασία) as an oscillation of the single and homogeneously rational ἡγεμονικόν, or διάνοια, as opposed to the

<sup>185</sup> Inwood (1985) 33 ff. Cf. Voelke (1973) 29.

<sup>186</sup> See *supra*, p. 38.

<sup>187</sup> See Zeller (1963/1921) p. 203 n.1., Bonhoeffer (1890) 46, Pearson (1891) 307, Von Arnim (1921) 572f., Rist (1969) 29f., Voelke (1973) 83, Kerferd (1978) 486. Cf. also Long-Sedley (1986) vol 1, 422: '... Cleanthes' verses ... do not prove that he distinguished reason and passion in the way Posidonius alleged'.

<sup>188</sup> Kidd *ad* Posid. T 92, F 166 (pp.79 f., 608 ff.) ascribes to Cleanthes 'a kind of Platonic psychology'. De Lacy *ad loc.* says that the dialogue between reason and anger represents 'a kind of Platonic allegory in which the irrational θυμός opposes reason by aligning βούλησις with ἐπιθυμία.' Cf. also Verbeke (1949) 167f. and Theiler, *Comm.* vol. 2, p. 359 (*ad* Posid. Fr. 417); Sandbach (1975) 65.

<sup>189</sup> Sen. *Ep.* 108.10 (SVF 1.487); cf. SVF 1.486 (verse especially suited to theology) with Von Arnim (1921) 560; Pohlenz (1949) ii, 16. Other examples of poems by Cleanthes are printed as SVF 1.557 and 559, both of which are concerned with ethics.

<sup>190</sup> Pohlenz (1938) 195 f.

dualistic model of two mental faculties—rational and irrational—pulling in different directions.<sup>191</sup>

The Stoic monistic position concerning weakness of will is still not fully understood. We do seem to be aware of a synchronous conflict. Did the Stoics acknowledge this experiential fact and, if so, how did they meet it? In addition to Inwood's account (see above), I pick out two other recent solutions. As usual, these do not refer to the dialogue between reason and anger.<sup>192</sup> One of the most ingenious suggestions ever made, no doubt, is that advanced by A.W. Price in his monograph on mental conflict. He distinguishes between present thoughts and memories: 'Vacillation permits a memory of a conflicting judgement, and even a recognition of its rationality ... Through memory, the Stoics hoped to reconcile awareness of conflict with an absence of synchronous conflict.'<sup>193</sup> Contemplating a particular course of action about, say, the desirability of vengeance consists in reactivating a particular judgement made previously under similar circumstances. This suits the Stoic view of reason as a collection of conceptions and preconceptions,<sup>194</sup> with memory (μνήμη) as 'a store of presentations' (i.e. conceptions).<sup>195</sup> In this sense reason is a unity-in-plurality. Mental conflict then results from a lack of harmony between past and present conceptions.

Price, then, takes due note of the attested Stoic view of reason. Yet on closer inspection his explanation is not without its weak spots. He sacrifices the idea of synchronous conflict in its strict sense, though our inner awareness tells us that there is such a situation. This would be strange, particularly in the light of the value attached by the Stoics to self-perception. Further, Price's solution lacks any underpinning from texts concerned with the phenomenon of mental conflict. In fact, he brings it to bear on that old favourite, Euripides, *Medea* 1078-

<sup>191</sup> Most explicit in this regard is the testimony on the Stoic position offered by Plut. *Virt. mor.* 7, 446F (SVF 3.459).

<sup>192</sup> Cf. also Gosling (1987).

<sup>193</sup> Price (1995) 160.

<sup>194</sup> *PHP* 5.2.27, 49 (SVF 3.471a), V 3.1 (SVF 2.841), Cic. *Tusc.* 4.31 (SVF 3.95), with Price (1995) 159.

<sup>195</sup> *SVF* 1.64 (2.56). Is also defined as imprints which have become 'permanent and steadfast' (SVF 2.847). Memory is an essential link in the process of the formation of concepts and their systematisation as expertise (τέχνη) or knowledge (SVF 2.56, 83, 115); hence its frequent and close connection with cognition (κατάληψις, cf. also SVF 3.213). When Chrysippus modified Cleanthes' crudely corporealist account of presentation (φαντασία), he did so in order to provide a more credible account of memory (SVF 2.56). The Stoics dealt separately with the question of selecting and evaluating memories (CN 1061C = SVF 3.213); cf. Long (1991) 116 f.

9 (quoted above, p. 171). But it is not clear what role could be played by memory here. Nor is memory involved in the lines of Cleanthes, which are similar to those of Euripides insofar as both pit anger against reason and portray reason as remaining fully aware of the evil nature of its opponent. In fact, the concept of memory never functions in the context of affection—at least not in the way required by Price's interpretation.<sup>196</sup> It is an important epistemological concept but only after Chrysippus had refined the cruder conception held by Cleanthes.<sup>197</sup> Indeed, the idea of reason as a collection of concepts is not attested before Chrysippus either.

So in the event Price's solution does not carry conviction. Nor is the similar suggestion recently made by Joyce, which does maintain simultaneous conflict by allowing for two or more presentations receiving attention at one and the same time.<sup>198</sup> This too presupposes the idea of the collection of concepts in the mind. There is however no textual evidence for this problematic idea (which is also based on the *Medea* passage). We cannot advert to two or more inner voices at the same time; rather our inner perception points to an alternation between them. Indeed, it is this phenomenon which is adequately expressed in the model of an internal dialogue between two voices.

So it may be expected that a closer scrutiny of the dialogue by Cleanthes may also contribute to a fuller understanding of how the Stoics conceived of mental phenomena such as weakness of will. Let us first try to determine what these four lines really are about; that is to say, to make more of the clues contained in them.

Firstly, it may be observed that the exchange of viewpoints does not refer to any external cause of anger (such as being slighted) but is concerned with the appropriate response. This seems to imply the distinction between affection as a (mistaken) view on how one ought to act and affection as a (mistaken) view on the value of certain things.<sup>199</sup> The former aspect concerns what the Stoics from Zeno

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<sup>196</sup> A false judgement turned into a memory may on the contrary co-exist with the abatement of affection, see *supra*, p. 124 f.

<sup>197</sup> See *supra*, n. 195.

<sup>198</sup> Joyce (1995) esp. 334 f.

<sup>199</sup> On this distinction, see further *supra*, pp. 169 ff. It is true that Cic. *Tusc.* 3.76 (*SVF* 1.576) ascribes this twofold analysis to Chrysippus, as opposed to Cleanthes. But Seneca's account of Cleanthes' position, *Ep.* 94.4 does seem to distinguish between precepts about how to act and propositions about what is the case. Differently Donini (1995) 328, who suggests that Chrysippus formulated the doctrine of the twofold propositional structure of affection out of dissatisfaction with Cleanthes' riposte to Aristo as reported by Seneca, *Ep.* 94.18 ff.

onwards called the καθήκοντα ('appropriate actions') defined as those which admit of a 'reasonable justification' (εὐλογος ἀπολογία).<sup>200</sup> Arguably, this is also implied by the fact that anger is connected twice with the verb cognate with βούλησις, which is the Stoic technical term for reasonable appetition (εὐλογος ὄρεξις).<sup>201</sup> Anger, in other words, presents its viewpoint as reasonable, assuming the voice of correct reason. A weakened intellect is marked by its failure to distinguish between real and seeming καθήκοντα (see above, pp. 185 f., 263).

Reason asks Anger to disclose its wish and to repeat what it has said. Reason has heard perfectly well and yet of its own accord<sup>202</sup> exposes itself once again to the persuasive voice of anger.<sup>203</sup> That is to say, the will to resist has been weakened; an amount of psychic strength has already gone over to the other side. It may be implied that this dialogue might be repeated a number of times before anger takes over completely, thus illustrating the wavering which according to the Stoics is characteristic of passionate conduct. The emphatic phrase πλὴν ὅμως ('and yet', 'nonetheless') expresses a marked inconsistency in reason's behaviour: although anger's claim is preposterous (cf. βασιλικόν), reason is interested after all. On the other hand, reason is still able to see that it would be bad if anger took over. In short, the dialogue shows a weak reason about to surrender to anger's persuasive voice rather than an intellect still strong enough to conjure up an affection and test its own strength in an act of self-examination.<sup>204</sup>

It has not been seen, or so I believe, that a few further elements nicely illustrate the monistic conception, while being rather pointless from a dualistic point of view. Twice θυμός claims the right to do *whatever* it wants *in whatever way* it wants (1.2 πᾶν ὃ βούλομαι ..., 1.4 ὧς ἂν ἐπιθυμῶ ...), i.e. it desires absolute control over the soul. This brings out the exclusivity of emotion, its monopolizing tendency.<sup>205</sup> Indeed, that the whole self is at stake also follows from a closer

<sup>200</sup> This concept goes back to Zeno, see *SVF* 1.230ff. For Cleanthes see *SVF* 1.576 ff. Cf. also 3.491 ff.

<sup>201</sup> See further *infra*, p. 272.

<sup>202</sup> Likewise Chrysippus in his *Περὶ παθῶν* mentions cases where people self-consciously choose to follow their desire or anger, *ap. Gal. PHP* 3.6.32 (*SVF* 3.475).

<sup>203</sup> On the often underestimated role of persuasiveness (τὸ πῖθανον) in Stoic thought, cf. further Tieleman (1996a) 255 ff.

<sup>204</sup> On this exercise see *infra*, p. 312; cf. Epict. 3.3.14-19.

<sup>205</sup> Cf. Seneca, *De ira* I, 8.1.

consideration of the term βασιλικόν ('royal'). This term recalls Platonic passages such as *Rep.* 473c-d, where royal rank and knowledge are conjoined in the ideal of the philosopher-kings.<sup>206</sup> Given the analogy drawn by Plato between the individual and society at large, the term may be applicable to the ruling element in the individual soul. That this passage is relevant here is shown by the fact that Posidonius ascribed to Plato the view that understanding (ἐπιστήμη) is a 'royal and despotic thing' (βασιλικόν ... τι ... καὶ δεσποτικόν, *PHP* 4.6.17 = Posid. Fr. 164 E.-K.). But the closest parallel comes from Aristotle, *Politics* A.5: 1254b5-10, where the intellect is said to govern the appetites with a constitutional and royal (βασιλικήν) rule. If we assume that these parallels provide the backdrop against which to read Cleanthes' exchange, we could say that reason in using this term implies that anger appropriates the role which rightfully belongs to it, reason itself.

Cleanthes' depiction of mental conflict strongly recalls one of the sayings of Heraclitus, the original version of which has been preserved by Plutarch, *Coriolanus* 22.2 (B 85 DK):

Θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὃ γὰρ ἂν θέλῃ, ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται  
It is difficult to fight against anger<sup>207</sup>; for whatever it wants,  
it buys at the cost of soul

Most of our ancient sources and present-day historians concur in taking this to pertain to inner conflict. It is so difficult to fight anger precisely because it involves loss of psychic strength.<sup>208</sup> In Greek thought in general the human will is very much a matter of psychic

<sup>206</sup> Cf. also 499b-c; *Lys.* 207d-210a. De Lacy *ad loc.* points to Pl. *Grg.* 492b2, where Callicles refers to kings as capable to the highest degree of indulging their pleasures and as despising the virtues. This would seem to fit the present context too, but the Platonic passages referred to in the text show that Plato's notion of kingship is not in itself pejorative.

<sup>207</sup> On the possible ambiguities involved see now Mansfeld (1992c), who suggests that 'θυμός is a manifestation of one's ψυχή, or rather that when one is angry one's rationality has become weaker precisely because part of one's vital psychic strength has already been converted into anger. The idea of strength is connected with the idea of the will. Consequently, it is difficult to fight one's won anger precisely because one's strength (or will) may be already on the side of anger rather than on that of reason ...' (p.18)

<sup>208</sup> Cf. Arist. *EE* B 7.1223b18-27: Heraclitus refers to the ἰσχὺν τοῦ θυμοῦ. Similarly *EN* B 2.1105a7f. At *Pol.* E 11.1315a24-31, however, he takes θυμῷ as someone else's anger; cf. Mansfeld (1992c) 15 ff. Aristotle does not explicitly mention reason as the faculty which, if unassailed by affection, exercises control over one's actions. This aspect is however made explicit in the version of Democritus, B 236 DK: θυμῷ μάχεσθαι μὲν χαλεπόν· ἀνδρὸς δὲ τὸ κρατεῖν εὐλογίστου.

*strength*.<sup>209</sup> The latter notion was given special prominence by Cleanthes.<sup>210</sup> Its presence in this Heraclitean dictum may have been what attracted his interest in the first place. Cleanthes was keenly interested in tracing Heraclitean anticipations of Stoic doctrines.<sup>211</sup> In his dialogue the will is represented, in three out of four lines, by the verbal forms βούλει, βούλομαι, ἐπιθυμῶ (ll. 1, 2, 4). Heraclitus refers to the will (ὁ ... ἄν θέλῃ) in a way that resembles the demands of θυμός in Cleanthes' poem (ll. 2, 4). These affinities are close enough to warrant the assumption that Cleanthes is inspired by—and alludes to—this saying of Heraclitus.

But this Heraclitean parallel is by no means the only possible allusion to be detected. Above all, there is an unmistakable echo of the Platonic tripartition of the soul and, even more prominently, of its Aristotelian version. This feature enables Galen to credit Cleanthes with the Platonic tripartition in the first place. Apart from θυμός and λογισμός, we have ἐπιθυμῶ, i.e. the verb cognate with ἐπιθυμία, as well βούλει and βούλομαι, which are forms of the verb cognate with βούλησις, the term standardly used for 'rational' (i.e. correct) wish in philosophical contexts, which thus is related to the rational faculty in particular. In fact, this presence of the tripartition is too obvious to go unnoticed.<sup>212</sup> Yet its implications have so far not been sufficiently pursued. It strains credulity that the three terms belonging to the Platonic-cum-Aristotelian tripartition are re-united here by sheer coincidence.

First, ἐπιθυμῶ as said by θυμός in l.4 agrees with Stoic definitions that make θυμός—as incipient ὀργή ('wrath')—a subspecies of ἐπιθυμία ('desire'), which is one of four primary affections.<sup>213</sup> This confines θυμός to a strikingly narrow sense as compared to its role in Plato. Similarly, ll.1-2 go against the tripartition by relating wish

<sup>209</sup> See Mansfeld (1991), esp. 114 ff.

<sup>210</sup> According to Plut. *De Stoic Rep.* 1034D (SVF 1.563) he replaced φρόνησις as one of the primary virtues with ἐγκράτεια ('self-control'), which he defined in terms of mental strength, i.e. pneumatic tension, τόνος. Cf. also Plut. *Virt. mor.* 446F-447A (SVF 3.459, second text); Clem. *Strom.* II 18.80.4 (SVF 3.275, second text). The tensional strength was indicated by the term δύναμις ('power') see Plut. *Virt. mor.* 441C (SVF 1.202; 3.459); Stob. *Ecl.* II p.74.1-3 W. (SVF 3.112); cf. Alex. Aphr. *De an. Mantissa* p.118.6ff. Br. (SVF 2.823).

<sup>211</sup> See Cleanthes *ap.* Euseb. *PE* 15.20 (SVF 1.519) with Long (1975/6), esp. 54. He devoted a separate study in no less than four books to the sage of Ephesus, viz. his *Exegeses of Heraclitus* (D.L. 7.174).

<sup>212</sup> See *supra*, n. 188.

<sup>213</sup> See the scholastic definitions, SVF 3.395 ff. The same hierarchy is implied by Chrysippus *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 3.1.25 (SVF 2.886); cf. Pohlenz (1938) 195 f.



(βούλει, βούλομαι) to anger. In 1.1 reason refers to the claim of irrational θυμός by using precisely the verb (βούλει) that, as we have noted, is related to the standard term for rational motivation—βούλησις. In 1.2 θυμός takes over the verb from reason to refer to its intentions. This feature may be meant to imply that both reason and anger present anger's claim as rational—in full accordance with the monistic conception of weakness of will, with its attendant idea of self-delusion (see below).

In sum, Cleanthes has reason and anger refer to each other and itself in terms which cut across the Platonic-cum-Aristotelian tripartition. The point is a very subtle one, but not to be missed by any reader familiar with the traditional divisions of the soul and the terms in which they were stated. Cleanthes effectively amalgamates, or implodes, the parts or faculties at issue, thus making nonsense of any division which sees them as manifestations of distinct and permanent psychic powers.<sup>214</sup>

But what can be learned about the position which Cleanthes himself advocates? Faculty psychology is replaced with an account along nominalist lines; that is to say, the three key-terms now function as *alternative descriptions* for the course of action contemplated by the intellect, i.e. the two interlocutors—in line with what we have found out about the linguistic and dialogic nature of deliberation, and in particular the role assigned by Cleanthes to the 'sayables' (λεκτά), i.e. in the particular predicates (κατηγορήματα) βούλει, βούλομαι and ἐπιθυμῶ.<sup>215</sup> The passionate intellect may delude itself into describing to itself a particular representation as appropriate and reasonable, as when anger presents itself in the guise of rational wish in the way explained. Aristotle had always been uncertain whether to assign wish to reason or to appetite.<sup>216</sup> Cleanthes resolves this problem by

<sup>214</sup> Cleanthes did not defined the powers in terms of distinct qualities (ποιότητες) separable in thought but not in fact. This analysis originates with his successor Chrysippus, who not only used it to differentiate between the soul's powers (see SVF 2.826) but also the virtues, see Plut. *Virt. Mor.* 441a. Quality of course features as one of the four so-called Stoic categories from the perspective of 'the qualified' (scil. material entity, the ποιόν, further subdivided into ἰδίως and κοινῶς ποιόν): see the evidence collected by Long-Sedley 28 and 29. For Chrysippus as the instigator of the four categories, see Long-Sedley (1986) 172 ff., 178 f.

<sup>215</sup> Cf. the tantalizingly brief notice in Cicero's summary of Chrysippus' *On Affections* at *Tusc.* 4.21 *ad fin.* (SVF 3.398), that appetite (*libido*, i.e. ἐπιθυμία) is intended at 'predicates' (κατηγορήματα), i.e. sayables, as opposed to real objects.

<sup>216</sup> See e.g. *De an.* Γ 9.432b4-7, with Price (1995) 108 ff. who argues that this wavering is caused by Aristotle's failure to distinguish clearly between faculties as either parts or factions of the soul. Voelke (1973) 58 f. points to Alex. *De an.* p.74.3

taking the predicate 'wishing' as a descriptive label used by the rational mind in a particular state, whether appropriately or inappropriately.

Thus understood, the strategy followed by Cleanthes is directed primarily against Aristotle, although of course Plato is included in the attack as well. Cleanthes has used the ploy of turning the terms of his opponents against them.<sup>217</sup> Galen simply turns the tables back again on the Stoics by arguing that the presence of these terms proved Cleanthes to have been committed to the Platonic tripartition. Likewise at *PHP* 4.1.6 ff. he imputes to Chrysippus the Platonic tripartition and trilocation.<sup>218</sup>

Cleanthes' procedure invites comparison with Aristotle's seminal critique of the Platonic tripartition (as well as bipartition<sup>219</sup>) at *De an.* Γ 9-10.<sup>220</sup> After an initial distinction between two functions in living creatures, viz. (i) judging (an act of the intellect and sensation combined) and (ii) locomotion, Aristotle raises the question what it is that causes movement? He presents two main alternatives, the former of which is further subdivided: motion is caused by (1) a part of the soul that is separable either (1a) in extension (i.e. in the Platonic sense of a part—*μόριον, μέρος*—with separate location and being) or (1b) in definition (i.e. as a *δύναμις*, 'power', in the Aristotelian sense); (2) the soul as a whole. We must in particular note this last option, since it is the one the Stoics were in effect to adopt.

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ff. Bruns, whose explanation of the status of *βούλησις* shows that the ancient exegetical tradition considered it problematic.

<sup>217</sup> I.e. the widespread dialectical technique of 'reversal' (*περιτροπή*) in its broader sense; see Burnyeat (1976), esp. 65. Galen's taste for this mode of argumentation is probably reflected by the title of his (lost) *Περὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦς περιτρεπόντων λόγων*, *Lib. prop.* 11, *SMII* p.119.23-4 Müller.

<sup>218</sup> See esp. *PHP* 3.1.10-15 (*SVF* 2.885), where Chrysippus presents the Platonic position in its original terminology. In book 4 Galen goes on to argue that Chrysippus changed his mind and ended up with Aristotle's view. Here his proof-text is an excerpt where Chrysippus argues that Homer located the Platonic parts, or rather the corresponding functions, in the heart (4.1.5-10 = *SVF* 2.905). Here too Galen exploits the fact that Chrysippus uses, for polemical purposes, the original Platonic terms. Two points may be noted: first, Galen's extreme literal-mindedness and total disregard for the original context of his quotations; secondly, his tendency to ascribe to his adversary the doctrines of rival schools.

<sup>219</sup> I.e. the division into a rational and non-rational capacity, which is also Platonic or at any rate considered equivalent with the Platonic tripartition by Aristotle's time, as is—*pace* Vander Waerdt (1987)—clear from Aristotle's own treatment. Cf. Rees (1957).

<sup>220</sup> On its persisting influence, see *supra*, p. 28.

Aristotle raises a preliminary problem (ἀπορία): 'In what sense should one speak of parts and how many are there?' (432a15-23; cf. 402b1-5). His subsequent treatment remains predominantly aporetic (cf. 432a22, 432b2, 12-13).<sup>221</sup> One need not be as opinionated a commentator as D.W. Hamlyn to sympathize with his remark that the difficulties raised by Aristotle might 'rightly provoke doubts on the whole faculty approach to the soul'.<sup>222</sup> Thus, having raised the question of the nature of the faculties and their number, Aristotle says that 'in a way they seem infinite' (*ibid.* 24); and, with regard to the perceptive power (αἰσθητικόν), one may doubt 'whether to view it as rational or non-rational'.<sup>223</sup> At face value, these considerations actually tell in favour of the second option, i.e. that of one indivisible soul. This option is not pursued in what follows however. Aristotle's critique is designed to pave the way for his own division into five main powers (δύναμεις).<sup>224</sup> Thus he concludes that motion is explicable in terms of powers that are 'distinct in definition but spatially inseparable'—i.e. option (1b) (10.433b24 f.).

On Plato's loose criterion of differentiation, Aristotle argues, much more parts would result than the three he (Plato) postulates, e.g. we would have to posit the nutritive (θρεπτικόν) and perceptive parts, which are even more different from the Platonic parts than these differ among themselves. But the following point is more important for our present purposes. Bipartition and tripartition, Aristotle holds, involve the splitting up of the appetitive faculty which seems different from all others, for 'wish (βούλησις) is in the rational part, and desire (ἐπιθυμία) and anger (θυμός) in the non-rational; and if the soul has three parts, desire (ὄρεξις) will be found in each one of them' (432b4-7). But this implication, he says, is wholly implausible (ἄτο-

<sup>221</sup> On Aristotle's critique of the soul-partition in this chapter see also Fortenbaugh (1970) and Vander Waerdt (1987).

<sup>222</sup> Hamlyn (1968) 150. Vander Waerdt (1987) 627-43, in contrast, argues that Aristotle is mainly concerned with self-criticism, viz. by confining tripartition to the sphere of ethics and preferring the division into five powers in the context of scientific psychology. But this distinction (rather than self-criticism) hardly needs to be argued: it is clearly indicated at e.g. *De an.* A 1.402b3ff. and *ENA* 13. Cf. also Porph. *ap.* Stob. *Ecl.* I 49.25a, p. 350.19 ff. = Fr. 253 Smith; and *supra*, pp. 78 ff.

<sup>223</sup> The Stoics were to describe perception as one of the four main activities of their unified rational soul: see Aëtius, cited *supra*, n. 38.

<sup>224</sup> See esp. B 3.414a31f. δυνάμεις δ' εἶπομεν θρεπτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, ὀρεκτικόν, κινητικόν κατὰ τὸν τρόπον, διανοητικόν. For Aristotle, this list is, so to speak, axiomatic: some people acknowledge all these functions, others only some of them; there are even people who accept one only, *ibid.* 29-31. The last option is identical to the view that was later ascribed to the Stoics, cf. e.g. Gal. *PHP* 6.2.5.

πον, 432b4). That is to say, Aristotle holds that desire has to be accepted as a distinct power. However, a problem remains as to the relation between desire and the rational faculty, since he has said that when we split up desire part of it will reside in reason. Later the Stoics will maintain just this: that reason has a will and motive power of its own and has no need of separate non-rational parts on this score.

Aristotle lumps together the three Platonic parts into a single faculty, wrecking the Platonic partition but retaining appetite as a separate power. Cleanthes' procedure is similar to Aristotle's in that it brings the terms at issue under one heading, viz. by representing them as voiced (literally) by a single intellect. In so doing Cleanthes can be said to cap Aristotle's critique of Plato. The upshot is a model of mental conflict that the Chrysippus and other Stoics took also to be exemplified by Medea's description of her plight (see above, p. 171). They did not conceive of emotion and mental conflict in terms of separate faculties but rather in terms of roles, or selves, one of which represents cosmically rooted 'right reason'.

As we have noticed, Aristotle raises several serious queries about the faculty approach to the soul without following them up. The points raised could be taken to tell in favour of Aristotle's option (2), which suits Stoic monism. It seems feasible to compare Chrysippus' definition in his *On Law* of conation (ὁρμή) as 'reason (λόγος) commanding man to act'.<sup>225</sup> This mode of formulation seems likewise designed to drive home the essence of monism as opposed to competing conceptions. Also, it is pertinent to point out that—as is also clear from what seems to have been the context of Chrysippus' definition—conation and appetite (ὄρεξις) are closely related concepts, appetite being defined as *rational* conation and thus in effect the only kind of conation which really matters, and that moreover the definitions of appetite and its subspecies in Aristotle and Stoicism in several cases do overlap.<sup>226</sup>

<sup>225</sup> Plut. *Stoic. Rep.* 1037F (SVF 3.175). The following context, featuring Chrysippean definitions of forms of conation, notably ὄρεξις, should be compared as well.

<sup>226</sup> According to Stoic definitions, ἐπιθυμία is an ἄλογος ὄρεξις and βούλησις an εὐλογος ὄρεξις. The generic (and morally neutral) term ὄρεξις is defined as 'a (rational) conation (ὁρμή) directed at an apparent good'. SVF 3.495; cf. 493, 494; cf. 3.431, 432 (βούλησις as one of the three εὐπαθείαι), 169; 173; 391. Chrysippus also fixed the meaning of ὄρεξις more narrowly as a 'rational conation towards something that gives pleasure to the extent it should'. PHP 4.2.3-4 (SVF 3.463); 4.2 (SVF 3.464); cf. *ibid.* 5.7.29-30. (Whether he intended this normative sense to coincide with that of βούλησις according to the above definition is a difficult point).

As to Cleanthes, the stark question now raises itself whether he had actually read *De an.* Γ 9. I take the similarities I have noted between his dialogue and this Aristotelian chapter to be significant, in particular where their mode of argumentation is concerned. There is one testimony about Cleanthes' attitude to the Peripatetics of his day which lends further weight to my interpretation. Cleanthes used to say that the Peripatetics were 'in a predicament similar to that of lyres, which give forth beautiful sounds but never hear themselves' (D.L. 7.173). This must mean that the Peripatetics left the full understanding of their words to others, like Cleanthes. This can only mean that Cleanthes used Peripatetic doctrines for his own purposes.

To conclude this section, we may note, first, that the dialogue is designed as a response to the positions of Plato and Aristotle and that the Aristotelian presence is particularly notable. It is a fair assumption that the dialogue is inspired by Aristotle's critique of the Platonic tripartition in his *On the Soul* Γ 9. In sum, the Stoics carry this critique to its logical conclusion, i.e. the abandonment of the whole faculty approach, whereas Aristotle had chosen to cling to the basic division between a rational component and a motive or appetitive one.<sup>227</sup> So Aristotle may have contributed to the genesis of Stoic psychological monism.<sup>228</sup>

### 9. Two Further Witnesses: Seneca and ps. Plutarch

Lactantius, *On God's Anger* 17.13 has preserved a cluster of definitions of anger which have been derived from Seneca's *On Anger* but cannot

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Arist. *De an.* Γ 10.433a23-31 defines βούλησις and ἐπιθυμία as correct (ὀρθός) and incorrect ὀρεξις respectively. Elsewhere he subsumes θυμός under ἐπιθυμία (*De an.* A 1.401a30f.). Likewise the pseudo-Platonic *Definitiones* (of uncertain date) defines βούλησις as ὀρεξις εὐλογος (413C8f.). For further parallels with Stoicism see Ingenkamp (1967) 106 ff. esp. 109 f., who sticks to the traditional view that this tract is Academic. For anticipations of the definitions at issue here cf. also Pl. *Ch.* 167e1-5, *Prot.* 340a8-b1.

<sup>227</sup> See esp. 432b26-33a9: pure reason is incapable of causing movement whereas desire (ἐπιθυμία, ὀρεξις) is not responsible for its movement but follows or should follow reason. Here Aristotle uses the same schema, with its moral implications, that he had proffered at *EN* A.13.

<sup>228</sup> To be sure, the resulting position also held its attractions for the Stoics. Frede (1986) 98 rightly points to the emphasis placed upon the affections being voluntary so that we are responsible for them. This is quite in line with the Socratic dictum that no one errs willingly (as expressed e.g. at Pl. *Tim.* 86e1-2 in a section that profoundly influenced the Stoics as well, see *supra* pp. 188 ff.)

be paralleled from the extant MSS of this work. In his OCT edition Reynolds prints these definitions at a point near the beginning of book I where the MSS feature a lacuna, *viz.*, I, 2.3b:

Anger is 'the desire (or 'appetite', *cupiditas*) to avenge an injustice' or, as Posidonius says, 'the desire to punish him by who you consider yourself to be unjustly harmed' (F 155 E.-K.). Some define it as follows: anger is an incitement of the mind to damage him who has done damage or wished to do damage'.

In fact Lactantius cites another definition of anger from Seneca,<sup>229</sup> 3,3:

'Aristotle's definition is not far from ours; he says that 'anger is a desire to pay back pain' (Cf. *De an.* A 1.403a29-b1).

The first definition is common Stoic (cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 3.11, 19; 4.44), while the third appears to be Epicurean.<sup>230</sup> Posidonius' definition is clearly a refinement of the general Stoic one (reflecting a more general attitude vis-à-vis his predecessors), but like the latter wholly monistic, and incompatible with the Platonic tripartition. Like Aristotle before them, the Stoic relegated anger to the status of a subspecies of desire.

The tract *Whether Appetite and Distress Belong to the Soul or the Body* is ascribed to Plutarch but certainly spurious. Its subject-matter is directly relevant to many of the issues raised in the present study. In chs. 4-6 ps.Plutarch sketches the three main positions that have been adopted by dogmatist philosophers: first, affections (i.e. in the wide sense comprising both mental and bodily affections) all belong to the soul—a position defended by Strato (ch.4 ~ Strato fr. 111 Wehrli)); secondly, affections (and indeed all mental activities) are bodily processes; there is no such a thing as a soul—a position instantiated by the author of a book entitled *On the Underworld*, whose author may be Heraclides of Pontus (ch. 5). Thirdly, there are those who, strike an awkward (as ps.Plutarch opines) compromise between these two opposing positions. This holds good for Posidonius:

Posidonius divides them [scil. the affections] into (1) those of the soul; (2) those of the body; (3) <those of the body> and involving, although not being of, the soul; <(4) those of the soul and involving, although not being of, the body. Of the soul> without qualification he

<sup>229</sup> As noted by Cooper and Procopé in their translation *ad loc.*

<sup>230</sup> Cf. Procopé (1998) 176 f.

calls those which consist of (1) judgements and assumptions, e.g. desires, fears, fits of anger; (2) of the body without qualification are fevers, chills, contractions and opening up of the pores; (3) of the body but involving the soul are cases of lethargies, derangements arising from black bile, mental pangs, mental appearances and feelings of relaxation; (4) of the soul but involving the body are tremors, pallors and other changes of appearance related to fear or distress (ch. 6 ~ F 154 E.-K.).<sup>231</sup>

The way in which different kinds of affection are apportioned to either body or soul or both strongly recall the options indicated by Aristotle in response to the question 'whether the affections of the soul are also shared by that which contains the soul [i.e. the body] or any of them is peculiar to the soul itself' (*De an.* A 1.403a3-b19). Whatever their precise relation to the body, the affections are inseparable from it; they are 'formulae expressed in matter'. Definition should conform to this. Here Aristotle introduces his two definitions of anger as (i) a desire for retaliation or (ii) the boiling of the blood and heat around the heart, calling the former typical of the dialectician and the latter of the physicist. This distinction corresponds to that between form and matter.

The Stoics, including Posidonius, as we have seen, took over both definitions, or accounts,<sup>232</sup> though obviously for them the difference could not be one between form and matter. Form was corporeal and this held good for the soul as well. In Posidonius' case, this point is illustrated by the way he dealt with Platonic form (see above, p. 211). So if Posidonius' category (1)—affections of the soul only—has no counterpart in Aristotle, it does suit his requirement (403a10-12) that any affection peculiar to the soul would have to be separable from the body in the light of the Stoic position on the relation of the soul to the body as two separate corporeal substances. Moreover, Aristotle allows for the possibility that thinking (*voëiv*) is peculiar to the soul, hence separable from the body as opposed to anger, desire and the like (403a7-8). But if these are taken in purely cognitive terms, they can be taken to belong exclusively to the soul even on Aristotle's terms. In general the careful way in which Aristotle distinguishes

<sup>231</sup> ὅ γε τοι Ποσειδώνιος τὰ μὲν εἶναι ψυχικὰ τὰ δὲ σωματικά, καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ ψυχῆς περὶ ψυχὴν δὲ (σωματικά, τὰ δ' οὐ σώματος περὶ σῶμα δὲ ψυχικά φησι· ψυχικά μὲν) ἀπλῶς λέγων τὰ ἐν κρίσεσι καὶ ὑπολήψεσιν, οἷον φόβους ὀργάς, σωματικά δ' ἀπλῶς πυρετοὺς περιψύξεις πυκνώσεις ἀραιώσεις, περὶ ψυχὴν δὲ σωματικά ληθάργους μελαγχολίας δηγμοὺς φαντασίας διαχύσεις, ἀνάπαλιν δὲ περὶ σῶμα ψυχικά τρόμους καὶ ὥχριάσεις καὶ μεταβολὰς τοῦ εἶδους κατὰ φόβον ἢ λύπην.

<sup>232</sup> See for the physical definition *supra* pp. 157 ff. Cf. also Pl. *Ti.* 70c1-5.

between the aspects involved in affection and their relation to either body or soul or both is strikingly similar to the above passage.

The testimony in ps. Plutarch has always been a stone in the shoe of all those who accepted Galen's testimony that Posidonius attributed the affections to two non-rational powers in the soul, viz. Platonic anger (or 'spirit') and desire. Category (a)—the affections themselves—is described in accordance with the Chrysippean position which Posidonius is supposed to have abandoned.<sup>233</sup> In fact, Posidonius represents here, as elsewhere, the general Stoic view—although ps. Plutarch seems primarily interested in this distinction of kinds of affections because he can present it as intermediary between the two other positions he has listed (that affections belong to the soul only and that they belong to the body only). Yet his report makes clear that Posidonius saw the affections in the sense at issue as primarily cognitive, having no need of separate psychic powers of the kind assumed by Galen.<sup>234</sup> Indeed, ps. Plutarch's testimony conforms to the distinction drawn by Chrysippus between the following aspects of affection:

- (i) a judgement
- (ii) a physical state or effect of the soul
- (iii) physical symptoms of the body related to certain affections

—all three of which aspects are related to one another by Chrysippus and used to demonstrate that the intellect resides in the heart in a verbatim fragment quoted by Galen at *PHP* 3.7.2-4 (*SVF* 2.900).<sup>235</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> In Tieleman (1996a) 229 I submitted that Posidonius' name had got wrongly attached to this account, taking this position in view of Galen's testimony as well as other problematic attributions made by ps. Plutarch. Sorabji (2000) 104 n. 67, 120 n. 66 was unconvinced. In line with my argument as set out in the text, I retract my earlier suggestion. Meanwhile Sorabji has adopted the view that according to Posidonius judgements are not necessary for emotions, see Sorabji (2000) ch. 8. But this is to ignore the clear testimony of ps. Plutarch. Elsewhere in his book, however, Sorabji argues that for Posidonius 'at least standardly in adult humans, emotions involve judgements' (p.104 n.67).

<sup>234</sup> The two terms 'judgements and assumptions' are also used in Galen's report on Posidonius' view on the genesis of affections, *PHP* 5.5.21 (F 169), see *supra*, pp. 231 ff. I take it that these terms reflect what Posidonius actually said. Note that Galen also includes a reference to the *logistikón* in his report. I assume that Posidonius did not use this Platonic term on his own behalf, though perhaps in his summary of Plato's view.

<sup>235</sup> Cf. Frede (1986) 102; Tieleman (1996a) 188.



Posidonius' fourth category—purely somatic diseases—are represented in Chrysippus' analogy between them and mental affections.

Further correspondences with early Stoic texts can be pointed out. The word we have translated as 'anger' here is ὀργή not θυμός. Atrabilious derangement of mind, or melancholy, features in Stoic texts concerned with the question whether or not the Sage is exempt from affection (i.e. ἀπαθείας).<sup>236</sup> Another way of putting this was to ask whether virtue, once acquired, could be lost again. For instance, Diogenes Laertius reports that Chrysippus assumed that virtue could be lost because of *melancholia* or alcoholism, whereas Cleanthes thought not (D.L. 7.127 ~ SVF 3.237). *Melancholia* presents a particularly interesting case because it was considered both a type of madness and a mark of genius.<sup>237</sup> But when Posidonius spoke of melancholy, he referred to a pathological condition related to black bile (Sandbach's translation 'atrabilious derangement' is therefore apt). When one is affected by it, one's soul is involved but one does not suffer from a πάθος in the crucial moral sense of affection, i.e. an affection resulting from judgement. Whether or not one believed that virtue could thus be lost, it made sense to distinguish the type of affection instantiated by lethargy and melancholy from affection. Thus Posidonius classed it as bodily though affecting the soul, quite in line with earlier Stoic ideas.

Another mental disease we find in the relevant early Stoic texts is lethargy, which features in Posidonius' classification too. Moreover, both Posidonius and Clement (in one of the parallel passages, *Strom.* IV 22 ~ SVF 3.240) refer to mental impressions or presentations, i.e. φαντασίαι. The concept of presentation is defined by the Stoics not only as an imprint in the intellect but also as πάθος, i.e. an affection, something one experiences or undergoes involuntarily.<sup>238</sup> So the

<sup>236</sup> SVF 3.237-241.

<sup>237</sup> In ancient sources the term does not stand for one of the four character-types or temperaments corresponding to the four humours in the body (black and yellow bile, blood and phlegma). This classification appears to originate in the Early Middle Ages, see Schöner (1964). The most comprehensive treatment of melancholy in antiquity is Flashar (1966); cf. also Klibansky *et al.* (1964). On Aristotle's influential concept of melancholy see Van der Eijk (1990). In the biographical tradition the founder of the Stoa, Zeno, in a way that suggests that he was a melancholic too, as befits a man of genius; see *supra*, p. 165.

<sup>238</sup> Aët. IV 12.1 (πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γίνομενον), D.L. 7.49 (διάνοια πάσχει ... ὑπὸ φαντασίας). On Zeno's definition of presentation as an imprint (τύπωσις) and its explanation as a qualitative change by Chrysippus, see D.L. 7.46, 50, S. M. 7.227. These texts have been assembled as SVF 2.52-56.

concept of presentation firmly belongs in the account of various kinds of affections and their influence on the intellect and in particular their detrimental effect. The presence of this neutral and wider concept suggests that what is involved in melancholy, alcoholism and the like are the presentations involved in these conditions, viz. a particular, distortive type of presentation. This is strongly suggested by Clement's account which refers in the same connection to mental disease and dreams, i.e. mental presentations received while asleep (cf. lethargy). Clearly the conditions mentioned, whether pathological or otherwise, affect the quality of our mental presentations.

Nonetheless, the Stoics held that virtue cannot be lost by presentations alone. After all, having a presentation does not necessarily involve assent and hence judgement. An affection may occur only if and when assent is given, and wrongly given. Thus the separate mention of presentations in category (c) balances that of judgements in connection with affections in category (a). Posidonius too lists them alongside cases of mental derangement such as melancholy and lethargy. It may not be too far-fetched to compare the Stoics' reference to (a particular kind of) presentations as one of the sources of evil (see above, p. 137).

In fact, it would seem that the 'bites' here merely exemplify an unpleasant type of presentation associated with grief (λύπη) in particular. Our sources list the bite as one of the physical reactions accompanying emotion. But there is no contradiction with the alternative description as a mental appearance, which after all is an imprint in the psychic *pneuma*.<sup>239</sup> The Stoics drew a crucial distinction: the bite is not yet the affection of grief. It may announce grief but need not develop into it. This requires assent to the accompanying presentation, i.e. judgement. Analogously, relaxation is a mental reaction

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<sup>239</sup> See Cic. *Tusc.* 3.83 (not in *SVF*), bringing out the involuntary nature of the bite (*morsus*) as opposed to the affection of grief as involving judgement. The Greek terms δῆξις or δῆγμος are also found in this sense; see Plut. *Virt. Mor.* 10, 449D (bites, contraction and relaxations); *PHP* 4.3.2 (*SVF* 1.209), where it is aligned with relaxations and contractions (cf. Plutarch as cited in the text). Galen says these mental phenomena are irrational and *attendant upon* judgements, that is to say, we here have the same distinction between ps.Plutarch's categories (a) and (c) again. The difference between these categories is no less crucial for Galen than for the Stoics themselves, because Galen argues that Zeno regarded these non-rational bites and contractions, etc. rather than the judgements as the *pathê*. This is clearly unfounded—as Galen himself clearly knows, see *PHP* 5.6.40–42. Cf. also 2.8.4 ('the bite in cases of grief'), not in *SVF*, but clearly referring to a Stoic argument designed to locate the intellect.

connected with pleasure (ἡδονή), though not identical to it.<sup>240</sup> Another way of putting it would be to say that it is a particular *feeling* typical of pleasure. This feeling represents the quality of our presentations when the soul is relaxed and heated up.<sup>241</sup> Thus Plutarch in his *On Moral Virtue* (ch. 9, 449A-B ~ SVF 3.439) formulates the traditional charge of word-splitting against the Stoics as follows:

But when they, though refuted by tears and tremors and changes of complexion, speak of certain bites and concentrations<sup>242</sup> instead of grief and fear and camouflage desires as inclination<sup>243</sup>, they appear to fabricate sophistic rather than philosophical subterfuges and evasions from the realities by means of words.

The Stoics insisted on the distinctions criticized here because they found them indispensable for delineating their concept of affection: grief, fear and desire occur only if a particular judgement is made. Feelings such as mental stings and contractions are not affections, though they may herald the latter. But not only do we find here ps.Plutarch's categories (a) and (c). Plutarch pokes fun at the Stoics by turning category (d) against them: the bodily effects indicative of the soul in a state of affection: not only the tears, but also the tremor and changes of complexion can be paralleled from ps.Plutarch's list. This is hardly a coincidence. The genuine Plutarch or his source must have drawn on a classification very similar to the Posidonian one used by ps.Plutarch. Plutarch's objection is not unlike the point made by ps.Plutarch, viz. that the distinction is oversubtle.<sup>244</sup>

<sup>240</sup> Plut. *Virt. Mor.* 449D (SVF 3.468): relaxation admits of gradations; Gal. *PHP* 4.2.6 (SVF 3.463), 5.1.4 (SVF 1 Zeno 209) lists mental relaxation alongside other physical reactions of the soul such as the bite and contraction. D.L. 7.114 (SVF 3.400) subsumes διάχυσις under ἡδονή (lust, pleasure) and defines it as an ἀναλυσίς τῆς ἀρετῆς. The second point is inaccurate in view of its alignment with δῆξις in our other texts. In this light διάχυσις cannot count as affection in the sense of a full-fledged affection and hence it cannot subvert virtue. It can merely initiate the loss of virtue. Nonetheless, the reference to virtue interestingly reflects the original context of Diogenes' notice, viz. an account of various kinds of affection and their effects upon virtue.

<sup>241</sup> Plutarch, *De primo frigido* 948D (SVF 3.430) says that the heat relaxes the sense-perception of the one who touches, just as brilliance does the same for the one who sees. For the role of the hot and the cold in perception and affection, see *supra*, p. 160 ff.

<sup>242</sup> Reading with Sorabji (2000) 40 συνθρόησεις for the otherwise unknown συνεόρσεις. Whereas the bite is typical of distress, the retreats towards the centre, i.e. the heart, in fear, see Cic. *Tusc.* 4.15, Gal. *PHP* 3.5.43-44.

<sup>243</sup> Ὁν προθυμία as an acceptable mental reaction different from appetite (ἐπιθυμία) see now Sorabji (2000) 52f.

<sup>244</sup> In fact, ps. Plutarch's tract exhibits more parallels with the genuine Plutarch's writings—so much so that some scholars waver as to the tract's inauthen-

10. *Conclusion*

Galen fails to produce any verbatim quotation in support of his contention that Posidonius saw desire and anger as independent powers alongside reason. On the contrary, Posidonius was at pains to avoid terms like power or part with reference to the mental phenomena he discusses. Galen however operates with a schema of options in which Posidonius is linked to Aristotle and credited with the Aristotelian version of the Platonic tripartition (6.2.5, see above, ch. 1.3, p. 34). This version involves a division of psychic faculties in terms of powers (*δυνάμεις*) not Platonic parts (*μερῇ, μόρια*)—a distinction which represents one of the issues in the philosophical debate in Galen's day (ch. 1.2). However, this schema divides the available options in terms of Platonist-cum-Peripatetic concepts (being, part, form and power) that are incommensurate with Stoic usage. I have pointed to the role of such schemas Galen's method, in particular when it comes to representing the positions of other philosophers and even their actual words as culled from their expositions.

Posidonius reserved the term affection (*πάθος*) for the completed conation (*ὁρμή*) which, *pace* Sorabji, always involved a judgement and to which a contribution is made by what he called affective *movements* (*παθητικαὶ κινήσεις*). These are manifestations of the affective side or aspect (*παθητικόν*) of the soul. This concerns its passivity as a feature (alongside the capability to act) of any corporeal substance. The passive moment in the genesis of emotion occurs when a mental appearance is formed (whether as a direct result of perception or from an act of reasoning) and its impact causes a physical process. When the soul's physical tension is weak, the 'first movement' thus caused may slip into the excessive motion that is technically a mental affection or emotion. The same mechanism can be described in intentional terms. Given Stoic psychological corporealism, it makes no sense to play off against one another the mental and physical aspects involved in this process—which is exactly what Galen is doing. It is a telling witness to the workings of his dialectic that he interprets the *παθητικόν* as a kind of super-division of the soul covering both Platonic non-rational parts, the anger-like (*τὸ θυμοειδές*) and appetitive (*τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*). This reading is based on a doxographic schema and can be paralleled from more or less contemporary Platonist sources.

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ticity, see e.g. Sandbach (1969a) 35

Though Galen links Posidonius to Aristotle, Posidonius was more concerned with Plato, viz. in the context of his discussion of the 'the ancient account' (ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος). The whole point of this exercise was not to abandon Chrysippean monism in favour of this ancient account, but to trace the pedigree of the Stoic model of the mind back to earlier thinkers such as Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle. That is to say, he presented their ideas as imperfect anticipations of the mainstream Stoic doctrine, to which he himself subscribed. Stoic predecessors such as Zeno and Cleanthes were also brought in to illustrate the continuity of this tradition.

This technique of appropriation has old credentials in ancient, including Stoic, dialectic. It involved an effort of reinterpretation and assimilation which offered Galen the opportunity to present Posidonius as returning to the bosom of his grand old tradition of good philosophy and medicine—one of the main themes of the *PHP*. Here, as elsewhere, he seized on the presence of Platonic terminology to illustrate his claim, notably in Cleanthes' dialogue between reason and anger as cited by Posidonius. In truth Posidonius worked the other way round: the ideas of the predecessors concerned were appropriated by him and served to strengthen the traditional Stoic doctrine. Of course, this claim should be rested on real textual evidence. The most plausible reading of the relevant passages is that Posidonius presented Plato and Aristotle as discoverers of a prototype of the Stoic technical concept of conation (ὁρμή). This resulted from their differentiation between reason and emotion (with Plato making the further distinction between two kinds of emotion). This is reading their positions from a Stoic point of view, since the Stoics defined emotion as a kind of conation (though it should be remembered that in this respect the Stoics found some footing in the Platonic texts as well, for example when Plato assigns appetite to each of the three parts of the *psychē*). Posidonius showed that the Platonic scale of nature in particular to some extent anticipated the Stoic concept of conation.

If Posidonius wished to present the Stoic position as a development from earlier ideas, he had to pay attention to both revision and continuity. Posidonius therefore also pointed to the differences between the Stoic position and its rivals. The precursors of Stoicism had been correct in identifying conation as a separate aspect but wrong in according to it the status of a separate psychic faculty, be it a part or a power. Aristotle had made some progress toward a more

correct model by subsuming anger under appetite. Thus the Stoics including Posidonius took over Aristotle's definition of anger as a subspecies of desire. This abolishes the Platonic tripartition. In spite of his fundamental and devastating criticism of the Platonic soul-division (*De an.* Γ 9), Aristotle did not take the obvious further step of abandoning the faculty approach, though he considered this as an option. He retained a basic division between reason and desire (e.g. *EN A* 13). On our interpretation of Cleanthes' dialogue, it reflects and caps the Aristotelian critique of soul-division—and this was of course the reason why Posidonius had quoted it, not because it demonstrated that the venerable Cleanthes had been a Platonist. That is to say, Posidonius presented Cleanthes as having taken the step Aristotle had been reluctant to take. This agrees fully with what we have found about the relation between conation and reason in the Stoic and Posidonian scale of nature (ch. 5.3), as well as with Chrysippus' definition of conation as reason in its commanding capacity (see above p. 276). Posidonius presented this part of the history of philosophy as a series of attempts to establish the correct relationship between human reason and motivation (or desire). He also showed its moral relevance by referring to the end of human life, or happiness, and explaining the superiority of the Stoic model to those competing doctrines which involved non-rational parts of the soul (above, p. 228).

In assimilating Platonic ideas to the Stoic position Posidonius also discussed the therapeutic treatment of the affections. To this subject Chrysippus had devoted a separate book of his *On Affections*, which stood model for Posidonius' work of the same title. Just as in the case of Chrysippus, the therapeutic application of the Stoic doctrine by Posidonius reveals the importance of the soul's corporeality. This emerges from the interest taken by Posidonius in diet and regimen in general, in line with predecessors such as Zeno and Chrysippus. Here too he traced Platonic anticipations and even found it possible to associate Plato with Stoic corporealism. This may seem surprising but we did find some evidence for Posidonius' corporealist reading of the Platonic *Timaeus* (see above, p. 210). In fact, Stoic psychology in its Chrysippean phase also betrays a discriminating use of Plato and in particular of those Platonic passages which suit Stoic corporealism (see above, p. 187 ff.). I do not wish to imply that Posidonius and other Stoics ruthlessly put the Platonic text on their Procrustean bed. But neither should we follow Galen in believing that Posidonius

represents a return to Plato, if this should mean that he distanced himself from Chrysippus. Posidonius' admiration for Plato was no doubt genuine. But this does not preclude adaptation and selective use. He stayed within the Chrysippean framework, contributing refinements of technical terminology, in part in the light of the ἀπορίαι first raised by Chrysippus (ch. 5.7). This conclusion is not jeopardized by the positions of his immediate predecessors Panaetius and Diogenes of Babylon (ch. 5.6) or for that matter Hecaton. We have found that their supposed psychological dualism is based on an uncritical reading of the sources who are either not interested in the opposition between dualism and monism (Cicero), or hostile to Stoicism (Philodemus). In this light it would be better to stop thinking in terms of a Middle Stoic period since this creates all kinds of misunderstanding.

## CHAPTER SIX

### CICERO ON AFFECTIONS

#### 1. *Preamble*

In the preceding chapters Cicero has repeatedly turned up as one of our sources. In his *Tusculan Disputations* books 4 and, to a lesser extent, 3, we find substantial passages which clearly run parallel, both in content and in wording, to those cited by Galen from Chrysippus' *On Affections*. Of particular importance is 4.11-33, where Cicero presents what appears to be an epitome of Chrysippus' treatise. This extensive and clearly demarcated section offers, it seems, a welcome opportunity to check and supplement the evidence from Galen. Admittedly, Cicero provides no verbatim quotations but evidence of an indirect kind, whose nature and provenance are open to question and have indeed been interpreted in various ways. On the other hand, he is quite unlike Galen in offering a fairly unbiased account of parts of Chrysippus' work: he even prefers it to that of other schools (4.9, 11). Add the altogether different historical and literary ambience of Cicero's writings, and we seem to be in a position to make all sorts of illuminating comparisons between him and Galen.

When Von Arnim used these books for his collection of fragments, various proposals had already been made as to the identity of Cicero's source, or sources. In the *SVF* we find a mere handful of passages in the section concerned with the *On Affections* (*SVF* 3.483-488), though—as a quick glance at his *Index* shows—several passages from these two Ciceronian books found their way into the thematic sections concerned with ethics. Even the coherent and explicitly attributed account at 4.9-33 has been broken up and scattered all over *SVF* III (and even, in one instance, I). Von Arnim did not undertake a systematic study of the text, although he responded to some of the proposals on offer, and submitted a few of his own.<sup>1</sup> Both his

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<sup>1</sup> See *SVF* vol. I (1905), pp. XX-XXVIII. In opposition to Hirzel (1883), 414 ff., 479 ff., who sees Philo of Larissa as the source of *Tusc.* as a whole, Von Arnim is confident that Cicero's source for much of book 3 must be Antiochus of Ascalon (cf. 3.59). In his view (p. XXVI), the account of Cicero/Antiochus comes close to



reluctance to present sections of Cicero's text as evidence for the *On Affections* and his fragmented mode of presentation tend to obscure its importance as a source. More recently, however, Jeanine Fillion-Lahille has reconsidered the relation between Cicero and Galen, presenting a number of relevant texts in parallel columns.<sup>2</sup> This once more demonstrates Cicero's dependence—whether direct or not—on Chrysippus, especially for the important section 4.11-33. Fillion-Lahille's treatment, however, is far from exhaustive, being part of a larger study focused on Seneca's *On Anger* and its sources. Some of her proposals (as I hope to show) are moreover dubious. What we need is a more comprehensive approach, which is not limited to tracing parallels between Cicero and Galen, but uses these parallels to reach clearer conclusions about Chrysippus' original exposition. Little work has been done on *Tusculans* 3-4 since the heyday of *Quellenforschung*. In fact, some of the most important questions remain more or less as they were left by Pohlenz (1906) and Philippson (1932).<sup>3</sup> Both these scholars refuted some of the less plausible speculations concerning sources, in the process making valuable observations on the Cicero's aims and methods. But their studies

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the original Chrysippean doctrine but book 3 is not a particularly valuable source of fragments (though he culls a dozen texts from it). Similarly Rabbow (1914) 142 ff., 186 ff. For book 4 Von Arnim assumed a few sources: § 11-33 record Chrysippean doctrine from all four books of the *On Affections*, but was not taken by Cicero directly from Chrysippus whose style he found difficult and uncouth. Even so, there remain many affinities of both content and wording to the original text of the *On Affections*. Hence Cicero used an epitome made by a Stoic. § 11-33 may be used to study Chrysippus' doctrine provided one is wary of later accretions (p. XXVII f.). M. Giusta argues that *Tusc.* 4.11-32 is based on the same doxographic manual that he believes Cicero used for *Fin.* 3, pointing to correspondences as to both content and structure between Cicero's text and accounts in Arius Didymus (*ap. Stob. Ecl.* II, pp. 88-93) and D.L. (7.110-6). See Giusta (1964-7) vol. 1, 45 ff. However, the correspondence between these texts is by no means close enough to warrant this assumption. The indisputable affinities between the relevant texts can be explained most easily by the fact that all three of them ultimately go back to Chrysippus' *On Affections*—a possibility Giusta does little to refute. On Giusta's speculations about an ethical doxographic tradition to match the physical one reconstructed by Diels, see further *supra*, p.65 n. 22. Graver (2002) 187 ff. presents an overview of a number of parallels in four (possible) sources or traditions: Crantor and the consolatory tradition, Epicurus and the Cyrenaics, the Early Stoics and Chrysippus, and Posidonius. She is rightly cautious in assuming Posidonius as one of Cicero's main sources on the basis of parallels with *PHP* 4-5 (though she does not refer to Fillion-Lahille (1984)). On Graver (2002) see also *supra*, p. 7 n. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Fillion-Lahille (1984) 82-93, 112 f.

<sup>3</sup> Görler (1974) has useful remarks on pp. 49 ff., 55 ff. Douglas' far from exhaustive treatment of *Tusc.* (1995) contains little on books 3 and 4, and Bringmann (1971) does not deal with them at all.

inevitably bear the stamp of a traditional line of approach still very much focused on individual sources. The most salient development since their work is an increased appreciation of Cicero's independence as a philosophical author. A landmark was Boyancé (1936), who demonstrated the inappropriateness of treating Cicero as a paraphraser of a single or a few sources (except for easily recognizable Roman *exempla*, introductions etc.).<sup>4</sup> Cicero works far more independently, that is to say, on the basis of presuppositions peculiar to himself. He may use several sources at the same time. When he decides to follow one particular source, as in the *On Duties* Books 1 and 2 Panaetius' *On Duty*,<sup>5</sup> he says so explicitly.<sup>6</sup> When he does not, he is likely to draw on a variety of sources, among which summaries, lecture-notes, handbooks, memoranda and so on.<sup>7</sup> The first kind of text, as we shall see, may underlie the account of Chrysippus' λογικά (*Tusc.* 4.11-33).

In what follows I shall exploit some of the insights achieved by recent studies of other works by Cicero, while raising the question what *Tusc.* 3 and 4 have preserved of Chrysippus' original exposition. Boyancé's point<sup>8</sup> that Cicero always tells us when he follows a particular source is confirmed by a reference to the *On Affections* (or at least its books called λογικά) at 4.33 (cf. *ibid.* 11). Even though this leaves open several questions as to the nature of the preserved material, we seem to be on reasonably firm ground when using Cicero as a source.<sup>9</sup>

## 2. Tusculan Disputations Books 3 and 4: Overview

Obviously the *Tusculan Disputations* are an altogether different work from *PHP* with respect to aims and methods as well as literary form.

<sup>4</sup> Repr. in *id.* (1970) 199-221. In addition see the excellent observations by Görler (1989) 253 ff., *id.* (1994) 1026-8, and *CHHP*, 15 f. On Cicero's self-image as a philosophical author see also Graff (1963) 58-62.

<sup>5</sup> *Off.* II 17, 60 ( ... *Panaetius quem multum his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus* ...). Note also that Cicero makes clear that he is not in the business of translating; similarly *ibid.* III 2,7. At *Off.* I 2,6 and *Fin.* III, 7 he also stresses that he makes his own decisions in keeping with his customary procedure.

<sup>6</sup> Boyancé (1936) 308; cf. *id.* (1962/1970) 331 f. This point is accepted by Görler (1994) 1028.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Görler (1989) 253-6; and in Flashar (ed.) (1994) 1028, further developing observations made by Boyancé

<sup>8</sup> See *supra*, n. 6.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. the nuanced positions adopted by Dyck (1996) 18-21; Mansfeld (1999) 15.

Cicero, unlike Galen, does not present (translated) verbatim fragments but uses Chrysippus and several other sources in a way that leaves ample room for his own additions (notably Roman *exempla*) and literary stylisation in general. It has been questioned whether Cicero had direct access to the *On Affections* or followed one or more intermediary sources—with all possibilities of adulteration entailed by such a relation of dependence. Posidonius, Philo of Larissa, Antiochus of Ascalon as well as anonymous sources—often in varying combinations—were successively put forward as candidates.<sup>10</sup> Most of these proposals were made in the heyday of *Quellenforschung* and strike many of us today as speculative or unilluminating. On the whole they presuppose a rather slavish dependence of Cicero on his *Vorlage*, though it is fair to say that some participants in the debate did acknowledge the role played by Cicero's authorial decisions. In spite of their disagreements, moreover, most of the source-hunters accepted as correct Galen's depiction of Posidonius as a dissident Stoic who espoused the Platonic tripartition. Accordingly, they ruled out Posidonius as an inspiration for those sections of Cicero's text which feature the view of affections as judgements and hence are labeled 'orthodox'.

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<sup>10</sup> O. Heine (1863) argued that Cicero in book 4 used an epitome of the *On Affections* by an unknown Stoic (11-33) and some rhetorical work (58 ff.), omitting book 3 from consideration. R. Poppelreuter (1883) posited Posidonius as the source for both 3 and 4. For the proposals by Hirzel and Von Arnim see *supra*, n. 1. Following Von Arnim's lead Pohlenz (1906) points to numerous and close affinities between Cicero's account in *Tusc.* 3 and the Chrysippean fragments from the *On Affections*. These similarities presuppose the use (alongside other sources) of a book by Antiochus, who is mentioned at § 59 and is known to have espoused the Chrysippean doctrine of the affections (cf. his defence of ἀπάθεια, *Ac. Pr.* 44.135). Indeed, '... im ganzen hat sein Buch aber wohl nur eine Art Neuauflage von Chrysipps Werk gebildet.' He goes even further in the case of in book 4. Here the large Chrysippean presence, which is clear from parallels with fragments in Galen and Origen, warrants the assumption that Cicero directly used Chrysippus' *Therapeutics*. Like Hirzel, Philippson (1932) postulated a single *Vorlage* for the two books but characterized its author as a 'younger Stoic' who used Chrysippus' in the *On Affections* while making subtle concessions to Posidonius' criticism, but only insofar as these did not conflict with the fundamental positions of the *Altmeister*. On older scholarship in this area cf. also Dougan and Henry (1934) pp. xxx ff., xlii ff., Giusta (1964-7) vol. 1, 45 ff. Fillion-Lahille (1984) 82 ff. differs from Pohlenz in ascribing 4.11-33 to the first three books of the *On Affections* in view of 33 ('*habes ea quae ... Stoici ... λογικά appellant*'; for the full text see *infra* in text). She discerns reflections of the *Therapeutics* at the beginning of book 3 and of the final section of 4 (i.e. § 58), where Cicero employs the medical analogy in its Chrysippean version, *ibid.* 112 ff. Clearly, the *Therapeutics* plays a smaller role in her explanation than in Pohlenz'.

In the five books of the *Tusculan Disputations* Cicero discusses an equal number of moral theses. In *On Divination* 2.2 Cicero says that Book 3 of the *Tusculans* is 'about relieving distress' (*de aegritudine lenienda*) and characterizes Book 4 as 'dealing with the remaining affections' (*de reliquis animi perturbationibus*). In fact the actual division of subject-matter is not as neat as this. The prologue of book 3 presents the general theme of philosophy as the therapy of the soul and hence as being more important, though in practice less appreciated, than medicine (1-7a). Clearly this theme applies to all the affections. It anticipates Chrysippean passages in book 4 (58, cf. 9, 23) and actually echoes Chrysippus' programmatic statement at the beginning of his *Therapeutics*.<sup>11</sup> This prologue then seems to introduce both books. What is more, having laid down the thesis to be refuted, viz. that the Sage is subject to distress (7b), Cicero goes on to present arguments that make clear its relation to other mental disturbances (7c-21), in particular the terse Stoic syllogisms he reproduces (14-21). This wider scope also holds good for the beginning of the ensuing section which is devoted to demonstrating the cause of distress (24-27 as part of 24-75a). In the shorter final sections Cicero discusses various means of consolation, i.e. the therapies proposed by Stoics and others (75b-79), and delivers the *peroratio* (80-4). Cicero treats distress as much as possible in isolation, but his material often seems to have been concerned with affection in all its four chief varieties. As he himself indicates, he has chosen to deal with distress separately from the other affections because he considers it to be the greatest evil of all (4.82): it makes us unhappy, whereas the others merely disturb our peace of mind. This decision was no doubt occasioned by his grief over his deceased daughter Tullia (cf. 3.71, 76; 4.63).<sup>12</sup> In the course of his argument Chrysippus is repeatedly mentioned in a way that suggests acquaintance with his writings. The passage that is crucial to any attempt to decide whether this was the case is found in book 4, viz. 11-33. It will therefore be most convenient to start there.

The Prologue to book 4 constitutes a brief excursus on the position occupied by philosophy in Roman society until Cicero's day (§ 1-7). Next (§ 8-10a) the thesis to be refuted is chosen, viz. that the Sage cannot be free of *each* affection—an expansion of yesterday's

<sup>11</sup> Quoted at *PHP* 5.2.22-24; see *supra*, p. 144.

<sup>12</sup> Good on this point Philippson (1936) 275 f.

discussion which was solely concerned with distress. Two larger sections present a Stoic division of the affections (§ 11-33) and a critique of the Peripatetic defence of emotions (§ 34-57). Finally Cicero discusses this therapy (58-81; 82-4 constitute the *peroratio*).

Having stated the theme for book 4 Cicero prefers the dialectical terseness of 'Chrysippus and the Stoics':

Chrysippus and the Stoics,<sup>13</sup> when discussing the soul's disturbances [i.e. emotions or affections], devote most space to dividing and defining them; that account of theirs through which they cure the affections of souls and prevent them from being affected is quite brief (*Tusc.* 4.9, *SVF* 3.483).

But to his Stoic account Cicero prefixes the following remarkable note concerning the structure of the soul:

Since I would like to call those things which the Greeks call *πάθη* disturbances rather than diseases, I shall in explicating them follow that old distinction, first of Pythagoras and subsequently of Plato, who divide the soul in two parts, making one partaking of reason, the other devoid of it;<sup>14</sup> in that which partakes of reason they locate tranquillity, i.e. peaceful and calm constancy, in that other the disturbed motions of both anger and appetite, contrary and hostile to reason (10).

The causal relation between the subordinate clause introduced by 'since' and the main sentence is not immediately transparent. Presumably Cicero means that he translated *πάθη* as 'disturbances' in view of the disturbed motions of the two non-rational parts of the soul with 'turbidos' clearly picking up 'perturbationes'. But of course this inadequately explains his preference for the Pythagorean-cum-Platonic dualist schema, which is further specified in terms of the well-known tripartition.

What we have here is the bipartite-cum-tripartite schema as presented and ascribed to the same two authorities in the *Placita* tradition.<sup>15</sup> The passage is often said to be motivated by Cicero's wish to show his Platonic colours before embarking upon his Stoic account of the affections (11-33).<sup>16</sup> But it has been insufficiently noted that the schema in its Ciceronian version exhibits a distinctively Stoic colouring. Its description of mental affections as irrational *motions* goes back to

<sup>13</sup> I.e. Chrysippus as followed by later Stoics. On this locution cf. Dougan and Henry *ad loc.*

<sup>14</sup> Similarly, though without reference to Pythagoras and/or Plato, *Tusc.* 2.47.

<sup>15</sup> See *supra*, p. 65.

<sup>16</sup> See e.g. the line taken by Dougan and Henry (1934), pp. xliii ff.

Zeno.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, anger and appetite are described as affections of the non-rational part rather than as soul-parts themselves. As such, they go against reason, i.e. they are wrong in themselves. This conforms to Stoic doctrine, whereas the Platonic non-rational parts are components of our mental make-up and responsible for certain physiological functions. The spirited part is reason's natural ally rather than its enemy (cf. Cicero's *inimicos*); its anger fulfils a wholesome function, viz. in subduing excessive claims of appetite. Further, 'constancy' (*constantia*) is Cicero's standard translation of the Stoic technical term εὐπάθεια ('good emotion'), which is the counterpart of πάθος. Its presence here anticipates the brief explanation of the concept offered a little further on in the Stoic account at 4.14 (SVF 3.438). In fact, the latter passage describes the disobedience of one affection, viz. distress, to reason (*ratio*) in terms similar to § 10, though within the Stoic framework of § 14 reason should be read in its normative sense ('correct reason'). 'Tranquillity' (*tranquillitas*) stands for one of the Stoic good emotions, viz. εὐθυμία (a subspecies of good joy, i.e. χαρά).<sup>18</sup> So even if Cicero bows to Plato's authority, he certainly presents an *interpretatio stoica* of the celebrated tripartition.

This Stoic dress-up notwithstanding, Cicero is sensitive to the incongruity involved between his preference for the Platonic tripartition and his Stoic definitions. Here all affections are judgements rather than disturbed motions going against reason. This is precisely what attracts him in these definitions, for it implies that disturbances are voluntary and hence (at least in his eyes) controllable; hence he lays particular stress on this aspect throughout *Tusc.* 3 and 4:

Let this [i.e. the Pythagorean-cum-Platonic division of the soul] then be the starting point; all the same let us, in describing these disturbances, avail ourselves of the definitions and partitions of the Stoics, who I believe deal with this question most intelligently (*ibid.* 4.11).

Still it remains startling to see that Cicero proceeds as he does. In the days of *Quellenforschung* this was sufficient to posit two different sources, since one could not have committed such an inconsistency.

<sup>17</sup> See *supra*, p. 98.

<sup>18</sup> D.L. 7.115 (SVF 3.431), Sen. *De tranq. an.* I.2.3: *hanc stabilem animi sedem Graeci εὐθυμίαν vocant ... ego tranquillitatem voco*, where again the aspect of mental calm and stability (as well as inward joy) is brought out, cf. *ibid.* § 4: *animus semper aequali secundoque cursu eat ... laetus ... gaudium ... placido statu maneat*.

It was considered less disturbing that Cicero saw no unsurmountable problem here. In those days lost sources were always smarter than extant authors.

Readers of Galen may be surprised to find no trace of the dramatic *choc des opinions* unfolded on the pages of *PHP* 4 and 5, with one Stoic, Posidonius, changing sides in equally dramatic fashion. One would expect Cicero, who had even known Posidonius personally (T 30-34 E.-K.), to show some familiarity with this debate and Posidonius' salient role in it. I do not wish to argue from silence. But if we are essentially right about Posidonius—viz. that he assimilated the Platonic psychology to the Chrysippean (ch. 5)—there had been at least one Stoic philosopher who may have encouraged Cicero to treat the two options as compatible. But can we go further and even posit Posidonius as the one from whom Cicero has taken this Stoicizing version of the tripartition at *Tusc.* 4.10 and 2.47? This question is difficult to answer, but merits consideration in view of a few further indications and its importance for the relations between Cicero, Galen and other sources we are trying to determine. First, Galen, too, tells us that Posidonius designated Pythagoras as the first among the ancients to have differentiated between the rational and the non-rational in the human soul. Posidonius had explained that Plato had further developed this division and made it more complete (*PHP* 4.7.38-9 ~ Posid. T 95 = F 165, ll. 165 ff. Cf. 5.6.42-43 ~ T 91, E.-K.). This is an unmistakable parallel to *Tusc.* 4.11. Note especially the sequence Pythagoras—Plato, with the tripartition as a refinement of the basic bipartition. Further, it may not be too fanciful to hear in the expression *veterem discriptionem* an echo of the Posidonius' 'ancient account' (παλαιὸς λόγος), which provided the context of his observations on Pythagoras and Plato.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand Posidonius' presence in the *Tusculan Disputations* is marginal. He is never mentioned in connection with the affections (i.e. in bks. 3 and 4).<sup>20</sup> And of course the parallel may be explicable by a common dependence on the *Placita* tradition where we find the original basic schema.<sup>21</sup> In that

<sup>19</sup> See further *supra*, pp. 207 ff.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. 2.61 (Posid. T 38 E.-K.), on his endurance of severe pain; 5.107 (T 3).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. the doxographic overview concerning the soul at *Tusc.* 1.18 ff., which is extensively discussed by Mansfeld (1990b) 3122 ff. At *Tusc.* 1.20 we read: *eius* [scil. *Pythagorae*] *doctor Plato triplicem finxit animum, cuius principatum, id est rationem, in capite sicut in arce posuit, et duas partes parere voluit, iram et cupiditatem, quas locis discluit: iram in pectore, cupiditatem supler praecordia locavit ...*

case Cicero's own synthesis of the Platonic tripartition of the soul and Stoic definitions of its affections may have been inspired by Stoics such as Posidonius in a more general way.

On the Platonist side, a philosopher who merits consideration is Antiochus of Ascalon (c. 130-68 BCE), whose philosophical project of forging a coalition of Platonism, Stoicism and Aristotelianism is well known. Moreover, he is known to have been one of the main influences on Cicero's philosophical writing. A survey of Ciceronian passages where his inspiration is detectable shows that he conceptualized the soul in Stoic terms but used other models at the same time.<sup>22</sup> The main impression is that of the translatability of one model into another. It is a fair assumption that Antiochus took Plato's tripartite soul as a poetical expression of the truth which was later formalized scientifically by Chrysippus.<sup>23</sup> This superficially resembles the Posidonian approach, while contrasting again sharply with Galen. In regard to Cicero's attitude we may recall the distinctly Stoic terms in which he casts his version of the Platonic tripartition.

In sum, Cicero could have derived from his philosophical education examples and considerations, which go a long way to explain the peaceful co-existence—despite fundamental differences—of Platonist and Stoic conceptions in *Tusc.* 4.11. On the whole he seems not very interested in the monist/dualist controversy staged by Galen with such fervor.

### 3. Cicero's logika (4.11-33)

The first section (*Tusc.* 4.11-14) runs closely parallel to the Galenic account of Chrysippus' treatise. This can be inferred from the two parallel columns presented by Fillion-Lahille, though her overview is far from exhaustive and some of her parallels are not entirely apposite.<sup>24</sup> I shall indicate the differences between her overview and mine as I proceed. First of all Cicero presents Zeno's two definitions of emotion, viz. as an irrational and unnatural motion of the soul and as an excessive conation (*aversa a recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio ... adpetitum vehementiorem*). Both their wording and their

<sup>22</sup> See e.g. *Luc.* 30.

<sup>23</sup> See Dillon (1977) 102. Note however that Dillon (p. 101 n. 1) finds Posidonius behind *Tusc.* 4.10-1 and hence the whole of *Tusc.* 4

<sup>24</sup> Fillion-Lahille (1984) 84-7.



position at the beginning correspond to what we find in Galen (*PHP* 4.2.8 ~ *SVF* 3.462).<sup>25</sup> Cicero omits the runners metaphor used by Chrysippus to explain the aspect of excess involved in emotional motion (*PHP* 4.2.14-18).<sup>26</sup> Cicero appends the definitions of the four so-called generic emotions in terms of the distinction between good/bad and between present/future (see above, p. 114). At 4.2-4 Galen bears witness to this section before he starts discussing the Zenonian definition of emotion in general and their exegesis by Chrysippus. Clearly Galen has reversed the original order. He presents (though not in direct quotation) the same definitions of distress, fear and pleasure (omitting appetite). He also differs from Cicero in adding 'fresh' (πρόσφατος) to the beliefs in question—a point which is here omitted by Cicero. A little further on Cicero too supplies this element (§ 14). At 12-13 Cicero proceeds to give the rational counterparts of the affections (minus that of distress, which does not exist), i.e. the three so-called 'good emotions' (εὐπαθείαι, Cicero's *constantiae*). This section as such is lacking in the *PHP* but there can be no doubt that it was in the *On Affections* for in the same context Galen has preserved the definition of one of the good emotions, viz. wish as the counterpart of appetite (4.2.3-4, p.238.35-37).<sup>27</sup> Cicero echoes Chrysippus' appeal to the phenomenology of rational behaviour (esp. 13 init. *cum ita movemur, ut in bono simus aliquo ... cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter ... ut bona natura adpetimus, sic a malis natura declinamus*), which corresponds to the latter's exegesis of Zeno's first general definition, quoted at *PHP* 4.2.10-11.<sup>28</sup> The same Chrysippean passage contains the explication of affection as disobedient to, and

<sup>25</sup> §§ 12-14 are printed as *SVF* 3.438, that is to say, *not* among the fragments of the *On Affections*

<sup>26</sup> There is a parallel case where Cicero outdoes his Stoic model with respect to a terse style, viz. when he decides to leave out large parts of Chrysippus' medical analogy as unnecessary for conveying doctrinal content, *Tusc.* 4.23, discussed *supra*, p. 144. But if he used an abstract, the runners metaphor may of course have already been omitted from it.

<sup>27</sup> 4, p. 238.36 f. ὀρίζεται [...] αὐτὴν [scil. ὀρεξίν] ὁρμὴν λογικὴν ἐπὶ τι(νος) ὅσον χρὴ ἡδον(τος). Here Cicero's reference to the Sage is not found but see the Galenic parallel passage, 5.7.29; a second parallel, 4.4.2 confirms that Chrysippus defined wish (βούλησις) in conjunction with desire (ἐπιθυμία). From Cicero (not from Galen) we may infer that Chrysippus also delineated the concept of caution (*cautio*, i.e. εὐλάβεια) as the correct form of avoidance, the incorrect one being of course fear (φόβος) as well as correct vs. incorrect joy (*gaudium* vs. *laetitia*, i.e. χαρά vs. ἡδονή), *Tusc.* 4.13. For these positive emotions (the so-called εὐπαθείαι) see further *SVF* 3.431-442.

<sup>28</sup> See *supra*, pp. 96 ff.

turned away from, (right) reason which is used by Cicero in the same passage (§ 13-4) as well.<sup>29</sup>

The first half of § 14 (*praesentis ... opponitur*) wraps up the overview of the four affections and the three good emotions, stressing that no good emotion corresponding to distress exists in the Sage. The second half (*sed ... adesse*) lays particular emphasis on the Stoic doctrine that all affections are brought about by judgement and opinion, so that they are wrong and lie in our power. Cicero indicates that there was a second series of definitions and what he has preserved shows that they added to the earlier ones the view that it is right for the soul to contract in the face of a supposedly bad thing. In § 15 Cicero lists the four physical effects, or feelings, corresponding to the four generic affections:

‘as it were some bite of pain’ (*quasi morsus aliquis doloris*) ~  
distress

‘a certain withdrawal and flight of the soul’ (*recessus quidam  
animi et fuga*) ~ fear

‘exuberant hilarity’ (*profusa hilaritas*) ~ pleasure

‘uninhibited impulse’ (*effrenata adpetentia*) ~ appetite

Cicero concludes by characterizing the opinion referred to in the definitions as weak assent, implying that ‘weak’ indicates the physical weakness apparent from the effects he has just described.

When we compare Galen, we find indications in two passages that Chrysippus said more about the affections being judgements. At 4.1.17 he is said to have raised the question of whether they are judgements or supervene on judgements (cf. 5.1.4; Fillion-Lahille aptly compares both passages with *Tusc.* 4.14). The latter option is associated by Galen with the physical effects included by Cicero in his examples of the second and more precise type of Stoic definition (4.2.4-7). Like Cicero at § 15, Galen comes up with a quartet of effects. He lists shrinking, rising up, contraction and expansion corresponding to distress, pleasure, fear and appetite respectively. Note that Cicero’s translation less clearly express physical effects, being of a more psychological nature (especially hilarity and impulse). Galen also says that Zeno identified the affections with these physical effects, which supervene on particular judgements (not in Cicero). Chrysippus in opting for the equation of judgement with affection

<sup>29</sup> The passages from *PHP* adduced by Fillion-Lahille (1984) 85 (4.2.8, 4.1.14, 4.4.16-7 ~ *SVF* 3.462, 461, 476) are less apposite.

would effectively have abandoned Zeno's original position. Clearly Chrysippus did not present himself as disagreeing with Zeno. In consequence Galen charges him with not distinguishing adequately between the two options at issue here (and hence being a bad logician). What he omits to mention is the concept of weak assent. But Fillion-Lahille appositely produces Galen's testimony at 4.6.1 (§ 2-3 should be added) that Chrysippus *repeatedly* assigned a crucial role to the soul's lack of tension and weakness and to their opposites in explaining incorrect and correct behaviour respectively. Of course Galen in his usual way speaks of an additional (non-rational) power acknowledged by Chrysippus and contradicting his official position. But it is worth noting that Galen despite Chrysippus' repeated appeal to this factor pays relatively little attention to it. However this may be, this testimony confirms that Cicero too has preserved an element of the argument of *On Affections* book 1.

If we compare the section *Tusc.* 4.11-5 with the relevant passages in Galen, we may conclude that Cicero reproduces in a fairly coherent way what must have been the gist of Chrysippus' argument in the opening sections of the first book *On Affections*. Galen presents substantial fragments from the exegesis concerned with Zeno's definition of affection (featuring the simile of the runners) but he is decidedly less informative as to the dual cognitive structure of emotion in relation to the physical effects involved in the soul's affection and as to the meaning and role of so-called 'weak assent'. It is also worth noting that Chrysippus, as is attested by Cicero, at an early stage discussed the difference between affections and good emotions.

Although § 11-5 follows Chrysippus' argument rather faithfully, Von Arnim does not add this section to the evidence for the *On Affections* (SVF 3.438, 380; cf. 393) (He does include other non-verbatim material from Cicero and other sources).

Chrysippus introduced the physical effects characteristic of certain affections because they had been referred to by Zeno as well. Further, he argued that these feelings too presuppose a second type of judgement, viz. about the proper reaction to a certain situation.<sup>30</sup> Cicero's second set of definition combine the two types of judgement involved. Here, then, we already encounter the twofold cognitive structure of mental affection. The second type was developed by Chrysippus as part of his exegesis of Zeno's definitions in terms of physical effects.

<sup>30</sup> On the cognitive structure of emotions and the question how far Chrysippus was innovative vis-à-vis Zeno and Ceanthes see Donini (1995), esp. 326 ff.

These do not presuppose a non-rational part or power but are cognitive as well.

The next section in Cicero (16-22) presents definitions of affections subsumed under each of the four principal ones, i.e. subspecies of fear, anger, pleasure and desire. It is reasonable to suppose that this is how Chrysippus proceeded—a feature reflected by Cicero's comments as to the space devoted to the matter by Chrysippus. This time there is nothing comparable in Galen, but Galen is concerned with the causes of affection in general, and so has no interest in reproducing Chrysippus' swarm of minor emotions. For parallels we have to turn to the lists to be found in such sources as pseudo-Andronicus, Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus, all of which may be taken to go back to Chrysippus, presumably through abstracts based on his original exposition and designed for use in the schools. Von Arnim cut up the section in Cicero and mixed the pieces with the relevant texts from these other sources (*SVF* 3.391-430).

At the end of § 21 (~ *SVF* 3.398) we come across a notice that appetite is intended at 'predicates' (κατηγορήματα), i.e. what were technically called 'sayables' (λεκτά), while a lack (*indigentia*) is of the things themselves, such as honour, money. Other sources explain the κατηγορήματα as the object of conation (ὁρμή), which coheres with the Ciceronian notice insofar as appetite, being an affection, is an excessive conation.<sup>31</sup> The notice in Cicero does not seem to belong with the definitions preceding it. It cannot be paralleled from Galen, which is hardly surprising. It looks like a remainder of the process of epitomization which the original exposition underwent at the hands of Cicero or rather his source. It is certainly not an element dragged in from elsewhere but must have been part of a fuller argument by Chrysippus. But since we lack any indication as to its original context we can only guess whether it was part of book 1 or of another book.

§ 22 (*SVF* 3.379) highlights incontinence (*intemperamentia*) as the source of all affections. This theme appears in some fragments derived from the fourth and last book of the *On Affections*, the *Therapeutics*, especially *PHP* 4.4.17 and 24 (*SVF* 4.476; cf. above pp. 97 f.), not mentioned by Fillion-Lahille, who unaccountably assigns *Tusc.* 4.22 ff. to book 3, i.e. the third of the λογικά.<sup>32</sup> In both Galen and Cicero it is connected with the disobedience to right reason and with having turned one's back to it, in keeping with the definitions in

<sup>31</sup> See e.g. Stob. *Ecl.* II pp. 88.1-3, 97.15 ff. Wachsmuth (*SVF* 3.171, 91)

<sup>32</sup> Fillion-Lahille (1984) 88.

book 1. Moreover, Chrysippus spoke of incontinent or uncontrolled states (κατάστασεις) of the soul—a point reflected by Cicero's *animi statum*. The close correspondence between the two texts is further illustrated by the language of controlling and steering used for the opposite state of mind (Cicero: *regi ... contineri*, Galen: οἰακίζοντες ... κρατοῦσιν).

What follows also contains much that can be paralleled from the *Therapeutics*, with Chrysippus being mentioned at the end of § 23 in connection with his medical analogy (see *supra*, p. 144).

The correspondences can be tabulated as follows:

<u>Cicero:</u>	<u>Galen:</u>
§ 23: mental affection is like that of the body: the soul is disturbed by conflicting opinions	5.2.32 (SVF 3.471) 5.4.14 (SVF 3.471), 10 (not in SVF)
§ 24: affections can become inveterate diseases	5.2.26 (SVF 3.471)
§ 25: examples: lust for glory, love of women but also opposite states such as hate of women	4.5.21-2 (SVF 3.480) —
§ 26: definition and more examples of mental disease, i.e. types of inveterate love and hate.	—
§ 27/8: analogies between body and soul: —proneness to disease —disease and health	5.2.3, 14 (SVF 3.465)
§ 28/9: <i>morbus, aegrotatio, vitium</i>	5.2.27 (SVF 3.471); cf. 4.5.31 [(Posid.)]
§ 30: <i>vitia</i> vs. <i>adfectiones</i>	—
§ 30/1: good things mental: — health, strength and beauty	5.2.33 (SVF 3.471), 47, 49 (SVF 3.471a)
§ 31: limitations of the analogy: — a healthy soul, unlike a healthy body, cannot be affected by disease —bodily disease is without blame, mental is not —non-rational animals do not exhibit mental affections but something similar	cf. 5.2.5 (Posid.), 10-1 — 4.5.4, 5.1.10 (SVF 3.476)
§ 32: intelligent persons are less prone to disease	?5.1.2 (on Sages, SVF 3.465) Galen, <i>QAM</i> ch. 4, pp.45-46.1 Müller (SVF 2.787). <sup>33</sup>
<i>vitia</i> are less easily cured than <i>morbi</i>	—

<sup>33</sup> See *supra*, pp. 149 ff.

The above overview proves beyond doubt that Cicero reproduces part of the contents of Chrysippus' *Therapeutics*. All the passages for which we have found no precise Galenic parallels are bound up with those which can actually be paralleled from *PHP*. These passages are clearly integral to Cicero's exposition, hence belong to the same original exposition, i.e. the *Therapeutics*. Von Arnim fails to print any part of this section as evidence for the *On Affections*, and treats the passage in his usual scissor-happy fashion (see *SVF* 3.279, 423, 424, 425, 427, 430).

This is how Cicero concludes his Stoic account of the affections:

Here you have what the Stoics in unadorned fashion expound about the affections, i.e. the things they call λογικά,<sup>34</sup> because they argue in rather plain terms (4.33).

As we have noticed (above, p. 93), Cicero takes the term λογικά as pertaining to the plain and abstract wording typical of technical definitions such as those he has just reproduced.<sup>35</sup> But this cannot be correct. Galen by contrast uses the term to characterize the first three books of the *On Affections* as theoretical in opposition to the therapeutic last book (above p. 89). Cicero's use of the term cannot be correct. The first three books were not all concerned with definitions couched in terse language. As far as we know, only the first book contained definitions. The second, as we have seen (ch. 3.5), discussed problems of a causal nature within the framework provided by book 1. For book 3 we have no explicitly attributed fragments. Cicero's account, as we have noticed, runs parallel to books 1 and 4. It is remarkable that Cicero includes the contents of the *Therapeutics* among what he calls λογικά, though this is perhaps not inconsistent with his own stylistic explanation of this term. At § 9 he too distinguishes between definitions and therapeutical passages, saying that the Stoics, unlike the Peripatetics, devote much space to the former at the expense of the latter. This could mean that the λογικά outnumbered the therapeutics. But if Cicero also drew λογικά, i.e. definitions and distinctions, from the *Therapeutics* he may simply mean that in the Stoic account definitions were also used for therapeutical purposes and as such replaced different kinds of argument such as others would use. We may have to accept that

<sup>34</sup> On the sense of this term, see further *supra*, pp. 89 ff.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. his initial announcement that he will use the oars of the 'dialecticians' (*dialectici*), *Tusc.* 4.9.

Cicero made a mistake, perhaps under the influence of what he read in his abstract. However this may be, that he did not draw directly on Chrysippus, or did not do so in a systematic fashion, is quite possible in the light of what we know about ancient methods of literary composition and those of Cicero in particular.<sup>36</sup> Thus he availed himself of a summary (called by Cicero τὰ κεφάλαια) of a work by Posidonius made by his friend, the Stoic Athenodorus the Bald, with a view to writing the *On Duties*.<sup>37</sup> The fact that we often hear distinct echoes of the original Chrysippean wording does not tell against his use of an epitome, since the ancient procedure of epitomizing was often more a matter of selective copying than of summarizing and reformulating according to present-day practice and convention.<sup>38</sup> On the other hand, ancient compository practice includes the possibility that an author may use the original exposition in addition to an epitome or an intermediary source of another kind.<sup>39</sup> In fact, Galen himself provides an example of this practice, for we know that he both read and used Chrysippus' *On Affections* Books 1 and 4 directly and drew his information for Book 2 from Posidonius.<sup>40</sup>

Still, the similarities between *Tusc.* 4.9-33 and the verbatim material preserved by Galen are sufficiently close to feel confident that Cicero's account is based on *On Affections*. Moreover, we may feel certain Cicero presents us with an on the whole accurate picture the original Chrysippean exposition which is free from the polemical approach and concomitant selectivity peculiar to Galen's treatment. Cicero even refrains from his habit to embroider his philosophical model with Roman *exempla* or literary quotations. He wants to reproduce the Chrysippean λογικά in all their dialectical terseness (cf. § 9, 33)

<sup>36</sup> See ch. 1.8.

<sup>37</sup> *Ad Att.* 16.11.4 (Posid. F 41a/T 44 E.-K., Panaet. Test. 92 Alesse). In 16.14.4 (Posid. F 41b) Cicero reports that Athenodorus has sent him a nice ὑπόμνημα. It is not wholly clear whether this is something different from what he had earlier called κεφάλαια. But clearly Cicero asks for, and receives, material which makes it unnecessary for him to go through the original exposition himself. The term ὑπόμνημα is notoriously flexible. On it and ancient methods of composition of this genre of treatises, see *supra*, p. 52.

<sup>38</sup> Mansfeld and Runia (1997) 182 ff.

<sup>39</sup> See *supra*, p. 57.

<sup>40</sup> See *supra*, p. 57.

4. *What Does Cicero Add ?*

If we accept that *Tusc.* 4.11-33 offers a fairly accurate rendering of a number of passages from books 1 and 4 of the *On Affections*, the next step should be to answer the question what profit can be gained from this insight. I should like to mention the following points. There is no significant difference between Chrysippus and Zeno over the physical effects and their relation to the concept of mental affection. At most Chrysippus refined the cognitive structure of affection by making explicit the judgement about appropriate behaviour presupposed by the feelings attendant upon the main kinds of mental affection. This tells strongly, if not decisively, against any reading of Zeno's position in terms of the faculty approach, whether Aristotelian, Platonic or other.

Opinion, as we have noticed, is also described by Cicero in physical terms, namely as *weak*. Here he adds an important element to Galen's account. But on the whole Cicero exhibits a marked tendency to suppress physical aspects. By employing indefinite pronouns like *aliquis* (as in 'a kind of bite') and *quidam* (in 'a certain withdrawal') and especially adverbs like *quasi* ('so to speak') as well as his choice of Latin terms (*hilaritas*, *adpetentia*) he turns Zeno's dry physical language into a more literary manner of speech. Cicero's uncomfortable attitude to the physical aspects can be illustrated by his fluctuation with regard to this 'bite'. At *Tusc.* 3.61 the bite is no longer directly connected with grief (*aegritudo*) but explained as a manifestation of pain *of the body* (*dolor corporis*). In regard to Galen's treatment of the fragments from the *Therapeutics* we have seen that he too suppressed certain physical aspects of Chrysippus, though for reasons quite different from Cicero's stylistic concerns (see above, p. 93). A comparison of Cicero with Galen does however bring out the importance of the soul's corporeal nature, where Chrysippus located both the dynamic and passive aspects of emotion. This side of his psychology is not subject to reason's assent in any direct sense; rather it determines the soul's immediate reactions to external stimuli. The affections proper are momentary crises. Cicero's text bears out that Chrysippus focused on the dispositions and habits from which they arise. Hence the careful distinction between *morbus* (νόσημα), *aegrotatio* (ἄρρωσθήμα) and *vitium* (κακία).



5. *Chrysippean Reflections in Other Sections of Book 4*

*Tusc.* 4.11-33 is by no means the only section in which to look for material deriving from the *On Affections*. Thus in the subsequent section (34-57) Cicero mounts a polemic against the Peripatetic defence of the usefulness (moderate) emotions. His point of view is of course Stoic but we cannot find further certifiable evidence for the *On Affections* (or any other Chrysippean treatise for that matter), though on occasion he avails himself of ideas he (or his source) had found in this treatise.<sup>41</sup> The reverse would have been rather suprising. An *extended* polemic against the Peripatetics or others about moderate emotions seems not to have been part of Chrysippus' treatise (though cf. above, p.167). This is consonant with what we know about his dialectic and in particular his way of dealing with opponents.<sup>42</sup>

Closer to the theme of the *Therapeutics* is the final section on the remedies for emotional disturbances (58-84).<sup>43</sup> This section opens in the same way as Chrysippus' *Therapeutics* (as well as the third book of *Tusculans*), viz. with a solemn statement that there exists an art of medicine for the soul no less than for the body (§ 58). This passage is clearly inspired by the Chrysippean original but adds nothing to the verbatim fragment preserved by Galen (5.2.22-5, quoted *supra*, p. 144). In what follows Cicero also includes Peripatetic ideas, in line with his announcement at § 9 that the Peripatetics, unlike the Stoics, offer much in the sphere of therapeutic treatment (*Peripatetici ad placandos animos multa adferunt*, cf. *variae curationes*, § 59). Nonetheless Cicero continues to use Chrysippean ideas and arguments. In particular we should note § 59-62, where we come across the idea that it is better to direct one's treatment at the affection than at its external cause.<sup>44</sup> The latter option means explaining that an external

<sup>41</sup> See esp. *Tusc.* 4.47 (SVF 1.205) repeats Zeno's two definitions of emotion from § 11; 53 (SVF 1.628, 3.285) is concerned with the virtue of courage and cannot be from the *On Affections*. § 54 (SVF 3.665) is diatribe-like passage on the difference between irascibility and anger, i.e. between the permanent diseased state (νόσημα ~ *morbus*) and the affection (πάθος ~ *perturbatio*). Although the distinction was important in the *Therapeutics*, and as such is reflected at § 23 ff., this passage is not directly related to the original work.

<sup>42</sup> See (with special reference to the *On the soul*) Tieleman (1996a) 265.

<sup>43</sup> Surveys in Fillion-Lahille (1984) 112 f., MacKendrick (1989) 159 f.

<sup>44</sup> See also the discussion by Donini (1995) 313 f. I agree that 'L'intera pagina di *TD* IV 60-2 riproduce l'ispirazione coerente di un solo filosofo stoico, Crisippo' (p.314).

object is neither good nor bad. Taking one's starting point from the individual means explaining to him or her the irrationality of the affective response. Cicero takes the irrationality involved, as defined by Zeno, as something that is, or at least should be, agreed by all (*inter omnes convenire oportet commotiones animorum a recta ratione aversas esse vitosas*, § 61), even if one considers the external cause of emotion good or bad. In the next section Cicero makes essentially the same point, urging that we speak of the affection itself irrespective of what we take the *summum bonum* to be. Thus appetite has to be removed, no matter what the end of life is believed to be—even if pleasure is the end (§ 62; cf. SVF 3.488). A little later on Chrysippus is mentioned, when Cicero says that in writing his (lost) *Consolatio* he himself had ignored Chrysippus' prohibition to apply a remedy to fresh swellings (*vetat Chrysippus ad recentis quasi tumores animi remedium adhibere*, § 63 ~ SVF 3.484). Clearly, Cicero is drawing here on Chrysippus' words in the passage from the *Therapeutics* preserved by Origen, *Contra Celsum* VIII 51 (quoted and discussed above, pp. 166 ff.). Cicero's proximity to the original text permits us to add it to the other instances we have found.

In § 64 Cicero wraps up his discussion of those affections that are triggered by supposedly bad things. Distress, he explains, has received sufficient attention in books 3 and 4, and the first two books have been devoted to those things which one fears most, viz. death and pain. Next (§ 65) he turns to pleasure and desire, i.e. the wrong opinions we form of supposedly good things and hence entirely voluntary and dependent upon ourselves. Although this position as such is Stoic, Cicero uses it for a more general account to which philosophers of different backgrounds should be able to subscribe. Thus he returns to the motif of the irrelevance of the value assigned to things, explaining that he now speaks a common language (*sed loquimur nunc more communi*). Accordingly, he also returns to the idea of the affection in question as shameful, making clear the distinction between affections and good emotions (§ 67, *init.*). Thus it is only excessive joy that is wrong. In a way familiar from Chrysippus Cicero quotes verses from Roman poetry in dealing with two further kinds of appetite, erotic love (*amor*, 68-76) and anger (*ira*, 77-81; cf. the various types distinguished in his so-called account of the λογικά, § 21). One should warn against these two affections as being varieties of madness (*furor, insania*). All this unmistakably echoes the *Therapeutics* (see ch. 4.7).

In the case of love, Cicero recalls the Stoic tenet that the Sage will fall in love—a surprising position for ‘the teachers of virtue’, as he here calls them, to hold.<sup>45</sup> No doubt the Stoics were attacked on this point. Cicero approvingly notes Epicurus’ rejection (§ 70 ~ *SVF* 3.653, Ep. Fr. 483b Usener). But a little further on he explains that the Stoics must mean a different kind of love, i.e. not the mad affection,<sup>46</sup> inserting a Stoic definition to support his point (§ 72 ~ *SVF* 3.653).<sup>47</sup> To point out to the lover how insane his behaviour really is looks like a distinctively Stoic argument. But we must note that Cicero also includes *remedia amoris* which cannot be tied to any particular school, let alone Chrysippus’ *Therapeutics*: all kinds of distractions, substituting a new love for the old one, etc. (§ 74-75). They may belong to the numerous Peripatetic cures mentioned by Cicero (see above, p. 305).

Anger is a particularly forceful affection. Plato and Aristotle had argued that it may occur in a natural and useful variety. But Cicero sides with Chrysippus. How, he rhetorically asks, can any form of insanity be natural or useful? (§ 79, *init.* Cf. 3.22). One of the stock elements of treatises in the *On Anger* tradition, but also prominent in Chrysippus’ *Therapeutics* (see above, p. 179) were vivid descriptions designed to bring out how horrifying anger looks. To this end Cicero supplies and comments on a few poetic quotations (§ 76-7). More specifically Chrysippean is the subsequent passage (78) explaining that there is no cure for an outburst of anger; one can only wait until the angry person stops raging. The measures proposed are suited to the impossibility to apply a remedy to the inflamed anger itself: in the meantime one may remove the people at who are the object of anger, or persuade the angry person to postpone revenge until her anger has abated. In anger ‘the parts soul of the mind are scattered’. The enraged soul is physically described as all ‘fire’ (*ardorem*) until it ceases to boil (*defervescat, defervescere*).

Although it might be argued that the picture of boiling anger was widespread (see above, pp. 157 ff., 279), the pattern of ideas at § 78-9 leaves little doubt that the main inspiration is Chrysippean. I take the reference to the incoherence between the *parts* of the intellect to be

<sup>45</sup> On this Stoic thesis see further *SVF* 3.716-22; further discussion in Inwood (1997), Sorabji (2000) 280 ff. Cf. also Schofield (1991) ch. 2.

<sup>46</sup> Thus at *Fin.* 3.68 he says: *Ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos arbitrantur.*

<sup>47</sup> This definition (*amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie*) is an exact translation of the Greek version at Stob. *Ecl.* p. 115.1-2 W. (*SVF* 3.650). Stobaeus reflects the scholastic systematization of Chrysippean doctrine, see *supra*, p. 1.

particularly valuable in view of the problem how far and in which sense Chrysippus employed an idea of 'parts' in this connection. As we have seen, Galen's coverage of this point is marred by his polemical manipulations.<sup>48</sup> Incoherence, or inconsistency (ἀνομολογία), is for Chrysippus the mark of affection.<sup>49</sup> In addition, we encounter another example of the limitations of a therapeutic treatment of affection to be compared with Cicero's remark about the impossibility of curing grief when the swelling is still fresh (§ 63, see above, p. 306). But then Chrysippus saw the affections (i.e. the παθή) as feverish outbursts symptomatic of a more enduring diseased condition of the soul.<sup>50</sup> If treatment of these outbursts is impossible or difficult, this does not mean the end of all therapy. On the contrary, this merely underlines the importance of therapeutic action in the intervals between outbursts of emotion when the patient is more receptive to rational argument. Hence the distinction between affection (πάθος) and the underlying diseased state (νόσημα) was an important one for Chrysippus. Its significance is reflected in the large section concerned with the distinction between these and related terms presented by Cicero in his account of the λογικά (4.24-29). Thus, he explains, we have to distinguish between irascibility (*iracundia*) and anger (*ira*), that is to say between the disposition and the activation arising from the disposition (§ 27). At § 78 he is clearly speaking about the latter.

The conception of affection as madness is itself Chrysippean too. Indeed, we have found Chrysippus arguing that this idea is firmly rooted in common experience and common parlance.<sup>51</sup> Apart from its unattractive aspect, it brings out the irrationality involved in affection—a point also touched upon by Cicero (§ 79). Yet none of the passages from Cicero merits adds anything new to our evidence. These reflections rather confirm and illustrate the material from

<sup>48</sup> On the parts of the soul according to Chrysippus, see *supra*, p. 152 n. 54.

<sup>49</sup> *PHP* 5.4.14: 'Chrysippus said ... that the diseases and affections of the soul consist in the mutual inconsistency (ἀνομολογία) of the judgements'; cf. Posidonius *ap. Gal. PHP* 5.5.4 and 6.12 (Posid. Fr. 187 E.-K., *SVF* 3.12; a very Chrysippean passage, on which see also *supra*, p. 228 ff.). In the verbatim fragment from the *Therapeutics* preserved by Origen, *Contra Celsum* VIII, 51 (quoted *supra*, p. 166 f.), Chrysippus recommends demonstrating to the emotional Epicurean that each affection is ἀνομολούμενον even for those who take pleasure to be the end. Cf. also the Stoic telos-formula 'living ὁμολογουμένως', see e.g. Stob. *Ecl.* II p. 76.3 ff., 16 ff., *Cic. Fin.* 3.31, 4.14. For Chrysippus' tract Περὶ ἀνομολογίας, see *supra* p. 180.

<sup>50</sup> See *supra*, p. 155 f.

<sup>51</sup> See *supra*, p. 186.

other sources. What Cicero offers is a kind of general philosophical culture including Stoic elements. One of the most salient of these is his conviction that all lies in our own hands because affection depend upon, indeed are, judgements and opinions. To this idea he return in the closing section (79 *fin.*-83). In consequence, Cicero stresses, our mental well-being lies in our power (*potestas*) or depends on our will (*voluntas*). This insight is the beginning of recovery (*ibid.* 83).

### 6. *The Third Tusculan*

The third book concentrates, though far from exclusively, on one particular affection, viz. distress or mental pain (*aegritudo*, λυπή), reflecting a personal interest on Cicero's part. As we have already noticed (above p. 292 f.), its theme and structure are closely related to book 4, in which Cicero proceeds to emotion in general and its species. At this point we have to take a closer look at the contents of book 3 in order to determine whether we may find anything to add to our evidence for Chrysippus' *On Affections*.<sup>52</sup>

In the prologue (1-7) Cicero opens with the medical analogy, just as in book 4. Although humans consist of body and soul, medicine is in higher repute, though less important, than the therapy of the soul (cf. 4.58; cf. 23). We are all capable in principle to follow Nature, which has created us, as our guide through life. Our minds carry little sparks of light, which are however easily extinguished by wrong habits and opinions, and the seeds of the virtues which, if allowed to grow, may lead us toward happiness. As it is, perversion occurs as soon as we are born through bad social influences such as nurses parents, teachers, poets and public opinion. Philosophy is needed to help the soul to heal itself.

This opening is quite Chrysippean: the medical analogy at § 1 is clearly inspired by the *Therapeutics*. It is followed by the picture of providential Nature setting us on the path towards virtue (which is the culmination of our natural psycho-moral development<sup>53</sup> and hence in principle attainable). All this runs closely parallel to Diogenes Laertius' account of one section in Chrysippus' *On Ends*,

<sup>52</sup> See the convenient summaries in MacKendrick (1989) 154-6, Fillion-Lahille (1984) 112.

<sup>53</sup> I.e. the process described by the Stoics as one of our familiarization (οἰκείωσις) with people and things in an increasingly rational manner

including the point made about the perversion of reason and the impeccable starting points provided by Nature (7.85-89).<sup>54</sup> The perversion of reason opens the door to the emotions. It occurs because we are from the beginning exposed to the wrong value-judgements of others. This is the social cause of corruption. That Cicero dishes up this Stoic view unadulterated may reflect his sombre mood at the time of writing the *Tusculans*. This is a far cry from the political engagement and patriotism which he elsewhere associates with Stoic ideas. However, alongside the social cause of evil, there is another, viz. a physical one. It is indicated in the accounts of both Galen and Calcidius, namely the sensations which weaken the soul and make it unduly impressionable to appearances reaching us.<sup>55</sup> In the account preserved by Calcidius, as we have noticed, a large share in the responsibility was attributed to the bath prepared by the nurses.<sup>56</sup> Here the nurses recur but Cicero says nothing about the physical sensations we undergo at their hands. Instead he intimates that it is the nurses' talk which corrupts us right from the beginning. Thus we have another example of Cicero's tendency to suppress physical aspects in the Chrysippean account. Whether the reference to virtue and our providentially ordained End also formed part of it we cannot know. Posidonius in his *On Affections* was explicit about the relevance of the study of the emotions for Virtue and the end (*PHP* 5.6.1-2 ~ F 30, 150a E.-K., see above p. 233). Moreover, he spoke on the need to bring our inner daemon in tune with universal nature which steers all. In the light of Diog. Laert. 7.85-9 (esp. 87), we may consider this Chrysippean doctrine too. That Posidonius put the subject of the emotion in the wider framework of moral theory may or may not be occasioned by his Chrysippean model. Galen (5.6.1-2) not only mentions Posidonius but also Chrysippus as having discussed the virtues in opposition to Plato (though admittedly without clear reference to the *On Affections*). At any rate, we have shown that he took up again many themes dealt with by Chrysippus (see above, esp. chs. 5.4, 5.5, 5.7).

But there is more material that reflects the *On Affections*. Having stated the thesis for today's discussion ('the Sage is subject to distress') (7), Cicero discusses distress as one of several mental disorders, all of which can be viewed as forms of insanity, though only in

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<sup>54</sup> On which see further *supra*, p. 160.

<sup>55</sup> See *supra*, pp. 132 ff., 157 ff.

<sup>56</sup> See *supra*, p. 134.

the light of the Greek term *πάθος*, which means disease. Cicero discusses a few relevant words and expressions in Latin. *Insania* is an appropriate term since it is related to foolishness (§ 7-13). What we have here corresponds exactly to what Chrysippus says about emotions as madness, including his appeal to common parlance (see above, p. 178 ff.).

Particularly striking is a protracted series of Stoic syllogisms proving the central thesis of the book, viz. that the Sage is immune to mental pain (§ 14-21). Cicero voices the same preference for Stoic terseness that inspired his inclusion of Stoic definitions in book 4 (11-33). But there are no indications that this long section is based on Chrysippus' treatise.

Turning to the question of the cause of anxiety, Cicero discusses its relation to other affections. He presents the definitions of the four main kinds as formulated by Zeno and refined by Chrysippus, viz. as wrong opinions differentiated in terms of their object being present or future and good or bad (24-27; cf. 4.11, on which see above, p. 114). In other words, the cause resides in false opinion. Thus distress is a false opinion that evil is present. In sum, he espouses the Stoic position (Cicero has just rejected the Peripatetic theory of the Mean on the grounds that there is no such thing as moderate madness; cf. 4.79, on which see above).

In the long subsequent section (28-61a) Cicero dwells on the phenomenology of anxiety. A large part is taken up with a tirade against Epicurus and his pleasure principle (36-51). The Stoic presence is clearly less pronounced than in the preceding sections. This, however, changes when Cicero approvingly cites the Cyrenaic view that unexpected blows hit us harder than those we foresee. At this point he adds that Chrysippus was of the same opinion (52, *SVF* 3.417). Of course, the observation in question pertains to the idea of 'dwelling in advance' (*praemeditatio*, *προενδημεῖν*) in order to fortify the soul against mental appearances which could otherwise trigger an emotion. The way in which Cicero adds this point about the Stoic (note esp. the words *etiam Chrysippo videri scio ...*) indicates that we are dealing with an insertion into an account which for the rest is largely based by Cicero on other, non-Stoic sources.

It is worth comparing *PHP* 4.7.6-11 (*SVF* 3.481-2, Posid. F 165 E.K.), where Galen speaks about an alleged difference between Chrysippus and Posidonius in respect of the definition of distress (*λυπή*) being, or being caused by, a *fresh* belief. Posidonius, Galen tells us,

questioned the addition of ‘fresh’ on the ground that it is not clear why only fresh belief would cause distress (*ibid.* 7, p.282, ll.5-7). Clearly ‘fresh’ is taken by Posidonius, and apparently also Chrysippus, in the sense of sudden and unexpected: it is occurrences of this kind which cause us to forget our earlier (good) judgement (*ibid.* ll. 7-10). Galen intimates that Posidonius disagreed with Chrysippus (cf. 6, p. 282, l.1: Ποσειδώνιος ἀντιλέγει τῷ Χρυσίππῳ). He continues:

That is why he [Chrysippus? Posidonius?] says that one should dwell in advance on and behave towards thing not yet present as though they were present. The word προενδημεῖν (dwell in advance) means according to Posidonius to imagine, as it were, in advance and to bring about a gradual habituation to it, as to something that has happened before.

Distress may befall us because of an unexpected experience. This was the whole point of having ‘fresh’ added to ‘belief’ in the definition. Clearly it can be prevented by realizing that such a thing is possible in principle and might occur at any time, and further by reflecting on what it would be like. So it would fit the view ascribed to Chrysippus that he would prescribe us ‘to dwell in advance’. If we take the subject of ‘says’ (φησι, *ibid.* l.10) to be Chrysippus, this is exactly what he does. In that case Posidonius would merely have provided an explanatory gloss on the unusual term προενδημεῖν. However, taking Chrysippus as the subject would involve a switch of subject: though not specified, the subject of the preceding sentence (l.7 καὶ φησι - l. 10 κομιδῇ) must be Posidonius, or else Galen’s line of reasoning would no longer be intelligible. But if Posidonius is the subject, it is he who exhorts us to dwell in advance on the disasters that may happen to us. But if this is the case, he will hardly have criticized the addition of ‘fresh’ in the definition simply because ‘dwelling in advance’ should prevent ‘fresh’ beliefs. In sum, Galen has attempted to make what in fact was a piece of explanation look like a refutation of Chrysippus by Posidonius. In that case, Posidonius may have raised the general question why unexpected blows of fortune hit us harder than expected ones—a fact which he acknowledged as commonly known and one on which he did not disagree with Chrysippus. In fact, the addition of ‘fresh’ was not even a Chrysippean innovation but featured already in Zeno’s version.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> This follows from what Galen quotes Posidonius as saying in the preceding context, 7.2-3. The definitions featuring the phrase ‘fresh belief’ are those which according to this passage Zeno pronounced and Chrysippus wrote down. This also



Galen's travesty of the relations between Zeno, Chrysippus and Posidonius is further revealed when we look at the rest of *Tusc.* 3.52. Here Chrysippus provides a decent answer to the question which, if we are to believe Galen, Posidonius had devastatingly put to him. Chrysippus gives two reasons for the impact of unexpected events, explaining why they trigger the psychic disturbance named distress. First, unexpected experiences hit us harder because we have no time to assess the magnitude of the disadvantage (a point which refers to another element of the definition: the belief is that of the presence of a *great* evil). This makes us liable to misjudge its real extent. Secondly, our distress is all the greater since we feel guilty about not having foreseen it and not having taken precautions. What kind of precautions are meant is left unclear. Perhaps this could be anything depending on the kind of disaster in question. Obviously we simply cannot know everything which the future holds in store for us. But nonetheless we feel guilty about what has happened to us. This is just the irrationality typical of emotion. For our purposes it is important to note that Chrysippus neatly links the aspects of 'fresh' (said of the opinion) and that of 'great' (said of the evil believed to be present): the evil seems so great, he explains, precisely because we have had no time to think properly. So when Galen plays these two aspects off against each other, we should not be led into supposing that he, let alone Posidonius to whom Galen assigns the role of criticizer, had really exposed a weak spot in Chrysippus' authentic position (4.7.5).<sup>58</sup>

Chrysippus suggests that the only thing we *can* do is 'to dwell in advance'—to try to foresee and realize what *might* happen, given the

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seems to imply that Posidonius in discussing Zeno's definitions based himself on Chrysippus in the first book of his *On Affections* only. Further, Cicero specifically says that it was Zeno who included the adjective 'fresh' in the definition, *Tusc.* 3.75 (*SVF* 1.212). (Cicero's phrasing here is infelicitous insofar as he says that Zeno added 'fresh' to the definition featuring the two judgement-types, but an overall consideration of the evidence shows that this formulation was Chrysippean and cannot be ascribed to Zeno; cf. Donini (1995) 326 n.42. This report too must be based on Chrysippus' treatment of the Zenonian definitions in the first book of his treatise.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Kidd *ad loc.* (p. 600) who notes that *Tusc.* 3.25, 28, too, combine magnitude and freshness but nonetheless seems to accept Galen's claim that Chrysippus stressed the former idea only and really had a problem when it came to accounting for the freshness: 'Posidonius does not wish to challenge or reject the definition here, but to show that it creates difficulties for Chrysippus himself, because of his psychology' (p. 599). I hope to have shown that a closer analysis of this Galenic passage makes clear that we cannot be sure that Posidonius criticized Chrysippus in any way. For further interpretations (all of which follow Galen on this point) see Hirzel (1882), vol. 3, 428-434, Pohlenz (1898) 552 f., 616 f., Reinhardt (1921) 292.

*condition humaine* and its numerous liabilities. Here, admittedly, Cicero does not refer to ‘dwelling in advance’ as a preventive measure arming us against the blows of fate. But he does so at *Tusc.* 3.29, speaking of the *praemeditatio futurorum malorum*, which clearly renders *προενδημεῖν*. It is the proper response to the phenomenon that distress is not brought about all bad things but only by *unexpected* bad things (*ibid.* 28). And at *ibid.* 52 the concept of *praemeditatio* is ascribed to Chrysippus. We may compare the position of Chrysippus as described by Galen. This is confirmed by the fact that Cicero goes on to present the same two illustrations of the value of mental preparation for disaster that are presented by Galen, 4.7.6-11: the unflinching response of the philosopher Anaxagoras on hearing the news of his son’s death (‘I knew I had begotten a moral being!’) and a line from Euripides’ *Phrixus* (Fr. 821 Nauck: Theseus saying he had imagined all diasters in advance so as better to be able to endure them).

What are we to conclude? Both *Tusc.* 3.52 and 29 are to be added to our dossier of materials deriving from *On Affections* and probably the *Therapeutics*, since they are concerned with the prevention of affections like grief. *PHP* 4.7.6-11 supplies the Greek terminology but when taken on its own is completely misleading on the relations between the Stoics involved.

*Tusc.* 3.59 (*SVF* 3.487) attests the fact that Chrysippus habitually (cf. *solebat*) quoted a passage from Euripides—which is also given—on the liabilities of the *condition humaine*. Clearly, this quotation fits Chrysippus’ exhortation to dwell in advance on the terrible things that might happen so as to pre-empt grief.

The next passage on our list is found at *Tusc.* 3.61 (*SVF* 3.485), presenting the etymological derivation—explicitly ascribed to Chrysippus—of λύπη as a λύεσθαι or perhaps rather παράλυεσθαι of the whole person.<sup>59</sup> (Cicero’s Latin has *solutionem totius hominis*: a ‘dissolution’, or ‘loosening’.) Given Cicero’s attested use of the first three books *On Affections* (the so-called λογικά, 4.33; see above, p. 302) and the fact that this time he does not mention an intermediate source, one feels tempted to ascribe this derivation to that section of the *On Affections*, book 1, which contained Chrysippus’ presentation-cum-explanation of Zeno’s definitions, although it cannot be paralleled

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<sup>59</sup> Cf. also Pohlenz (1906) 335, who is also in favour of the Chrysippean provenance of this and the related passages.

from the Galenic material. There is a notice in Stobaeus' anthology ascribing the definition of λύπη as a παράλυσις to Cleanthes, which certainly strengthens the possibility that Chrysippus re-used it in the first book.<sup>60</sup> The fact that this etymological pun was more commonly made (e.g. Pl. *Crat.* 419c) may only have encouraged Chrysippus to take it into account. In addition *Tusc.* 3.61 refers to the Chrysippean analysis of affection (in this case distress) in terms of two types of judgement (see above, p. 169).

Literary and historical examples follow, describing in what ways people consider it appropriate to indulge in repugnant forms of grief. We must note the conclusion he draws from these instances at 3.64 (not in *SVF*): the fact that people believe they ought to act in the ways just illustrated proves that affection is *voluntary*. He adds two further examples. Mourning people are often seen to forget themselves, whereupon they start displaying grief again. They feel guilty about having ceased mourning. Children who behave inappropriately during the period of mourning are even punished and made to wail. Cicero ends with the observation that as time passes grief fades. Then it is understood that mourning is pointless. This common experience confirms that grief depends upon our will from its inception.

The coherent section § 61 (*sed ad hanc opinionem ...*) - 64 presents the position taken by Chrysippus on an important aspect. Can it be paralleled from Galen's verbatim fragments of the *On Affections*? There are but few relevant fragments referring to the aspect of appropriateness. Some others concern people expecting certain forms of emotional behaviour from themselves or others.<sup>61</sup> Galen is

<sup>60</sup> Stob. *Floril.* p. 108.59 Meineke ~ *SVF* 1.575.

<sup>61</sup> See *PHP* 4.5.27, 40 (Posid. F 164). In addition we should note several quotations from the poets showing people who self-consciously decide upon emotional behaviour: *PHP* 4.5.43, 4.6.19 (the famous final lines of Medea's grand decision speech, E. *Med.* 1078-9), 4.6.34, 4.6.38, 4.6.40 (*SVF* 3.475). In addition there is an important fragment at 4.6.29 (*SVF* 3.475), where Chrysippus explains that loved ones expect lovers to behave in an uncalculated, non-rational way and they themselves do not *want* to listen to advice. This explanation evidently belongs in the same context, viz. the thesis defended by Chrysippus that emotional behaviour presupposes a mistaken view about which actions are appropriate. In addition, 4.7.12-17 (*SVF* 3.466), which is also concerned with the gradual abatement of grief: when this occurs, three factors can be distinguished (1) the opinion that grief is (still) present; (2) the contraction that slackens (ἀνίεσθαι ἢ συστολή), i.e. the physical reaction of the soul: see *supra*, p. 298; and (3) 'the conation towards the contraction' (ἡ ἐπὶ τὴν συστολὴν ὁρμήν). I shall deal with the relations between these three factors more fully below. Suffice it to observe here that factor (3) must be the determinant and so corresponds to the second opinion distinguished in the Chrysippean analysis, viz. that it is appropriate to indulge in a particular affection.

out to show that Chrysippus again and again in spite of himself employs the idea of the non-rational with reference to *involuntary* causes of emotional responses. Obviously he has no interest in highlighting the aspect of *voluntariness* in the Stoic's theory.

In a fragment from the second book quoted (from Posidonius) at *PHP* 4.7.26-36 (*SVF* 467, Posid. F 165) we find a few Homeric quotations which are meant to illustrate the common fact that grief subsides in the course of time and people becomes sated with it. This is essentially the same observation as one at the end of *Tusculans* 4.64. According to Galen, this can only be explained on the assumption of non-rational factors in the mind because the 'supposition and opinion' persist (*ibid.* 28). The opinion which Galen means is the opinion that what has happened is evil, for instance the death of a loved one, as in the case of Achilles and Patroclus (cf. *PHP* 4.7.14 ~ *SVF* 3.466).<sup>62</sup> So why do people after some time abandon their sorrow? In Galen's account Chrysippus pointed to the fact that reason finds its way into our mind again and shows the irrationality (*ἄλογίαν*) of the affection (*ibid.* 27). Likewise Chrysippus according to Cicero says that after some time people realize that mourning is pointless. But here the opinion which they abandon is not the opinion that something evil has happened—this opinion arises from a flawed value-system which is not replaced overnight and indeed is still in place. Persons who stop mourning give up the *second* type of opinion distinguished by Chrysippus: the opinion that it is appropriate to mourn. This explains what Chrysippus means by irrationality: good sense is partially restored when people realize the inappropriateness of their behaviour.<sup>63</sup>

Thus Galen coalesces the two kinds of opinion distinguished in the Chrysippean analysis, or rather suppresses one of them. This makes it once again possible for him to claim that Chrysippus pointed to forms of non-rational behaviour for which he admitted having no explanation. Once again he uses Posidonius as his prime witness. In the light of our Ciceronian parallel, one may well ask what it means when Galen says that 'Posidonius himself *shows* that the

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According to Chrysippus conation is 'reason commanding man to act' (Chrys. *ap.* Plut. *SR* 1037F, *SVF* 3.175) and the concept is closely related to that of appropriate action (*καθήκον*): see e.g. Stob. *Ecl.* 86,17 (*SVF* 3.169): τὸ δὲ κινεῖν τὴν ὁρμὴν οὐδὲν ἕτερον εἶναι λέγουσιν ἀλλ' ἢ φαντασίαν ὁρμητικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος αὐτόθεν.

<sup>62</sup> See *supra*, pp. 123 f.

<sup>63</sup> Appropriate action is defined as that having a 'well-reasoned justification', D.L. 7.107 (*SVF* 493).

affections arise from anger and desire' (*ibid.* 24)? Nowhere in the ensuing quotation do we find Posidonius' own words, let alone his criticism of Chrysippus. But we do know that Posidonius showed full awareness of the role of appropriateness in Chrysippus' account of grief.<sup>64</sup> Did he go on to suppress this point to attack Chrysippus in the way Galen tells us?

At § 76 and 79<sup>65</sup> the aspect of the appropriateness of an emotional response is once again associated with the name of Chrysippus. Here we also have its therapeutical application: one should convince a mourning person that he mourns because he thinks it his duty to do so, that is to say, that he *wants* to mourn. Thus we may speed up a natural process, viz. the fact that almost everyone sees after a period of time that protracted expression of grief is irrational. It is very likely that these two passages go back to the *Therapeutics*. Interestingly, these passages sandwich a critical comment on Cleanthes (§ 77 on which see *supra*, pp. 169 f.).<sup>66</sup>

## 7. Conclusion

In the preceding pages I have undertaken to provide a complete survey of the Ciceronian evidence which can be related to the *On Affections* and, consequently, be used in the reconstruction and interpretation of this treatise. The basis for attribution has been twofold. First, I argued that the long section *Tusc.* 4.11-33 based on the so-called λογικά runs parallel, both as to content and (often) as to wording, to a comparatively large number of verbatim quotations provided by Galen. In addition, the two sets of texts exhibit an unmistakable correspondence as to what must have been the original *order* of themes treated by Chrysippus (on which we are also informed by some explicit remarks by Galen). The testimony of Galen also reveals that certain passages offered by Cicero as part of the λογικά (i.e. the first three 'theoretical' books) were really from the fourth book, entitled *Therapeutics* (Θεραπευτικόν). This mistake—which led Cicero also to attach a different meaning to the term λογικά as well

<sup>64</sup> See *PHP* 4.5.27, 40 (Posid. F 164).

<sup>65</sup> Cf. (*SVF* 3.486). On this passage cf. Donini (1995) 305 ff.

<sup>66</sup> On this passage see further Philippson (1932) 272 ff. and, more recently, White (1995).

(i.e. 'abstract' instead of 'theoretical')—may have arisen because of his use of an intermediary source, perhaps an epitome for 4.11-33.

The identification of *Tusc.* 4.11-33, at any rate, as a rendering, albeit in Latin, of the gist of Chrysippus' argument in the *On Affections* invites a scrutiny of other related material found scattered in other sections of book 4 as well as other books. It proved possible to track down some further parallels between the Ciceronian material and explicitly attested fragments from Galen. This procedure has enabled us to add several Ciceronian passages to our dossier on Chrysippus' treatise.<sup>67</sup>

So what does this add up to when it comes to reconstructing Chrysippus' original position? A few times we have seen that Chrysippus in the Ciceronian account did provide answers to questions which according to Galen (with frequent appeal to Posidonius) he could not resolve. A prime example is the role accorded by Chrysippus to judgements on how to respond appropriately to certain events—an ingredient which Galen suppresses as much as he can. Cicero confirms that the affections involve two kinds of (wrong) judgement: (1) that a thing is either good or bad; (2) that it is appropriate to respond to it in an emotional way.

At the same time Cicero is not without his preferences and blind spots either. He has little patience with the physical side of the Stoic theory. He repeatedly couches the 'shrinkings', 'expansions' and other physical effects involved in emotion in figurative language. Here Galen remains our main source of information, though his account is problematic on this point as well. Cicero is clearly more interested in the social aspect of emotion, viz. ideas on the appropriateness of certain types of behaviour—ideas largely determined by one's character and social relations or place in society, as in the examples drawn from family life (3.64). Hence the greater prominence of judgements of type 2 in Cicero's account. But insofar as character is a matter of the soul's physical strength, we hardly find anything in Cicero that we did not already know from Galen.

There is however another aspect of Cicero's account where he is of greater help than Galen could ever be. Galen, at least in *PHP* 4 and 5, is not interested in therapy in the sense of those techniques and exercises designed to treat and prevent affections of the soul. He focuses on the more theoretical passages which illustrate what he sees

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<sup>67</sup> See also the overview, *infra*, pp. 325 ff.

as the inadequate conception of the soul advocated by Chrysippus—inadequate insofar as it fails to account for the cause of emotion. For therapy proper we have to turn to Cicero and a few testimonies from other sources, notably Origen and Philodemus. Unlike Galen, Cicero is interested in therapy. Having argued that the Sage is exempt from distress and other emotions, he *disertis verbis* turns to the therapeutic treatment of those who are not yet Sages in both books (3 and 4).

So what is the picture of the therapeutical side of Chrysippus' treatise which emerges from Cicero? On a few occasions, as we have noticed, Cicero observes that Chrysippus and other Stoics, unlike the Peripatetics, in fact offer little in the way of therapeutic measures. Cicero must think of those mental techniques and exercises which help persons who are in a state of emotion. Think of such remedies as curing erotic passion by realizing that the object of one's feelings really is not so beautiful after all.<sup>68</sup> That Chrysippus had little therapy of this kind on offer becomes more understandable in the light of a few other passages where Cicero reports that Chrysippus believed emotion to be incurable—save from a few emergency measures (cf. Origen, *Contra Celsum* 3.51, *Tusc.* 4.69-70). This point bears directly on the distinction drawn by Chrysippus between affection or emotion (πάθος, *perturbatio animi*) and disease (νόσημα, *morbus*), on which we are informed by both Galen and Cicero. Chrysippus saw the affection as a momentary outbreak, or a moment of activation arising from an underlying condition, viz. the diseased state of the soul.

Chrysippean therapy would be virtually non-existent if it was directed only at affection in this narrowly defined sense—a hopeless task, as Chrysippus himself stressed, for obvious reasons: a person at the climax of affection is particularly unreceptive to reason. In consequence Stoic therapy is directed largely at the underlying diseased condition of the soul. There is thus an important preventive side to it. One needs to strengthen the soul beforehand, so that it can withstand the impact of mental appearances that would otherwise drag it towards an emotional response. The name for one of the main techniques designed for this purpose is what Cicero calls *praemeditatio*, the 'contemplation in advance' (προενδημείν in Greek). Mentally one invokes appearances of the above kind, thus training and improving the soul with a view to the possible occurrence of real objects which would cause them. The relevant passages of Cicero and Galen

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<sup>68</sup> For a general survey of such ancient techniques see Sorabji (2000) 211 ff.

combined indicate that Chrysippus had recommended this technique. It was not a Posidonian invention.

In addition Cicero provides a few indications that the definitions of the emotions were given therapeutic and preventive significance. Given the Stoic monistic conception of the soul, these definitions teach us that the emotions are misguided judgements and hence entirely voluntary. Since they are up to us, they can be withstood in principle. Since they describe judgements as a wrong evaluation, which mistakes an indifferent thing for something good or evil, it is the task of Stoic philosophy to teach us the correct value of things. Clearly this type of therapy concerns judgements of type 1 as distinguished above.

Finally, the sheer ugliness and irrationality of emotion was depicted. Thus it emerged as something to be avoided at all costs. This is also reflected in Philodemus' report that the Stoics did not do much more than censure emotion.<sup>69</sup> This also should be compared with Cicero's testimony that the Stoics offer little to nothing in the way of therapy. The description of emotion as repulsive pertains to the second type of judgement, since it makes clear that under no circumstance such behaviour can be considered appropriate.

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<sup>69</sup> Philod. *De ira* col. I.10-20 Indelli (cf. SVF 3.470 based on Gomperz' older transcription), who, referring to criticism levelled against Chrysippus by one Timaxagoras (on whose identity cf. Indelli, p. 142 f.) says: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπετίμα [scil. Timaxagoras] τοῖς ψέγουσιν μ[ό]νον, ἄλλο δὲ μὴδὲ ἐν ποιοῦσιν ἢ βαι[ό]ν, ὥς Βίων ἐν τῷ Περι τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τ[ῷ] Π[ε]π[τ]ῇ παθῶν θεραπευ[τι]κῷ, κἂν μετρίως ἴστατο.



## GENERAL CONCLUSION

I have reached the end of my discussion of the evidence relating to Chrysippus' *On Affections*. It is time to look back and present a general picture of the position defended by Chrysippus, his procedure and arguments, as well as the relations between him and others philosophers, most notably the Stoics with whom he is said by Galen to have disagreed. In line with the 'contextual' approach explained in the General Introduction, I have paid considerable attention to the aims and methods of our sources, most notably Galen and Cicero. My principal aim in doing so was to establish the extent and nature of the evidence on which any reconstruction of the *On Affections* should be based. It has proved possible to make several additions (mostly from Cicero) to the evidence assembled by Von Arnim from Galen, Cicero and Calcidius. (A survey of the evidence is presented in the Appendix, below, p. 325). Even so the assembled material is insufficient to undertake a continuous reconstruction of complete sections. On the other hand, Galen and Cicero combined cover substantial sections of Books 1 and 4. In addition, Galen's evidence for Book 2 gains much interest once the real role played by Posidonius is understood. Studying the relevant fragments and testimonies together as deriving from this particular treatise permits us to see connections that Chrysippus was concerned to make. Moreover, we may grasp the original context and sense of many snippets of preserved text which otherwise would be easily overlooked or neglected—as in fact they often are.

The main impression emerging from Galen, Cicero and our additional sources is of a Chrysippus who further develops Zeno's doctrine. In so doing he takes full account of the soul's corporeal nature, witness his medical analogy and other arguments. Overall, his approach is far more phenomenological and empirical than would at first sight appear from the accounts of Galen and Cicero. Furthermore, we have noticed echoes from Plato's *Timaeus* (86-88) as well as Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (ch. 4.7). Chrysippus can be shown to develop his position with an eye on these predecessors, using them as well as improving upon them (cf. also ch. 5.7 on Platonic and Aristotelian echoes in Cleanthes' dialogue between Reason and Anger). In

addition, we have found several points of contact with the medical traditions such as represented by the Hippocratic corpus—a feature which suits the prominence given by Chrysippus to the medical analogy (4.8).

One of the main tasks we have set ourselves was to understand the workings of Galen's dialectic. Most of his cast of characters, it has turned out, played a rather different role in real life. Zeno did not identify the affections with the physical effects of the corporeal soul. In reality he used intentional as well as physical terms to refer to what were two aspects of one and the same phenomenon. There is no difference with Chrysippus (or for that matter Cleanthes) on this score. Chrysippus advanced beyond Zeno and Cleanthes in his analysis of the types of judgment involved in emotion: (1) a false judgement on the value of a particular thing; (2) a false judgement that a particular emotional response is appropriate. We have devoted ample space to the motivation and application of this refinement. From Galen's text we learned that Chrysippus introduced this distinction to tackle certain problems arising from the phenomenology of emotion, e.g. its abatement when the relevant value-judgements are still in place. Cicero's account shed light on its therapeutical relevance. The cure of an affection is primarily directed at judgements of type (2), i.e. one may try to convince the patient of the inappropriateness of his response. However, affection is understood as a momentary crisis arising from an underlying diseased condition marked by mistaken judgements of type 1. A complete and successful therapy is therefore aimed at this type of judgements as well. But it can correct these judgements only in the intervals between emotional crises. In fact, since the patient is unreceptive to reason during an emotional crisis, it is often difficult to convince him even of the inappropriateness of his behaviour. Many of Chrysippus' examples and poetic quotations, as we have noticed, capture the sheer irrationality and inconsistency of emotional behaviour. The ideal therapy therefore places much emphasis on preventive measures, i.e. it seeks to strengthen the underlying mental condition from which the affections arise. It does so through philosophical instruction and through regimen aimed at physical factors. In addition, it consists of mental exercises and techniques (e.g. dwelling in advance on certain mental appearances). Chrysippus denounced affection as a form of insanity, employing vivid depiction as a deterrent. Here too the importance attached to prevention emerges.

Another of our findings is the sustained physicalism underlying Chrysippus' approach, a feature which we have been able to situate against the contemporary medical backdrop (ch. 4.8). His so-called medical analogy was not a mere metaphor but the expression of a meaningful physical correspondence between body and soul, most notably the physical tension in both. Chrysippus explained this more fully in terms of the elemental qualities, following Zeno in this respect as well. The corporeal basis of his theory also surfaces in his concept of 'first movements', which may trigger a full-fledged emotion. Considered in this light, the soul's corporeal nature helps explain the element of passivity in the experience of emotion, viz. insofar as it involves being affected by a mental imprint, i.e. the appearance (φαντασία). But of course there is an important active aspect as well, in line with the Chrysippean concept of the corporeal cause. In explaining the occurrence of emotions Chrysippus employed his distinction between antecedent cause (~ the external object appearing to us) and sustaining cause (~ the soul responsible for the affection). Galen's complaint that Chrysippus provided no proper causal account is unjustified. Accordingly, his appeal to Posidonius as the one Stoic who did press for such an explanation is equally misleading. There may have been a difference between the two Stoics concerning the limits of the causal explanation. This however shows Posidonius developing a *Stoic* line of explanation further than Chrysippus had done. Contrary to what Galen alleges, Posidonius was no dissident but merely contributed some terminological points and conceptual refinements. What Galen tells us about his attitude to Chrysippus should not be taken at face value. It provides no reliable guide to possible weak spots in the Chrysippean theory but should be carefully and critically examined (see also the conclusion to ch. 5).

One of the main points resulting from our inquiry is that our two principal sources—Galen and Cicero—show little interest in what might be called the physical-cum-theological basis of the Stoic theory of the emotions. Stoic corporealism was not confined to the human microcosm. Each individual intellect is part of the macrocosmic whole ensouled by the divine intellect. Thus our intellect is continuous not only with the lower levels of reality through its connection with the body. It is also rooted in the higher, divine realm through its share in divine reason. This divine element of our being is referred to by both Chrysippus and Posidonius (as it had no doubt been by Zeno

before them) as our guardian spirit, the *daimôn*. This Stoic model provides an alternative to the Platonist-cum-Peripatetic faculty approach, since it serves to explain phenomena such as mental conflict and the status of so-called right reason.

Our own way of thinking is closer to the faculty approach since the Stoic parts-and-whole schema requires a drastic departure from our tendency to conceive of the subjective and objective in terms of a sharp internal/external distinction.<sup>1</sup> The opposition erected by our main sources between the Stoic 'one-faculty' approach and the Platonist-cum-Peripatetic multi-faculty approach has done much to obscure the different kind of distinction underlying the Stoic approach—which, confusingly, takes account of the philosophical and especially Aristotelian heritage in other important respects.

The view of emotion as cognitive was not a Stoic innovation. It goes back to Plato and Aristotle. The Stoics further developed their insights and formulated the most radically cognitive theory on offer in ancient philosophy. But the Stoic position resists rough-and-ready classification in modern terms. It is therefore potentially misleading to characterize it as a cognitive theory *tout court*. The Stoic theory comprises various aspects, including physical ones, not least because of their view of the soul as *pneuma*. In consequence, they use intentional and physical terms interchangeably. Phenomena such as the intensity or duration of the emotional impulse or the quality of the mental appearances are also explained in corporeal terms. Chrysippus also addressed elusive phenomena of this sort. If he did not press a few remaining questions, it was because there was as yet no compelling answer. The Stoic Sage remains silent in such cases, although it is possible that Posidonius in revisiting some of the same questions pressed them further. Chrysippus' willingness to leave the irrational a niche of its own within the general Stoic framework earned him the scorn of polemicists such as Galen. But Galen's unsophisticated appeal to irrational soul-parts is not in the slightest bit more illuminating. Chrysippus for his part saw that emotion is not only cognitive (which holds good for all human thought) but is also marked by a particular kind of impulse and concomitant feelings. It seems therefore apposite to characterize his approach to emotion as conative no less than cognitive.

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<sup>1</sup> On the difference between our own and other cultures in this respect see Taylor (1988).

## APPENDIX

### THE TEXTUAL EVIDENCE RELATING TO CHRYSIPPUS' *ON AFFECTIONS*

In what follows I inventorize the textual evidence I have established as deriving from Chrysippus' *On Affections* in chs. 3-6 of this book. To locate the interpretations on the fragments and testimonies concerned see the Index. Most of the texts are quoted in the main body of the book. A full presentation of the texts will be given in the new edition of Early Stoic fragments that is being prepared at Utrecht University. For this reason references to the *SVF* have been omitted.

#### *Overall contents, length:*

Four long books: the first three theoretical, the fourth and last one therapeutical: Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.9, 4.33; Gal., *PHP* 4.1.14, 4.5.10, 4.7.21, 5.7.52, 8.1.47; *Loc. Aff.* III, 1, VIII p. 138 K.

#### **BOOK 1:**

Exegesis of

- Zeno's two definitions of affection. *PHP* 4.2.10-12, 4.2.14-18 (runner simile), 4.5.3-8; *Tusc.* 4.11-14, 4.22.
- Zeno's definitions of the four 'generic' affections: *PHP* 4.2.1-7, 4.2.4-7; *Tusc.* 4.11-14 (cf. 3.24-7).
- Physical definition (contraction, expansion): *PHP* 4.3.2, 4.15; *Tusc.* 4.15; cf. 3.61, 83.
- Subspecies of the generic affections: *Tusc.* 4.16-22 (not in Galen).

Cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.111 (affections are judgements as main thesis of the treatise).

#### **BOOK 2:** problems (*aporiai*):

- the abatement of affection/two types of judgement: *PHP* 4.7.1-17 (distress, a 'fresh' judgement); 4.7.26-7, 30-1 (*id.*); cf. *Tusc.* 3.61-4; cf. 76, 79.

- the origin of evil: *PHP* 5.5.1-26; Calcidius, *In Tim.* 165-168; *Tusc.* 3.2; cf. D.L. 7.89.

### BOOK 3:

No attested evidence.

### BOOK 4 (The *Therapeutics*)

- The ‘medical analogy’:
  - the analogy expounded: *PHP* 5.2.22-4, 26-7, 31-33, 47, 49; cf. *Cic. Tusc.* 3.6, 4.23, 30-31; cf. *ib.* 58.
  - health, strength and beauty: *PHP* 5.2.33, 47, 49, *Tusc.* 4.30-1.
  - elemental qualities: *PHP* 5.3.7-8, 9-10, 12; *QAM* 4, pp.45.5-46.1 Müller; cf. *Tusc.* 4.32.
  - disease, fever (disposition vs. activation) *PHP* 5.2.13-14; cf. 5.3.12, 5.4.14; *Tusc.* 4.24-30.
  - proneness to disease, health: *PHP* 5.2.3, 14; *Tusc.* 4.27-8.
  - disease, infirmity, badness: *Tusc.* 4.28-29, *PHP* 5.2.27; cf. 4.5.31 (Posid.)
- definitions of affection (repeated from Bk. 1): 5.2.14; cf. *Tusc.* 4.22.
- weakness of the will, or turning one’s back on (right) Reason:
  - anger *PHP* 4.6.7-9, 11 (Menelaos and Helen), 19-20, 23, 24-25, 34-5 (Medea)
  - (erotic) desire: *ib.* 4.6.27-32, 40-41.
  - grief: *ib.* 38, 40
  - pleasure: *ib.* 43; cf. 30
- Affection as insanity/mental blindness:
  - PHP* 4.5.21-2, 4.6.44-46; *Tusc.* 4.24-6, 79; cf. Philod. *On Anger*, col. I.10-20, *Tusc.* 4.76-7.
- Therapy proper:
  - treating an emotional Epicurean or Peripatetic: Origen, *Against Celsus* VIII 51, vol. II, p. 266.18 ff. Kö. (cf. *ib.* I 64, vol. 1, p. 117.16 ff.).
  - *Tusc.* 4.59-63; cf. *ib.* 3.76, 79 (show that the emotion, though considered appropriate, is in fact inappropriate: one of the two types of judgement involved), 4.78-9 (no cure for outburst of anger);
  - prevention: ‘dwelling in advance’: *Tusc.* 3.52 (cf. *ib.* 29); cf. *PHP* 4.7.6-11.

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A SERIES OF STUDIES ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

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